The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (87 page)

1156.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, ████████, ██████, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: McCain; date: December 19, 2005, at 10:18:58 AM.

1157.
Emphasis in original. CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15. As described in the relevant sections of this summary, and more extensively in Volume II, these claims were inaccurate.

1158.
Email from: █████; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: ████████, ██████, ██████; subject: Source list for our AZ paragraphs; date: August 31, 2006, at 08:56 AM.

1159.
The cited cables describe Abu Zubaydah’s June 2002 description of a meeting with Ramzi bin al-Shibh (acquired prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah), and Abu Zubaydah’s August 2002 reporting discussing the same meeting (after the use of the techniques). (See CIA (101514Z JUN 02); ███████ (21 August 2002).) Neither cable—or any other CIA record—indicates a connection between Abu Zubaydah’s reporting on his meeting with bin al-Shibh and bin al-Shibh’s capture. The cited cables also do not include information, which was available to the CIA prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah, highlighting KSM’s “importance.” The cited cable describes Abu Zubaydah’s April 2002 reporting, prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, identifying KSM as “Mukhtar” and the “mastermind” of the 9/11 attacks. (See ███████ (13 April 2002).) The citations did not include cables referencing information available to the CIA about KSM that was obtained prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah, including information on KSM’s alias “Mukhtar’” and KSM’s role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, as is detailed elsewhere in this summary. The cables also did not support the claim that information provided by Abu Zubaydah or Ramzi bin al-Shibh led to the capture of KSM. One cited cable related to the identification by Ramzi bin al-Shibh, while bin al-Shibh was in foreign government custody, of Ali Abdul Aziz Ali as “Ammar.” [The cable was cited as █████ 20700 ████████. As determined later, the actual cable was █████ 20790.] As described elsewhere in this summary, KSM was not captured as a result of information related to Ammar al-Baluchi. The email exchange listed two cables directly related to the capture of KSM. The first cable, from approximately a week before KSM’s capture, described the CIA’s operational use and value of the asset who led the CIA to KSM. The cable stated that the relationship between the asset and KSM’s █████, through whom the asset gained access to KSM, was “based on ██████████████████.” The cable stated that CIA Headquarters “continues to be impressed with the evidence of [the asset’s] access to ████████ KSM ██████ associates, ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.” (See DIRECTOR ████ ████████.) The second cable described KSM’s capture, stating that it was “based on locational information” provided by the asset. (See █████████ 41351 ██████████.) Neither of the two cables cited to support the claim made any reference to Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other detainee in CIA or foreign government custody. The capture of KSM, including the role of the asset (referred to herein as “ASSET X”) is detailed elsewhere in this summary and in greater detail in the full Committee Study. See email from: █████; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: █████████, ████████, ██████; subject: Source list for our AZ paragraphs; date: August 31, 2006, at 08:56 AM.

1160.
Pronunciation brackets in original draft. CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15.

1161.
The document cited a cable on Abu Zubaydah’s August 2002 description of his meeting with Ramzi bin al-Shibh, but not the previously cited June 2002 cable related to Abu Zubaydah’s description of the same meeting Zubaydah was subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. See █████████████.

1162.
The information included in the cable describing Abu Zubaydah’s August 2002 reporting on his meeting with Ramzi bin al-Shibh was unrelated to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. (See █████████████.) The CIA document also cited as a “source” the capture of bin al-Shibh with no mention of Abu Zubaydah’s reporting. (See ████████████.) The details of Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s capture are described elsewhere in this summary and in greater detail in the full Committee Study.

1163.
The CIA document included a previously cited cable relating to the capture of KSM that made no mention of reporting from CIA detainees. (See █████████████ 41351 ████████████.) The CIA document also included the previously cited cable describing bin al-Shibh’s identification of “Ammar.” As described in the section of this summary, as well as in Volume II, on the Capture of KSM, KSM was not captured as a result of information related to Ammar al-Baluchi. (The document cited the cable as ███████ 20700, as noted, the actual cite was ███████ 20790.) The CIA cable also cited an analytical product whose relevance was limited to the connection between KSM and al-Aziz (Ammar al-Baluchi). (See DI Serial Flier CTC 2002-30086 CH: CIA analytic report, “Threat Threads: Recent Advances in Understanding 11 September.”) Finally, the document included a cable that was unrelated to the content of the speech.

1164.
See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM).

1165.
Presidential Speech on September 6, 2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel.

1166.
CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15; ████████████████.

1167.
███████ 13678 (070724Z MAR 03), disseminated as ████████. Further, the June 2003 cable, DIRECTOR █████ (122120Z JUN 03), cited by the CIA as validation, makes no reference to reporting from KSM. Khan was captured on March 5, 2003 and was in foreign government detention until being transferred to CIA custody on May ██ 2003. See details on the detention and interrogation of Majid Khan in Volume III.

1168.
On April 29, 2009, Marc Thiessen, the speechwriter responsible for President Bush’s September 6, 2006, speech, wrote: “This was the most carefully vetted speech in presidential history - reviewed by all the key players from the individuals who ran the program all the way up to the director of national intelligence, who personally attested to the accuracy of the speech in a memo to the president. And just last week on Fox News, former CIA Director Michael Hayden said he went back and checked with the agency as to the accuracy of that speech and reported: “We stand by our story.’” See Marc Thiessen, “The West Coast Plot: An ‘Inconvenient Truth,”’
The National Review
, April 25, 2009.

1169.
Email from: █████████; to: █████████, █████████, ████████████, ██████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████ m ███████████, [REDACTED], █████████; subject: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!! Please verify the attached; date: September 8, 2006, at 06:28 PM.

1170.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: █████████; cc: ███████████, █████████, [REDACTED], █████████ [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████, ███████, █████████, █████████; subject: Re: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!! Please verify the Attached; date: September 11, 2006, at 9:16:15 AM; attachment Nl: CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy Final (Draft #15). The email also identified as unrelated one cable that had been cited as a source and corrected a transposed number of the cable describing Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s identification of “Ammar.”

1171.
Email from: █████████; to █████████████, ███████████, ██████████, ██████████, Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], █████████, ███████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydah’s identification of KSM as “Mukhtar”; date: September 7, 2006. A September 7, 2006, article (published September 8, 2006) in the
New York Times
, by Mark Mazzetti, entitled, “Questions Raised About Bush’s Primary Claims of Secret Detention System” included comments by CIA officials defending the assertions in the President’s speech. The article stated: “Mr. Bush described the interrogation techniques used on the C.I.A. prisoners as having been ‘safe, lawful and effective,’ and he asserted that torture had not been used . . . Mr. Bush also said it was the interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah that identified Mr. bin al-Shibh as an accomplice in the Sept. 11 attacks. American officials had identified Mr. bin al-Shibh’s role in the attacks months before Mr. Zubaydah’s capture.”

1172.
There are no CIA records to support these claims. See the section of this summary on the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, as well as a more detailed account in Volume II.

1173.
Email from: ████████████; to ████████████, ███████████, ███████████, ███████████, Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], ███████████, █████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydah’s identification of KSM as “Mukhtar”; date: September 7, 2006. There are no CIA records indicating what was “explained” to the White House. The CIA validation document provided officially concurred with the passage in the speech. See CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15: ██████████████████.

1174.
Email from: █████████████; to █████████████, ████████████, ████████████, ████████████, Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], ███████████, ████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydah’s identification of KSM as “Mukhtar”; date: September 7, 2006.

1175.
The Unofficial Story of the al-Qaeda 14; Their torture by the CIA was wrong - in more ways than you might think, Ron Suskind,
Time
, 18 September 2006.

1176.
Email from: █████████████ to: [REDACTED], █████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: URGENT: FOR YOUR COMMENT: DCIA Questions on the Suskind Article; date: September 11, 2006, at 08:23 PM.

1177.
See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM). In 2007, CIA officers also questioned the passage in the President’s September 6, 2006, speech concerning the disruption of plotting against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting for additional information.

1178.
President Bush made other public statements that relied on inaccurate information provided by the CIA. For example, as described elsewhere in this summary, on March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed legislation that would have limited interrogations to techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual. The President’s veto message to the House of Representatives stated that “[t]he CIA’s ability to conduct a separate and specialized interrogation program for terrorists who possess the most critical information in the war on terror has helped the United States prevent a number of attacks, including plots to fly passenger airplanes into the Library Tower in Los Angeles and into Heathrow Airport or buildings in downtown London.” (See message to the House of Representatives, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). The President also explained his veto in his weekly radio address, in which he referenced the “Library Tower,” also known as the “Second Wave” plot, and the Heathrow plot, while representing that the CIA program “helped us stop a plot to strike a U.S. Marine camp in Djibouti, a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi . . .” (See President’s Radio Address, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). As detailed in this summary, and described more fully in Volume II, CIA representations regarding the role of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques with regard to the Second Wave, Heathrow, Djibouti and Karachi plots were inaccurate.

1179.
The OLC memorandum, along with other OLC memoranda relying on inaccurate CIA representations, has been declassified, as has the May 2004 OIG Special Review containing inaccurate information provided by CIA officers. Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS#2009-1810, Tab14).

1180.
See Volume II for additional information on CIA representations.

1181.
Among other documents, see Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.

1182.
Among other documents, see Memorandum for the Record: “Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003.” Memorandum prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides entitled, “CM Interrogation Program,” dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; and Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, “Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program.”

1183.
Among other documents, see March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from █████, ███ Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.

1184.
Among other documents, see CIA classified statement for the record. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, “Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program.” Director Hayden stated: “Now in June [2002], after about four months of interrogation, Abu Zubaydah reached a point where he refused to cooperate and he shut down. He would not talk at all to the FBI interrogators and although he was still talking to CIA interrogators no significant progress was being made in learning anything of intelligence value.”