The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (85 page)

1090.
See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots; the Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting; the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris; the Capture of Majid Khan; the Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group; and the KSM detainee review in Volume III.

1091.
██████ listed Majid Khan (gas station and poison plotting), Iyman Faris (the suspension bridge plot, as well as a possible shopping mall plot), Khallad bin Attash (the Heathrow plot), Masran bin Arshad (the “tallest building” plot), and Ammar al-Baluchi (the plot against the U.S. consulate in Karachi). See relevant sections of this summary and Volume II for additional information.

1092.
As noted, the “Renditions and Interrogations Group,” is also referred to as the “Renditions Group,” the “Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Group,” “RDI,” and “RDG” in CIA records.

1093.
Email from: ██████; to: DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs; cc: ██████, ████████, ██████, ███████, ███████, ███████, █████, ███████; subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 01:09 PM.

1094.
Email from: █████████; to: DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs; cc: ██████, ████████, ██████, ███████, ███████, ███████, █████, ███████; subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 01:09 PM.

1095.
Email from: ███████; to █████, ███████, [REDACTED], ██████, [REDACTED], ██████, ███████, [REDACTED], ███████, ███████, ███████; subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 2:30:09 PM; email from: DO_CTC_ALEC Chiefs Groups, ███████, █████, ███████, ███████, █████, ███████ ██████, [REDACTED], █████; cc: █████; subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 3:57:45 PM.

1096.
See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla; the Capture of Majid Khan; the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris; and the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha.

1097.
Italics added. Email from: ███████; to: ███████, DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs, ██████, ██████, ███████,███████, █████, ██████, ███████, [REDACTED], ██████; cc: ███████; subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 3:57:45 PM.

1098.
Email from: ███████; to: ███████, DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs, ██████, ██████, ███████, ███████, █████, ██████, ███████, [REDACTED], ██████; cc: ███████; subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 3:57:45 PM. See CIA document “Significant Detainee Reporting.”

1099.
See section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots, and the KSM detainee review in Volume III.

1100.
Email from: ███████; to: ███████, DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs, ██████, ██████, ███████, ███████, █████, ██████, ███████, [REDACTED], ██████; cc: ███████; subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 3:57:45 PM.
See also
“Significant Detainee Reporting” and KSM detainee review in Volume III.

1101.
CIA Memorandum for the Record, “Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003,” prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, “
CIA Interrogation Program
,” dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. Those attending the meeting included the director of the CIA, George Tenet; the CIA general counsel, Scott Muller; Vice President Cheney; National Security Advisor Rice; White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales; Attorney General Ashcroft; Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Patrick Philbin; and counsel to the National Security Council, John Bellinger.

1102.
CIA Memorandum for the Record, “Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003,” prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, “
CIA Interrogation Program
,” dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.

1103.
CIA Memorandum for the Record, “Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003,” prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, “
CIA Interrogation Program
,” dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.

1104.
CIA records indicate that the “attacks,” “attack plans,” and “targets” discussed by KSM were well known to the Intelligence Community prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, or were merely ideas for attacks that were proposed, but never operationalized. The CIA briefing slides made no mention of KSM withholding or fabricating information during and after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. See relevant sections of this summary and Volume 11, as well as the KSM detainee review in Volume III.

1105.
CIA records indicate that al-Nashiri provided details on multiple terrorist plots—including plans to target ships in the Strait of Hormuz—prior to his CIA detention and the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. With regard to the targeting of ships in the Strait of Hormuz, this information was provided by al-Nashiri while he was still in foreign government custody and was disseminated in CIA intelligence reports prior to his CIA detention. (See ██████ 36595 █████████; ██████ 36726 █████████; ALEC ████ ███████. For disseminated intelligence, see ████████ CIA ████ ███████; ███████ CIA ████ ███████; █████████ CIA ███ ███████; ███████CIA ███ █████.) For other reporting from al-Nashiri while in foreign government custody, see ███████ 70879 ███████; ███████ 70866 ███████; ███████ 70868 ███████; ███████ 70870 ███████. For disseminated intelligence, see ███████; ███ ███████; ███████.
See also
detainee review of ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Volume III.

1106.
Al-Hawsawi was linked to the September 11, 2001, attacks and targeted by the CIA and other intelligence agencies prior to bin al-Shibh’s capture. (See WASHINGTON ████ (232012Z MAY 02), CIA ████ (032022Z APR 02); ███████ 17743 (051408Z MAR 02); DIRECTOR ██████ (231756Z APR 02); ALEC ████ (161821Z JUL 03).) Al-Hawsawi’s arrest on March 1, 2003, was unrelated to any reporting from CIA detainees. (See ALEC ████ (161821Z JUL 03).) With regard to the referenced “attacks,” no operational plots targeting the sites referenced were ever identified by the CIA. Personnel at CIA Headquarters concluded in 2005 that the “most significant” intelligence derived from Ramzi bin al-Shibh was obtained prior to his rendition to CIA custody and the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. According to a 2005 CIA assessment, the “most significant” reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh on future attacks was background information related to al-Qa’ida’s plans to attack Heathrow Airport. (See ALEC ████ (302240Z JUN 05).) Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided the majority of this information in mid-October 2002, while in the custody of a foreign government and prior to being transferred to CIA custody. (See CIA █████ ███████.)
See also
detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume III.

1107.
See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots. CIA officers in █████ wrote of the referenced reporting from bin Attash: “[w]hile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] was chilling-[CIA officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either through previous information or through interviews of al-Baluchi and Ba Attash prior to their transfer out of Karachi.” This cable also stated, “[a]s noted in several previous cables, in December 2002 ████ Consulate became aware of the threat to Consulate officials.” See █████ 14510 ███████.

1108.
For information on the “[i]dentification of [Jose] Padilla,” see the section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla. Richard Reid was arrested in December 2001, prior to Abu Zubaydah’s capture. See multiple open source reporting and Department of Justice materials, including,
United States v. Richard Reid
Indictment, U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts, January 16, 2002. Abu Zubaydah provided information on potential places al-Qa’ida might target, including banks and subways, shortly after his capture to FBI interrogators, months prior to the use of the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” in August 2002. See Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah” and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).
See also
Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.

1109.
Memorandum for the Record; subject: CIA Interrogation Program; September 27, 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50088). Slides, CIA Interrogation Program, 16 September 2003. The Memorandum for the Record drafted by John Bellinger refers to a “detailed handout” provided by the CIA. See John B. Bellinger, III, Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Legal Advisor, National Security Council; Memorandum for the Record; subject: Briefing of Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld regarding Interrogation of High-Value Detainees; date: September 30, 2003.

1110.
Scott W. Muller; Memorandum for the Record; Interrogation briefing for Jack Goldsmith; date: 16 October 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50097).

1111.
Interview of chief of the ███ Branch of the UBL Group, by █████, Office of the Inspector General, July 30, 2003.

1112.
Interview of █████, by ███████, Office of the Inspector General, August 5, 2003.

1113.
August 19, 2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting with ███████, Office of the Inspector General.

1114.
August 19, 2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting with ███████, Office of the Inspector General. This information was not included in the IG Special Review.

1115.
███████, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center Al-Qa’ida Department; date: 28 July 2003.

1116.
Interview of John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 5, 2003. This information was included in the CIA’s July 2003 briefing slides. Richard Reid was arrested in December 2001, prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah.

1117.
See the section in this summary and in Volume II on the Capture of Majid Khan; the Capture of Hambali; and the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha.
See
also
the KSM detainee review in Volume III. Richard Reid was arrested prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah.

1118.
Interview of Jose E. Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 12, 2003.

1119.
Interview of John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 5, 2003.

1120.
Pavitt also stated that by “September, October and November” of 2002, “they saw a clear benefit” to the use of CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah (Interview of James Pavitt, by ██████ and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21, 2003).

1121.
Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 8 September, 2003.

1122.
For example, the draft described interrogators placing pressure on a detainee’s artery, conducting mock executions, blowing cigarette or cigar smoke into a detainee’s face, using cold water to interrogate detainees, and subjecting a detainee to a “hard takedown.” In an interview conducted after Gul Rahman’s death at DETENTION SITE COBALT, Dr. DUNBAR described a “rough takedown.” The interview report stated: “According to [DUNBAR], there were approximately five CIA officers from the renditions team. Each one had a role during the takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door of [a detainee] cell and rushed in screaming and yelling for him to ‘get down.’ They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. They covered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a long corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped him and punched him several times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it was obvious they were not trying to hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). [The detainee] did acquire a number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention.” DUNBAR stated that after “something like this is done, interrogators should speak to the prisoner to ‘give them something to think about.’” See Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul Rahman, pp. 21–22, paragraph 34.

1123.
CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), January 2004.

1124.
The Special Review draft stated that KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrests” of Sayf al-Rahman Paracha, Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al-Marri, and Majid Khan, and that KSM’s information “led to the investigation and prosecution” of Iyman Faris. The draft Special Review also stated that information from Abu Zubaydah “helped lead to the identification” of Jose Padilla and Binyam Muhammad. Finally, the draft included the “plots” described by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station ██████████ during her July 16, 2003, interview. Most of the inaccurate representations would remain in the final version of the Special Review completed in May 2004. See CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123- IG), January 2004.

1125.
CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program(2003-7123-IG), January 2004.