The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (42 page)

None of the above information resulted in Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s capture. As detailed below, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured unexpectedly during raids in Pakistan on September 11, 2002, targeting Hassan Ghul.
1791

Prior to Abu Zubaydah’s capture, the CIA considered Hassan Ghul a “First Priority Raid Target,” based on reporting that:

“Ghul has been a major support player within the al-Qa’ida network and has assisted al-Qa’ida and Mujahadin operatives by facilitating their travel. He is a senior aide to Abu Zubaydah who was heavily involved in fund raising for a terrorist operation in spring 2001.”
1792

Additional reporting noted that Hassan Ghul’s phone number had been linked to a terrorist operative who “was ready to conduct a ‘surgical operation’ at any time,”
1793
while other reporting indicated that Hassan Ghul was working on a “program” believed to be related to terrorist activity.
1794

According to CIA cables, once captured, and prior to the initiation of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah confirmed that Hassan Ghul was a high-level al-Qa’ida facilitator who had contact with senior al-Qa’ida members, including Hamza Rabi’a and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
1795
Abu Zubaydah also corroborated intelligence in CIA databases that Ghul was involved in al-Qa’ida fundraising efforts.
1796
During this same period, the CIA continued to receive additional intelligence on Ghul from foreign governments, including that Ghul was responsible for facilitating the movement of Saudi fighters through Pakistan.
1797
As noted, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation and was not asked any questions for 47 days.
1798

In early July 2002, Pakistani authorities and the CIA were continuing their efforts to locate and capture Hassan Ghul. A detainee in Pakistani custody, █████████, ███████████████████, was providing detailed information to Pakistani authorities on Hassan Ghul.
1799
█████ [the detainee in Pakistani custody] had been arrested with ███████ in ████████, on May ██, 2002, during █████████ government raids on multiple residences thought to be associated with al-Qa’ida.
1800
During interviews with Pakistani authorities concerning how to locate and capture Hassan Ghul, ██████████ [the detainee in Pakistani custody] identified ███████ [a well-known associate of Hassan Ghul] and the location of the ████████ [well-known associate’s] home.
1801

On July █, 2002, seeking to capture Hassan Ghul, Pakistani authorities
████████
raided the home of ████████████████████ [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul]. When the raid occurred, present at the home was █████████████ [the well-known associate], ███████████████████ [and family members of the well-known associate]. A
███████
providing details on the raid states that “
█████
[the well-known associate] was interviewed on the spot and was fully cooperative with [Pakistani authorities].” ██████████ [the well-known associate] stated that he had not seen Hassan Ghul or
███████████████
since June 3, 2002, but that he believed they were still in Karachi. According to
█████
[the well-known associate], he had already informed Pakistani authorities that Hassan Ghul was an al-Qa’ida member. According to a cable
███████████████
[the well-known associate] stated that, as a result of his reporting on Ghul to Pakistani officials, he received “a death threat from Hassan Ghul,” causing Ghul to “cease coming to the ██████████ [the well-known associate’s] house.”
1802

CIA records indicate that Pakistani authorities continued to interview the ████████ [the well-known associate] in an effort to acquire information and capture Hassan Ghul. A CIA cable dated July █, 2002, states that the Pakistani government “is keying on any information which could get ██ closer to bagging [Hassan] Ghul,” specifically “through ongoing interviews of █████████████████████ [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul].” According to the cable, during one of the interviews, ██████ [the well-known associate] told Pakistani authorities about an address where Hassan Ghul used to reside circa December 2001. █████ [the well-known associate] sent █████ with the Pakistani officers to identify the home.
1803
The CIA officers wrote that the location “is extremely close to (if not an exact match)” to a location where KSM once resided, according to a June 18, 2002, report from the FBI.
1804
The identified home was raided, but found empty. The CIA wrote “██ are hitting the right places [safe houses], albeit at the wrong time. Our efforts have got us closer than even to at least Hassan Ghul.”
1805
During the meetings between the Pakistani authorities and ████████ [the well-known associate], ███████ [the well-known associate] provided the Pakistani authorities with a copy of a ███████ “reportedly belonging to Hassan Ghul” ██████████████████████.” In the same cable, the CIA reported that █████ [the well-known associate] had “approached the police for assistance in retrieving █████████,” who was
██████████
[a specific family member of the well known associate].
1806

On July █, 2002, CTC officers at CIA Headquarters wrote that they were reading the cables from the CIA ████████, noting they were “particularly interested in the in the interview of raid target ██████████ [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul], who admitted █████████████████ to his knowledge of Ghul’s involvement in al-Qa’ida activities.” The cable stated:

“[r]ecognize that ██████ [the well-known associate] claims his contact with Ghul stopped approximately one month ago, when he reported Ghul to the Pakistani authorities. However, given
███████████
[his close association] to one of our high interest targets, request
██████████
initiate technical surveillance of
████████
[the well-known associate’s] telephone . . . to determine if they may yield any information on Ghul’s current whereabouts.”
1807

CIA records do not indicate if “technical surveillance” of ███████ [the well-known associate’s] telephone was conducted.
1808

According to CIA records, once captured, and prior to the initiation of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah confirmed that Hassan Ghul was a high-level al-Qa’ida facilitator who had contact with senior al-Qa’ida members, including Hamza Rabi’a and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Abu Zubaydah also corroborated intelligence in CIA databases that Ghul was involved in al-Qa’ida fundraising efforts.
1809
As noted, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation and therefore was not questioned on the July 2002 raids on
███████████████
[the well known associate’s] home or the information acquired from the interviews of ████████ [the well-known associate] conducted by Pakistani authorities.
1810
On August 4, 2002, after Abu Zubaydah spent 47 days in isolation, CIA interrogators entered his cell and immediately began subjecting Abu Zubaydah to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard.
1811
As he had before the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, when asked questions, Abu Zubaydah continued to provide intelligence, including on Hassan Ghul. On August 20, 2002—while still being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—Abu Zubaydah was asked specifically how he would find Hassan Ghul. There are no records indicating that Abu Zubaydah had previously been asked this question. In response, Abu Zubaydah provided corroborative reporting: that Hassan Ghul could possibly be located through
█████████
[the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul].
1812
There are no CIA records indicating that Abu Zubaydah provided information on the location of
█████████
[the well-known associate’s] home, which, as noted, had been raided weeks earlier, on July █, 2002, and was already known to the CIA and Pakistani authorities.
1813

Nine days after Abu Zubaydah referenced ██████████ [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul], on August 29, 2002, CIA Headquarters asked
████████
to request that Pakistani authorities “reinterview ██████ [the well-known associate] for additional intelligence on Hassan Ghul.”
1814
The next day, August 30, 2002, ███████ informed CIA Headquarters that Pakistani authorities were “in contact with the ██████ [the well-known associate],’’ but that ███████ would nonetheless ask the Pakistani authorities to question ████████ [the well-known associate] again about Hassan Ghul’s location.
1815
On August 31, 2002, ███████ relayed that Pakistani authorities and ██████ believed it was possible that
███████
[the well-known associate] was not being fully truthful in his interviews with Pakistani authorities.
1816
On September 3, 2002,
█████████
reported that Pakistani authorities had re-interviewed
█████████
[the well-known associate] an unknown number of times, and that the Pakistani authorities noted that at times
█████████
[the well-known associate] contradicted himself.
1817
Approximately one week later, on September 9, 2002, Pakistani authorities returned again to
████████
[the well-known associate’s] home and interviewed
████████
[a specific family member of the well-known associate], who had recently returned to
█████████
[the well-known associate’s home].
1818

In interviews with Pakistani authorities,
███████████
[the specific family member of the well-known associate] was cooperative and told the Pakistani authorities where Hassan Ghul’s last apartment was located.
1819
Based on the information provided on Ghul’s apartment, Pakistani authorities conducted a raid, but found the apartment empty.
1820

Pakistani authorities then located and interviewed ██████████ [a third individual at the apartment complex]. From the interview [of the third individual], Pakistani authorities learned that while Hassan Ghul had vacated the apartment, he was scheduled to return to the complex
████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████
. Based on this information, Pakistani authorities placed the complex under surveillance and waited for Hassan Ghul to return.
1821
On September 10, 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested two individuals believed to be Hassan Ghul and his driver outside of the apartment complex.
1822
A CIA cable noted that “Ghul had returned to the apartment to ████████████████████, however, he got more than he bargained for.”
1823
Another CIA cable stated:

“Interestingly, he denies being Hassan Ghul—claiming Hassan Ghul is someone else. While ████████ are fairly certain we do in fact have Hassan Ghul in custody, we would like to make every effort to verify.”
1824

By September 11, 2002, it was determined that an individual named Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani, aka Abu Badr, and his driver were arrested, not Hassan Ghul.
1825
Abu Badr’s driver, Muhammad Madni, was immediately cooperative and told the arresting officers that Abu Badr was a “major al-Qa’ida [facilitator].” He then proceeded to provide Pakistani authorities with information about al-Qa’ida-affiliated residences and safe houses in Karachi.
1826

Based on the information provided by Muhammad Madni, Pakistani authorities ██████████ conducted █████████ raids in Karachi over the next two days.
1827
Raids of the initial sites resulted in the recovery of “a number of modified electrical switch type mechanisms, modified circuit and ‘game’ boards and other miscellaneous wires with alligator clips and battery attachments.”
1828
On September 11, 2002, additional raids resulted in the arrest of 11 individuals, including Ramzi bin al-Shibh.
1829
According to CIA records, bin al-Shibh initially identified himself as ‘Umar Muhammad ‘Abdullah ba-’Amr, aka “Abu ‘Ubyadah,” but the CIA noted:

“This individual strongly resembled pictures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. When asked if he was videotaped in al-Qa’ida videos, he answered yes.”
1830

Shortly thereafter the CIA confirmed Ramzi bin al-Shibh was the individual in Pakistani custody.
1831

Hassan Ghul was ultimately captured by foreign authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, on January █, 2004.
1832
Hassan Ghul’s capture was unrelated to any reporting from the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
1833

4. The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM)

On September 6, 2006, President Bush delivered a speech based on information provided by the CIA, and vetted by the CIA, that included the following statement:

“Zubaydah
was questioned using these procedures
[the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques], and soon he began to provide information on key al-Qa’ida operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks on September the 11th. For example, Zubaydah identified one of KSM’s accomplices in the 9/11 attacks, a terrorist named Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The information Zubaydah provided helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh.
And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
.”
1834

Contrary to CIA representations, there are no CIA records to support the assertion that Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other CIA detainee played any role in the “the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.” CIA records clearly describe how the capture of KSM was attributable to a unilateral CIA asset (“ASSET X”
1835
) who gained access to KSM through ███████████, with whom the CIA asset had prior independent connections. ASSET X’s possible access to KSM through ████████ was apparent to the CIA as early as the fall of 2001, prior to his formal recruitment. The CIA had multiple opportunities to exploit ASSET X’s access to KSM’s █████████ in 2001, and in 2002, after he was recruited, but did not. In February–March 2003, ASSET X led the CIA directly to KSM. The contemporaneous documentary record of this narrative is supported by numerous after-action interviews conducted by the CIA’s Oral History Program. As the CIA officer who “handled” ASSET X and who was directly involved in the capture of KSM stated, “[t]he op[eration] was a HUMINT op pretty much from start to finish.”
1836