The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (91 page)

1293.
CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, “Talking points,” sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed entitled, “Talking Points Appeal of the $██ Million reduction in CIA/CTC’s Rendition and Detention Program.”

1294.
“DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007,” dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was “sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting.”

1295.
CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team. “Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)” including “Tab 7,” named “RDG Copy—Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009,” prepared “13 January 2009.”

1296.
CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, “Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDl Program—18FEB.2009” and graphic attachment, “Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM),” Includes “DCIA Briefing on RDI Program” agenda, CIA document “ElTs and Effectiveness,” with associated documents, “Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),” “Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment,” and “supporting references,” to include “Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.”

1297.
CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, at 3:46 PM, entitled, “[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR],” which includes “Key Captures and Disrupted Plots Gained From HVDs in the RDI Program” (DTS #2009-1258).

1298.
From 2003 through 2009, the CIA’s representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots “disrupted” and terrorists captured that the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in “saved lives.” Among other CIA representations, see: (1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the OLC include that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was “necessary” to obtain “critic,” “vital,” and “otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence” that was “essential” for the U.S. government to “detect and disrupt” terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that “[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States.” (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Citing CIA documents and the President’s September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA’s interrogation program (which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: “The CIA interrogation program—and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence . . . As the President explained [on September 6, 2006], ‘by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the program has saved innocent lives.’” (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 represented that “the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives,” and warned policymakers that “[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive.” (See August 5, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The CIA’s response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: “Information [the CIA] received . . . as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques (‘ElTs’) has almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties.” (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the “CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the [enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence,” and that “[m]ost, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means.” (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, “Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program—18FEB.2009” and graphic attachment, “Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM),” including “DCIA Briefing on RDI Program” agenda, CIA document “EITs and Effectiveness,” with associated documents, “Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),” “Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment,” and “supporting references,” to include “Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.”) (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, entitled, “[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR],” located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, which provides a list of “some of the key captures and disrupted plots” that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: “CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means.” See Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that “saved lives.”

1299.
The CIA has represented that it has provided the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence with all CIA records related to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. This document production phase lasted more than three years and was completed in July 2012. The records produced include more than six million pages of material, including records detailing the interrogation of detainees, as well as the disseminated intelligence derived from the interrogation of CIA detainees. The CIA did not provide—nor was it requested to provide—intelligence records that were unrelated to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. In other words, this Study was completed without direct access to reporting from CIA HUMINT assets, foreign liaison assets, electronic intercepts, military detainee debriefings, law enforcement derived information, and other methods of intelligence collection. Insomuch as this material is included in the analysis herein, it was provided by the CIA within the context of documents directly related to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. For example, a requirements cable from CIA Headquarters to CIA interrogators at a CIA detention site could cite SIGNALS intelligence collected by NSA, or include a CIA HUMINT source report on a particular subject, with a request to question the CIA detainee about the reporting. While direct access to the NSA report, or the CIA HUMINT report, may not have been provided, it may still be included in this Study because it appeared in the CIA Headquarters requirements cable relating to the questioning of a CIA detainee. As such, there is likely significant intelligence related to the terrorist plots, terrorists captured, and other intelligence matters examined in this report, that is unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program and within the databases of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but which has not been identified or reviewed by the Select Committee on Intelligence for this Study. As is detailed in the near 6800-page Committee Study, the Committee found that there was significant intelligence in CIA databases to enable the capture of the terrorists cited, and “disrupt” the terrorist plots represented as “thwarted,” without intelligence from the CIA interrogation program. Had the Committee been provided with access to all intelligence available in CIA and Intelligence Community databases, it is likely this finding would be strengthened further. Finally, as of March 2014, the White House had not yet provided approximately 9,400 documents related to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program—equivalent to less than .2 percent of CIA detention and interrogation records—pending an Executive Privilege determination. The Committee requested access to these documents in three letters dated January 3, 2013, May 22, 2013, and December 19, 2013. The White House did not respond to the requests.

1300.
See Volume II for additional information and analysis.

1301.
█████ 10090 (210703Z APR 02) and CIA Document, Subject: “CIA Statement Summarizing Significant Information About Jose Padilla (21:10 hrs.- 8 June 02).” For more information on the Internet article that recommended enriching uranium by “putting it into a bucket and twisting it around one’s head to enrich it,” see “How to Make an H-Bomb” and [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04).
See also
email from: [REDACTED], ███OTA/CTWG/CBRN Group; to: [REDACTED] and multiple ccs, including ███████; subject: “Re: [REDACTED]: Re: KSM homework on AQ nuke program”; date: April 22, 2003, at 03:30 PM, explaining CIA’s CBRN group’s position on Padilla and Mohammed’s plotting. According to the email: “Padilla and Binyam/Zouaoui had pulled an article off a satirical web site called ‘How to make an H-bomb’ which is based on a 1979 Journal of Irreproducible Results article. The article was intended to be humorous and included instructions such as enriching uranium by placing liquid uranium hexaflouride in a bucket, attaching it to a six foot rope, and swinging it around your head as fast as possible for 45 minutes. While it appears that Padilla and Zouaoui took the article seriously, Zubaydah recommended that they take their (cockamamie) ideas to (I believe) KSM in Karachi. It was at that point that KSM told them to focus on bringing down apartment buildings with explosives. (in other words: keep your day jobs).” U.K. courts noted “that [█████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████].”

1302.
Email from: [REDACTED], CTC/OTA/CBRNB; subject: “Note to Briefers Updating Zubaydah ‘Uranium Device’ Information”; date: April 23, 2002, at 08:25:40 PM. The email states, “CIA and Lawrence Livermore National Lab have assessed that the article is filled with countless technical inaccuracies which would likely result in the death of anyone attempting to follow the instructions, and would definitely not result in a nuclear explosive device.”
See also
[REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04).

1303.
█████ 10090 (210703Z APR 02).

1304.
CIA ███ (290925Z APR 02); ████ 11086 (261140Z APR 02).
See also
Padilla statement noting Abu Zubaydah “chuckled at the idea,” but sent Padilla and Muhammad to Karachi to present the idea to KSM. See fax from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice National Security Division, to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on August 15, 2007, with subject line: “Jose Padilla.”

1305.
DIRECTOR ███ (041637Z).
See also
CIA ███ (290925Z APR 02); ████ 10091 (210959Z APR 02); [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04); and DIRECTOR ███ (101725Z MAR 04).

1306.
For additional background on the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plotting, see fax from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice National Security Division, to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on August 15, 2007, with subject line: “Jose Padilla.” The document states: “Jose Padilla is a United States citizen who has been designated as an enemy combatant by the President and has been detained by the military since June 9, 2002. Padilla is commonly known as the ‘dirty bomber’ because early intelligence from a senior al Qaeda detainee [Abu Zubaydah] and Padilla’s intended accomplice [Binyam Muhammad] indicated that he had proposed to senior al Qaeda leaders the use of a radiological dispersion device, or ‘dirty bomb,’ against United States targets, or interests, and he was detained by the military partly on that basis. Based on later and more complete intelligence, including Padilla’s own statements during military detention, it now appears that Padilla re-entered the United States after he accepted a mission from al Qaeda leaders, specifically from Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (‘KSM’), the emir of the attacks of September 11, to destroy one or more high-rise apartment buildings in the United States through the use of natural gas explosions triggered by timing devices, and had received training, equipment and money for that mission.”
See also
other records that describe the plotting as targeting tall apartment buildings, without reference to a radiological or “dirty” bomb. For example, a July 15, 2004, CIA intelligence report titled, “Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa’ida,” noted: “From late 2001 until early 2003, KSM also conceived several low-level plots, including an early 2002 plan to send al-Qa’ida operative and US citizen Jose Padilla to set off bombs in high-rise apartment buildings in an unspecified major US city.” Similarly, an Intelligence Community report titled, “Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,” noted: “Binyam Muhammad stated during his debriefings that his and Padilla’s objective was to topple a high-rise building with a gas explosion in Chicago.” (See Community Counterterrorism Board, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment, “Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,” Report Number IICT-2003-14, April 3, 2003.) The unclassified ODNI “Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program,” released September 6, 2006, states that, “[w]orking with information from detainees, the US disrupted a plot to blow up tall buildings in the United States. KSM later described how he had directed operatives to ensure the buildings were high enough to prevent the people trapped above from escaping out of the windows, thus ensuring their deaths from smoke inhalation.”