The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (86 page)

1126.
Email from: ███████ to: Scott Muller, John Rizzo, ██████, ████████, ███████, and ███████; subject: “For the response to the IG report”; date: February 4, 2004, at 1:04:03 PM.

1127.
Email from: ███████; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 10, 2004.

1128.
Email from: ███████; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 10, 2004. As described in this summary and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, the examples compiled were provided over the following years to the President, the Congress, the Department of Justice, and the American public.

1129.
Email from: ███████; to: ████████; cc: ██████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ███████; subject: re: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. █████’s email began: “here is my draft contribution . . . it’s late, I’m tired, so it’s not especially elegant . . . welcome any fact correcting I got wrong, but let’s be foward [sic] leaning.” The inaccurate information included in the email was used in the CIA’s formal response to the OIG.

1130.
█████’s email and the subsequent DDO response to the OIG were used as the template for talking points on the program. See, for example, from: ██████; to: █████; ████████; subject: re: EDITED Final - RE: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures (forwarding comments for response to draft Inspector General review for paper for Condoleezza Rice in December 2004); date: December 6, 2004; email from: ███████; to: ███████; ██████; ████████; cc: ███████ ███████; subject: re: EDITED Final - RE: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures (forwarding comments for response to draft Inspector General review for talking points in November 2005); date: November 4, 2005.

1131.
In response to █████’s email, one CIA officer asked whether “re the jaffar al-tayyar stuff, didnt [sic] we already have email from FBI before he confirmed the name?” See email from: [REDACTED]; to: ██████; cc: ███████, ███████, ██████, ███████; subject: on KSM/AZ and measures; date February 10, 2004, at 09:38 AM.

1132.
Email from: ███████; to: ███████; cc: ██████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████; subject: re: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004.

1133.
See relevant sections of this summary and Volume II on the eight primary CIA effectiveness representations and 12 other prominent CIA representations of effectiveness.

1134.
Email from: ███████; to: ███████, cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; ██████, subject: Re: Please Read -- Re: CTC Response to the Draft IG Report; date: February 10, 2004. As noted, in an August 19, 2003 Memorandum for the Record detailing ███████’s interview with the Office of the Inspector General, ██████ told the OIG that “the often-cited example of Zubaydah identifying Padilla is not quite accurate,” and that “[n]ot only did [Abu Zubaydah] not tell us who Padilla was, his information alone would never have led us to Padilla.” Noting that the Pakistani government had told the CIA about Jose Padilla and his partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing any information on the pair, ██████ stated, “[i]n essence, CTC got lucky.” This information was not included in the draft or final OIG Special Review.

1135.
The information forwarded by █████ was related to the Heathrow Airport plotting and stated that “[o]nly after enhanced measures” did KSM “admit that the sketch of a beam labeled Canary Wharf in his notebook was in fact an illustration that KSM the engineer drew himself to show another AQ operative that the beams in the Wharf like those in the World Trade Center - would likely melt and collapse the building, killing all inside.” The email also stated that KSM “identified the leading operatives involved in both the UK and Saudi cells that would support the operation.” These representations were inaccurate. See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting, and the KSM detainee review in Volume III.

1136.
The information forwarded by █████ stated that, “subsequent to the application of enhanced measures,” the CIA “learned more in-depth details” about operational planning, “to include ongoing operations against both the US and Saudi interests in Saudi Arabia.” This representation omitted key information provided by al-Nashiri in foreign government custody and prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. See the ‘Abd al-Rahimal-Nashiri detainee review in Volume lII.

1137.
The information forwarded by █████ stated that, “after the use of enhanced measures [Hambali] provided information that led to the wrap-up of an al-Qa’ida cell in Karachi, some of whose members were destined to be the second wave attack pilots inside the US after 911 . . . . [TJheir identification and subsequent detention saved hundreds of lives.” This representation was inaccurate. See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group. (See email from: ███████; to ██████, ██████, ██████; multiple cc’s; subject: EDITED—Re: Heathrow plot insight from KSM; date: February 10, 2004, at 2:38:36 PM.) The email included the following text: “Here is Heathrow.” Below this text were forwarded emails from ███████ and ██████. See email from: ███████; to: ██████, ██████, ██████; subject: Heathrow plot insight from KSM; date: February 10, 2004, at 01:34 PM; email from ██████; to: ██████, ██████; subject: OGC rebuttal part 5 and final-Re: al-Nashiri; date: February 12, 2004, at 02:59 PM; forwarding email from: ██████; to: ████████, ███████, ██████, ██████; subject: Re: al-Nashiri; date: February 10, 2004, at 06:11 PM; email from: ███████; to: ███████; ██████; subject: **immediate—Hambali Reporting; date: February 10, 2004, at 11:43 AM.

1138.
Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.

1139.
Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.

1140.
Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.

1141.
A review of CIA records found that almost all of the information in the Pavitt memorandum was inaccurate and unsupported by CIA interrogation and intelligence records. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that CIA officers “generally provided accurate information [to the Inspector General] on the operation and effectiveness of the program,” and that “with rare exceptions, [CIA officers] provided accurate assessments to the OIG.”

1142.
The CIA Inspector General Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program,” was declassified with redactions in May 2008. On August 24, 2009, some portions of the Review that were redacted in May 2008 were unredacted and declassified.

1143.
██████ wrote in an email: “We can expect to need to present these data to appropriately cleared personnel at the IG and on the Hill, to the Attorney General and quite possibly to the President at some point, and they must be absolutely verifiable.” (See email from: ████████; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 10, 2004.) As detailed in this Study, the CIA consistently used the same “effectiveness” case studies. The eight most frequently cited “thwarted” plots and captured terrorists are examined in this summary, and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, as are 12 other prominent examples that the CIA has cited in the context of the “effectiveness” of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

1144.
Talking Points for the DCI: DOD Proposals to Move Forward on Transfer of HVDs to Guantanamo, 16 December 2004.

1145.
DCI Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National Security Advisor, 12 January 2005; included in email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], ██████; cc: ███████, John A. Rizzo, ██████, ██████, ███████, ███████, ██████, ██████; subject: Re Coord on NSC Talkings for 1/14; date: January 11, 2005, at 03:33 PM.

1146.
The draft stated that the “Second Wave” plotting “was uncovered during the initial debriefings of a senior al-Qa’ida detainee,” that the Heathrow plotting “was also discovered as a result of detainee debriefings,” that the Karachi plotting “was revealed during the initial debriefings of two senior al-Qa’ida detainees,” and that the CIA “learned form [sic] detainee debriefings of the second shoe bomber. (See email from: ███████; to: [REDACTED], ██████, ██████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████, [REDACTED], ██████, [REDACTED], ██████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: █████████████; subject: FOR IMMEDIATE COORDINATION: summary of impact of detainee program; date: April 13, 2005, at 5:21:37 PM.) These claims were inaccurate. See relevant sections of this summary and Volume II.

1147.
The draft discussed Issa al-Hindi, who had been referenced in the 9/11 Commission Report, stating that“[p]rior to KSM’s reporting, the U.S. Government was not aware of Issa’s casing activity, nor did we know his true identity.” It added that “KSM’s reporting was the impetus for an intense investigation, culminating in Issa’s identification and arrest.” The draft also included two examples that had not been in official public documents, but had been described in press stories. The first was that “KSM led U.S. investigators to an Ohio truck driver named Iyman Faris.” The second was that “KSM’s confessions were also instrumental in determining the identity of Saajid Badat,” the second shoe bomber. (See email from: ██████, Chief of Operations, ALEC Station; to: ██████, ███████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████, ██████,[REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████, ██████, ██████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████, ██████, ██████; cc: ███████, ███████; subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 13, 2005, at 6:46:59 PM.) As described elsewhere, these claims were incongruent with CIA records. At least one earlier media account of KSM’s purported role in the arrest of Iyman Paris was provided in a book by an author who had extensive access to CIA officials. (See Ronald Kessler,
The CIA at War
, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2003.). The CIA’s cooperation with the author is described elsewhere in this summary, as well as in more detail in the full Committee Study.

1148.
Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and ███████, April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 19:56:05.

1149.
Email from: ██████; to: ███████; cc: [REDACTED], ███████, [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, ████████, ██████, █████████; subject: Re Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM.

1150.
See CIA document entitled, “INTERROGATION PROGRAM DRAFT PRESS BRIEFING,” from April 2005.

1151.
Email from: ████████; to ███████; cc: ██████, John Rizzo; subject: Re Interrogation Program-Going Public Draft Talking Points—Comments Due to ████me by COB TODAY Thanks; date: April 20, 2005, at 5:10:10 PM.

1152.
See the sections of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) and the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Khallad bin Attash).

1153.
“The frightening evolution of al-Qaida; Decentralization has led to deadly staying power,”
Dateline NBC
, June 24, 2005. In 2003, Ronald Kessler published a book with which the CIA cooperated that stated “intercepts and information developed months earlier after the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh . . . allowed the CIA to trace [KSM].” The Kessler book also stated that the bin Attash capture was the “result” of interrogations of KSM. This information is incongruent with CIA records. See Ronald Kessler,
The CIA at War
, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2003.
See
also
email from: John A. Rizzo; to: ███████; cc: ███████, Scott W. Muller, ██████, [REDACTED]; subject: Re CIA at War; date: January 22, 2004, at 09:28 AM).

1154.
See the sections of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) and the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Khallad bin Attash).

1155.
The CIA attorney also described the Israeli precedent with regard to the “necessity defense” that had been invoked by CIA attorneys and the Department of Justice in 2001 and 2002. The CIA attorney wrote that the Israeli Supreme Court “also specifically considered the ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario and said that enhanced techniques could not be pre-approved for such situations, but that if worse came to worse, an officer who engaged in such activities could assert a common-law necessity defense, if he were ever prosecuted.” (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, ███████, ███████, [REDACTEDl; subject: Re McCain; date: December 19, 2005, at 10:18:58 AM.) At the time, the CIA attorney and the former █████ CTC Legal, ███████, were working in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The OLC, in its July 20, 2007, memorandum, included an analysis of the Israeli court case in the context of concluding that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were “clearly authorized and justified by legislative authority” as a result of the Military Commissions Act. See memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.