The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (112 page)

1943.
According to handwritten notes of the briefing, CIA briefers described Janat Gul as “senior AQ” and a “key facilitator” with “proximity” to a suspected pre-election plot. Committee records indicate that CIA briefers told the chairman and vice chairman that, given the pre-election threat, it was “incumbent” on the CIA to “review [the] need for EITs,” following the suspension of “EITs.” (
See
Handwritten notes of Andrew Johnson (DTS #2009-2077); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024 pp. 92–95); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024, pp. 110–121).) ███████ CTC Legal ████ ████ later wrote that the “only reason” for the chairman and vice chairman briefing on Janat Gul was the “potential gain for us” as “the vehicle for briefing the committees on our need for renewed legal and policy support for the CT detention and interrogation program.”
See
email from: ████████; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Priority: congressional notification on Janat Gul; date: July 29, 2004.

1944.
July 29, 2004, Memorandum for the Record from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller re Principals Meeting relating to Janat Gul on 20 July 2004.

1945.
Letter from Attorney General Ashcroft to Acting DCI McLaughlin, July 22, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 4). Attorney General Ashcroft, who attended the July 2, 2004, meeting, had opined earlier on the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul.
See
letter from Assistant Attorney General Ashcroft to General Counsel Muller, July 7, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 3); July 2, 2004, CIA Memorandum re Meeting with National Security Advisor Rice in the White House Situation Room, Friday 2 July re Interrogations and Detainee Janat Gul; July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence re Janat Gul; Memorandum from █████████, to Jose Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, █████████, █████████, [REDACTED], re standard interrogation techniques - DOJ limits, July 2, 2004.

1946.
██████ 1512 (███████ 04).

1947.
██████ 1497 (███████ 04).

1948.
██████ 1512 (███████ 04); ██████ 1497 (███████ 04); ██████ 1519 (███████ 04); ██████ 1521 (███████ 04); ███████ 1530 (███████ 04); ██████ 1537 (███████ 04); ██████ 1541 (███████ 04); ██████ 1542 (███████ 04); ██████ 1603 (███████ 04).
See
Volume II and III for additional information.

1949.
██████ 1574 (██████ 04). Notwithstanding this assessment, on August 21, 2004, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that Janat Gul “is believed to possess information about risks to the citizens of the United States or other nations,” that the “use of enhanced techniques is appropriate in order to obtain that information,” and that CIA Headquarters was therefore approving the resumed use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul.
See
HEADQUARTERS ████ (█████████ 04).

1950.
█████ 1622 (██████ 04).

1951.
August 25, 2004, Letter from ████████, Associate General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (DTS #2009-1809, Tab 10).

1952.
August 25, 2004 Letter from ████████, Associate General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (DTS #2009-1809, Tab 10).

1953.
August 25, 2004 Letter from ████████, Associate General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (DTS #2009-1809, Tab 10).

1954.
Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA; from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, August 26, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 6).

1955.
██████ 1631 (271859Z AUG 04).

1956.
██████ 1650 (311620Z AUG 04).

1957.
See
email from: ████████; to ██████████, ████████, █████████, ████████, ████████, [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: “Req to extend authorization to use EITs”; date; September 1, 2004.

1958.
HEADQUARTERS ████ (032155Z SEP 04).

1959.
Rather than a “high value detainee,” the memo characterized Janat Gul as a “senior facilitator.” The CIA officer concluded that Gul was likely “not directly included in operational planning and operations.”
See
September 7, 2004, CIA Document EYES ONLY — ███████, written by ███████.

1960.
█████ 1706 (161749Z SEP 04). The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “Janat Gul’s claim that [ASSET Y] never met the al-Qa’ida finance chief—who [ASSET Y] said told him about the pre-election threat—was vital to CIA’s assessment and handling of the case. CIA officers assessed Gul was cooperating during his interrogations by that time, leading CIA to █████ [ASSET Y] on the meeting and the plot, which he ultimately recanted.” As described earlier, CIA records indicate that Janat Gul denied knowledge of any imminent threats against the United States homeland, which had been reported by ASSET Y, prior to the use of the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul. At the time, Gul’s denial was deemed a “strong resistance posture” by the CIA.
See
██████ 1497 (███████ 04).

1961.
HEADQUARTERS ████ (██████ 04); ███████ 4267 (███████ 04).

1962.
█████ 1411 (██████ 04). The cable states: “After █████ deception █████ on the question of meeting Sa’id, [ASSET Y] quickly confessed to [the CIA officer] that he had fabricated his meeting and blamed pressure from his handling [CIA] officer to produce leads as the catalyst for his lies.” ASSET Y continued to assert that he discussed the pre-election threat with Janat Gul, who, as noted, had denied to CIA interrogators that he had any knowledge of imminent threats to the United States.

1963.
ALEC ████ (092126Z NOV 04).

1964.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████, ████████, ████████, ██████████, subject: re ALEC ████; date: November 10, 2004.

1965.
See
email from: ██████████; to: ██████████; subject: re Gul and ████ Report; date: November 22, 2004, at 8:25 AM.

1966.
See
email from: ██████████; to: ██████████; subject: re Gul and ████ Report; date: November 22, 2004, at 8:25 AM.

1967.
CIA “Comments on Detainees,” December 19, 2004, notes from DETENTION SITE BLACK. In April 2005, the chief of Base where Janat Gul was held emailed that “[Janat Gul] was never the person we thought he was. He is not the senior Al-Qa’ida facilitator that he has been labeled. He’s a rather poorly educated village man with a very simple outlook on life. He’s also quite lazy and it’s the combination of his background and lack of initiative that got him in trouble. He was looking to make some easy money for little work and he was easily persuaded to move people and run errands for folks on our target list. While he openly admits that he helped move people, it’s pretty well established that the vast majority of his work involved seeking medical care and providing housing for family members of Tahir Jan’s Uzbek organization. There simply is no ‘smoking gun’ that we can refer to that would justify our continued holding of [Janat Gul] at a site such as [DETENTION SITE BLACK]. It should be noted, however, that [Janat Gul] has made what I think is great progress. He fingered [ASSET Y] as a fabricator and has been generally responsive to requirements though, it must be said, he never had access to most of the information we seek from him.”
See
email from: [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to: ████████; cc: ████████, ████████, █████████; subject: re █████████; date: April 30, 2005.

1968.
Email from: ███████; to: ██████████, ███████, ████████, ████████, and [REDACTED]; subject: questions from OLC for Art 16 opinion; date: April 6, 2005.

1969.
Email from: ███████; to: ██████████, ███████, ████████, ████████, and [REDACTED]; subject: questions from OLC for Art 16 opinion; date: April 12, 2005. email from: ███████; to: ██████████, ███████, ████████, ████████, and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: questions from OLC for Art 16 opinion; date: April 14, 2005.

1970.
Email from: ██████; to: ███████, █████████, ███████, ████████, and ████████; subject: response to no. 5 request from ███████: OTA’s Detainee Reporting Brief; date: April 14, 2005.

1971.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee.

1972.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee.

1973.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

1974.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

1975.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (brackets in the original). The OLC memorandum also cited an “Undated CIA Memo, ‘Janat Gul’ (
‘Janat Gul Memo
’). The OLC also relied on CIA representations that Janat Gul’s interrogations “greatly increased the CIA’s understanding of our enemy and its plans.”

1976.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

1977.
The OLC relied on CIA representations that Janat Gul had information, but that he withheld it. In describing the interrogation process, the OLC stated that Janat Gul’s resistance increased as questioning moved to his “’knowledge of operational terrorist activities.’” The OLC also wrote that “Gul apparently feigned memory problems (which CIA psychologists ruled out through intelligence and memory tests) in order to avoid answering questions.” The OLC further conveyed that the “CIA believes that Janat Gul continues to downplay his knowledge.”
See
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

1978.
As described elsewhere, on April 21, 2009, a CIA spokesperson confirmed the accuracy of the information in the OLC memorandum in response to the partial declassification of this memorandum and others.

1979.
Among other documents,
see
Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.

1980.
See
details in the intelligence chronology in Volume II.

1981.
CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, “Comments to Draft IG Special Review, ‘Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program’ (2003-7123-IG),” Attachment, “Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities,” dated February 24, 2004.

1982.
████████, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003. These representations were included in the final, and now declassified Special Review of the Inspector General, which states that KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including Sayfullah Paracha and his son Uzair, businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh Muhammad planned to use to smuggle explosives in New York.” (
See
CIA Inspector General Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004). The statements in the Special Review regarding the purported effectiveness of the program, including the reference to the Parachas, were cited by the Office of Legal Counsel in its analysis of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
See
Memorandum for John A, Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees, pp. 10–11, citing IG Special Review, pp. 85–91.