The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (84 page)

1059.
Among other documents, see Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel memoranda dated May 30, 2005, and July 20, 2007. The May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum repeats additional CIA representations, including that “enhanced interrogation techniques remain essential to obtaining vital intelligence necessary to detect and disrupt such emerging threats” and that the use of the techniques “led to specific, actionable intelligence.” The July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum states that the “. . .use of enhanced interrogation techniques is intended to service this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence,” citing CIA representations to the President that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques produced information “we could not get anywhere else,” and that “the use of such techniques saved American lives by revealing information about planned terrorist plots.”

1060.
See CIA draft response to Questions for the Record submitted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence after an April 12, 2007, hearing on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA draft response states the CIA Blue Ribbon Panel, consisting of two outside reviewers, was the only independent review of the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, and that “CIA had not conducted any other studies on the effectiveness of [the] interrogation techniques.” The final CIA response to the Committee states: “The 2004 CIA Office of the Inspector General report that reviewed CIA’s counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities recommended a non-CIA independent experts’ review of the effectiveness of each of the authorized EFT and a determination regarding the necessity for the continued use of each technique. As a result, CIA sought and obtained the agreement of Mr. ██████ and Mr. ████████ to conduct an independent review, which is also known as the Blue-Ribbon Panel report. Their individual reports are provided at Tabs A and B.”

1061.
See: (1) CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004; (2) May 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from █████████, Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Divisions via Associate Deputy Director for Operations, with the subject line, “Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program”; and (3) Blue Ribbon Panel Review, including a September 2, 2005, Memorandum from ████████ to Director Porter Goss, CIA, entitled “Assessment of EITs Effectiveness,” and a September 23, 2005, Memorandum from ██████ to the Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, entitled, “Response to request from Director for Assessment of EIT effectiveness.”

1062.
See, among other examples, a June 27, 2003, Inspector General interview with CTC’s Chief of Operations, █████████. The record of that interview (2003-7123-IG) states: “[████████] stated that the Agency’s Al-Qa’ida program has been very effective. . . . [███████] views the intelligence as the main criteria for judging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other terrorists off the street and to prevent terrorist attacks. This is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way.”

1063.
November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, “Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers.” This document includes information regarding Paragraph 4.

1064.
November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, “Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers.” See Volume I for additional information.

1065.
Italics added. November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, “Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers,” at 1. The CIA would later repeat both claims, representing to senior officials and the Department of Justice that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques produced intelligence that “saved lives,” and that this intelligence was otherwise unavailable. Further, on August 1, 2002, OLC issued an unclassified, but non-public opinion, in the form of a memorandum to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, analyzing whether certain interrogation methods would violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. The memorandum provides a similar rationale for the necessity defense, stating, “certain justification defenses might be available that would potentially eliminate criminal liability. Standard criminal law defenses of necessity and self-defense could justify interrogation methods needed to elicit information to prevent a direct and imminent threat to the United States and its citizens.” The memorandum later concludes: “even if an interrogation method might violate Section 2340A, necessity or self-defense could provide justifications that would eliminate any criminal liability.”

1066.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████ and [REDACTED]; subject: “POW’s and Questioning”; date: February 1, 2002.

1067.
Italics added. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: █████████ and [REDACTED]; subject: “POW’s and Questioning”; date: February 1, 2002. In response to a request from the Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), the CIA provided two memoranda—one dated November 7, 2001, the other undated—neither of which discussed the necessity defense. The OPR report states: “Although the CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) told us that these were the only CIA memoranda in its possession on interrogation policy, some of the information we obtained from the CIA suggested otherwise. In an internal email message dated February 1, 2002, from CTC attorney [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] referred to ‘[CIA Attorney [REDACTED]] papers reflecting on necessity and anticipatory self defense.’” See Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Report. Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009, pp. 31–32.

1068.
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay C. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, “Re Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C 2340-2340A,” the U.S. Federal Torture Statute.

1069.
Italics added. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, pp. 39–41. On December 30, 2004, the OLC issued a new memorandum superseding the August 1, 2002, memorandum in its entirety. The OLC wrote that “[b]ecause the discussion in [the August 1, 2002] memorandum concerning the President’s Commander-in-Chief power and the potential defenses to liability was—and remains—unnecessary, it has been eliminated from the analysis that follows. Consideration of the bounds of any such authority would be inconsistent with the President’s unequivocal directive that United States personnel not engage in torture.” (See Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A). No CIA detainees were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques between the issuance of the December 2004 memorandum and May 2005, when the OLC opined on the application of the federal prohibition on torture to the techniques.

1070.
Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009, p. 51.

1071.
Bybee response, at 74, n. 6, cited in the OPR Report at fn. 171. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009.

1072.
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.

1073.
See section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla.

1074.
Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 1).

1075.
Among other documents, see CIA memorandum for the Record, “Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003,” prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, “CIA Interrogation Program,” dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, “Comments to Draft IG Special Review, ‘Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program’ (2003-7123-IG),” Attachment, “Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities,” dated February 24, 2004; and the September 6, 2006, CIA-vetted speech by the President on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

1076.
See, among other examples, interview of James Pavitt, by ██████ and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21, 2003; Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re: Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re: Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention Interrogation Activities; and a June 27, 2003, Inspector General interview of the Chief of Operations CTC, ██████████. The record of that interview states: “[██████] stated that the Agency’s Al-Qa’ida program has been very effective. . . .[██████] views the intelligence as the main criteria for judging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other terrorists off the street and to prevent terrorist attacks. This is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way.”

1077.
Interview of ████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. On April 2003, a CTC analyst told the IG that KSM “has not provided anything significant to date.” See interview of ████ █████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 21, 2003.) On April 30, 2003, one of KSM’s interrogators pointed to “information on hijackings, bridges in New York, and nuclear plants,” and information on hidden uranium, which was never found. See interview of ████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003.

1078.
███████ told the OIG that KSM was asked about the plan to hijack an airplane in Malaysia and fly it into the Library Tower in Los Angeles, which the CIA had learned from another detainee. That detainee was Masran bin Arshad, who was in foreign government custody. ██████ told the OIG that KSM “provided information on the Heathrow/Canary Wharf option, but not until personnel at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] asked him about a picture he drew of an I-beam.” See ███████, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, ████████, Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.

1079.
██████, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, ██████████, Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003. See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group, and the Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting.

1080.
█████████, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, ████████, Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.

1081.
See section of this summary and Volume II on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris.

1082.
████████, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, ██████ Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.

1083.
June 26, 2003, Statement by the President, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030626-3.html.

1084.
Email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman, ███████; cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William Harlow; subject: Today’s Washington Post Piece on Administration Detainee Policy; date: June 27, 2003.

1085.
Email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman, ███████; cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William Harlow; subject: Today’s Washington Post Piece on Administration Detainee Policy; date: June 27, 2003.

1086.
July 3 2003, CIA Memorandum for National Security Advisor from Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet with the Subject: Reaffirmation of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Interrogation Program.
See also
Scott Muller, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; date: 5 August 2003 (OG003-50078).

1087.
████████ Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, ██████████, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.

1088.
See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris; the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha; the Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri; the Capture of Majid Khan; and the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Ammar al-Baluchi).

1089.
█████████, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.