A World at Arms (220 page)

186
The title is that of an early book on the subject by Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke (New York: Schumann, 1949). The best recent survey of the German activities is included in Michael Kater,
The Nazi Doctors
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1989). I am not aware of any similar survey of Japanese experimentation.

187
See
DRuZW,
4: 708.

188
Lammers,
Fahrtberichte,
p. 88 n 97.

11: FROM THE SPRING OF 1943 TO SUMMER 1944

1
On the tanks, see von Senger und Etterlin,
German Tanks of World War II,
pp. 59–74.

2
On Mar. 10, 1943 Hitler, after a talk with Goebbels, decided that postcards from German prisoners of war in the U.S.S.R. were not to be delivered to the addressees (AA, St.S., “Russland,” Bd. 10, fr. 33600).

3
Note “Vertraulicher Bericht von Herrn Seligo-Lissabon,” 17 Mar. 1943, BA, ZSg. 115/6, f. 45–101; Ankara to Tokyo No. 94 of 11 Mar. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 32483–85.

4
See the U.S. Military Intelligence reports on morale in Italy in 1942–43, in NA, RG 165, 7 Dec. 1942, NA, RG 456, SRDJ 28932–34; and the German naval attache’s report of 19 Mar. 19431n BA/MA, RM 7/233, f. 528–33, with the military attache’s comments in ibid., f. 527 and 534.

5
Note General Roatta’s comments reported in a {J.S. Naval Intelligence report of 7 Apr. 1944, NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 1197, File 3850-Germany.

6
Von Senger und Etterlin, “Bericht der deutschen Delegation bei der italienischfranzosischen Waffenstillstandskommission Turin,” 22 June 1942, BA/MA, N 64/9.

7
Rintelen to Weizsäcker, 13 Sep. 1942, AA, St.S., “Italien,” Bd. 10, fr. 125016–17; Mackensen memorandum of 13 Nov. 1942, AA, Nachlass Mackensen, Bd. 6, fr. 65367–68; KTB Ski A 39,15 Nov. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/42, f. 382; Rome to Tokyo, no number read, 7 June 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 29861–62.

8
These frictions have yet to be carefully investigated; they are touched on in Frederick W. Deakin,
The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler, and the Fall of Italian Fascism
(New York: Harper & Row, 1962), and Schroder,
Italiens Kriegsaustritt.
Numerous documents have been published in the German and Italian editions of diplomatic documents; there is much more in the archives.

9
William S. Linsenmayer, “Italian Peace Feelers before the Fall of Mussolini,”
JCB
16 (1981), 653–54; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 70, 102 n; Woodward,
British Foreign
Policy,
2: 461–64.

10
Chadwick,
Britain and the Vatican,
pp. 250–52, 257–58; WP(43) 27, Eden memorandum “Proposal Received from Certain Anti-Fascist Elements in Italy,” 14 Jan. 1943, and Cabinet WM(43) 18 Jan. 1943, 9th Confidential Annex, both in PRO, PREM 3/242/9; Denis Mack Smith,
Italy and Its Monarchy
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1989), p. 298.

11
PM Minute 58/3, in PRO, PREM 3/242/9. Churchill added: “I am not going to take the responsibility of carrying on this war a day longer than is necessary to achieve full victory.”

12
See Schroder,
Italiens Kriegsnaustnitt,
chap. 2. The projects for a mild New Order were primarily identified with Giuseppe Bastianini, who as Under Secretary ran the Italian Foreign Ministry after Ciano’s dismissal.

13
Boyle,
China and Japan,
pp. 308–10, 323–26; Burns and Bennett,
Diplomats in Crisis,
pp. 171–93; Tokyo to Tientsin Circular 109, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 28399–402. On the No. 64 of 9 Mar. 1943, SRDJ 33324. On continued German interest in possible Japanese-
Chinese negotiations, see Steengracht, “Inland II B 115g R,” of 1 Aug. 1942, AA, Inland IIg, “Berichte zur Lage in und über Ostasien 1941–1944,” fr. 267318.

14
See Lebra,
Japanese-Trained Annies,
pp. 10–11.

15
Hesse to Ribbentrop, 5 Nov. 1942, AA, S1.S., “Politischer Schriftwechsel,” Bd. 9, fr. 303944–50; Sakamoto (Bern) to Tokyo, Special No.6, 3 Mar. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 32276.

16
For examples of Japanese worry, see NA, RG 457, SRA 01401–2, 01815–16, 02781–87 (all Feb. - Mar. 1943).

17
Sato (Kuibyshev) to Tokyo No. 189 of 22 Feb. 1943, ibid., SRDJ 31948–49, No. 214 of 26 Feb. 1943, SRDJ 32129–35, and No. 283 of 19 Mar. 1943, SRDJ 32961–63.

18
Most of the text is printed in Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 636–40.

19
See the U.S. Naval Intelligence report of 10 Mar. 1943, NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 2360, File 5900 National Defense General-Japan;ADAP, E, 5, No. 218; Ohmae, “Strategischen Konzeptionen," pp. 198-99.

20
The issues are summarized in Alexander S. Cochran, Jr., “The Avalanchel Baytown Decision: British Ascendancy or Allied Consensus?” paper delivered at the Southern Historical Association meeting in 1983.

21
The most recent treatment is in Warren F. Kimball,
The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991), chap. 3.

22
Ibid, chap. 7; Louis,
Imperialism at Bay:
Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
pp. 324ff.

23
Note Dill to Nye, 30 Mar. 1943, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/38.

24
See, e.g., the reference in the Brooke Diary for 24 July 1943: “He [Marshall] cannot see beyond the tip of his nose and is maddening.” Or the full text of the relevant portion of his entry for 12 Aug. 19431, in connection with the Quebec Conference: “I only wish to heaven that I could go on escaping into the country instead of having to face up to a conference with our American friends who have no strategic outlook, cannot see beyond the end of their noses, and imagine that this war can be run by a series of legal contracts based on false concepts of what may prevail six months ahead! I am tired of arguing with them." Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers. Fraser (
Alanbrook
, pp. 360–61) implies that Brooke’s black mood was related to his disappointment over the decision, communicated to him rather insensitively by Churchill, that the command of the cross-Channel invasion would be assigned to an American, not to Brooke himself. I do not agree with this interpretation; Brooke was surely disappointed, but he was always the model of the “good soldier” in the best sense of the term.

25
See Carlo d’Este,
Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, July-August
1943 (London: Collins, 1988).

26
There is a very strongly pro-Montgomery account of these disputes in Hamilton,
Monty,
2: 241–68. There are helpful accounts in the American army and navy official histories. Thoughtful and critical of Montgomery is Richard Lamb,
Montgomery in Europe
1943—
1945:
Success or Failure?
(London: Buchan & Enright, 1983), pp. 21–31. See also Blumenson,
Patton,
pp. 186–85; Schroder,
ltaliens Kriegsaustritt,
pp. 158–76, 258–66. On April 9, Brooke commented on the difficulties with “Husky” planning owing “to Montgomery’s egotistical outlook”; on May 28 he wrote, “Alexander too is somewhat disappointing and only realizes half the situation.” Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers.

27
Ewen Montague,
The Man Ulho Never Was
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1954). For Axis evaluation and acceptance of the fake, see Schroder, Italiens Kriegsaustritt, pp. 112-14; Papeleux, L’admiral Canaris, 178-81,184-87; Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3/1: 119-21; KTB Sid 45,7 May 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/48, f. 125ff. See also the discussion of this deception operation in Chapter ro, above.

28
For an account based on interviews and published materials, see William B. Breuer,
Drop Zone Sicily: Allied Airborne Strike July
1943 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983).

29
Bad weather hurt the airborne operation but persuaded the defenders that there could be no landing at that time. See A.A. Nofi, “Sicily: The Race for Messina 10 July - 17 August 1943,”
Strategy and Tactics
89 (1981), 9.

30
Blumenson,
Patton,
pp. 198–207.

31
See Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 95–99.

32
Blumenson,
Patton,
pp. 209–16, provides an excellent, fair, and brief summary of the whole affair. The relevant documents are in the published Patton and Eisenhower papers: Martin Blumenson (ed.),
The Patton Papers
1940–1945
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), pp. 326–42; Chandler
et al.
(eds.),
Eisenhower Papers,
Nos. 1190, 1396, 1397, 1401, 1414, 1416, 1418, 1423. (Henceforth cited as
Eisenhower Papers.)
See also David Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War,
1943–1945 (New York: Random Houses 1986), pp. 36–38. pp. 326–42; Chandler
et al.
(eds.),
Eisenhower Papers,
Nos. 1190, 1396, 1397, 1401, 1414, 1416, 1418, 1423. (Henceforth cited as
Eisenhower Papers.)
See also David Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War,
1943–1945 (New York: Random Houses 1986), pp. 36–38.

33
On German troops in Aug. - Sep. 1943 replacing Italians in the Balkans, see Hinsley, 3/1: 11–13, 29.

34
Schroder,
Italiens Kriegsaustritt,
pp. 116–31.

35
Ibid., pp. 138–56.

36
Already on 1 Apr. 1943 Berlin had ordered its Rome embassy to send home older sensitive files as a precaution (Berlin to Rome No. 1354, AA, St.S., “Italien,” Bd. 13, fr. 124146–48); on 10 May 1943 Tokyo ordered its embassy in Rome to be ready to destroy codes and cypher machines (Tokyo to Rome No. 394, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 36812).

37
The best analysis of “Alarich” remains Schroder,
Italiens Kriegsaustritt,
pp. 176–75.

38
See Hidaka (Rome) to Tokyo No. 309 of 31 May 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 37492–96.

39
Harry Fornari,
Mussolini’s Gadfly: Roberto Farinacci
(Nashville: Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 1971). Most interesting is the report of the Japanese ambassador Hidaka Shirokuro of 23 Aug. 1943, No. 624, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 42310-14.

40
Rome to Tokyo No. 243 of 30 July 1943, NA, RG 457, SRA 02409–16. See also Smith,
Italy and its Monarchy,
pp. 300–6.

41
Note that on July 18 Mussolini had neither approved nor forbidden Bastianini’s plan to sound the Allies about peace (Linsenmeyer, “Italian Peace Feelers,” pp. IS I-52).

42
ADAP,
E, 6, No. 159; Deakin,
Brutal Friendship,
4, chap.3; Dino Alfieri,
Deux diaateurs face
Ii
face. Rome-Berlin
1939–1943 (Geneva: Les editions du cheval oile, 1948), pp. 311-

43
Hidaka to Tokyo No. 488 of 25 July 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 40965–74; see also Hidaka No. 602 of 18 Aug. 1843, SRDJ 41818. The Japanese Foreign Minister passed on the gist of Hidaka’s report to the German ambassador in Tokyo who responded, as instructed, that Germany sought victory, not peace
(;1DAP,
E 6, No. 191).

44
Note the belief of Enno von Rintelen, the German military representative in Italy, that Badoglio thought the war lost when he took over, preferred to make peace jointly with Germany, but went his own way when this was clearly impossible (Rintelen to Egon Heymann, 13 May 1948, Rintelen Papers, BA/MA, N 433).

45
Schroder,
Italiens Kriegsaustritt,
pp. 252–58, 320–25.

46
For an astonishing illustration, see Adrian Carton de Wiart,
Happy Odyssey
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1950), chap. 17.

47
Linsenmeyer, “Italian Peace Feelers,” pp. 656–57.

48
The Germans discovered that the excavations for explosives to block the Brenner Pass were all empty; the Italians had alarmed the Germans by their preparations but had never gotten around to making these effective (see the transcript of the Rommel Tagebuch for 31 July 19431n the Institut flir Zeitgeschichte, AL 1708/1).

49
See the account in Richard Lamb,
The Ghosts of Peace
1935–1945 (Wilton, England: Richard Russell, 1987), chap. 8.

50
In spite of its silly comments about the Allies, Schroder’s account, pp. 196ff, remains the best; cf. Smith,
Italy and its Monarchy,
pp. 306–23.

51
Alexander S. Cochran’s account cited in n 20, above, covers the issue.

52
Brooke Diary, 13 Sep. 1943, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers. He added negative comments on both Eisenhower and Alexander: “neither will ever have sufficient vision to be big soldiers.”

53
By Oct. 2, 1943 the Allies had learned from ultra that the Germans were planning to hold a front south of Rome but believed themselves not in a position to mount an offensive to drive the Allies off the continent because of Russian pressure in the East (Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 173–75).

54
The full text of the order is in
KTB OKW,
1943, 2: 1420–22; it is discussed in Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp. 124-26. The revised order of 15 Apr. is in
KTB OKW
, 1943, 2: 1425-28. A fine account of the operation in Ernst Klink, Den Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation "Zitadelle" 1943 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966).

55
Note Klink, p. 48.

56
On the new position of Guderian as Inspector General of Armored Forces on Feb. 28, 1943, see ibid., pp. 41–46.

57
Ibid., pp. 110–16 (Guderian sided with Model, pp. 140–43).

58
“Der Sieg von Kursk muss für die Welt wie ein Fanal wirken”
(KTB OKW,
1943, 2: 1425).

59
See Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 128–33; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
p. 97. For Hitler’s speech to the Army Group and army commanders on July t, 1943, see Klink, Operation “Zitacklle”, pp. 197-98. Very helpful, Timothy Mulligan, “Spies, Cyphers and ‘Zitadelle’ ”: Intelligence and the Battle of Kursk,” JCH 22 (1987), 235-60.