A World at Arms (217 page)

196
ADAP,
E, 5, No. 149.

197
See Tokyo to Oshima No. 250 of 16 Apr. 1943, and Oshima to Tokyo No. 444 of 19 Apr. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 34430–34.

198
Hans-Erich Volkmann, “Das Vlasov-Unternehmen zwischen Ideologie und Pragmatismus,”
MGM
2 pp. 125–29, (1972), and the documents cited there.

199
M.R.D. Foot,
Resistance: European Resistance to Nazism, 1940–1945
(New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1977), p. 319.

200
They certainly disregarded Franco’s plea to take account of Spanish culture in the Philippines (Suma [Madrid] to Tokyo No.9 of 4 Jan. 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 18649). A survey in Ienaga,
Pacific War,
chap. 8, is entitled “The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: Liberation or Exploitation?” and shows why the latter is the correct description.

201
An example is the situation in Burma, surveyed in Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, “Japanese-Burmese Relations,” 9 May 1945, NA, RG 457, SRH-074.

202
Note the analysis in Peter Herde, “Jose P. Laurel: Konservativer Katholizismus und Japanische Sozialphilosophie als philippinische Variante der ‘Neuen Ordnung’ in der ‘Grossostasiatischen Wohlstandsphare’ (1942–1945),” in Sabine Weiss (ed.),
Historische Blickpunkte: Festschrift fur Johann Rainer
(Innsbruck: Amoe, 1988), p. 269.

10: MEANS OF WARFARE: OLD AND NEW

1
One of the best semi-fictional books on World War II, Kurt Emmrich (pseud. Peter Bamm),
The Invisible Flag
(New York: Day, 1956, and other eds.), records the adventures of a German medical company on the Eastern Front which generally relied on horse transport. A general survey in Di Nardo,
Mechanized Juggernaut.

2
Fritz Hahn,
Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres
19JJ-1945
2 vols. (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe, 1986-87), 191-94. For other German monster guns, see ibid., 2: 107-9. Dora’s use at Sevastopol is reviewed in Chapter 8.

3
An account in Groehler, “Die ‘Hochdruckpumpe’,” pp. 738–44. The installation in France from which London was to be bombarded by this weapon was wrecked by Allied bombers on July 6, 1944.

4
Von Senger und Etterlin,
German Tanks of World War II,
pp. 29–31. Such tanks were still used by the Germans in the final defense of Berlin.

5
Hahn, 2: 45–47.

6
See ibid., pp. 89–91. The various monster tanks would, if built, have been untransportable by train and too heavy for practically all the bridges then in place or being built by German engineers.

7
An excellent account in John J. Sweet,
Iron Arm: The Mechanization of Mussolini’s Army,
1920–1940
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1980).

8
This is repeatedly stressed by Hinsley,
Bn’tish Intelligence.
See the study by David Fletcher,
The Great Tank Scandal: British Armor in the Second World War,
of which Part 1 (London: HMSO, 1989) has appeared.

9
See the
Statistical Digest of the War
in the British official series, p. 148.

10
Charles H. Bailey,
Faint Praise: American Tanks and Tank Destroyers during World War II
(Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1983). Also useful, R.P. Hunnicutt,
Sherman: History of the American Medium Tank
(San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978).

11
Note the favorable comments in Keegan,
Six Armies in Normandy,
pp. 197-98.

12
John Milsom,
Russian Tanks,
1900–1970
(London: Arms and Armor, 1970).

13
See Donald B.
Mc Kean,Japanese Tanks, Tactics and Antitank Weapons
(Wickenburg, Ariz.: Normount Technical Publications, 1973).

14
The closest German plane in general use was a military version of a civilian plane, the FW 200 “Condor.” On German projects for long-range bombers, see Horst Boog, “‘Baedeker-Angriffe’” und Fernstflugzeugprojekte 1942: Die strategische Ohnmacht der and Strategic Bombing,”
Journal of Strategic Studies
1 (1978), 125–33.

15
There is excellent material on the British problems in developing sound air–armycooperation in PRO, PREM 3/119/8.

16
See William A.B. Douglas,
Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force
(Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1986), 2: 293.

17
See Great Britain, Air Ministry, Air Historical Branch, “Balloon Defences, 1914–1945: The Development and Employment of Balloon Barrages with Particular Reference to the Work of Balloon Command, Royal Air Force,” Royal Air Force Monograph (First Draft), London [1945?], PRO, AIR 41/1.

18
it can be argued that the 18.11nch gun carrying Japanese super-battleships
Yamato
and
Musashi,
discussed below, constituted a new type. Had there been a fleet action, as the Japanese originally intended, instead of Yamamoto’s Pearl Harbor scheme, this would probably have been demonstrated with disastrous results for the Americans. See Malcolm Muir, Jr., “Rearming in a Vacuum: United States Naval Intelligence and the Japanese Capital Ship Threat, 1936–1945,”
Journal of Military History
54 (1990), 473–85.

19
A useful survey in Kahn,
Hitler’s Spies.
On German agents in Latin America, see Hilton,
Hitler’s Secret War.
A systematic German wartime operation destroyed records of agent operations in the United States as well as in parts of Latin America; note German Minister in Santiago to Berlin No. 926 of 2 Aug. 1942, AA, St.S., “U.S.A.,” Bd. 1I, fr. 39204–5.

20
The 1945 account of John C. Masterman,
The Double-Cross System in the War -of
1939
to
1945 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1972), was prepared for publication
before the release of information about the Allied breaking into German enigma machine codes. It must, therefore, be read with the understanding that the "secret sources" repeatedly mentioned were derived from code-breaking. There are very substantial additional details in Hinsley, British Intelligence, 4 and 5. The process of turning German agents continued with those left behind in the areas liberated in the West in 1944; see Nigel West, The Circus: MI5 Operations 1945-1972 (New York: Stein & Day, 1984), pp. 24-25.

21
Elyesa Bazna (with Hans Nogly),
I was Cicero
(New York: Harper & Row, 1962). A puzzle which awaits resolution is whether the British found out, or could have found out, about this leak from reading reports from the German embassy in Ankara, which sent them by radio and not always with the highest security classification (including references to Cicero). Relevant documents are in AA, 5t.S., “Türkei,” Bd. 9, including a 17 Nov. 19431tem which refers to Cicero documents and carries only a “geheim” classification (fr. 41768–70). For material from the Cicero documents in the diary of Alfred Jod I for September 1944 see the transcript in the Imperial War Museum, AL 930/4–3, f. 38. The continued British-American secrecy concerning the “Floradora” documents, the fruit of the breaking of German diplomatic codes, makes any even reasonably accurate assessment of questions like the one raised by the Cicero affair impossible. Hinsley, 4: 213–15, downplays the whole matter.

22
West,
SIGINT,
pp. 241–42; Hinsley, 4: Appendix 14.

23
This was best, or worst, illustrated in France; see Robert Marshall,
All the King’s Men.
The similarity between the rivalries of intelligence agencies in Germany, Britain and the U.S. in World War II simply cries out for a comparative analysis.

24
On the Oslo document, see Andrew,
HM Secret Service,
p. 433; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
1: Appendix 5 and numerous references in this and other volumes. Reginald V. Jones,
Reflections on Intelligence
(London: Heinemann, 1989), pp. 319–27, identifies the author as Hans Ferdinand Mayer (I am indebted to Richard Breitman for calling this work to my attention).

25
See Joseph E. Persico,
Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents During World War II
(New York: Viking, 1978).

26
Note those submitted by Donovan to Roosevelt (in French) in FDRL, PSF Box 165, 055 Donovan Reports 7–13; and Donovan to Roosevelt, Memorandum No. 566, 29 May 1942, Box 166, 055 Donovan #12.

27
Barry M. Katz,
Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services,
1942–1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1989).

28
The activities of Kolbe, code-named George Wood, and whose material is referred to in documents as “Boston” (Kappa) material, await scholarly investigation. See also Foot,
Resistance,
pp. 218–19; Klemens von Klemperer,
German Resistance against Hitler: The Struggle for Allies Abroad,
1938–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 321–23; Donovan to Roosevelt, 15 Apr. 1944, FDRL, Map Room Box 163, Naval Aide Intelligence A-8–2.

29
The huge file is in NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 1431, File: Polish
OIB
Intelligence. Recent changes in Poland may open the way for a review of Polish intelligence, combining information from both inside and outside the country.

30
Note the comments by the Finnish charge in Lisbon reported by the U.S. naval attache there on 31 July 1943, NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 1311, File 6000-Germany. For an example of information provided by the Hungarian Minister to the British Minister in Stockholm in Feb. 1944, see C 2946/1343/12, PRO, FO 371/38941. There were also minimal low-level German-British contacts which both sides tried to use for intelligence purposes; see Bern to Berlin NO.1164 of 14 Apr. 1944, AA, St.S., “Ungarn,” Bd. 11, fro 110140–42.

31
On Japanese intelligence, see Walter T. Hitchcock (ed.),
The Intelligence Revolution: A
Historical Perspective (Washington: GPO, 1991), section 3.

32
Ulrich Sahm,
Rudolf von Scheliha
1897–1942:
Ein deutscher Diplomat gegen Hitler
(Munich: Beck, 1990).

33
Boog,
Luftwaf Jenf Uhrung,
p. 81.

34
Heinz Hahne,
Codeword: “Direktor”: The St01J! of the Red Orchestra,
trans. by Richard Barry (New York: Coward, Mc Cann & Georghegan, 1971), pp. 148–49, 165–67, 191, 202; and
The Rote Kapelle: The CM’s History of Soviet Intelligence and Espionage Networks in Western Europe,
1936–1945 (\Vashington: University Publications of America, 1979), are among the more useful. it is quite possible that the main source of “Lucy” (Rudolf Roessler) was the Swiss general staff, which used him to pass information to the Soviet Union. See also Richard Aldrich, “Soviet Intelligence, British Security and the End of the Red Orchestra: The Fate of Alexander Rado,”
Intelligence and IVational Security
6 (1991), 196–217.

35
The most reliable books are Prange,
Target Tokyo
and Johnson,
An Instance of Treason.
In the
Kido Dia1J!
(p. 333) Sorge is referred to as Zolge.

36
The Lissner story awaits serious study. See
ADAP,
E, 2, Nos. 83, 94; Shigemitsu to Berlin No. 426 of 15 June 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 38584; Stahmer to Berlin No. 1757 of 5 June 1943, AA, St.S., “japan,” Bd. 12, fro E 489973–74; and documents in the file AA, Inland IIg, “Namen Le-Li,” fro 437798, 437802, 437864–67.

37
Useful works include Chapman Pincher,
Too Secret Too Long
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1984); John Costello,
Mask of Treachery
(New York: Morrow, 1989); Hitchcock (ed.),
The Intelligence Revolution,
pp. 251ff.

38
West, SIGINT, pp. 232–33.

39
On exchanges about low-level German Air Force codes, see documents in PRO, AIR 20/2766. See also J. Dane Hartgrove (ed.),
The OSS-NKVD Relationship,
1943–1945
(New York: Garland, 1989).

40
See documents in PRO, AIR 20/2075; Donovan to Roosevelt, 22 Feb. 1944, FDRL, Map Room, Naval Aide Intelligence A-8–2.

41
Crankshaw left for Russia on Sep. 19, 1941 (PRO, WO 165/38). On Churchill’s insistence, see Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaujklärung,
pp. 391, 393–94.

42
Most interesting is the British ADI (Science) Air Scientific Intelligence Report No. 131, “Air Technical Liaison between Germany and Japan,” of 16 Oct. 1944. A very fine analysis in John W. M. Chapman, “Signals Intelligence Collaboration among the Tripartite Pact States on the Eve of Pearl Harbor,”
Japan Forum
3, No.2 (Oct. 1991), 23 1–56.

43
Salewski, 2:
Seekriegsleitung, 95–96.

44
An especially good account of such operations may be found in the memoirs of a distinguished British woman Y-service officer, Aileen Clayton,
The Enemy is Listening
(London: Hutchinson, 1980). A file of RAF Wireless Intelligence Service “Periodical Summary” reports for Oct. 1939 - May 19411n PRO, AIR 20/335, provides some insight into the Y-system.

45
The best introduction remains Kahn,
Codebreakers,
supplemented by the same author’s collection,
Kahn on Codes: Secrets of the New Cryptology
(New York: Macmillan, 1983) and his
Seizing the Enigma.
Most helpful, but unfortunately not translated, are the materials collected in Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaujklärung.

46
A number of examples from the Allied side of the war in the Pacific are in Lewin,
American Magic
index p. 329. For examples of Japanese use of traffic analysis, see
Ugaki Diary,
pp. 322, 324.

47
Much information is summarized in Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaujklärung.
The point about
“Die deutsche Funkaufklarung im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Michalka (ed.),
Der Zweite Weltkrieg,
pp. 501–12; John W.M. Chapman, “Signals Intelligence in the Pacific,” pp.

48
Note OKM Skl Chef MNDB, “XB Bericht Nr. 2/42,” 16 Jan. 1942, f. 3, NA, RG 457, SRS 548/12; Nigel \Vest,
SICINT,
pp. 163, 190–91.