A World at Arms (221 page)

60
Soviet preparations are covered in detail by Erickson and in more summary form by Ziemke. See also Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 154–63. On the Eastern Front from Leningrad south about three million Germans and 350,000 Hungarians and Romanians with 2000 tanks faced close to six million Soviet soldiers with over 8000 tanks (figures in Ziemke, p. 144).

61
An excellent account in Charles W. Sydnor, Jr.,
Soldiers of Destruction: The
SS
Death’s Head Division,
1933–1945 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 281-90.

62
Ibid., pp. 291 ff recounts the subsequent operations of the SS divisions which were sent to Italy; in the event, two of the three remained on the Eastern Front and only one was actually transferred to Italy.

63
Hitler’s comments to the Japanese ambassador on Oct. 3, 1943, exaggerated the situation but are nevertheless of interest; see Oshima’s 1186 of 4 Oct. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 43965-69 (no German record of this conversation has been found, ADAP, E, 7, No. 15 n 5).

64
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
chap. 8; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 121 ff; Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 165–79, 182–86, 216–21.

65
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
chaps. 9–10; Glantz, pp. 186–216, 243–49, 258–78.

66
Very useful is Ingeborg Fleischhauer,
Die Chance des Sonderfriedens.
She has worked in German, British, and U.S. archives, was able to obtain access to Swedish materials, and interviewed some of the key participants. Her use of intercepted Japanese telegrams is, however, based on the Magic Summaries, not the full collection of intercepts. Her interpretation differs from the one presented here in down–playing Soviet interest in the contacts. Schroder,
Bestrebungen,
surveys the 1942–43 contacts (pp. 25–32), but is very brief and uses none of the Japanese material. For additional information see Diether Krywalski (ed.), “Zwei Niederschriften Ribbentrop’s tiber die Personlichkeit Hitlers und die letzten Tage in Berlin," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 18 (1967), 739; Meskill, Hitler and Japan, PP. 414, 423; Harold Nicolson (ed.), The War Years, 1939-1945 (New York: Atheneum, 1967), PP. 277, 345; Bryant (ed.), Turn of
the Tide,
pp. 531, 535; Stockholm to Tokyo No. 156 of 9 June 1943, NA, RG 457, SRA 02022–23; Tokyo to Berlin No. 757 of 14 Oct. 1942, SRDJ 27253, and No. 29 of 12 Jan. 1943, SRDJ 30140; Oshima to Tokyo Nos. 549 of 21 May, 858 of 4
Aug., 1142 of 25 Sep. and 1185 of 4 Oct. 1943, SRDJ 37447–52, 41430–31, 4348691 and 43769–74; Bukarest to Tokyo No. 37 of 20 Mar. 1943, SRDJ 33451; Burkner to Wagner, 28 Dec. 1950, and Burkner to Lutz, 14 July 1953, BA/MA, Nachlass Bürkner, N 565/5 and 9; Karl Werner Dankwort, “Infernalische Reise,” a post-war memoir in AA, Dankwort Nachlass; Scheidt Papers in Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, B 2, f. 267; Ribbentrop to Stahmer No. 847 of 25 May 1943, AA, St.S., “Japan,” Bd. 12, fro 17248–52; U.S. War Department G-2 documents in NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 3481 File 690o-Peace. Some British documents in Admiralty to Foreign Office, 16 Aug. 1943, C 6896/155/18, PRO, FO 371/34449; War Cabinet 129
⁴³
of 20 Sep. 1943, CAB 65/35; Dill to Brooke, 16 and 22 Oct. 1943, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/38.

On German knowledge of Italian-Japanese cooperation in urging a separate peace with the Soviet Union as well as greater concessions in occupied areas gathered from Italian documents seized after the German occupation of Rome, see Memorandum of Hencke, “PI XI 222Ig Rs,” 21 Oct. 1943, AA, St.S., “Italien,” Bd. 18, fr. 70822X-25X.

67
Note Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
pp. 413–17; Memorandum by Colonel Harvey H. Smith, “Possible Developments on the Soviet-German Front,” 20 Sep. 1943, NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 1419 File 6900 Peace. See the conversation Kawahara-Hencke of 7 Sep. 19431n which the former argued that Germany and Japan should take advantage of the split among the Allies the way Germany had done in the summer of 1939, when the Soviet Union had faced the choice between making sacrifices for the West and making an agreement with Germany and had settled for the latter
(ADAP,
E, 6, No. 288). Earlier the Japanese had speculated that the Russians might simply stop when they reached their old border and let their allies carry the rest of the fight (precisely the possibility which greatly worried the British); see Tokyo to Berlin No. 98 of 13 Feb. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 31415–16.

68
See Goebbels’ diary for 8 May, 10 Sept. and 23 Sep. 1943 (currently available in the Lochner edition but soon to be published by Frohlich in the complete German edition); Oshima to Tokyo No. 858 of 4 Aug. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 41430–37. On Nov. 17, 1943, Hitler told Rosenberg to keep his most effective administrators of the evacuated territories in the East in reserve for a possible redeployment (Memorandum by Albrecht of Bormann’s staff, BA, R 43 II/684, f. 4).

69
OSS, “Memorandum for the Planning Group,” 29 July 1943, FDRL, Map Room Box 78, File MR 210(3), National Committee for Free Germany; John C. Wiley to Roosevelt, I I Aug. 1943, FDRL, PSF Box 167, OSS Donovan, 1941, 1943; Sato (Kuibyshev) to Tokyo No. 906 of 12 Aug. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 42041–42; Tokyo Circular No. 74 of 12 Aug. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRA 02707–8; Clark Kerr to London No. 53 of 22 Oct. 1943, PRO, PREM 3/11/10; Fleischhauer,
Sonderfrieden,
p. 172; Bodo Scheurig,
Freies Deutschland: Das Nationalkomitee und der Bund deutscher Offiziere in der Sowjetunion
1943–1945 (Cologne: Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 1984); James Donald Carnes,
General zwischen Hitler und Stalin: Das Schicksal des Walter
V.
Seydlitz,
trans. Friedrich Forstmeier (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1980). Kai P. Schoenhals,
The Free Germany Movement: A Case of Patriotism or Treason?
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), is interesting but marred by a complete lack of appreciation of the situation in Soviet prisoner of war camps and in post-war Soviet-occupied Germany.

70
Maurice Matloff,
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warftre,
1943–44, (Washington: GPO, 1959), chaps. 5, 6, 8; Stoler,
Politics of the Second Front
, chaps. 6–7. Stimson’s memoranda are in FDRL, Map Room, Box 164, Naval Aide’s File. Before the conference, Churchill had sent Roosevelt the British diplomatic report showing that the Soviets were almost certainly responsible for Katyn. The text is published in Kimball (ed.),
Churchill and Roosevelt
, 2: 389–99; Roosevelt initialled and dated the covering letter, an unusual action on his part.

71
Hamilton (
Monty,
2: 71–73, 253, 422ft) presents the evidence on this but without ever

72
See Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
pp. 413–17.

73
A fine summary in Matloff,
Strategic Planning
1943–44, pp. 168–73. Criticism of Morgan and his plans overlooks the key point: if you never began work on a plan, you were never likely to get an invasion started. For an account which stresses the key role of COSSAC in really getting Overlord moving forward, see Kent Roberts Greenfield,
American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1963), p. 42.

74
Stoler,
Politics of the Second Front,
chap. 8.

75
On the British disaster and German victory in the Aegean in 1943, see Matloff,
Strategic Planning
1943–44, pp. 253–59; Stoler, pp. 124–28, 131; Lamb,
Churchill as War Leader,
chap. 18. On this occasion, Brooke, partly out of concern about the likely American reaction, tried hard but unsuccessfully to restrain Churchill. The most recent detailed account, Jeffrey Holland,
The Aegean Mission: Allied Operations in the Dodecanese
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), is very critical of Churchill’s role.

76
Matloff,
Strategic Planning
1943–44, pp. 225–27.

77
Danchev,
Very Special Relationship,
pp. 108–10, cites the relevant evidence (much of which is in PRO, PREM 3/53/3). The objection appears to have been based on the belief, possibly erroneous, that Douglas was anti-American. In any case, the endless prolongation of the argument by Churchill was surely unwise; Dill helped straighten it out.

78
Brooke, who had wanted Douglas, “still considered that he [Mountbatten] lacked balance for such a job” (Diary, 15 Aug. 1943, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers). Montgomery, on the other hand, thought the appointment a good one (Montgomery to Brooke, 3 Sep. 1943, ibid., folder 14/24).

79
On the Lumsden appointment, see Matloff,
Strategic Planning
1943–44, p. 238. Lumsden’s report on his first meeting with MacArthur together with a letter to Brooke of 22 Nov. 1943 is in PRO, WO 216/96. He was killed when a kamikaze struck the battleship
New Mexico
on 6 Jan. 1945. MacArthur had become good friends with Lumsden (see James,
The Years of MacArthur,
p. 619); the latter was replaced by General St. Clair Gairdner who also developed an excellent relationship with MacArthur. Simultaneously with the Lumsden appointment, General Carton de Wiart was appointed to represent Churchill with Chiang Kai-shek (an interesting parallel!); see his memoirs,
Happy Odyssey
(London: Cape, 1950), chaps. 18–19.

80
Hastings,
Bomber Command,
pp. 241–46; Saward,
“Bomber” Harris,
pp. 208–11; Murray,
Luftwaffe,
pp. 162–64; Gordon Musgrove,
Operation Gomorrah: The Hamburg Firestorm Raids
(New York: Jane’s, 1981); Martin Middlebrook,
The Battle ofHamburg: Allied Bomber Forces against a German City in 1943
(New York: Scribner’s, 1981); Norman Longmate,
The Bombers: The RAF against Germany,
1939–1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1983), chap. 19; Hans Brunswig,
Feuersturm über Hamburg
(Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1978).

81
Summary in Murray, Luftwaffe, p. 199. Silly in its political and historical portions but useful for its documents, Werner Dettman,
Die Zerstörung Kassels im Oktober
1943:
Eine Dokumentation
(Kassel: Hesse, 1983).

82
For the argument that the attacks on Berlin were a mistake and a failure, see Hastings,
Bomber Command,
pp. 306ff;’ Murray,
Luftwaffe,
pp. 199–206; Longmate, chap. 20 (now reinforced by Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 301–3). For a carefully reasoned defense of the attacks, see Saward,
“Bomber” Hams,
pp. 219–25. See also the “Streng vertraulicher Informationsbericht tiber Berlin, Die Lage nach den drei Grossangriffen," 3 Dec. 1943, BA, ZSg. 115/7; Gordon Musgrove,
Pathfinder Force: A History of 8 Group
(London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1976). For a German account, very dubious in parts, see Werner Girbig,
Im Anfiug auf die Reichshauptstadt
(Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1970), pp. 59–41.

83
See Boog,
Luftwaffenj Uhrung,
p. 260; Murray,
Luftwaffe,
pp. 174–77.

84
Collier,
Defence,
p. 339; Hinsley, 3/1: 375; Murray,
Luftwaffe,
p. 173; Saward, pp. 211–12.

85
Murray,
Luftwaffe,
pp. 176–77,214. With less experienced pilots and fewer training flight hours, the accident rate also rose. From 1941 through 1944 between 40 and 45 percent of German air force total losses were due to
non-combat
causes.

86
Ibid., pp. 178–82, 215–18.

87
On Schweinfurt, see Thomas M. Coffey,
Decision over Schweinfurt: The U.S. 8th Air Force Battle for Daylight Bombing
(New York: Mc Kay, 1977); Friedhe Im Golticke,
Schweinfurt und der strategische Luftkrieg
1943:
der Angriff der U.S. Air Force vom
14.
Oktober
1943
gegen die Schweinfurter Kugellagerindustrie
(Paderborn: Schoningh, 1988); Martin Middlebrook,
The Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission
(New York: Scribner, 1983). See also Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 293–96, 308–16; Murray,
Luftwaffe,
pp. 164–68.

88
Boog,
Luftwaffenj Uhrung,
p. 145.

89
On Ntirnberg, see Murray,
Luftwaffe,
pp. 206–9; Hastings,
Bomber Command,
pp. 318-

90
On Ploesti, see Murray,
Luftwaffe,
p. 169; Leon Wolff,
Low Level Mission
(New York: Arno Press, 1972 [1957]). There is a very useful chart of U.S. 8th Air Force heavy bomber crews and planes and losses in Murray, p. 170; his analysis of British bomber losses is in ibid., pp. 210–11.

91
The text of the final approved plan for the defeat of the Axis of Aug. 24, 1943, is in Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 650–53.

92
The British files on the issue of what to pass on to Moscow about the Overlord plans, PRO, WO 106/4161 –62, include much discussion of the Soviet refusal to reciprocate with information about their own military plans. The record for the fall of 1943 also reflects the remaining tentativeness in the British commitment to Overlord.

93
The best record at present is Keith Sainsbury,
The Turning Point: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek,
1943,
The Moscow, Cairo and Teheran Conferences
(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985), chaps. 1–4. My account does not always follow Sainsbury’s interpretation. See also Stoler,
Politics of the Second Front,
pp. 128–32. The question of Austria is discussed in the work of Robert H. Kayserlingk,
Austria in World War II: An Anglo-American Dilemma
(Kingston and Montreal: Mc Gill-Queen’s Univ. Press, 1988).

94
Note Lisbon to Tokyo No. 568 of 24 Oct. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRA 08127–28.

95
Stoler,
Politics of the Second Front,
pp. 130–32; Madoff,
Strategic Planning
1943–44, p. 302; Sainsbury, pp. 63, 96. The key document is Churchill to Eden, 20 Oct. 1943, T 1677/3, PRO, CAB 120/412. This action of Churchill must be seen in connection with his order of the preceding day for a secret study of operations in the Mediterranean if the British commitments to the U.S. on Overlord could be modified (Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1 : 15).