A World at Arms (218 page)

49
The question is discussed at length in Beesly,
Very Special Intelligence,
and Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaujklärung.
The changeover is reflected in OKM Skl Chef MNDIII, “XB-Bericht Nr. 24/43,” 17 July 1943, f. 5, NA, RG 457, SRS 548/ 15.

50
OKM Skl Chef MNDIII, “XB-Bericht Nr. 37/43,” 16 Sep. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRS 548/ 16 .

51
Santoni,
Ultra siegt im Millelmeer,
pp. 64–65; Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaujklärnng,
p. 107; Steengracht, "St.S. Nr. 277," 3 June 1943, AA, St.S., "Aufzeichnungen über nicht-Diplomatenbesuche," Bd. 2, fr. 371875-77.

52
Woermann Memorandun1, “U.St.S.Pol. Nr. 600g Rs.,” 28 Sep. 1942, AA, St.S., “Italien,” Bd. 10, fr. 125074–75; Woermann Memorandum “V.St.S.Pol. Nr.64 g Rs,” 26 Jan. 1943, ibid., Bd. 12, fr. 123858–59.

53
“Zusammenstellung der F[orschungs]A[mt]-Meldungen über ungarische Bemühungen urn ein Abrücken vom Bündnis mit dem Reich (15.6.-30.9.43),” 30 Sep. 1943, AA, St.S., “Ungarn,” Bd. 10, fr. 106683–87; related documents are in the same file, fr. 106688–93, and Bd. I I, fr. 109770–82.

54
Kahn,
Codebreakers,
pp. 469–70.

55
Santoni,
Ultra siegt im Millelmeer,
pp. 60ff.

56
Ibid., pp. 64–65; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
5: 65; Kahn,
Codebreakers,
pp. 472–77; Gordon Welchman,
The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes
(New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1982), pp. 234–35. Examples of Fellers’s signals decyphered by the Germans are in Hans-Otto Behrendt,
Rommel’s Intelligence in the Desert Campaign,
1941-
1943 (London: William Kimber, 1985), Appendix II.

57
Mackensen to Berlin No. 2451 of 25 May 1943, AA, St.S., “Italien,” Bd. 13, fr. 124411. See also the discussion of this in Chapter 9, above.

58
A survey in Kahn,
Codebreakers,
pp. 579–85; see also Chapman, “Signals Intelligence in the Pacific.”

59
Thus the Americans learned from an intercept of a Japanese telegram of 9 Mar. 1944 of the Japanese reading a report by the Chinese ambassador in London on his meeting with Eden on March 3 (Tokyo Circular 938 of 9 Mar. 1944, trans. 13 Mar., NA, RG 457, SRA 07510).

60
See the extensively “sanitized” page 2 of the “Magic” Far East Summary No. 224 of 30 Oct. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRS 224.

61
Kahn,
Codebreakers,
p. 582.

62
Lewin,
American Magic,
p. 245.

63
In addition to the numerous specific documents from the SRDJ, SRA and other series cited in notes throughout this book, there are several articles by Professor Carl Boyd, who is preparing a book on the subject of Allied knowledge about Europe from intercepted Japanese reports.

64
See Oshima to Tokyo No. 1349 of 10 Nov. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 45465–69; and Colonel Ito’s inspection report quoted in U.S., Army Security Agency, “Examples of Intelligence Obtained from Cryptanalysis,” 1 Aug. 1946, SRH-066, f. 5–6.

65
See, e.g., the footnotes on SRDJ 33800 (a document of 26l\1ar. 1943), SRDJ 33941 (31 July 1942), and SRDJ 34050 (18 Jan. 1943). In addition, the documents intercepted often needed interpretation; see Leahy to Roosevelt, 23 Jan. 1944, FDRL, Map Room Box 163, Naval Aide Intelligence A-8–2.

66
Note Japanese military attache Lisbon to military attache Rome No. 360 of 1 July 1943, NA, RG 457, SRH 01629; Japanese military attache Budapest to military attache
Stockholm, 25 June 1944, SRA 07047–48 (sanitized); and the material about the OSS theft of Japanese code materials from their embassy in Lisbon cited in SRH-066, f. 7, and SRH 113.

67
Very helpful are the two books by Holmes,
Undersea Victory,
and
Double-Edged Secrets
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1979); a good survey in Lewin,
American Magic,
chap. 10.

68
Lewin,
American Magic,
pp. 195–96.

69
Kahn,
Codebreakers,
pp. 609–10; Morison,
US Naval Operations,
14: 319–30. Many of those who survived the week–longordeal, one of whom I had an opportunity to interview, were never the same afterwards.

70
Numerous examples of Willoughby’s underestimation of Japanese strength are included in the text. There is no evidence that MacArthur ever called him to account. The fairest summary may be in Lewin’s assessment,
American Magic,
pp. 147–49, 180–81.

71
Ibid., pp. 196–97. See also Alexander S. Cochran, “Mac Arthur, Ultra et la guerre en Pacifique, 1942–1944,"
Revue d’historie de la deuxieme guerre mondiale
, No. 133 Gan. 1984), 17–27. The Australian discovery of abandoned and not destroyed Japanese code materials is recounted in Drea,
Mac Arthur’s Ultra,
pp. 92–93, 226.

72
Some details in Lewin,
American Magic,
pp. 268ff. A detailed scholarly study of the fighting on Leyte utilizing the now available materials would be a major contribution to our understanding of the Pacific War.

73
it also uncovered such issues as last-minute German-Japanese cooperation in landing agents in India (Magic Far Eastern Summary No. 401, 25 Apr. 1945, and No. 407, 1 May 1945, NA, RG 457, SRS 401, 407).

74
West,
SIGINT,
p. 127.

75
Jean Stengers, “Enigma, the French, the Poles and the British, 1931–1940,” in Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds.),
The Missing Dimension: Governments and
Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century
(London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 126–37, 267–73; Kozaczuk,
Enigma;
Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/2: Appendix 30; Kahn,
Seizing
Enigma,
chaps. 3–9.

76
The best account of this process currently available is Gordon Welchman,
The Hut Six
Story.

77
On the seizure of German enigma materials, see Beesly,
Very Special Intelligence;
Kahn,
Seizing Enigma;
Hinsley, 3/2: 955. The capture of Italian materials is referred to in Santoni,
Ultra,
pp. 66–71, 101–2.

78
Andrew Boyle,
The Climate of Treason: Five Who Spied for Russia
(London: Hutchins, 1979), pp. 239–44. For examples of American reading of German diplomatic traffic, see NA, RG 457, SRH-066, f. 8–9. It was such a break in Oct. 1943 which led to the arrest of a key German agent in Argentina, Osmar Hellmuth (SRH-066, f. 8; Hinsley, 4: 203; Newton,
The “Nazi Menace” in Argentina,
chap. 16). See also von Klemperer,
German
Resistance,
pp. 321–23.

79
West,
SIGINT,
pp. 225–28; Lewin,
Ultra Goes to War,
pp. 131–32. Unlike the enigma with three or four rotors, the Geheimschreiber had ten and sent its code text directly by radio without a human transmitter. The details of how the Allies managed to break into this system remain closed.

80
David A.T. Stafford, “‘Ultra’ and the British Official Histories: A Documentary Note,”
Military Affairs
42, No. 1 (1978), 29–31.

81
Accounts by Hinsley, Kahn, Rohwer and Jäckel, Lewin, and Bennett supersede the early book by F.W. Winterbotham,
The Ultra Secret
(New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

82
Note the example of Crete, Santoni,
Ultra siegt i,n Mittelmeer,
pp. 246–47.

83
Ibid., pp. 85–99.

84
Ibid., pp. 255–56.

85
Ibid., p. 172.

86
NA, RG 457, SRH-066, f. 4–5.

87
Note Christopher Andrew’s comments in Hitchcock (ed.),
The Intelligence Revolution,
pp. 113ff.

88
For an example of an ultra supplement at Hyde Park see FDRL, Map Room Box 127, MR 450(4) Enemy Raidei’s (a 10 Dec. 1942 document declassified at my request on 7 Oct. 1975). For American practice in general, see NA, RG 457, RHH-I07. Very helpful, David Kahn, “Roosevelt, MAGIC, and ULTRA,” in Kent (ed.),
Historians and Archivists,
pp. 115–44.

89
Note Roosevelt to Knox, copies to Stimson, Leahy, FCC Chairman Fly, 7 Sep. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRMN-7.

90
A good summary of the problem in Santoni,
Ultra,
pp. 252–53.

91
This is the conference recorded in Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaufklärung.
The author discussed the point with several of the German participants. See also Kahn,
Seizing Enigma,
pp. 202–3, 205–7, 213, 260–62.

92
This point is repeatedly and effectively made by Welchman. The whole question of the extent to which the Soviets broke German machine cyphers in World War II, captured some of the machines, and used their knowledge remains open. For some discussion of the subject, see the exchange between Geoff Jukes and Ralph Erskine in
Intelligence and National Security
4 (1989), 374–84, 503–11.

93
A survey in Thomas L. Cubbage II’s piece in Michael L. Handel (ed.),
Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War
(London: Frank Cass, 1987), pp. 327–46. See also Hinsley,
British Intelligence,S:
chap. 6.

94
Welchman,
The Hut Six Story,
pp. 240–41.

95
See John P. Campbell’s piece in Handel (ed.), pp. 92–113; Hinsley,s: 76ff. For the serious effects of this disaster on the SOE and on French resistance networks, see Marshall,
All the King’s Men.

96
Hinsley, 3/1: 119–21, 5: 89–92. I do not find Klaus-Jurgen Muller’s argument on this (Handel, pp. 3o7ff) convincing. At the key point (p. 324 n 36), he relies on the notoriously unreliable David Irving for his evidence.

97
Katherine L. Herbig in Handel, pp. 263–64.

98
Ibid., pp. 265–78.

99
The best account in Rolf-Dieter Muller, “Die deutschen Gaskriegvorbereitungen 1919–1945: Mit Giftgas zur Weltmacht?”
MGM
27, No. 1 (1980), 25–54. See also Hahn,
Waffin und Geheimwaffin,
1: 227–30; Harris and Paxman,
A Higher Form of Killing,
chap. 3. The account in Gellermann,
Der Krieg der nicht stattfand,
is not reliable and has been effectively challenged in the review by Rudibert Kunz
(A1GM,
44, No.2 [1988], 201–5).

100
Rolf-Dieter Muller, “Gaskriegsvorbereitungen”, pp. 44–45; Harris and Paxman,A
Higher Form of Killing,
p. 64. On British ignorance, see Hinsley, 2: 119–21.

101
Such warnings had been issued in May 1942 and April 1943; see documents in PRO, AIR 8/449. An implementing plan for that contingency of 9 July 19431s in AIR 20/27; further documents are in AIR 20/6112. Note the report that Hungarian Regent Horthy had urged the use of gas on the Eastern Front (Dornberg memorandum of 20 Apr. 1942, AA, St.S., “Ungarn,” Bd. 6, fr. 104879–94).

102
Hahn,
Waffen und Geheimwaffen,
1: 235.

103
The formal consideration of gas use began with War Cabinet 8(44) of 18 June 1944 (PRO, CAB 65/41). See also Jones,
Reflections,
pp. 251–55.

104
The statistics in Harris and Paxman, pp. 155ff, overstate the size of the American stockpile, because the authors fail to take into account that all smoke bombs and shells were included in the figures, since these too came under the jurisdiction of the Chemical Corps. See Brooks E. Kleber and Dale Birdsall,
The Chemical Warfare Seroice: Chemicals
in Combat (Washington: GPO, 1966).

105
Harris and Paxman, p. 117; John Ellis van Courtland Moon, “Chemical Warfare: A
Forgotten Lesson,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
45, No.6 (1989), 40–43, and “Project SPHINX: The Question of the Use of Gas in the Planned Invasion of Japan,”
Journal of Strategic Studies
12 (1989), 303–23.

106
Glenn B. Infield,
Disaster at Bari
(New York: Macmillan 1971, Ace Book, 1973).

107
A preliminary account in Yuki Tanaka, “Poison Gas: The Story Japan Would Like to Forget,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
44, No.8 (1988), 10–19. See also Ienaga,
Pacific War,
pp. 187, 239.

108
Louis Allen,
Burma: The Longest War
1941–1945 (London: Dent, 1984), pp. 301–2. Note the reference to the discontinuing of “hand thrown self–exploding bottles” in an intercepted Japanese circular of 15 July 1944, Warren F. Kimball (ed.),
Churchill and Roosevelt
, 3: 256.

109
Professor Reinhard R. Doerries has been trying to penetrate this veil. See his
Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count BernstorfJ and German-American Relations
, 1908–1917 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 189.

110
See Stockholm, International Peace Research Institute,
The Problems of Chemical and Biological Warfare,
vol. I,
The Rise of CB Weapons
(New York: Humanities Press, 1971).

111
Harris and Paxman,
A Higher Form of Killing,
chap. 4; Jones,
Reflections,
pp.2SI-SS. Barton J. Bernstein, “Churchill’s Secret Biological Weapons,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43
(1987), 46–50, uses important British materials but is marred by his vehement bias against Churchill. More reliable, Julian Lewis,
Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence,
1942–1947 (London: Sherwood Press, 1988), pp. 211–14, Appendix 8.

112
A pioneering work on the subject is Peter Williams and David Wallace,
Unit
731:
Japan’s Secret Biological Warfare in World War II
(New York: Free Press, 1989). It does, however, contain much speculation set forth as facts.

113
An excellent survey of the projects in Holsken, “Die V-Waffen”, pp. 95–122. See also Hahn,
Waffen und Geheimwaffen,
2: I62ff.

114
Holsken, p. 116.

115
On British efforts to deceive the Germans as to the impact of V-2S, see Masterman,
The Double-Cross System,
p. 181.