A World at Arms (212 page)

91
Harry R. Rudin,
Annistice
1918 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1944) remains an excellent account. Raymond G. O’Connor,
Diplomacy for Victory: F.D.R. and Unconditional Surrender
(New York: Norton, 1971), pp. 4–5, suggests that Roosevelt, then Acting Secretary of the Navy, leaned toward a surrender demand in 1918. The best recent account is Lothar Kettenacker, “‘Unconditional Surrender’ als Grundlage der angelsachsischen Nachkriegsplanung,” in Wolfgang Michalka (ed.),
Der Zweite Weltkrieg: Analysen, Grundzuge, Forschungsbilanz
(Munich: Piper. 1989), pp. 174–88.

92
Note the draft by Robert Sherrod, dated 17 May 1944, giving the background of the

93
Sikorski’s account is quoted in Terry,
Poland’s Place in Europe,
p. 302. A minimally different translation is in \Vlodzimierz T. Kowalski, “The Western Powers and the Polish-
German Frontier during the Second World War (1943–45),”
Polish Western Affairs
6, No. 1 (1965), p. 91, but is there erroneously dated to Jan. 3, 1943. In any case, the choice of words obviously reflects World War I experience.

94
See O’Connor,
Diplomat)’ for Victory,
pp. 50–53. A careful examination of National the Unconditional Surrender formula had little resonance there; see Gunter Moltmann, “Nationalklischees und Demagogje: Die deutsche Amerikapropaganda im Zweiten

95
Note that in Mar. 1943 the British had, on reconsideration, once again rejected a cross-Channel operation as a replacement for the invasion of Sicily (Hinsley,
3
/1 :
3–4).

96
Mark A. Stoler, “The American Perception of British Mediterranean Strategy, 1941–1945,” in Craig L. Symonds (ed.),
New Aspects of Naval History
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1981), pp. 332–33; Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 454–59; Maurice Marloff,
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare,
1943–1944 (Washington: GPO, 1959), pp. 123–24

97
Brooke’s diary entry for 10 May 1943 as quoted in
Turn of the Tide,
p. 500, is very much toned down from the original entry at the Liddell Hart Centre.

98
On Trident, see Howard,
Grand Strategy,
4, chaps. 22–23; Stoler,
Politics,
chap. 7.

99
Howe,
Northwest Africa,
chaps. 20–22.

100
Ibid., pp. 366–67.

101
On the Kasserine Pass battle, see Howe, chaps. 23–24; Martin Blumenson, “Kasserine Pass, 30 January - 22 Feb. 1943,” in Charles E. Heller (ed.),
America’s First Battles,
1776-
1965 (Lawrence, Kans.: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1986), pp. 226–45, 394–97. On the disputed issue of intelligence before the battle, see Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 577–86; E. E. Mockler-Ferryman’s privately printed memoirs in the Imperial War Museum, p. 323, barely touches on the subject.

102
A summary in Howe, pp. 479–81,671–73.

103
See Alexander’s long, most secret, private and confidential letter to Brooke of 3 Apr. 1943, in Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers,
14/63.
Montgomery’s views are both cited and reflected in Hamilton’s
Monty, Master of the Battlefield,
1942–44.

104
Hinsley, 2: 593–95; Hamilton,
Monty, Master,
pp. 152–70.

105
Hinsley, 2: 600–5.

106
Sir Francis de Guingand,
Operation Victory
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1947), pp. 248–49; Howe, chaps. 26–28; Hamilton,
Monty, Master,
pp. 182–207; Martin Blumenson,
Patton: The Man behind the Legend,
1885–1945 (New York: Berkley Books, 1987), p. 184. Because Patton was not satisfied with the handling of the 1st U.S. Armored Division in this operation, he replaced General Orlando Ward with General Ernest Harmon as division commander.

107
See David R. Mortensen,
A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support,
North Africa
(Washington: GPO, 1987). By this time, Allied control of the sea around Tunisia was also almost total; only about 800 Axis soldiers escaped across the Mediterranean (Santoni,
Ultra siegt im Mittelmeer,
p. 229).

108
Boog,
Luftwaffenf Uhrung,
pp. 25–26.

109
Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 437–40.

110
A summary in ibid., pp. 440–41; more detail in Harrison,
Soviet Planning in Peace and

111
Jurgen Forster,
Stalingrad: Risse im Bundnis,
1942/43 (Freiburg: Rombach, 1975), pp.
252
9;
ADAP
,
E, 2, No. 231,3, No. 85.

112
Wilhelm, “Die Prognosen der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost 1942-1945,” pp. 47–48. The erroneous summary of German army intelligence for the Eastern Front (OKHl FHO)
of 12 Nov. 1942 is printed in
KTB OKW,
1942, 2: 1306–7. For another, quite idiotic, assessment by Reinhard Gehlen, that agency’s chief, see ibid., p. 1283. Cf. Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 454–56.

113
Hitler’s references are summarized in Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
p. 456, and discussed in
DRuZW,
6: 1014.

114
Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 458–68.

115
Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
p. 469.

116
Ibid., pp. 453–72; Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 468–77.

117
The most complete examination of these matters in Manfred Kehrig,
Stalingrad: Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht
(Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1974), pp. 195–234; additional details in Johannes Fischer, “Uber den Entschluss zur Luftversorgung
und Dokumentation einer Schlacht
(Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1974), pp. 195–234; additional details in Johannes Fischer, “Uber den Entschluss zur Luftversorgung Stalingrad,” MGM 6 (1969), 7–67; more recently,
DRuZW
, 6: 1024ff.

118
See Boog,
Lufiwaffenfuhnmg,
p. 22 n 23 and p. 24.

119
Note Kehrig,
Stalingrad,
pp. 286–98.

120
The best statistics in ibid., p. 670. The table in Hans-Detlef Herhudt von Rohden,
Die Luftwaffe ring! um Stalingrad
(Wiesbaden: Limes, 1950), p. 100, gives a daily average of 96.16 tons. Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
p. 497, reads the evidence as showing that on one day, Dec. 2, 1942, the 300 ton figure was reached.

121
A few samples of Manstein’s distortions are noted in Kehrig, PP. 224, 39of, 395, 396; see also Ernst Alexander Paulus (son of the field marshal) to General Arthur Schmidt, 11 Nov. 1957, Nachlass Paulus, BA/MA, N 372/43, f. 131. Because of the sensitivity of the Stalingrad question in post-war Germany, Manstein worked as hard to distort the record on this matter as on his massive involvement in the murder of Jews.

122
See Kehrig,
Stalingrad,
p. 279.

123
For Hitler’s own view at this time there is the surviving, but damaged, record of the situation conference of Dec. 12, 1942 in Heiber,
Hillers Lagebesprechungen,
pp. 71–119.

124
On the relief operation, see Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 478–83; Kehrig, pp. 307ff. On Soviet countering of the relief effort, see Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 124–29.

125
Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 485–86; Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
pp. 449–50; Glantz, pp. 120–24.

126
On “Koltso,” see Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 492–502.

127
For personnel management, see Manfred Messerschmidt,
Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Zeit der Indoktrination
(Hamburg: Decker, 1969); Dermot Bradley and Richard Schulze-Kossens (eds.),
Tätigkeitsbericht des Chefs des Heerespersonalamtes General der Infanterie Rudolf Schmundt
(Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1984). The bribery system understandably does not figure prominently in the endless memoir literature of the recipients and has attracted little scholarly attention. For an introductory journalistic survey, see Peter Meroth, “Vorschuss auf den Endsieg,”
Stern
, 12 June 1980, pp. 8692; for detailed examination of a single case, see Gerhard L. Weinberg, “Zur Dotation an Generalfeldmarschall Ritter von Leeb,” MGM, No.2 (1979), pp. 97–99. The more general issues for both the Soviet Union and Germany are discussed in Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad
, pp. 506–10; Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad
, pp. 461–62.

128
On the disastrous defeat of 2d Hungarian Army, see Glantz, pp. 131–41; German military attaché Budapest (Pappenheim) to Berlin, “Unterredung mit ungar. Genstb.Chef iiber Versagen ungar. 2.Armee,” 1 Mar. 1943, AA, Handakten Ritter, “Verschiedenes I, 11,” fro 280665–70.

129
See Zeitzler’s comments in his papers, BA/MA, N 63/12, f. 69–71.

130
An account of the evacuation and its background in Friedrich Forstmeier,
Die Räumung des Kuban-Brückenkopfes im Herbst
1943 (Darmstadt: Wehr & Wissen, 1964).

131
Earl F. Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East
(Washington: GPO, 1968), pp. 85–94.

132
Ibid., pp. 90–97; John Erickson,
The Road to Berlin
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,

133
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 110–17; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 59–62.

134
Note Hugh R. Trevor-Roper (ed.),
The Bonnann Letters
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954), p. 6; Steinert,
Hitler’s War
pp. 184–215.

135
Peter Longerich (ed.), “Joseph Goebbels und der Totale Krieg: Eine unbekannte Denkschrift des Propagandaministers vom 18. Juli 1944,”
VjZ
35 (1987), 294–5 and 302 n 44. L. believes much of the effect of Goebbels’s push was lost as a result of the March victory at Kharkov (ibid., p. 296).

136
The best account in Forster,
Stalingrad,
pp. 46ff.

137
Ribbentrop to Killinger No. 737 of 11 Mar. 1843, AA, St.S., “Italien,” Bd. 12, fro 124028–29; Mackensen to Ribbentrop, No. 1916 of 23 Apr. 1943, AA, Botschaft Rom (Quir.), Geheim, Bd. 56/2, fro E 258342–44;
ADAP
, E, 5, No. 332.

138
Forster,
Stalingrad,
pp. 54ff. For German information on Hungary’s peace soundings, see the Forschungsamt summary of intercepts of 30 Sep. 1943 in AA, St.S., “Ungarn,” Bd. 10, fro 106683–87; also Woermann to Budapest No. 547 of 15 Mar. 1943, AA, St.S., “Ungarn,” Bd. 9, fro 106077–78.

139
On Italian efforts to urge a separate Axis-Soviet peace, see Forster,
Stalingrad,
pp. 54–57; Josef Schröder,
Bestrebungen zur Eliminierung der Ostfront
1941–1943 (Göttingen: No. 720 of 15 May 1943, AA, St.S., “Ttirkei,” Bd. 8, fro 41379–80; Zeitzler to Heinrici, 14 Jan. 1954, BA/MA, N 63/15, f. 50–51. Japanese telegrams concerning RG 457, SRDJ 32092–93, 32542–44, 34186–88, 34330–32, 34383–85, 39609, and

140
On the possibility of a Soviet-Finnish peace in the winter of 1942–43, see
ADAP
, E, 4, Nos. 116,263; Memorandum by Weizsäcker, 11 Nov. 1942, AA, St.S., “Russland,” Bd. 9, fro 33442–43, also St.S. No. 713 of 7 Dec. 1942, fro 33494; Memorandum by Weizsäcker, St.S. No. 155, 10 Mar. 1943, AA, St.S., “Aufzeichnungen über Diplomatenbesuche,” Bd. 13, fro 289947–48, also St.S. No. 204, 1 Apr. 1943, fro 289957–60, and St.S. No. 278, 3 June 1943, fro 289970–78; Blucher tel. No. 422 of 24 Feb. 1943, AA, Gesandtschaft Helsinki, “Drahtberichte
400–960,
1943,” fro H 062660; Maisky to Nos. 116,263; Memorandum by Weizsäcker, 11 Nov. 1942, AA, St.S., “Russland,” Bd. 9, fro 33442–43, also St.S. No. 713 of 7 Dec. 1942, fro 33494; Memorandum by Weizsäcker, St.S. No. 155, 10 Mar. 1943, AA, St.S., “Aufzeichnungen über Diplomatenbesuche,” Bd. 13, fro 289947–48, also St.S. No. 204, 1 Apr. 1943, fro 289957–60, and St.S. No. 278, 3 June 1943, fro 289970–78; Blucher tel. No. 422 of 24 Feb. 1943, AA, Gesandtschaft Helsinki, “Drahtberichte
400–960,
1943,” fro H 062660; Maisky to

141
On earlier Japanese interest in a German-Soviet separate peace, see Meskill,
Hitler and Japan,
pp. 409 n 3, 414;
ADAP
, E, 2, Nos. 4, 19, 48, 72, 78, 3, Nos. 255, 295; Memorandum by Weizsäcker, St.S. No. 671 of 14 Nov. 1942, AA, S1.S., “Japan,” Bd. 10, fro 17060–61; Japanese documents intercepted by the Americans in NA, RG 457, SRDJ 21456–61, 21747, 25705–6, 28403, 28744. After the Germans seized the files of the Italian Foreign Ministry in September 1943, they prepared an analysis of Italian-
Japanese joint efforts to urge a compromise peace on the Eastern Front, “Pol.XI 2221gRs.,” 21 Oct. 1943, AA, St.S., “Italien,” Bd. 18, fro 70822–25.

142
ADAP
, E, 4, No. 275, 5, Nos. 145 n 8, 188, 272 n 6, 318, 6, Nos. 12, 15, 16, 41; Memorandum by Weizsäcker, St.S. No. 701 of 27 Nov. 1942, AA, St.S., “Japan,” Bd. Bd. 12, fro 398593-94, and 847 of 25 May 1943, fro 17248–52; Schröder,
Bestrebungen,

143
It should be noted that the Japanese similarly overestimated German capabilities when they suggested in April 1943 that Germany reverse the tide in the Mediterranean by taking Gibraltar; see Seekriegsleitung to OKW, 17 Apr. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/254, f.

144
Oshima No. 1433 of 12 Dec. 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 28955–56 <;
ADAP
, E, 4, No.

145
Madrid No. 224 of 3 Mar. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 32477. On Dec. 21, 1942 Ambassador Sato in Kuibyshev had sent home a very clear survey of the real situation on the Eastern Front concluding that Germany had no chance of either succeeding or obtaining a compromise there, see his No. 121 I of 21 Dec. 1942, SRDJ 29486–88; cf. his No. 182 of 20 Feb 1943, SRDJ 32088-91. The conclusion of Tokyo was that there was much more optimistic
(Kido Diary,
12, 15 Feb. 1943, pp. 351–52). For Japanese criticism of the German 1943 plan to attack in the East, see Tokyo to Berlin No. 291 of 28 Apr. 1943, SRDJ 34892-98; Oshima’s assessment is in his No. 518 of 9 May 1943, his No. 182 of 20 Feb 1943, SRDJ 32088-91. The conclusion of Tokyo was that there 28 Apr. 1943, SRDJ 34892-98; Oshima’s assessment is in his No. 518 of 9 May 1943,