Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (85 page)

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7

Soviet Suspicions

Unconditional Surrender and Military Capitulation

— General Wolff Meets Mr. Allan Dulles in
Switzerland, March
8 —
A Second Meeting, March
19
— Molotov’s Insults
—
Eisenhower’s Anger —

My Minute of March
25 —
Stalin’s Telegram to the
President of April
3 —
Mr. Roosevelt’s Reproach,
April
5 —
My Telegram to Stalin of April
6 —
His
Replies, April
7
— The Semblance of an Apology

— Mr. Roosevelt’s Telegram of April
12.

W
HILE ALL THE VEXATIONS of the Soviet abandonment of the spirit of Yalta were the subject of the prolonged correspondence set forth in the preceding chapter, a far more bitter and important interchange was taking place between the British and American Governments and the Soviets. It has been advisable to recount these issues in separate chapters but it must not be forgotten that the events recorded reacted continually and forcibly upon each other.

By the middle of February the Nazis realised that defeat was near. The advance of the Soviet armies, Alexander’s victories in Italy, the failure of their counter-attack in the Ardennes, and Eisenhower’s march to the Rhine convinced all but Hitler and his closest followers that surrender was imminent and unavoidable. The question was, surrender to whom? Germany could no longer make war on two fronts.

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Peace with the Soviets was evidently impossible. The rulers of Germany were too familiar with totalitarian oppression to invite its importation from the East. There remained the Allies in the West. Might it not be possible, they argued, to make a bargain with Great Britain and the United States? If a truce could be made in the West they could concentrate their troops against the Soviet advance. Hitler alone was obstinate. The Third Reich was finished and he would die with it. But several of his followers tried to make secret approaches to the English-speaking Allies. All these proposals were of course rejected. Our terms were unconditional surrender on all fronts. At the same time our commanders in the field were always fully authorised to accept purely military capitulations of the enemy forces which opposed them, and an attempt to arrange this while we were fighting on the Rhine led to a harsh exchange between the Russians and the President, whom I supported.

In February General Karl Wolff, the commander of the S.S.

in Italy, had got into touch through Italian intermediaries with the American Intelligence Service in Switzerland. It was decided to examine the credentials of the persons involved, and the link was given the code-name

“Crossword.” On March 8 General Wolff himself appeared at Zurich, and met Mr. Allan Dulles, the head of the American organisation. Wolff was bluntly told that there was no question of negotiations, and that if the matter were pursued it could only be on the basis of unconditional surrender. This information was immediately conveyed to Allied Headquarters and to the American and British Governments. On March 15 General Airey and General Lemnitzer, the British and American Chiefs of Staff at Caserta, went in disguise to Switzerland, and four days later, on March 19, a second exploratory meeting was held with General Wolff.

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I realised at once that the Soviet Government might be suspicious of a separate military surrender in the South, which would enable our armies to advance against reduced opposition as far as Vienna and beyond, or indeed towards the Elbe or Berlin. Moreover, as all our fronts round Germany were part of the whole Allied war the Russians would naturally be affected by anything done on any one of them. If any contacts were made with the enemy, formal or informal, they ought to be told in good time. This rule was scrupulously followed. There was at no stage any question of concealing anything from the Russians. The Allied representatives then in Switzerland even explored ways of smuggling a Russian officer in to join them if the Soviet Government wished to send someone.

On March 21 Mr. Eden accordingly instructed our Ambassador in Moscow to inform the Soviet Government of these happenings. This he did. Next day Molotov handed him a written reply, which contained the following expressions:

In Berne for two weeks, behind the backs of the
Soviet Union, which is bearing the brunt of the war
against Germany, negotiations have been going on
between the representatives of the German military
command on the one hand and representatives of the
English and American commands on the other.

Sir Archibald Clark Kerr of course explained that the Soviet had misunderstood what had occurred and that these

“negotiations” were no more than an attempt to test the credentials and authority of General Wolff. Molotov’s comment was blunt and insulting. “In this instance,” he wrote, “the Soviet Government sees not a misunderstanding, but something worse.”

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In the face of so astonishing a charge it seemed to me that silence was better than a contest in abuse, and on March 24 I minuted to Mr. Eden:

Prime Minister to

24 Mar. 45

Foreign Secretary

For the moment these negotiations have dropped.

They may be reopened in a far more vital area than
Italy. In this military and political questions will be
intertwined. The Russians may have a legitimate fear of
our doing a deal in the West to hold them well back in
the East. On the whole it will be well to send no reply

[to Molotov] till we have checked up with Washington,
to whom you should repeat the Russian message.

At the same time it was necessary to warn our military commanders in the West. I accordingly showed Molotov’s insulting letter both to Montgomery and to Eisenhower, with whom I at this time was watching the crossing of the Rhine.

General Eisenhower was much upset, and seemed deeply stirred with anger at what he considered most unjust and unfounded charges about our good faith. He said that as a military commander he would accept the unconditional surrender of any body of enemy troops on his front, from a company to the entire Army, that he regarded this as a purely military matter, and that he had full authority to accept such a surrender without asking anybody’s opinion.

If however political matters arose he would immediately consult the Governments. He feared that if the Russians were brought into a question of the surrender of Kesselring’s forces what could be settled by himself in an hour might be prolonged for three or four weeks, with heavy losses to our troops. He made it clear that he would insist upon all the troops under the officer making the surrender Triumph and Tragedy

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laying down their arms and standing still until they received further orders, so that there would be no possibility of their being transferred across Germany to withstand the Russians. He would also at the same time advance through these surrendered troops as fast as possible to the East.

I thought myself that these matters should be left to his discretion, and that the Governments should only intervene if any political issues arose. I did not see why we should break our hearts if, owing to mass surrender in the West, we got to the Elbe, or even farther, before Stalin. Jock Colville reminds me that I said to him that evening, “I hardly like to consider dismembering Germany until my doubts about Russia’s intentions have been cleared away.”

I minuted to Mr. Eden on March 25:

Prime Minister to

20 Mar. 45

Foreign Secretary

Further reflection convinces me we should send no
answer to the insulting letter from Molotov. I presume
you have already sent a copy of it to the State
Department, pointing out, in no spirit of complaint, that
it was they who particularly wished that the Russians
should not come to Switzerland and that Alexander
should deal with the matter on a purely military basis. I
am sure the right thing now is to get absolutely in line
with the United States, which should be easy, and
meanwhile let Molotov and his master wait.

I agree with you that the whole question of the San
Francisco Conference hangs in the balance. The
sending of Gromyko instead of Molotov is a grimace. I
should suppose the President would be much offended
by this.

We have had a jolly day, having crossed the Rhine.

Tomorrow we go to the 15th Scottish Division, on the
other side. I should think it not at all unlikely that the
whole German front in the West may collapse and be
broken up into blobs. There is still hard fighting going
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on in the North, and the brunt again seems to come
from the left-hand hinge, which, as usual, we form.

And later on the same day:

Prime Minister to

25 Mar. 45

Foreign Secretary

… We should ask the United States where they
stand and whether they will now agree to a telegram
from the President and me to Stalin, and secondly
whether this should, as you say, cover other topics — e.

g., access to Poland, treatment of our prisoners,
imputations against our good faith about Berne,
Rumania, etc.

Molotov’s refusal to go to San Francisco is no doubt
the expression of the Soviet displeasure. We should put
it to Roosevelt that the whole question of going to San
Francisco in these conditions is called in question and
that quite definite forming up by Britain and the United
States against breach of Yalta understandings now is
necessary if such a meeting is to have any value.

However, I must say that we cannot press the case
against Russia beyond where we can carry the United
States. Nothing is more likely to bring them into line
with us than any idea of the San Francisco Conference
being imperilled. Could you let me have a draft on the
above lines on which I can send you back a personal

[message] to Roosevelt this time tomorrow? Meanwhile
no answer should be sent to any of the Russian
messages, even though the loss of time be prejudicial
to us. When we come back at them now it must be both
together. These matters will not be ripe for debate
before Easter.

We have had a glorious day here, and I hope the
consequences will be far-reaching. I am to see
Eisenhower tomorrow at his request. I showed
Montgomery Molotov’s rude message, as of course the
venue of the negotiations may easily be changed to his
theatre. I well understand the Russian anxiety lest we
should accept a military surrender in the West or South,
which means that our armies will advance against little
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or no opposition and will reach the Elbe, or even Berlin,
before the Bear. Therefore, should military negotiations
break out on this front, which is not a secondary front
like Italy, it will not be possible to keep the military and
the political aspects separate. In my view the Russians
should be in from the start, and we should carry on in
accordance with our duty, our obvious advantage, and
our plain right. They are claiming to have everything
yielded to them at every point, and give nothing in
return except their military pressure, which has never
yet been exerted except in their own interest. They
ought to be made to feel that we also have our point of
view. In my opinion, the military, in the event of
disagreement in negotiations, must refer to their
Governments before reaching any conclusion.

My wife was at this time about to visit the Soviet Union on behalf of her “Aid to Russia” fund, but so intense was the Russian suspicion about the conversations at Berne that I even considered postponing her departure.

Prime Minister to

25 Mar. 45

Foreign Secretary

My immediately preceding minute. I suppose it is all
right Clemmie going on her journey in these circumstances. Let me know your unprejudiced opinion
whether it would be better to put it off for a few days or
weeks, or whether it would be considered as a sign of
personal goodwill. I incline to her going as arranged.