Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (83 page)

President Roosevelt

I hope that the rather numerous telegrams I have to
send you on so many of our difficult and intertwined
affairs are not becoming a bore to you. Our friendship is
the rock on which I build for the future of the world, so
long as I am one of the builders. I always think of those
tremendous days when you devised Lend-Lease, when
we met at Argentia, when you decided with my heartfelt
agreement to launch the invasion of Africa, and when
you comforted me for the loss of Tobruk by giving me
the 300 Shermans of subsequent Alamein fame. I
remember the part our personal relations have played
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in the advance of the World Cause, now nearing its first
military goal.

2. I am sending to Washington and San Francisco
most of my Ministerial colleagues on one mission or
another, and I shall on this occasion stay at home to
mind the shop. All the time I shall be looking forward to
your long-promised visit. Clemmie is off to Russia next
week for a Red Cross tour as far as the Urals to which
she has been invited by Uncle Joe (if we may venture
to describe him thus), but she will be back in time to
welcome you and Eleanor. My thoughts are always with
you all.

3. Peace with Germany and Japan on our terms will
not bring much rest to you and me (if I am still
responsible). As I observed last time, when the war of
the giants is over the wars of the pygmies will begin.

There will be a torn, ragged, and hungry world to help
to its feet; and what will Uncle Joe or his successor say
to the way we should both like to do it? It was quite a
relief to [me to] talk party politics the other day. It was
like working in wood after working in steel. The
advantage of this telegram is that it has nothing to do
with shop, except that I had a good talk with Rosenman
2
about our daily bread.

All good wishes.

WINSTON

The President was evidently pleased with this message for two days later he sent me the following telegram which he knew I would like:

President Roosevelt

20 Mar. 45

to Prime Minister

I would very much appreciate it if you would see
Bernie Baruch as soon as convenient to you, and also
appreciate it if you could wire him as he counts you one
of his oldest friends and would much prefer having your
approval before he goes.

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Prime Minister to

21 Mar. 45

President Roosevelt

I am greatly looking forward to seeing Bernie, who is
one of my oldest friends. I am telegraphing to him to
say how glad I am that he is coming. I should like to
know when he will come.

I had often wondered he did not make more use of Baruch’s immense knowledge and experience both of American politics and War Production.

Mr. Baruch came over as planned and we had long and intimate talks which led to a further agreeable interchange with the President. I had hopes that I might find a new tie of correspondence and communication with my all-important colleague and comrade. Alas, we were very near the end.

Prime Minister to

30 Mar. 45

President Roosevelt

I am delighted to see from the abundance of
messages I have received from you this morning that
you are back in Washington and in such vigour. I saw
Bernie yesterday and he is coming tonight for the week-end. He seems in great form. As you know, I think he is
a very wise man. Winant is coming tomorrow. Clemmie
is in flight for Moscow and will be flying about there for
at least a month, all of which hangs on my mind.

President

Roosevelt

1 Apr. 45

to Prime Minister

I did receive your very pleasing message.

The efforts of Bernie, who is a wise man of wide
experience, should be of much assistance to both of us.

We hope that Clemmie’s long flying tour in Russia
will first be safe and next be productive of good which I
am sure it will be. The war business today seems to be
going very well from our point of view and we may hope

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now for the collapse of Hitlerism at an earlier date than
had heretofore been anticipated.

Anglo-American tactics and procedure were at length agreed. Meanwhile, as we in London had foreseen, the deadlock in Moscow continued. The Soviet policy became daily more plain, as also did the use they were making of their unbridled and unobserved control of Poland. They asked that Poland should be represented at San Francisco only by the Lublin Government. When the Western Powers would not agree the Soviets refused to let Molotov attend.

This threatened to make all progress at San Francisco, and even the Conference itself, impossible. Molotov in reply to an agreed communication from our Ambassadors on March 19 and in discussion on March 23 returned a series of flat negatives on every point he dealt with and ignored others.

He persisted that the Yalta communiqué merely meant adding a few other Poles to the existing Administration of Russian puppets, and that these puppets should be consulted first. He maintained his right to veto Mikolajczyk and other Poles we might suggest, and pretended that he had insufficient information about the names we had put forward long before. Nothing was said about our proposal that the Commission should preside in an arbitral capacity over discussions among the Poles; nothing on our point that measures in Poland affecting the future of the Polish State and action against individuals and groups likely to disturb the peace should be avoided. Molotov ignored his offer about observers, and told us to talk to the Warsaw puppets about it. It was as plain as a pikestaff that his tactics were to drag the business out while the Lublin Committee consolidated their power. Negotiations by our Ambassadors held no promise of an honest Polish Triumph and Tragedy

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settlement. It merely meant that our communications would be sidetracked, and time would be wasted on finding formulas which did not decide vital points.

On March 27 I felt bound to renew the discussion.

Prime Minister to

27 Mar. 45

President Roosevelt

… As you know, if we fail altogether to get a
satisfactory solution on Poland and are in fact
defrauded by Russia both Eden and I are pledged to
report the fact openly to the House of Commons. There
I advised critics of the Yalta settlement to trust Stalin. If
I have to make a statement of facts to the House the
whole world will draw the deduction that such advice
was wrong; all the more so that our failure in Poland will
result in a set-up there on the new Rumanian model. In
other words, Eastern Europe will be shown to be
excluded from the terms of the Declaration on Liberated
Europe, and you and we shall be excluded from any jot
of influence in that area.

Surely we must not be manoeuvred into becoming
parties to imposing on Poland — and on how much
more of Eastern Europe — the Russian version of
democracy? … There seems to be only one possible
alternative to confessing our total failure. That
alternative is to stand by our interpretation of the Yalta
Declaration. But I am convinced it is no use trying to
argue this any further with Molotov. In view of this, is it
not the moment now for a message from us both on
Poland to Stalin? I will send you our rough idea on this
in my immediately following telegram. I hope you can
agree.

I see nothing else likely to produce good results. If
we are rebuffed it will be a very sinister sign, taken with
the other Russian actions at variance with the spirit of
Yalta — such as Molotov’s rude questioning of our
word in the case of “Crossword,”
3
the unsatisfactory
proceedings over our liberated German prisoners, the
coup d’état in Rumania, the Russian refusal to allow the
Declaration on Liberated Europe to operate, and the
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blocking of all progress in the European Advisory
Commission by the Russians.

What also do you make of Molotov’s withdrawal from
San Francisco? It leaves a bad impression on me.

Does it mean that the Russians are going to run out, or
are they trying to blackmail us? As we have both
understood them, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals,
which will form the basis of discussion at San
Francisco, are based on the conception of Great Power
unity. If no such unity exists in Poland, which is after all
a major problem of the post-war settlement — to say
nothing of the other matters just mentioned — what, it
will legitimately be asked, are the prospects of success
of the new World Organisation? And is it not indeed
evident that, in the circumstances, we shall be building
the whole structure of future world peace on foundations of sand?

I believe therefore that if the success of San
Francisco is not to be gravely imperilled we must both
of us now make the strongest possible appeal to Stalin
about Poland, and if necessary about any other
derogations from the harmony of the Crimea. Only so
shall we have any real chance of getting the World
Organisation established on lines which will commend
themselves to our respective public opinions. Indeed, I
am not sure that we should not mention to Stalin now
the deplorable impression Molotov’s absence from San
Francisco will cause.

To this I added later in the day a positive proposal.

Prime Minister to

27 Mar. 45

President Roosevelt

Could we not both tell him [Stalin] that we are
distressed that the work of the Polish Commission is
held up because misunderstandings have arisen about
the interpretation of the Yalta decisions? The agreed
purpose of those decisions was that a new Government
of National Unity was to be established, after
consultations with representatives of Lublin and other
Democratic Poles, which both our Governments could
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recognise. We have not got any reply on the various
Polish names we have suggested, pleading lack of
information. We have given him plenty of information.

There ought not to be a veto by one Power on all
nominations. We consider that our nominations for the
discussions have been made in the spirit of confidence
which befits allies; and of course there could be no
question of allowing Lublin to bar them. We will accept
any nominations he puts forward, being equally
confident that the Soviet Government will not suggest
pro-Nazi or anti-Democratic Poles. The assembled
Poles should then discuss the formation of a new
Government among themselves. The Commission
should preside as arbitrators to see fair play. Molotov
wants the Lublinites to be consulted first. The
communiqué does not provide for this. But we have no
objection to his seeing them first. We cannot authorise
our representatives to do so, since we think it contrary
to the spirit of the communiqué. Also, to our surprise
and regret, Molotov, who suggested at an earlier stage
that we might like to send observers, has now
withdrawn the offer. Indeed, he appears to suggest it
had never been made, and has suggested that we
should apply to the present Warsaw Administration.