Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (84 page)

Stalin will understand that the whole point of the Yalta
decision was to produce a Polish Government we could
recognise, and that we obviously cannot therefore deal
with the present Administration. We feel sure he will
honour the offer to send observers, and his influence
with his Warsaw friends is so great that he will
overcome with ease any reluctance they may show in
agreeing.

2. Also, Stalin will surely see that while the three
Great Allies are arranging for the establishment of the
new Government of National Unity those in power in
Poland should not prejudice the future. We have asked
that the Soviet Government should use their influence
with their friends in temporary power there. Stalin will,
we feel confident, take steps to this end.

3. Stalin will find all this set out in most reasonable
terms in our [Ambassadors’] communication of March
19. Will he cast his eye over it and judge whether our
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suggestions are not all in line with the spirit of the Yalta
decision, and should they not all be met by our Ally in
order that the aim of the Yalta settlement of Poland —

viz., the setting up of a representative Government
which Britain and the U.S.A. can recognise — may be
carried out without further delay?

The President replied that he also had been watching “with anxiety and concern the development of the Soviet attitude since the Crimea Conference.” He set forth his proposals for further negotiations by our Ambassadors, and then concluded: “I agree with you however that the time has come to take up directly with Stalin the broader aspects of the Soviet attitude (with particular reference to Poland), and my immediately following telegram will contain the text of the message I propose to send. I hope you will let me have your reaction as soon as possible.”

I was of course much relieved that we were at length agreed to address Stalin directly. All the time I felt sure that it was only in this way that any practical results could be achieved. “I am glad,” I telegraphed on March 30 to the President, “you agree that the time has come for us both to address Stalin directly. Your draft is a grave and weighty document, which, though it does not give full expression to our views, we will wholeheartedly accept. I will also endorse it in my parallel message to Stalin.”

On April 1 I addressed Stalin myself.

Prime

Minister

to

1 Apr. 45

Marshal Stalin

You will by now, I hope, have received the message
from the President of the United States,
4
which he was
good enough to show to me before he sent it. It is now
my duty on behalf of His Majesty’s Government to
assure you that the War Cabinet desire me to express
to you our wholehearted endorsement of this message
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of the President’s, and that we associate ourselves with
it in its entirety.

2. There are two or three points which I desire
specially to emphasise. First, that we do not consider
we have retained in the Moscow discussions the spirit
of Yalta, nor indeed, at points, the letter. It was never
imagined by us that the Commission we all three
appointed with so much goodwill would not have been
able to carry out their part swiftly and easily in a mood
of give and take. We certainly thought that a Polish
Government “new” and “reorganised” would by now
have been in existence, recognised by all the United
Nations. This would have afforded a proof to the world
of our capacity and resolve to work together for its
future. It is still not too late to achieve this.

3. However, even before forming such a new and
reorganised Polish Government it was agreed by the
Commission that representative Poles should be
summoned from inside Poland and from Poles abroad,
not necessarily to take part in the Government, but
merely for free and frank consultation. Even this
preliminary step cannot be taken because of the claim
put forward to veto any invitation, even to the
consultation, of which the Soviet or the Lublin
Government do not approve. We can never agree to
such a veto by any one of us three. This veto reaches
its supreme example in the case of M. Mikolajczyk, who
is regarded throughout the British and American world
as the outstanding Polish figure outside Poland.

4. We also have learned with surprise and regret
that M. Molotov’s spontaneous offer to allow observers
or missions to enter Poland has now been withdrawn.

We are therefore deprived of all means of checking for
ourselves the information, often of a most painful
character, which is sent us almost daily by the Polish
Government in London. We do not understand why a
veil of secrecy should thus be drawn over the Polish
scene. We offer the fullest facilities to the Soviet
Government to send missions or individuals to visit any
of the territories in our military occupation. In several
cases this offer has been accepted by the Soviets and
visits have taken place, to mutual satisfaction. We ask
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that the principle of reciprocity shall be observed in
these matters, which would help to make so good a
foundation for our enduring partnership.

5. The President has also shown me the messages
which have passed between him and you about M.

Molotov’s inability to be present at the Conference at
San Francisco. We had hoped the presence there of
the three Foreign Ministers might have led to a
clearance of many of the difficulties which have
descended upon us in a storm since our happy and
hopeful union at Yalta. We do not however question in
any way the weight of the public reasons which make it
necessary for him to remain in Russia.

6…. If our efforts to reach an agreement about
Poland are to be doomed to failure I shall be bound to
confess the fact to Parliament when they return from
the Easter recess. No one has pleaded the cause of
Russia with more fervour and conviction than I have
tried to do. I was the first to raise my voice on June 22,
1941. It is more than a year since I proclaimed to a
startled world the justice of the Curzon Line for Russia’s
western frontier, and this frontier has now been
accepted by both the British Parliament and the
President of the United States. It is as a sincere friend
of Russia that I make my personal appeal to you and to
your colleagues to come to a good understanding
about Poland with the Western democracies, and not to
smite down the hands of comradeship in the future
guidance of the world which we now extend.

A week later Stalin replied to us both. He blamed the British and American Ambassadors in Moscow for getting “the Polish affair into a blind alley.” We had agreed at Yalta to form a new Polish Government by using the Lublin Government as a nucleus and reconstructing it. Instead, our Ambassadors were trying to abolish it and establish a completely new one. At Yalta we had also agreed to consult five Poles from Poland and about three from London. Our Ambassadors were now claiming that every member of the Moscow Commission could invite an unlimited number from Triumph and Tragedy

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both places. The Soviet Government could not allow this.

The Commission as a whole should decide whom to ask and these must only be Poles who accepted the decisions of Yalta, including the Curzon Line, and who genuinely desired friendly relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R.

“The Soviet Government,” he wrote, “insists on this, since much blood of Soviet soldiers has been shed for the liberation of Poland, and since in the course of the last thirty years the territory of Poland has twice been used by the enemy for an invasion of Russia.” Stalin then summed-up the steps we should take to “escape from the blind alley.”

The Lublin Government must be reconstructed, not liquidated, by replacing some of its existing Ministers by new ones from outside it; only eight Poles should be invited for consultation, five from Poland and three from London, and all must accept the Yalta decisions and be friendly to the Soviet Government; the Lublin Government must first be consulted because of its “enormous” influence in Poland and because any other course might insult the Polish people and make them think we were trying to impose a Government upon them without consulting public opinion. “I think,” he concluded, “that if the above observations were taken into account an agreed decision on the Polish question could be arrived at in a short time.”

Stalin also sent me a personal message.

Marshal

Stalin

to

7 Apr. 45

Prime Minister

The British and American Ambassadors, who are
members of the Moscow Commission, are unwilling to
take account of the Provisional Polish Government, and
insist on inviting Polish personalities for consultation
without regard to their attitude to the decisions of the
Crimea Conference on Poland and to the Soviet Union.

They absolutely insist on summoning to Moscow for
consultation, for instance, Mikolajczyk, and this they do
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in the form of an ultimatum. In this they take no account
of the fact that Mikolajczyk has come out openly against
the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland.

However, if you think it necessary, I should be ready to
use my influence with the Provisional Polish Government to make them withdraw their objections to inviting
Mikolajczyk, if the latter would make a public statement
accepting the decisions of the Crimea Conference on
the Polish question and declaring that he stands for the
establishment of friendly relations between Poland and
the Soviet Union.

2. You wonder why the Polish theatre of military
operations must be wrapped in mystery. In fact there is
no mystery here. You ignore the fact that if British
observers or other foreign observers were sent into
Poland the Poles would regard this as an insult to their
national dignity, bearing in mind the fact moreover that
the present attitude of the British Government to the
Provisional Polish Government is regarded as
unfriendly by the latter. So far as the Soviet Government is concerned, it cannot but take account of the
negative attitude of the Provisional Government to the
question of sending foreign observers into Poland.

Further, you are aware that the Provisional Polish
Government puts no obstacles in the way of entrance
into Poland by representatives of other States which
take up a different attitude towards it, and does not in
any way obstruct them. This is the case, for instance, in
regard to the representatives of the Czechoslovak
Government, the Yugoslav Government, and others.

3. I had an agreeable conversation with Mrs.

Churchill, who made a great impression on me. She
gave me a present from you. Allow me to express my
heartfelt thanks for this present.

These carefully considered documents at least offered some hope of progress. I began at once my painful discussions with Mikolajczyk and other Polish representatives with the object of obtaining their unreserved affirmation of agreement with the Yalta decisions.

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“We shall,” cabled the President on April 11, “have to consider most carefully the implications of Stalin’s attitude and what is to be our next step. I shall of course take no action of any kind nor make any statement without consulting you, and I know you will do the same.”