Read Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) Online
Authors: Winston S. Churchill
PS. — The above was dictated by me before I had
seen the United States Chiefs of Staff riposte.
The “riposte” had by now arrived. The United States Chiefs replied in substance that Eisenhower’s procedure in communicating with the Russians appeared to have been an operational necessity, and that any modification of it should be made by him, and not by them. The course of action outlined in his plan appeared to accord with agreed strategy and with his directive. Eisenhower, they claimed, was deploying across the Rhine in the north the maximum forces which could be used. The secondary effort in the south was achieving an outstanding success, and was being exploited as much as supplies would permit. They were confident that the Supreme Commander’s course of action would secure the ports and everything else mentioned by the British more quickly and more decisively than the plan urged by them.
The Battle of Germany, they said, was at a point where it was for the Field Commander to judge the measures which
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should be taken. To turn away deliberately from the exploitation of the enemy’s weakness did not appear sound. The single objective should be quick and complete victory. While recognising that there were factors not of direct concern to the Supreme Commander, the United States Chiefs considered his strategic concept was sound and should receive full support and that he should continue to communicate freely with the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Army.
The United States Chiefs of Staff however also suggested that General Eisenhower should be asked to submit to them an amplification of his message to Marshal Stalin, and to delay replying to any new request from Moscow for further information until he had heard from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
In full agreement with my military colleagues, I repeated the substance of my minute to General Eisenhower.
Prime Minister to
31 Mar. 45
General Eisenhower
Very many thanks. It seems to me personally that if
the enemy’s resistance does not collapse the shifting of
the main axis of advance so much farther to the
southward and the withdrawal of the Ninth U.S. Army
from the Twenty-first Army Group may stretch
Montgomery’s front so widely that the offensive rôle
which was assigned to him may peter out. I do not
know why it would be an advantage not to cross the
Elbe. If the enemy’s resistance should weaken, as you
evidently expect and which may well be fulfilled, why
should we not cross the Elbe and advance as far
eastward as possible? This has an important political
bearing, as the Russian armies of the South seem
certain to enter Vienna and overrun Austria. If we
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deliberately leave Berlin to them, even if it should be in
our grasp, the double event may strengthen their
conviction, already apparent, that they have done
everything.
2. Further, I do not consider myself that Berlin has
yet lost its military and certainly not its political
significance. The fall of Berlin would have a profound
psychological effect on German resistance in every part
of the Reich. While Berlin holds out great masses of
Germans will feel it their duty to go down fighting. The
idea that the capture of Dresden and junction with the
Russians there would be a superior gain does not
commend itself to me. The parts of the German
Government departments which have moved south can
very quickly move southward again. But while Berlin
remains under the German flag it cannot, in my opinion,
fail to be the most decisive point in Germany.
3. Therefore I should greatly prefer persistence in
the plan on which we crossed the Rhine, namely, that
the Ninth U.S. Army should march with the Twenty-first
Army Group to the Elbe and beyond Berlin. This would
not be in any way inconsistent with the great central
thrust which you are now so rightly developing as the
result of the brilliant operations of your armies south of
the Ruhr. It only shifts the weight of one army to the
northern flank.
I also summed up the position in a message to the President.
Prime
Minister
to
1 Apr. 45
President Roosevelt
You will have read the telegrams between the British
Chiefs of Staff and their United States colleagues. I
think there is some misunderstanding on both sides,
which I am anxious to disperse without more ado.
2. We are very much obliged to the United States
Chiefs of Staff for their paragraph which gives time for a
reasonable interchange of views between our two
Chiefs of Staff Committees.
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550
3. I am however distressed to read that it should be
thought that we wish in the slightest degree to discredit
or lower the prestige of General Eisenhower in his
increasingly important relations with the Russian
commanders in the field. All we sought was a little time
to consider the far-reaching changes desired by
General Eisenhower in the plans that had been
concerted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Malta and
had received your and my joint approval. The British
Chiefs of Staff were naturally concerned by a procedure
which apparently left the fortunes of the British Army,
which though only a third of yours still amounts to over
a million men, to be settled without the slightest
reference to any British authority. They also did not fully
understand from General Eisenhower’s message what
actually was intended. In this we may be excused,
because General Deane was similarly puzzled and
delayed delivery of General Eisenhower’s message to
Stalin for twenty hours in order to ask for background. I
am in full agreement in this instance with the procedure
proposed by your Chiefs of Staff, and I am sorry we did
not think of it ourselves.
4. At this point I wish to place on record the
complete confidence felt by His Majesty’s Government
in General Eisenhower, our pleasure that our armies
are serving under his command, and our admiration of
the great and shining qualities of character and
personality which he has proved himself to possess in
all the difficulties of handling an Allied Command.
Moreover, I should like to express to you, Mr. President,
as I have already done orally in the field to General
Eisenhower, my heartfelt congratulations on the
glorious victories and advances by all the armies of the
United States Centre in the recent battles on the Rhine
and over it….
5. Having dealt with and I trust disposed of these
misunderstandings between the truest friends and
comrades that ever fought side by side as allies, I
venture to put to you a few considerations upon the
merits of the changes in our original plans now desired
by General Eisenhower. It seems to me the differences
are small, and, as usual, not of principle but of
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551
emphasis. Obviously, laying aside every impediment
and shunning every diversion, the Allied armies of the
North and Centre should now march at the highest
speed towards the Elbe. Hitherto the axis has been
upon Berlin. General Eisenhower, on his estimate of
the enemy’s resistance, to which I attach the greatest
importance, now wishes to shift the axis somewhat to
the southward and strike through Leipzig, even perhaps
as far south as Dresden. He withdraws the Ninth United
States Army from the northern group of armies, and in
consequence stretches its front southward. I should be
sorry if the resistance of the enemy was such as to
destroy the weight and momentum of the advance of
the British Twenty-first Army Group and to leave them
in an almost static condition along the Elbe when and if
they reach it. I say quite frankly that Berlin remains of
high strategic importance. Nothing will exert a
psychological effect of despair upon all German forces
of resistance equal to that of the fall of Berlin. It will be
the supreme signal of defeat to the German people. On
the other hand, if left to itself to maintain a siege by the
Russians among its ruins, and as long as the German
flag flies there, it will animate the resistance of all
Germans under arms.
6. There is moreover another aspect which it is
proper for you and me to consider. The Russian armies
will no doubt overrun all Austria and enter Vienna. If
they also take Berlin will not their impression that they
have been the overwhelming contributor to our
common victory be unduly imprinted in their minds, and
may this not lead them into a mood which will raise
grave and formidable difficulties in the future? I
therefore consider that from a political standpoint we
should march as far east into Germany as possible,
and that should Berlin be in our grasp we should
certainly take it. This also appears sound on military
grounds.
7. To sum up, the difference that might exist
between General Eisenhower’s new plans and those
we advocated, and which were agreed upon beforehand, would seem to be the following, viz., whether the
emphasis should be put on an axis directed on Berlin or
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552
on one directed on Leipzig and Dresden. This is surely
a matter upon which a reasonable latitude of discussion
should be allowed to our two Chiefs of Staff Committees before any final commitment involving the
Russians is entered into.
8. I need hardly say that I am quite willing that this
message, which is my own personal message to you
and not a Staff communication, should be shown to
General Marshall.
Actually, though I did not realise it, the President’s health was now so feeble that it was General Marshall who had to deal with these grave questions.
Eisenhower replied at once to my telegram of March 31.
General
Eisenhower
1 Apr. 45
to Prime Minister
After reading your message dated yesterday I think
you still have some misunderstanding of what I intend
to do.
In the first place I repeat that I have not changed
any plan. I made certain groupings of this force in order
to cross the Rhine, with the main deliberate thrust in the
north, isolate the Ruhr, and disrupt, surround, or
destroy the Germans defending that area. This is as far
as strategic objectives of this force have ever been
approved by me, because obviously such a victory over
the German forces in the West and such a blow to its
industrial capacity would necessarily create new
situations requiring study and analysis before the next
broad pattern of effort could be accurately sketched.
The situation that is now developing is one that I
have held before my Staff for more than a year as the
one toward which we shall strive, namely, that our
forces should be concentrating across the Rhine
through avenues of Wesel and Frankfurt and situated
roughly in a great triangle with the apex resting in the
Kassel area. From there onward the problem was to
determine the direction of the blow that would create
the maximum disorganisation to the remaining German
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