Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (88 page)

The destruction of German military power had brought with it a fundamental change in the relations between Communist Russia and the Western democracies. They had lost their common enemy, which was almost their sole bond of union. Henceforward Russian imperialism and the Communist creed saw and set no bounds to their progress and ultimate dominion, and more than two years were to pass before they were confronted again with an equal willpower. I should not tell this tale now when all is plain in glaring light if I had not known it and felt it when all was dim, and when abounding triumph only intensified the inner darkness of human affairs. Of this the reader must be the judge.

The decisive, practical points of strategy and policy with which this narrative seeks to deal were:
First,
that Soviet Russia had become a mortal danger to the free world.

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Secondly,
that a new front must be immediately created against her onward sweep.

Thirdly,
that this front in Europe should be as far east as possible.

Fourthly,
that Berlin was the prime and true objective of the Anglo-American armies.

Fifthly,
that the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the entry into Prague of American troops was of high consequence.

Sixthly,
that Vienna, and indeed Austria, must be regulated by the Western Powers, at least upon an equality with the Russian Soviets.

Seventhly,
that Marshal Tito’s aggressive pretensions against Italy must be curbed.

Finally, and above all,
that a settlement must be reached on all major issues between the West and the East in Europe
before the armies of democracy melted,
or the Western allies yielded any part of the German territories they had conquered, or, as it could soon be written, liberated from totalitarian tyranny.

All kinds of rumours, only slightly sustained by our reports, were rife about Hitler’s future plans. I had thought it prudent to have them searchingly examined, because I heard that they were counting for much at Eisenhower’s headquarters.

Certainly a movement of German administrative departments southward from Berlin was noticeable.

Prime Minister to

17 Mar. 45

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee

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I should like the Intelligence Committee to consider
the possibility that Hitler, after losing Berlin and
Northern Germany, will retire to the mountainous and
wooded parts of Southern Germany and endeavour to
prolong the fight there. The strange resistance he made
at Budapest and is now making at Lake Balaton, and
the retention of Kesselring’s army in Italy so long, seem
in harmony with such an intention. But of course he is
so foolishly obstinate about everything that there may
be no meaning behind these moves. Nevertheless the
possibilities should be examined.

Although nothing could be positive, the general conclusion of our Chiefs of Staff was that a prolonged German campaign, or even guerrilla, in the mountains was unlikely on any serious scale. The possibility was therefore relegated by us, as it proved rightly, to the shades. On this basis I inquired about the strategy for the advance of the Anglo-American armies as foreseen at Allied headquarters, and received this reply:

General Eisenhower

30 Mar. 45

to Prime Minister

As soon as the U.S. Ninth and First Armies join
hands and enemy encircled in Ruhr area is incapable of
further offensive action I propose driving eastward to
join hands with Russians or to attain general line of
Elbe. Subject to Russian intentions, the axis Kassel-Leipzig
1
is the best for the drive, as it will ensure the
overrunning of that important industrial area, into which
German Ministries are believed to be moving; it will cut
the German forces approximately in half, and it will not
involve us in crossing of Elbe. It is designed to divide
and destroy the major part of remaining enemy forces
in West.

This will be my main thrust, and until it is quite clear
that concentration of all our effort on it alone will not be
necessary I am prepared to direct all my forces to
ensuring its success. It lies in Bradley’s zone, and he
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will have the Third, First, and Ninth Armies to carry it
out, with Fifteenth Army also under his command,
following, if possible, mopping up. He will have
Montgomery protecting his left flank, with British and
Canadian Armies, north of general line Hanover-Wittenberg, and Devers protecting his right with
Seventh and First French Armies.

Once the success of main thrust is assured I
propose to take action to clear the northern ports, which
in the case of Kiel will entail forcing the Elbe.

Montgomery will be responsible for these tasks, and I
propose to increase his forces if that should seem
necessary for the purpose.

In addition Sixth Army Group will be prepared, when
above requirements have been met, to drive to
southeast on axis Nuremberg-Regensburg to prevent
any possible German consolidation in south and to join
hands with Russians in Danube valley.

I trust this added information will make clear my
present plans. Naturally they are flexible and subject to
changes to meet unexpected situations.

About the same time we learned that Eisenhower had announced his policy in a direct telegram to Marshal Stalin on March 28 without previously mentioning the subject either to his Deputy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, or the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We all thought that this went beyond the limits of negotiation with the Soviets by the Supreme Commander in Europe as they had previously been understood. General Eisenhower felt justified in this direct correspondence with the head of the Russian State because Stalin was also Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army. Yet it was not with the President of the United States that he corresponded, who was also head of the military forces, but with General Marshall.

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In this telegram Eisenhower said that after isolating the Ruhr he proposed to make his main thrust along the axis Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden, which, by joining hands with the Triumph and Tragedy

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Russians, would cut in two the remaining German forces. A secondary advance through Regensburg to Linz, where also he expected to meet the Russians, would prevent “the consolidation of German resistance in the redoubt in Southern Germany.” Stalin agreed readily. He said that the proposal “entirely coincides with the plan of the Soviet High Command.”“Berlin,” he added, “has lost its former strategic importance. The Soviet High Command therefore plans to allot secondary forces in the direction of Berlin.” This statement was not borne out by events.

The British Chiefs of Staff were concerned both about the merits of the new plan and about the short-circuiting of the highest authorities, both military and constitutional. They drafted a lengthy telegram to their colleagues in Washington, which I did not see till after it had gone. This very often happened in inter-Staff negotiations. I was in full agreement in principle with our Chiefs of Staff, and we thought on the same lines. All the same, I thought that their telegram brought in many minor extraneous matters and did not take the best ground for an argument with the United States Chiefs of Staff. I accordingly sent them the following minute.

Prime Minister to

31 Mar. 45

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee

I have considered your telegram, and of course it is
a good thing for the military points to be placed before
the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. I hope
however we shall realise that we have only a quarter of
the forces invading Germany, and that the situation has
thus changed remarkably from the days of June 1944….

3. It seems to me that the chief criticism of the new
Eisenhower plan is that it shifts the axis of the main
advance upon Berlin to the direction through Leipzig to
Dresden, and thus raises the question of whether the
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Twenty-first Army Group will not be so stretched as to
lose its offensive power, especially after it has been
deprived of the Ninth United States Army. Thus we
might be condemned to an almost static role in the
north and virtually prevented from crossing the Elbe
until an altogether later stage in the operations has
been reached. All prospect also of the British entering
Berlin with the Americans is ruled out.

4. The validity of such criticism depends on the
extent of the enemy’s resistance. If that resistance is
practically collapsing there is no reason why the
advances, both of the main Army and of the Twenty-first Army Group, should not take place on a broader
front than hitherto. This is a point on which the
Supreme Commander must have the final word.

5. It also seems that General Eisenhower may be
wrong in supposing Berlin to be largely devoid of
military and political importance. Even though German
Government departments have to a great extent moved
to the south, the dominating fact on German minds of
the fall of Berlin should not be overlooked. The idea of
neglecting Berlin and leaving it to the Russians to take
at a later stage does not appear to me correct. As long
as Berlin holds out and withstands a siege in the ruins,
as it may easily do, German resistance will be
stimulated. The fall of Berlin might cause nearly all
Germans to despair.

6. We weaken our case for a stronger concentration
between the sea and the Hanover-Berlin flank by
suggesting we should like to turn aside to clean up
matters in Denmark, Norway, and along the Baltic
shore….

7. In short, I see argumentative possibilities being
opened to the United States Chiefs of Staff by our
telegram, on which they will riposte heavily. It must be
remembered that Eisenhower’s credit with them stands
very high. He may claim to have correctly estimated so
far the resisting strength of the enemy and to have
established by deeds (a) the “closing”[i.e., reaching] of
the Rhine along its whole length, (b) the power to make
the double advance instead of staking all on the
northern advance…. These events, combined with the
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continual arrival of American reinforcements, have
greatly enhanced General Eisenhower’s power and
prestige, and the Americans will feel that, as the
victorious Supreme Commander, he has a right, and
indeed a vital need, to try to elicit from the Russians
their views as to the best point for making contact by
the armies of the West and of the East.

8. Finally, the capture of Danzig and consequent
annihilation of one of the three principal U-boat bases is
a new event bringing great relief to the Admiralty. The
renewal of the U-boat warfare on the scale which they
predicted is plainly now impossible…. Therefore I
cannot admit a state of urgency in any way justifying
left-handed diversions to clear the Baltic ports, etc., if
these diversions take anything from the speed or
weight of the advance of the Twenty-first Group of
Armies.