Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (43 page)

Corps on their left were on top of the watershed. The Triumph and Tragedy

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Gothic Line, turned at its eastern end by the Eighth Army, had now been pierced in the centre.

Though at the cost of grievous casualties, great success had been achieved and the future looked hopeful. But Kesselring received further reinforcements, until his German divisions amounted to twenty-eight in all. Scraping up two divisions from quiet sectors, he started fierce counter-attacks, which, added to our supply difficulties over the mountain passes, checked the XIIIth Corps’ advance on Imola. General Clark thereupon shifted the weight of his onslaught to the Bologna road, and the IId U.S. Corps advanced on October I with four divisions. In a few days they reached Loiano. The defence was stubborn, the ground very difficult, and it was raining hard. The climax came between October 20 and 24, when they reached a point southeast of Bologna only four miles from the Imola road. We very nearly succeeded in cutting in behind the enemy facing the Eighth Army. Then, in Alexander’s words,

“assisted by torrential rains and winds of gale force, and the Fifth Army’s exhaustion, the German line held firm.”

For the Eighth Army too October was a month of frustration.

General McCreery had taken over the command from General Leese, who had been transferred to a higher appointment in Southeast Asia. On October 7 his advance began along the axis of the Rimini-Bologna road, with the British Vth Corps, joined later by the Canadians, while the Xth Corps operated in the mountains to the south. The weather was appalling. Heavy rains had swollen the numberless rivers and irrigation channels and turned the reclaimed agricultural land into the swamp it had originally been. Off the roads movement was often impossible. It was with the greatest difficulty that the troops toiled forward towards Bologna.

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Despite all, Cesena was reached on October 19, and the Polish Corps, who had replaced the Xth Corps on the southern flank, struggled forward towards the Forli-Florence road, important because it would give a shorter lateral communication with Mark Clark’s army. That army, as we have seen, was drawing very close to Bologna, and in the critical situation the German commander took the courageous decision to transfer three good divisions from the eastern to his central front. These doubtless just saved the day in the centre of his line. The Eighth Army also had its subtractions. The 4th Indian Division and the Greek Brigade had to be detached to deal with the crisis in Greece, the story of which falls to a later chapter.

I reported to the President about all this from Moscow, so far as it had developed, on October 10, adding:
The pressure in Dutch salient seems to me to be
growing very severe, and our advances are slow and
costly. In these circumstances we have with much
sorrow had to recommend that we should put off

“Dracula” [the amphibious attack on Rangoon] from
March to November and leave the British 3d Division in
France, as well as sending there the 52d Division, one
of our best, about 22,000 strong in fighting troops, and
the 6th Airborne Division to the Netherlands. Eisenhower is counting on these for the impending operation on
the Rhine, and of course this was much the quickest
way to bring additional troops into France.

3. Could you not deflect two, or better still three,
American divisions to the Italian front, which would
enable them to join Mark Clark’s Fifth Army and add the
necessary strength to Alexander? They would have to
be there in three or four weeks. I consider the fact that
we shall be sending Eisenhower these extra two
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divisions gives me a case for your generous consideration.

4. With regard to Istria, Trieste, etc., General Wilson
is forwarding his plan to Combined Chiefs of Staff. This
plan will be in accord with over-all strategic objective,
namely, the expulsion from or destruction in Italy of
Kesselring’s army.

He replied some days later:

President Roosevelt

16 Oct. 44

to

Prime

Minister

(Moscow)

I appreciate your report on the Italian campaign,
where, up to the present, our combined effort has cost
us nearly 200,000 battle casualties, 90,000 of them
American. My Chiefs of Staff accept Wilson’s estimate
that we cannot now expect to destroy Kesselring’s army
this winter and that the terrain and weather conditions
in the Po valley will prevent any decisive advance this
year. They further consider that the Germans are free
to transfer five or six divisions from Italy to the Western
Front whenever they consider such action more
profitable than using these divisions in containing our
forces south of the Po. Provision of additional U.S.

divisions will not affect the campaign in Italy this year.

All of us are now faced with an unanticipated shortage
of man-power, and overshadowing all other military
problems is the need for quick provision of fresh troops
to reinforce Eisenhower in his battle to break into
Germany and end the European war. While the
divisions in Italy are undoubtedly tiring as the result of
fighting in the present battle since August 25,
Eisenhower is now fighting the decisive battle of
Germany with divisions which have been in continuous
combat since they landed on the Normandy beaches in
the first part of June. The need for building up
additional divisions on the long front from Switzerland to
the North Sea is urgent. Even more urgent is the need
for fresh troops to enable Eisenhower to give some rest
to our front-line soldiers, who have been the spear-Triumph and Tragedy

271

point of the battle since the first days in Normandy. On
the basis of General Marshall’s reports on the present
situation we are now taking the very drastic step of
sending the infantry regiments of the divisions ahead of
the other units in order that General Eisenhower may
be able to rotate some of our exhausted front-line
soldiers.

Diversion of any forces to Italy would withhold from
France vitally needed fresh troops, while committing
such forces to the high attrition of an indecisive winter
campaign in Northern Italy. I appreciate the hard and
difficult task which our armies in Italy have faced and
will face, but we cannot withhold from the main effort
forces which are needed in the Battle of Germany.

From General Marshall’s reports on the problem
now facing General Eisenhower, I am sure that both of
them agree with my conviction that no divisions should
be diverted from their destination in France.

The rest of the story is soon told. Although hopes of decisive victory had faded, it remained the first duty of the armies in Italy to keep up the pressure and deter the enemy from sending help to the hard-pressed German armies on the Rhine. And so the Eighth Army fought forward whenever there was a spell of reasonably fine weather, taking Forli on November 9, and soon afterwards clearing all the road to Florence. Thereafter no major offensive was possible. Small advances were made as opportunity offered, but not until the spring were the armies rewarded with the victory they had so well earned, and so nearly won, in the autumn.

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15

October in Moscow

I Arrive at Moscow, October
9 —
Our First Meeting
in the Kremlin — A Half-Sheet of Paper — My
Telegram to the President of October
11 —
Stalin
Dines at the British Embassy — I send Harry
Hopkins the News — Balkan Tangles — My Note
of October
11
on Eastern Europe — -A Report to
the Cabinet, October
12 —
Russia and Rumania

— Great Britain and Greece — A Meeting with the
Poles, October
13 —
Command Performance at
the Bolshoi Theatre, October
14 —
Russian Plans
for War with Japan — The Second Military
Meeting in the Kremlin, October
15 —
The Curzon
Line —“All Poles Day”— My Telegram to the King
of October
16 —
And to the President, October
22

—
The Future of Germany — Closer Contact with
the Soviets than Ever Before.

W
E ALIGHTED at Moscow on the afternoon of October 9, and were received very heartily and with full ceremonial by Molotov and many high Russian personages. This time we were lodged in Moscow itself, with every care and comfort. I had one small, perfectly appointed house, and Anthony another near by. We were glad to dine alone together and rest. At ten o’clock that night we held our first important meeting in the Kremlin. There were only Stalin, Molotov, Eden, Harriman, and I, with Major Birse and Pavlov as interpreters. It was agreed to invite the Polish Prime Triumph and Tragedy

273

Minister, M. Romer, the Foreign Secretary, and M. Grabski, a grey-bearded and aged academician of much charm and quality, to Moscow at once. I telegraphed accordingly to M.

Mikolajczyk that we were expecting him and his friends for discussions with the Soviet Government and ourselves, as well as with the Lublin Polish Committee. I made it clear that refusal to come to take part in the conversations would amount to a definite rejection of our advice and would relieve us from further responsibility towards the London Polish Government.

The moment was apt for business, so I said, “Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don’t let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?” While this was being translated I wrote out on a half-sheet of paper: Rumania

Russia

90%

The others

10%

Greece

Great Britain (in accord with U.S.A.) 90%

Russia

10%

Yugoslavia

50-50%

Hungary

50-50%

Bulgaria

Russia

75%

The others

25%

Triumph and Tragedy