Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (98 page)

The two months that had passed since then had seen tremendous changes cutting to the very roots of thought.

Hitler’s Germany was doomed and he himself about to perish. The Russians were fighting in Berlin. Vienna and most of Austria was in their hands. The whole relationship

Triumph and Tragedy

604

of Russia with the Western Allies was in flux. Every question about the future was unsettled between us. The agreements and understandings at Yalta, such as they were, had already been broken or brushed aside by the triumphant Kremlin. New perils, perhaps as terrible as those we had surmounted, loomed and glared upon the torn and harassed world.

My concern at these ominous developments was apparent even before the President’s death. He himself, as we have seen, was also anxious and disturbed. His anger at Molotov’s accusations over the Berne affair has been recorded. In spite of the victorious advance of Eisenhower’s armies, President Truman found himself faced in the last half of April with a formidable crisis. I had for some time past tried my utmost to impress the United States Government with the vast changes which were taking place both in the military and political spheres. Our Western armies would soon be carried well beyond the boundaries of our occupation zones, as both the Western and Eastern Allied fronts approached one another, penning the Germans between them.

The following telegrams show that I never suggested going back on our word over the agreed zones provided other agreements were also respected. I became convinced however that before we halted, or still more withdrew, our troops we ought to seek a meeting with Stalin face to face and make sure that an agreement was reached about the whole front. It would indeed be a disaster if we kept all our agreements in strict good faith while the Soviets laid their hands upon all they could get without the slightest regard for the obligations into which they had entered.

Triumph and Tragedy

605

As early as April 5 I had sent a serious warning to Roosevelt.

Prime

Minister

to

5 Apr. 45

President Roosevelt

… There is very little doubt in my mind that the
Soviet leaders, whoever they may be, are surprised
and disconcerted at the rapid advance of the Allied
armies in the West and the almost total defeat of the
enemy on our front, especially as they say they are
themselves in no position to deliver a decisive attack
before the middle of May. All this makes it the more
important that we should join hands with the Russian
armies as far to the east as possible, and, it circumstances allow, enter Berlin.

I may remind you that we proposed and thought we
had arranged six weeks ago provisional zones of
occupation in Austria, but that since Yalta the Russians
have sent no confirmation of these zones. Now that
they are on the eve of taking Vienna and very likely will
occupy the whole of Austria it may well be prudent for
us to hold as much as possible in the north.

We must always be anxious lest the brutality of the
Russian messages does not foreshadow some deep
change of policy for which they are preparing. On the
whole I incline to think it is no more than their natural
expression when vexed or jealous. For that very reason
I deem it of the highest importance that a firm and blunt
stand should be made at this juncture by our two
countries in order that the air may be cleared and they
realise that there is a point beyond which we will not
tolerate insult. I believe this is the best chance of saving
the future. If they are ever convinced that we are afraid
of them and can be bullied into submission, then indeed
I should despair of our future relations with them and
much else.

General Eisenhower had proposed that while the armies in the west and the east should advance irrespective of demarcation lines, in any area where the armies had made Triumph and Tragedy

606

contact either side should be free to suggest that the other should withdraw behind the boundaries of their occupation zone. Discretion to request and to order such withdrawals would rest with Army Group commanders. Subject to the dictates of operational necessity, the retirement would then take place. I considered that this proposal was premature and that it exceeded the immediate military needs. I therefore sent the Chiefs of Staff the following minute for their guidance in discussing General Eisenhower’s proposal with their American counterparts.

Prime

Minister

to

7 Apr. 45

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee

When the forces arrive in contact, and after the
preliminary salutations have been exchanged, they
should rest opposite each other in those positions,
except in so far as actual neighbouring military
operations require concerted action. Thus, if we
crossed the Elbe and advanced to Berlin, or on a line
between Berlin and the Baltic, which is all well within
the Russian zone, we should not give this up as a
military matter. It is a matter of State to be considered
between the three Governments, and in relation to what
the Russians do in the south, where they will soon have
occupied not only Vienna but all Austria. There cannot
be such a hurry about our withdrawing from a place we
have gained that the few days necessary for consulting
the Governments in Washington and London cannot be
found, I attach great importance to this, and could not
agree to proposals of this kind [being decided] on a
Staff level. They must be referred to the President and
me.I am very glad to see the delaying action proposed
in our Chiefs of Staff message. It is entirely in
accordance with my thought.

Action was taken accordingly.

Triumph and Tragedy

607

The death of President Roosevelt on April 12 led me to seek the concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff in presenting anew the whole argument about zones to his successor.

Prime

Minister

to

14 Apr. 45

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee

I should advise the following line:

“We consider that before the Anglo-American armies
retire from any ground they have gained from the
enemy, over and beyond the zones of occupation
agreed upon, the political issues operative at that time
should be discussed between the heads of Governments, and in particular that the situation should be
viewed as a whole and in regard to the relations
between the Soviet, American, and British Governments. These Governments will have to make sure that
there is in fact a friendly and fair execution of the
occupation zones as already agreed between
Governments. For these reasons we consider the
matter is above the sphere of purely military decision by
a commander in the field.”

I addressed myself to the new President on April 18. Mr.

Truman was of course only newly aware at second hand of all the complications that faced us, and had to lean heavily on his advisers. The purely military view therefore received an emphasis beyond its proper proportion.

Prime

Minister

to

18 Apr. 45

President Truman

Your armies soon, and presently ours, may come
into contact with the Soviet forces. The Supreme
Commander should be given instructions by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible how to
act.In my view there are two zones:
Triumph and Tragedy

608

(a)The tactical zone, in which our troops must stand
on the line they have reached unless there is
agreement for a better tactical deployment against the
continuing resistance of the enemy. This should be
arranged by the Supreme Commander through our
military representatives in Moscow, or if convenient
across the lines in the field. The Combined Chiefs of
Staff have already taken up the issue of instructions to
cover this phase.

(b)The occupational zone, which I agreed with
President Roosevelt on the advice of the Combined
General Staffs. In my view this zone should be
occupied within a certain time from V.E. Day, whenever
this is declared, and we should retire with dignity from
the much greater gains which the Allied troops have
acquired by their audacity and vigour.

2. I am quite prepared to adhere to the occupational
zones, but I do not wish our Allied troops or your
American troops to be hustled back at any point by
some crude assertion of a local Russian general. This
must be provided against by an agreement between
Governments so as to give Eisenhower a fair chance to
settle on the spot in his own admirable way.

3. The occupational zones were decided rather
hastily at Quebec in September 1944, when it was not
foreseen that General Eisenhower’s armies would
make such a mighty inroad into Germany. The zones
cannot be altered except by agreement with the
Russians. But the moment V.E. Day has occurred we
should try to set up the Allied Control Commission in
Berlin and should insist upon a fair distribution of the
food produced in Germany between all parts of
Germany. As it stands at present the Russian
occupational zone has the smallest proportion of
people and grows by far the largest proportion of food,
the Americans have a not very satisfactory proportion
of food to conquered population, and we poor British
are to take over all the ruined Ruhr and large
manufacturing districts, which are, like ourselves, in
normal times large importers of food. I suggest that this
tiresome question should be settled in Berlin by the
Allied Control Commission before we move from the
Triumph and Tragedy

609

tactical positions we have at present achieved. The
Russian idea of taking these immense food supplies
out of the food-producing areas of Germany to feed
themselves is very natural, but I contend that the
feeding of the German population must be treated as a
whole and that the available supplies must be divided
pro rata between the occupational zones.

4. I should be most grateful if you would let me have
your views on these points, which, from the information
I receive from many sources, are of the highest
consequence and urgency.

Mr. Eden was in Washington, and fully agreed with the views I telegraphed to him.

Prime Minister to Mr.

19 Apr. 45

Eden (Washington)

This is for your eyes alone. It would seem that the
Western Allies are not immediately in a position to force
their way into Berlin. The Russians have two and a half
million troops on the section of the front opposite that
city. The Americans have only their spearheads, say
twenty-five divisions, which are covering an immense
front and are at many points engaged with the
Germans….