Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (44 page)

274

I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down.

Of course we had long and anxiously considered our point, and were only dealing with immediate war-time arrangements. All larger questions were reserved on both sides for what we then hoped would be a peace table when the war was won.

After this there was a long silence. The pencilled paper lay in the centre of the table. At length I said, “Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper.”“No, you keep it,”

said Stalin.

I also raised the question of Germany, and it was agreed that our two Foreign Ministers, together with Mr. Harriman, should go into it. I told Stalin that the Americans would be outlining to him during the course of our future discussions their plan of operations in the Pacific for 1945.

We then sent a joint message to Roosevelt on our first talk.

Prime Minister and

10 Oct. 44

Marshal

Stalin

to

President Roosevelt

We have agreed not to refer in our discussions to
Dumbarton Oaks issues, and that these shall be taken
up when we three can meet together. We have to
consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy
about the Balkan countries, including Hungary and
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Turkey. We have arranged for Mr. Harriman to sit in as
an observer at all meetings where business of
importance is to be transacted, and for General Deane
to be present whenever military topics are raised. We
have arranged for technical contacts between our high
officers and General Deane on military aspects, and for
any meetings which may be necessary later in our
presence and that of the two Foreign Secretaries,
together with Mr. Harriman. We shall keep you fully
informed ourselves about the progress we make.

We take this occasion to send you our heartiest
good wishes and to offer our congratulations on the
prowess of United States forces and upon the conduct
of the war in the West by General Eisenhower.

I now reported privately to the President.

Prime

Minister

to

11 Oct. 44

President Roosevelt

We have found an extraordinary atmosphere of
goodwill here, and we have sent you a joint message.

You may be sure we shall handle everything so as not
to commit you. The arrangements we have made for
Averell are, I think, satisfactory to him, and do not
preclude necessary intimate contacts, which we must
have to do any good. Of all these I shall give you a
faithful report.

2. It is absolutely necessary we should try to get a
common mind about the Balkans, so that we may
prevent civil war breaking out in several countries,
when probably you and I would be in sympathy with
one side and U.J. with the other. I shall keep you
informed of all this, and nothing will be settled except
preliminary agreements between Britain and Russia,
subject to further discussion and melting down with
you. On this basis I am sure you will not mind our trying
to have a full meeting of minds with the Russians.

3. I have not yet received your account of what part
of the Pacific operations we may mention to Stalin and
his officers. I should like to have this, because
otherwise in conversation with him I might go beyond

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what you wish to be said. Meanwhile I will be very
careful. We have not touched upon Dumbarton Oaks,
except to say it is barred, at your desire. However,
Stalin at lunch today spoke in praise of the meeting and
of the very great measure of agreement that has been
arrived at there. Stalin also in his speech at this same
luncheon animadverted harshly upon Japan as being
an aggressor nation. I have little doubt from our talks
that he will declare war upon them as soon as Germany
is beaten. But surely Averell and Deane should be in a
position not merely to ask him to do certain things, but
also to tell him, in outline at any rate, the kind of things
you are going to do yourself, and we are going to help
you to do.

In the evening of October 11 Stalin came to dine at the British Embassy. This was the first time that the British Ambassador had succeeded in making such an arrangement. Every precaution was taken by the police.

One of my guests, M. Vyshinsky, on passing some of the N.

K.V.D. armed guards on our staircase, remarked,

“Apparently the Red Army has had another victory. It has occupied the British Embassy.” Till the small hours of the morning we ranged over the whole field of discussion in an informal atmosphere. Among other topics we discussed the next General Election in England. Stalin said that he had no doubt about the result: the Conservatives would win. It is even harder to understand the politics of other countries than those of your own.

I also cabled to Hopkins on various matters.

Prime Minister to Mr.

12 Oct. 44

Harry Hopkins

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277

Everything is most friendly here, but the Balkans are
in a sad tangle. Tito, having lived under our protection
for three or four months at Vis, suddenly levanted,
leaving no address, but keeping sentries over his cave
to make out that he was still there. He then proceeded
to Moscow, where he conferred, and yesterday M.

Molotov confessed this fact to Mr. Eden. The Russians
attribute this graceless behaviour to Tito’s suspicious
peasant upbringing, and say that they did not tell us out
of respect for his wish for secrecy. The Bulgarians are
treating our people ill, having arrested some of our
officers still remaining both in Greece and Yugoslavia. I
saw a tale of their having treated very cruelly American
officers when prisoners of theirs. Russian attitude is
that they are of course willing to indict Bulgaria for her
many offences, but only in spirit of a loving parent

—“This hurts me more than it does you.” They are
taking great interest in Hungary, which, they mentioned
erroneously, was their neighbour. They claim fullest
responsibility in Rumania, but are prepared largely to
disinterest themselves in Greece. All these matters are
being flogged out by Mr. Eden and Molotov.

2. Under dire threats from us we persuaded
Mikolajczyk and the Poles to accept the invitation we
had extracted from the Russians. We hope they will be
here tomorrow.

3. We are seeing a great deal of Averell, and he is
giving a dinner tomorrow night on Teheran lines — i.e.,
only the secret ones there. He is sitting in on the
military discussions and on the future of Germany talks,
as well of course as the Polish conversations when
they begin. We have so many bones to pick about the
Balkans at the present time that we would rather carry
the matter a little further àdeux in order to be able to
talk more bluntly than at a larger gathering. I will cable
fully to the President about this in a day or two. Will you
very kindly show this to him? I shall be very glad to
hear from him.

The President now sent us an encouraging message.

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President Roosevelt

12 Oct. 44

to Prime Minister and

Marshal Stalin

Thanks for your joint message of October 10.

I am most pleased to know that you are reaching a
meeting of your two minds as to international policies in
which, because of our present and future common
efforts to prevent international wars, we are all
interested.

After our first meeting I reflected on our relations with Russia throughout Eastern Europe, and, in order to clarify my ideas, drafted a letter to Stalin on the subject, enclosing a memorandum stating our interpretation of the percentages which we had accepted across the table. In the end I did not send this letter, deeming it wiser to let well alone. I print it only as an authentic account of my thought.

Moscow,
October
11, 1944

I deem it profoundly important that Britain and
Russia should have a common policy in the Balkans
which is also acceptable to the United States. The fact
that Britain and Russia have a twenty-year alliance
makes it especially important for us to be in broad
accord and to work together easily and trustfully and for
a long time. I realise that nothing we can do here can
be more than preliminary to the final decisions we shall
have to take when all three of us are gathered together
at the table of victory. Nevertheless I hope that we may
reach understandings, and in some cases agreements,
which will help us through immediate emergencies, and
will afford a solid foundation for long-enduring world
peace.

These percentages which I have put down are no
more than a method by which in our thoughts we can
see how near we are together, and then decide upon
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the necessary steps to bring us into full agreement. As I
said, they would be considered crude, and even
callous, if they were exposed to the scrutiny of the
Foreign Offices and diplomats all over the world.

Therefore they could not be the basis of any public
document, certainly not at the present time. They might
however be a good guide for the conduct of our affairs.

If we manage these affairs well we shall perhaps
prevent several civil wars and much bloodshed and
strife in the small countries concerned. Our broad
principle should be to let every country have the form of
government which its people desire. We certainly do
not wish to force on any Balkan State monarchic or
republican institutions. We have however established
certain relations of faithfulness with the Kings of Greece
and Yugoslavia. They have sought our shelter from the
Nazi foe, and we think that when normal tranquillity is
re-established and the enemy has been driven out the
peoples of these countries should have a free and fair
chance of choosing. It might even be that Commissioners of the three Great Powers should be stationed there
at the time of the elections so as to see that the people
have a genuine free choice. There are good precedents
for this.