Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (46 page)

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Americans use the airfields and other facilities in the maritime provinces which they needed for their Strategical Air Force. Stalin did not seem anxious about the effect of these preparations on the Japanese. In fact, he hoped they would make a “premature attack,” as this would encourage the Russians to fight their best. “The Russians,” he remarked, “would have to know what they were fighting for.”

On the 15th I had a high temperature and could not attend the second military meeting, which was held in the Kremlin that evening. Eden took my place, and had with him Brooke, Ismay, and Burrows; while Stalin, in addition to Molotov and Antonov, had Lieutenant-General Shevchenko, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army in the Far East. Harriman was again there, with General Deane. The only subject discussed was Soviet participation against Japan. Substantial conclusions were reached.

Stalin first of all agreed that we should concert our war plans. He asked for United States help in building up a two to three months’ reserve of fuel, food, and transport in the Far East, and said that if this could be done and the political issues could be clarified the U.S.S.R. would be ready to attack Japan about three months after Germany had been defeated. He also promised to prepare airfields in the maritime provinces for the United States and Soviet Strategic Air Forces, and to receive American four-engined planes and instructors without delay. Meetings between the Soviet and American military staffs in Moscow would begin at once, and he promised to take part in the first one himself.

As the days passed only slight improvement was made with the festering sore of Soviet-Polish affairs. The Poles were Triumph and Tragedy

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willing to accept the Curzon Line “as a line of demarcation between Russia and Poland.” The Russians insisted on the words “as a basis of frontier between Russia and Poland.”

Neither side would give way. Mikolajczyk declared that he would be repudiated by his own people, and Stalin at the end of a talk of two hours and a quarter which I had with him alone remarked that he and Molotov were the only two of those he worked with who were favourable to dealing

“softly” with Mikolajczyk. I was sure there were strong pressures in the background, both party and military.

Stalin did not think it desirable to proceed with an attempt to form a united Polish Government without the frontier question being agreed. Had this been settled he would have been quite willing that Mikolajczyk should head the new Government. I myself thought that difficulties not less obstinate would arise in a discussion for a merger of the Polish Government with the Lublin Poles, whose representatives continued to make the worst possible impression on us, and who, I told Stalin, were “only an expression of the Soviet will.” They had no doubt also the ambition to rule Poland, and were thus a kind of Quislings.

In all the circumstances the best course was for the two Polish delegations to return whence they had come. I felt very deeply the responsibility which lay on me and the Foreign Secretary in trying to frame proposals for a Russo-Polish settlement. Even forcing the Curzon Line upon Poland would excite criticism.

In other directions considerable advantages had been gained. The resolve of the Soviet Government to attack Japan on the overthrow of Hitler was obvious. This would have supreme value in shortening the whole struggle. The arrangements made about the Balkans were, I was sure, the best possible. Coupled with successful military action, they should now be effective in saving Greece, and I had

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no doubt that our agreement to pursue a fifty-fifty joint policy in Yugoslavia was the best solution for our difficulties in view of Tito’s behaviour and of the arrival of Russian and Bulgarian forces under Russian command to help his eastern flank.

There is no doubt that in our narrow circle we talked with an ease, freedom, and cordiality never before attained between our two countries. Stalin made several expressions of personal regard which I feel sure were sincere. But I became even more convinced that he was by no means alone. As I said to my colleagues at home,

“Behind the horseman sits black care.”

Prime Minister to the

16 Oct. 44

King

With humble duty, the Prime Minister hopes His
Majesty has had a successful and interesting visit to the
armies in the Nether lands and is now safely back
home. He trusts His Majesty is well after these
exertions.

2. Here in Moscow the weather is brilliant but crisp,
and the political atmosphere is extremely cordial.

Nothing like it has been seen before. The Prime
Minister and Mr. Eden in their various talks with
Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov have been able to deal
with the most delicate problems in a frank, outspoken
manner without the slightest sign of giving offence. The
Prime Minister attended a special performance of the
ballet, which was very fine, and received a prolonged
ovation from an enormous audience. Presently when
Marshal Stalin came into the box for the first time in this
war and stood beside him there was an almost
passionate demonstration. At or after the very lengthy
feasts, with very numerous cordial toasts, it has been

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possible to touch on many grave matters in an easy
fashion. The nights are very late, lasting till three or
even four o’clock; but the Prime Minister also keeps late
hours, and much work is done from about noon
onwards, with conferences of various kinds.

3. We had three hours on the entire military scene.

After Field-Marshal Brooke and the Prime Minister had
explained the situation and plans in the West, in Italy,
and in Burma, Mr. Harriman and General Deane, U.S.

A., gave a full account of the Pacific, past, present, and
future, which appeared to interest Marshal Stalin
greatly. Later the Russian Deputy Chief of Staff told us
much about Russian plans against Germany which we
had never heard before, the gist of which was
extremely satisfactory. On account of secrecy I will
defer all further reference to what he said until I get
home. Tonight at six o’clock we are to have a Russian
statement on the Far Eastern theatre, which is likely to
be satisfactory and of the greatest interest.

4. The day before yesterday was “All Poles Day.”

Our lot from London are, as your Majesty knows,
decent but feeble, but the delegates from Lublin could
hardly have been under any illusions as to our opinion
of them. They appeared to me to be purely tools, and
recited their parts with well-drilled accuracy. I cross-examined them fairly sharply, and on several points
Marshal Stalin backed me up. We shall be wrestling
with our [London] Poles all today, and there are some
hopes that we may get a settlement. If not we shall
have to hush the matter up and spin it out until after the

[American] Presidential election.
1

5. There are still many subjects to be discussed, like
the future treatment of Germany.

Mr. Churchill, with his humble duty, remains Your
Majesty’s faithful servant.

On the evening of October 17 we held our last meeting.

The news had just arrived that Admiral Horthy had been arrested by the Germans as a precaution now that the

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whole German front in Hungary was disintegrating. I remarked that I hoped the Ljubljana Gap could be reached as fast as possible, and added that I did not think the war would be over before the spring. We then had our first talk on the question of Germany. We discussed the merits and drawbacks of the Morgenthau Plan. It was decided that the European Advisory Commission should study the problem in detail.

While flying home I gave the President further details of our talks.

Prime

Minister

to

22 Oct. 44

President Roosevelt

On our last day at Moscow Mikolajczyk saw Bierut,
who admitted his difficulties. Fifty of his men had been
shot in the last month. Many Poles took to the woods
rather than join his forces. Approaching winter
conditions behind the front would be very hard as the
Russian Army moved forward, using all transport. He
insisted however that if Mikolajczyk were Premier he
(Bierut) must have 75 per cent of the Cabinet.