The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (41 page)

On at least two prominent occasions, the CIA represented, inaccurately, that Abu Zubaydah provided this information after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. On May 30, 2005, the Office of Legal Counsel wrote in a now-declassified memorandum:

“Interrogations of [Abu] Zubaydah—again, once enhanced interrogation techniques were employed—furnished detailed information regarding al Qaeda’s ‘organization structure, key operatives, and modus operandi’ and identified KSM as the mastermind of the September 11 attacks.”
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The OLC memorandum cited a document provided by the CIA to support the statement.
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The OLC memorandum further stated that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques provide the U.S. government with “otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence,” that “ordinary interrogation techniques had little effect on . . . Zubaydah,” and that the CIA had “reviewed and confirmed the accuracy of [the OLC’s] description of the interrogation program, including its purposes, methods, limitations, and results.”
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In November 2007, the CIA prepared a set of documents and talking points for the CIA director to use in a briefing with the president on the effectiveness of the CIA’s waterboard interrogation technique. The documents prepared assert that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as the “mastermind” of the September 11, 2001, attacks after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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While Abu Zubaydah did provide information on KSM’s role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, this information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases and was obtained prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. There is no evidence to support the statement that Abu Zubaydah’s information—obtained by FBI interrogators prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and while Abu Zubaydah was hospitalized—was uniquely important in the identification of KSM as the “mastermind” of the 9/11 attacks.

The following describes information available to the CIA prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah:

• Both the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and the CIA Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks include lengthy chronologies of the Intelligence Community’s interest in KSM prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The timelines begin in 1995, when the United States determined that KSM was linked to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, leading to the determination by the National Security Council’s Policy Coordination Group that KSM was a top priority target for the United States.
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  The Congressional Joint Inquiry further noted that information obtained prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks “led the CIA to see KSM as part of Bin Ladin’s organization.”
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  There was also CIA reporting in 1998 that KSM was “very close” to UBL.
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  On June 12, 2001, it was reported that “Khaled” was actively recruiting people to travel outside Afghanistan, including to the United States where colleagues were reportedly already in the country to meet them, to carry out terrorist-related activities for UBL. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the CIA presumed this “Khaled” was KSM.
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• On September 12, 2001, a foreign government source, described as a member of al-Qa’ida, stated “the 11 September attacks had been masterminded from Kabul by three people,” to include “Shaykh Khalid,” who was related to Ramzi Yousef.
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• Also on September 12, 2001, a CIA officer familiar with KSM wrote a cable stating that “[o]ne of the individuals who has the capability to organize the kind of strikes we saw in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon is Khalid Shaykh Mohammad.”
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• On September 15, 2001, a CIA officer wrote to a number of senior CTC officers, “I would say the percentages are pretty high that Khalid Sheikh Mohammad is involved [in the September 11, 2001, attacks].”
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• On October 16, 2001, an email from a CTC officer who had been tracking KSM since 1997, stated that although more proof was needed, “I believe KSM may have been the mastermind behind the 9-11 attacks.
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• A foreign government informed the CIA that in late December 2001, ███ source,
  ██████████████████████████████
  , provided information on the attacks of September, 11, 2001, and stated, “Khalid Shayk Muhammad, the maternal uncle of Ramzi [Yousef] . . . was the person who supervised the ‘final touches’ of the operation.”
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• Other reporting prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah stated that KSM was: “one of the individuals considered the potential mastermind”;
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  “one of the top candidates for having been involved in the planning for the 11 September attacks” and one of “the masterminds”;
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  and “one of the leading candidates to have been a hands-on planner in the 9/11 attacks.”
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2. The Identification of KSM’s “Mukhtar” Alias

The CIA represented that CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided “important” and “vital” information by identifying Khalid Shaykh Mohammed’s (KSM) alias, “Mukhtar.”
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In at least one instance in November 2007, in a set of documents and talking points for the CIA director to use in a briefing with the president on the effectiveness of the CIA’s waterboard interrogation technique, the CIA asserted that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as “Mukhtar” after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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While Abu Zubaydah did provide information on KSM’s alias, this information was provided by Abu Zubaydah to FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—and while Abu Zubaydah was still in the intensive care unit of a █████ hospital recovering from a gunshot wound incurred during his capture. Further, the information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases.
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Prior to the information provided by Abu Zubaydah, the CIA had intelligence, including a cable from August 28, 2001, indicating that KSM was now being called “Mukhtar.”
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3. The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh

The CIA has represented that information acquired from CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah, as a result of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, led to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. This CIA representation was included in President Bush’s September 6, 2006, speech on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. The speech, which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, stated that the intelligence provided by CIA detainees “cannot be found any other place,” and that the nation’s “security depends on getting this kind of information.”
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The speech included the following:

“Zubaydah
was questioned using these procedures
[the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques], and soon he began to provide information on key al-Qa’ida operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks on September the 11th.
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For example, Zubaydah
identified
one of KSM’s accomplices in the 9/11 attacks, a terrorist named Ramzi bin al-Shibh.
The information Zubaydah provided helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh.
And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.”
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While the speech provided no additional detail on the capture of bin al-Shibh, an internal email among senior CIA personnel provided additional background for why the CIA included “the capture of Ramzi bin ai-Shibh” in the president’s speech as an example of the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. After the speech, the chief of the
█████
Department in CTC, ███████, sent an email to the chief of CTC,
███████
, ████████ CTC Legal,
██████
, and two officers in the CIA Office of Public Affairs, among others. The email addressed press speculation that the intelligence successes attributed to CIA detainees and the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in the president’s speech were not accurate. Defending the accuracy of the speech, the chief of the ███████ Department in CTC wrote: “The NY Times has posted a story predictably poking holes in the President’s speech.” Regarding the CIA assertion that Abu Zubaydah provided information after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques that led to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the chief explained:

“. . . we knew Ramzi bin al-Shibh was involved in 9/11 before AZ was captured; however, AZ gave us information on his recent activities that—when added into other information—helped us track him. Again, on this point, we were very careful and the speech is accurate in what it says about bin al-Shibh.”
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In addition, on February 17, 2007, the deputy chief of the ████ Department in CTC, ██████ testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Abu Zubaydah “led us to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who in kind of [
sic
] started the chain of events” that led to the capture of KSM.
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A review of CIA records found no connection between Abu Zubaydah’s reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s capture. CIA records indicate that Ramzi was captured unexpectedly—on September 11, 2002, when Pakistani authorities, █████████, were conducting raids targeting Hassan Ghul in Pakistan.
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While CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, there is no indication in CIA records that Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh’s whereabouts. Further, while Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh while being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided similar information to FBI special agents prior to the initiation of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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Prior to the application of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, during interrogation sessions on May 19, 2003, and May 20, 2003, Abu Zubaydah reviewed photographs of individuals known by his interrogators to be associated with the bombing of the
USS Cole
, as well as the September 11, 2001, attacks. Abu Zubaydah identified a picture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh as “al-Shiba” and “noted that he is always with” KSM.
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Another record of this interrogation stated that showing Abu Zubaydah the photos:

“was done to gauge his willingness to cooperate and provide details about people, the last times he saw them, where they were going, etc. He appeared to be very cooperative, provided details on people that we expected him to know, the collective groups when they departed Afghanistan, where he thinks they may now be, etc.”
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Shortly thereafter, on June 2, 2002, an FBI special agent showed Abu Zubaydah the FBI “PENTTBOM photobook”
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which contained photographs numbered 1–35. A cable states that Abu Zubaydah was volunteering information and was “forthcoming and respond[ing] directly to questioning.” Abu Zubaydah, who was not asked any “preparatory questions regarding these photographs,” identified photograph #31, known to the interrogators as Ramzi bin al-Shibh, as a man he knew as al-Shiba, and stated al-Shiba was with KSM in Qandahar circa December 2001. Abu Zubaydah stated that al-Shiba spoke Arabic like a Yemeni and noted that al-Shiba was in the media after the September 11, 2001, attacks.
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In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah’s interrogators recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members traveled ████ “as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time off for a break and to attend to personal matters ███████,” as well as to discuss “the endgame” of Abu Zubaydah ██████ with officers from CIA Headquarters.
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As a result, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation.
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Abu Zubaydah spent the remainder of June 2002 and all of July 2002, 47 days in total, in solitary detention without being asked any questions. During this period, Abu Zubaydah’s interrogators █████████████. The FBI special agents never returned to the detention site.
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When CIA officers next interrogated Abu Zubaydah, on August 4, 2002, they immediately used the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah, including the waterboard.
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On August 21, 2002, while Abu Zubaydah was still being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, a CIA cable noted that Abu Zubaydah was shown several photographs and “immediately recognized the photograph of Ramzi bin al-Shibh.”
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Abu Zubaydah described bin al-Shibh as having “very dark, almost African looking” skin and noted that he first met bin al-Shibh after the 9/11 attacks in Kandahar, but added that he “did not have in-depth conversations with him.”
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A cable stated that, after being shown the photograph of bin al-Shibh, Abu Zubaydah told interrogators that he was told bin al-Shibh stayed at the same safe house that KSM “had established for the pilots and others destined to be involved in the 9/11 attacks.”
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An accompanying intelligence cable stated that Abu Zubaydah informed interrogators that he did not know—and did not ask—whether bin al-Shibh had been involved in the attacks of September 11, 2001, but did state that he believed that bin al-Shibh was “one of the operatives working for Mukhtar aka Khalid Shaykh Mohammad.”
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The information Abu Zubaydah provided while being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was described by CIA interrogators as “significant new details.”
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However, the information provided by Abu Zubaydah was similar to information Abu Zubaydah provided prior to the application of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, or was otherwise already known to the CIA. CIA records indicate that as early as September 15, 2001, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was identified as an associate of the September 11, 2001, hijackers who attempted to obtain flight training in Florida.
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A July 27, 2002, cable from the CIA’s ALEC Station provided “background information” on bin al-Shibh and stated that he was “suspected of being the original ‘20th hijacker,’ whose participation in the 11 September attacks was thwarted by his inability to obtain a visa to enter the United States.”
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Ramzi bin al-Shibh was also identified as “a member of the Hamburg cell that included hijacker Mohammed Atta,”
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and bin al-Shibh was featured in one of “five suicide testimonial videos found in December 2001 at the residence of former UBL [Usama bin Ladin] lieutenant Mohammad Atef in Afghanistan.”
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