The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (81 page)

982.
See Assets/nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/022/icrc—report.pdf and detainee reviews and reports in Volume III.

983.
CIA officers in RDG and OMS prepared a number of documents disputing the ICRC allegations. See document entitled, “CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen ‘High Value Detainees’ in CIA Custody.” See Volumes I and III for additional information.

984.
Email from: ███████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: █████████ John Rizzo; subject: FW: Summary of
Hamdan
Decision; date: June 30, 2006, at 4:44 PM.

985.
Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury told the Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) that officials from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice met with the president and officials from the CIA and the NSC to consider the impact of the
Hamdan
decision, and that it was clear from the outset that legislation would have to be enacted to address the application of Common Article 3 and the War Crimes Act to the CIA interrogation program. As the OPR report noted, “
Hamdan
directly contradicted OLC’s January 22, 2002 opinion to the White House and the Department of Defense, which had concluded that Common Article 3 did not apply to captured members of al Qaeda.” See Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility; Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009 (DTS #2010-1058).

986.
S. 3930 passed the Senate by a vote of 65-34 (Record Vote Number: 259) and the House by a vote of 250-170 (Roll no. 508). It was signed into law on October 17, 2006.

987.
██████████████ 6361 ████.

988.
See, for example, █████ 1335 (021946Z NOV 06); ████ 1340 (041114Z NOV 06); ████ 1343 (041805Z NOV 06); ████ 1370 (071318Z NOV 06); ████ 1574 (230910Z NOV 06); ████ 1624 (271250Z NOV 06); ████ 1703 (040918Z DEC 06); ████ 1860 (181622Z DEC 06); ████ 1931 (081606Z JAN 07; ████ 1956 (151211Z JAN 07); ████ 2007 (251057Z JAN 07).

989.
█████ 2065 (081633Z FEB 07).

990.
Email from: ████████, █CTC/LGL; to: ██████████, █████████, [REDACTED], ████ ███████; subject: What needs to occur before we ask for EITs on ███; HEADQUARTERS ████ (272015Z FEB 07); date: February 9, 2007.

991.
See October 23, 2006, Memorandum for Director, CIA from ████████, Chief, ███████ ███████.

992.
See October 23, 2006, Memorandum for Director, CIA from ██████ Chief, ███████ ███████ and DCIA Talking Points for 9 March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting.

993.
February 9, 2007, letter from John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice. At the time, there were internal disagreements within the CIA about whether the CIA should have a detention and interrogation program. An April 2007 Sametime communication between the chief of CTC and another senior CIA leader described these disagreements and how CIA leadership responded to them. According to █████████, “[REDACTED] was carping to [REDACTED] and Jose [Rodiguez] last Friday . . . that he and [Michael] Sulick (!) had a long talk and agree the CIA is off the track and rails . . . that we should not be doing detention, rendition, interrogation.” Referring to a CIA leadership meeting that day in which the Committee’s April 12, 2007, hearing would be discussed, ███████ stated that: “I want to take that [criticism] on by letting all know how importan [sic] this [hearing] is . . . and what the leaderships [sic] position is from hayden, kappes and jose . . . in case there is some corrosive, bullshit mumbling and rumblings among comopennt [sic – “compotent”] chiefs, some of which i am seeing.” Sametime communication between █████████ and █████████, 12/Apr/07, 09:50:54 to 09:56:57.

994.
Email from: █████████; to: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo etc.; subject: EIT briefing for SecState on June 22, 2007; date: June 22, 2007; July 3, 2007, Steven Bradbury, Handwritten Notes, “John Rizzo”; email from: John A. Rizzo; to: ███████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with Bradbury; date: July 3, 2007.

995.
█████ 1199 (251634Z JUN 07); ███████ 6439 █████████; █████████████ 7516 ██████.

996.
CIA memorandum titled, CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammed Rahim - 19 June 2007. The document was unsigned, and the author is unknown. A subsequent version, with identical text, was titled CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammad Rahim - 25 June 2007.
See
also
█████ 2463 (201956Z JUL 07).

997.
Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: ██████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with Bradbury; date: July 3, 2007.

998.
██████ 6439 ████████; █████████ 7516 █████.

999.
████ 2432 ████JUL 07).

1000.
July 16, 2007, letter from Michael Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to President George W. Bush; Executive Order 13440, July 20, 2007; and Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Acting Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

1001.
CIA memorandum titled, “CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammed Rahim - 19 June 2007.” The document was unsigned, and the author is unknown. A subsequent version, with identical text, was titled “CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammad Rahim - 25 June 2007.”

1002.
████ 2445 (181104Z JUL 07); ████ 2463 (201956Z JUL 07); ████ 2467 (211341Z JUL 07).

1003.
████ 2463 (201956Z JUL 07).

1004.
████ 2467 (211341Z JUL 07).

1005.
████ 2467 (211341Z JUL 07).

1006.
████ 2467 (211341Z JUL 07).

1007.
████ 2467 (211341Z JUL 07).

1008.
Rahim was subjected to 104.5 hours of sleep deprivation from July 21, 2007, to July 25, 2007. Sleep deprivation was stopped when Rahim “described visual and auditory hallucinations.” After Rahim was allowed to sleep for eight hours and the psychologist concluded that Rahim had been faking his symptoms, Rahim was subjected to another 62 hours of sleep deprivation. A third, 13 hour session, was halted due to a limit of 180 hours of sleep deprivation during a 30 day period. See ████ 2486 (251450Z JUL 07); ████ 2491 (261237Z JUL 07); ████ 2496 (261834Z JUL 07); ████ 2501 (271624Z JUL 07); ███ 2502 (281557Z JUL 07); and ████ 2508 (291820Z JUL 07).) On August 20, 2007, Rahim was subjected to a fourth sleep deprivation session. After a session that lasted 104 hours, CIA Headquarters consulted with the Department of Justice and determined that “[t]ermination at this point is required to be consistent with the DCIA Guidelines, which limit sleep deprivation to an aggregate of 180 hours in any repeat any 30 day period.” (See HEADQUARTERS ████ (240022Z AUG 07).) Between August 28, 2007, and September 2, 2007 Rahim was subjected to three additional sleep deprivation sessions of 32.5 hours, 12 hours, and 12 hours. (See ████ 2645 (291552Z AUG07); ████ 2661 (311810Z AUG 07); ████ 2662 (010738Z SEP 07) and ████ 2666 (020722Z SEP 07).) As described, CIA interrogators conducted an eighth sleep deprivation session, lasting 138.5 hours, in November 2007.

1009.
████ 2467 (211341Z JUL 07); ████ 2502 (281557Z JUL 07); ████ 2554 (071453Z AUG 07); ████ 2558 (081511Z AUG 07); ████ 2654 (301659Z AUG 07); ████ 2671 (061450Z SEP 07).

1010.
████ 2496 (261834Z JUL 07); ████ 2508 (291820Z JUL 07); ████ 2554 (071453Z AUG 07); ████ 2558 (081511Z AUG 07); ████ 2626 (241158Z AUG 07); ████ 2644 (281606Z AUG 07); ████ 2645 (291552Z AUG 07); ████ 2661 (311810Z AUG 07); ████ 2662 (020738Z SEP 07); ████ 2666 (030722Z SEP 07).

1011.
████ 2467 (211341Z JUL 07); ████ 2570 (101155Z AUG 07); ████ 2615 (201528Z AUG 07).

1012.
████ 2501 (271624Z JUL 07).

1013.
████ 2467 (211341Z JUL 07); ████ 2476 (231419Z JUL 07); ████ 2496 (261834Z JUL 07); ████ 2502 (281557Z JUL 07); ████ 2508 (291820Z JUL 07); ████ 2554 (071453Z AUG 07); ████ 2558 (081511Z AUG 07); ████ 2570 (101155Z AUG 07); ████ 2626 (241158Z AUG 07); ████ 2644 (281606Z AUG 07); ████ 2645 (291552Z AUG 07); ████ 2654 (301659Z AUG 07); ████ 2661 (311810Z AUG 07); ████ 2662 (020738Z SEP 07); ████ 2666 (030722Z SEP 07); ████ 2671 (061450Z SEPT 07). CIA contractor DUNBAR participated in Muhammad Rahim’s interrogation sessions from August 9, 2007, to August 29, 2007. See Volume III for additional details.

1014.
CIA memorandum from ██████, Director, Counterterrorism Center, to Director, Central Intelligence Agency, September 7, 2007, Subject: Request to Extend Detention of Muhammad Rahim.

1015.
CIA Routing and Record Sheet with Signatures for approval of the Memorandum, “Request to Extend Detention of Muhammad Rahim,” September 5, 2007. J.A.R. are the initials of the Director of the NCS, Jose A. Rodriguez.

1016.
█████ 2697 (121226Z SEP 07); CIA memorandum from ██████, Director, Counterterrorism Center, to Director, Central Intelligence Agency, October 31, 2007, Subject: Request Approval for the use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; HEADQUARTERS ████ (101710 SEP 07). During this period, contractor Grayson SWIGERT recommended two approaches. The first was increasing Rahim’s amenities over 8-14 days “before returning to the use of EITs.” The second was “switching from an interrogation approach that in effect amounts to a ‘battle of wills,’ to a ‘recruiting’ approach that sidesteps the adversarial contest inherent in framing the session as an interrogation.” SWIGERT noted, however, that the latter approach “is apt to be slow in producing information” since intelligence requirements would not be immediately serviced, and “it would work best if [Rahim] believes he will be in [CIA] custody indefinitely.” (See email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED] and ████████; cc: ███████ and Hammond DUNBAR; subject: Some thoughts on [Rahim] interrogation next steps; date: September 17, 2007, at 4:05 PM.) The CTC’s deputy chief of operations replied that, “It’s clear that the ‘harsh’ approach isn’t going to work and the more we try variants on it, the more it allows [Rahim] to believe he has won. The question is whether that perception will be conveyed in Scenario 2.” See email from [REDACTED] to: ██████; cc: [REDACTED], ███████, Grayson SWIGERT, Hammond DUNBAR, [REDACTED], ███████, [REDACTED]; subject: Fw: Some thoughts on [Rahim] interrogation next steps; date: September 17, 2007, at 4:28 PM.

1017.
High Value Detainee Interrogators (HVDI).

1018.
████ 2691 (101306Z SEP 07).

1019.
████ 2888 (022355Z NOV 07); ████ 2915 (081755Z NOV 07). Due to the time zone difference, when this sleep deprivation session began it was November 2, 2007, at CIA Headquarters, but November 3, 2007, at the detention site.

1020.
████ 3097 (141321Z DEC 07); ████ 3098 (151203Z DEC 07); ████ 3144 (270440Z DEC 07); ████ 3151 (291607Z DEC 07); ████ 3158████████; ████ 3165 (311016Z JAN 08); ████ 3166 (011404Z JAN 08); HEADQUARTERS ████ (180120Z DEC 07).

1021.
See Volume II and Volume III for additional information.

1022.
████ 3445 ██████; ██████ 9754 ██████; █████ 8405 ███████ ███; ████ 8408 ██████. Records indicate that Rahim did not depart █████████ during his time in nominal █████ custody. See Volume III for additional details on this transfer.

1023.
Undated CIA Memorandum, titled █████ After-Action Review, author (REDACTED); Undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification of Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of Walling as an EIT, and Memorandum from ██████████████████ to Director, CTC, May 9, 2008, Subject: Results of After-Action Review of [Rahim] Interrogation. A document drafted by one of the participants prior to the review suggested that “intense legal/policy scrutiny” was also a negative factor; however, this point was not mentioned in any of the post-review summaries, except in the context of discussing confusion over whether particular interrogation methods were legal. The summary documents state that CIA officers devised and implemented several different strategies, one after another. According to one of the documents, “[t]hese varied strategies were implemented due to frustration and concern regarding the lack of intelligence production.”

1024.
Undated CIA Memorandum, titled ██████ After-Action Review, author (REDACTED), Undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Deprivation and Reinstatement of Walling and Memorandum from ████████████████████████████████████ to Director, CTC, May 9, 2008, Subject: Results of After-Action Review of [Rahim] Interrogation.

1025.
Undated CIA Memorandum, titled ███████ After-Action Review, author (REDACTED), Undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification of Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of Walling as an EIT.

1026.
See Volume III for additional information.

1027.
For more information on CIA contracting with [Company Y], see Volume I.

1028.
Letter to ██████████████████ [Company Y], attn: Hammond DUNBAR from [REDACTED], Contracting Officer, re: Confirmation of Verbal Authorization to Proceed Not to Exceed (ATP/NTE); email from: [REDACTED]; to: █████████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ███████; [REDACTED]; subject: Next Contractual Steps with SWIGERT& DUNBAR; date: March 2, 2005; March 18, 2005, Letter from [REDACTED], Chief, to ████████ [Company Y], re: Letter Contract ████████.

1029.
Email from: ██████; to: ███████; subject: ████; date: June 17, 2005, at 11:08:22 AM; email from: ███████ to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: ████████████. [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: PCS CTC officer to [Company Y location] (“One of the primary functions is to develop and set-up what we call the ‘Terrorist Think Tank’ (previously briefed to the DDO and ADDO) which will be critical as we develop our █████████); date: July 12, 2005, at 10:25:48 AM; Justification Date: 28 February 2006, Justification For Other Than Full And Open Competition, Contractor: [Company Y].

1030.
See, for example, [Company Y] Monthly report, February 2006; [Company Y] Monthly Report, March 2006; [Company Y] Quarterly, 01 Jan - 31 March 2007.

1031.
Justification Date: 25 July 2006, Justification For Other Than Full and Open Competition, Contractor: [Company Y].

1032.
DO/CTC███/RDG Projected Staff & Contractors, updated as of March 15, 2006.

1033.
DO/CTC/███/RDG Projected Staff & Contractors, updated as of March 15, 2006.

1034.
June 4, 2007, RDG, Mission Summary.

1035.
CTC confirmation, received by telephone on November 16, 2012.

1036.
DTS #2009-1258; DTS #2012-4008. CIA paid Company Y $612,000 in 2010 for contract close-out costs. In a March 2009 notification, the CIA also informed the Committee that, in addition to payments to Company Y, Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR had received $1.5 million and $1.1 million, respectively, as individuals. As noted elsewhere, the notification includes inaccurate representations about the effectiveness of the CIA program. See Congressional Notification, March 18, 2009 (DTS#2009-1258).

1037.
Email from: [REDACTED], CTC████; to: Hammond DUNBAR, Grayson SWIGERT; cc: [REDACTED], ██████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Copy of Signed Indemnification Agreement; date: July 13, 2007, at 02:22 PM; email from: [REDACTED], Chief, Contract Law Division; to: ██████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Fw: Modified Indemnification Agmt . . . New AR 7-17 Waiver Memo, Too?; date: November 13, 2007, at 10:32 AM.