The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (40 page)

Similarly, on July 13, 2004, the CIA disseminated an Intelligence Assessment entitled, “Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa’ida.”
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On April 2005, the paper, as well as other materials on CIA detainee reporting, was faxed from
██████
CTC Legal, to the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, to support the OLC’s legal review of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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The document states:

“. . . information that KSM provided on Majid Khan in the spring of 2003 was the
crucial first link
in the chain that led us to the capture of prominent JI leader and al-Qa’ida associate Hambali in August 2003, and more than a dozen Southeast Asian operatives slated for attacks against the US homeland. KSM told us about [Majid] Khan’s role in delivering $50,000 in December 2002 to operatives associated with Hambali . . . [Majid] Khan—who had been detained in Pakistan in early 2003—was confronted with KSM’s information about the money and acknowledged that he delivered the money to an operative named ‘Zubair.’ . . . Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June 2003.”
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On August 24, 2009, this document was declassified with redactions and publicly released with the inaccurate information unredacted.
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The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the capture of Hambali in 18 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.
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In these representations, the CIA consistently asserted that “
after applying
” the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided “
the crucial first link
” that led to the capture of Hambali.
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A review of CIA operational cables and other records found that information obtained from KSM during and after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the capture of Hambali. A review of CIA records further found that prior to reporting from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA had intelligence on: (1) Hambali’s role in the Jemaah Islamiyah; (2) funding by al-Qa’ida and KSM of Hambali’s terrorist activities; (3) the operative to whom Majid Khan delivered the money, Zubair, and Zubair’s links to terrorism, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Hambali; and (4) Majid Khan’s $50,000 money transfer from al-Qa’ida to Zubair in December 2002. CIA records indicate that the intelligence that led to Hambali’s capture was based on signals intelligence, a CIA source, and Thai investigative activities in Thailand.
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Prior to his capture, Hambali was known to have played a supporting role in the KSM and Ramzi Yousef “Bojinka Plot,” an effort in early 1995 to place explosives on 12 United States-flagged aircraft and destroy them mid-flight.
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By the end of 2001, Hambali was suspected of playing a supporting role in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, as well as helping to enroll Zacarias Moussaoui in flight school.
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By early 2002, a body of intelligence reporting unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program indicated that KSM was providing Hambali with funding to conduct terrorist operations in Southeast Asia.
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In March 2002, Hambali was described as the CIA’s “number one target” in Southeast Asia.
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That same month, the FBI provided information to the CIA stating that foreign government detainee reporting indicated that KSM reimbursed terrorism-related expenditures made by Hambali for the JI.
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By June of 2002, the CIA had entered into discussions with representatives of the ██████ government regarding their willingness to accept custody of Hambali once he was captured.
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On September 25, 2002, the CIA reported that an individual in FBI custody since May 2002, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, reported that in November 2001, he collected $50,000 from KSM for a Hambali-directed terrorist operation targeting U.S. interests, as well as at least one other $10,000 payment.
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On the same day, September 25, 2002, a CIA cable stated that Masran bin Arshad, while in the custody of a foreign government, had detailed his connections to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and KSM.
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According to bin Arshad, after KSM’s “Second Wave” plotting was “abandoned” in late 2001, bin Arshad was tasked by KSM to meet with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in Pakistan and to deliver $50,000 to Hambali for terrorist operations. Bin Arshad stated he was unable to deliver the money.
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When the October 12, 2002, terrorist attacks occurred on the Indonesian island of Bali, killing more than 200 individuals, Hambali was immediately suspected of being the “mastermind” of the attacks and was further described as “one of the world’s most wanted terrorists.”
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Open source information in October 2002 identified the funding for the Bali bombings as flowing through Hambali from al-Qa’ida leadership in Pakistan. Through November 2002, news reports highlighted links between senior al-Qa’ida leadership—including KSM—and JI in the context of the Bali bombings. Hambali continued to be identified as a potential mastermind of the bombing and likely residing in Thailand. These same reports identified a Malaysian named “Zubair” as one of three individuals sought by security officials for the Hambali-linked Bali bombings.
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In early January 2003, coverage of a known al-Qa’ida email account uncovered communications between that account and the account of a former Baltimore, Maryland, resident, Majid Khan. The communications indicated that Majid Khan traveled to Bangkok, Thailand, in December 2002 for terrorist support activities and was in contact there with a “Zubair.”
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By this time, the CIA had significant information—prior to KSM’s capture—indicating that a “Zubair” played a central supporting role in the JI, was affiliated with al-Qa’ida figures like KSM, had expertise in
███████████
Southeast Asia, and was suspected of playing a role in Hambali’s October 12, 2002, Bali bombings.
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This information was derived from traditional intelligence collection, open source reporting, and FBI debriefings of Abu Zubaydah (prior to Abu Zubaydah being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques).
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On March 4, 2003, the day before Majid Khan’s capture, the FBI requested additional information from the CIA on the “Zubair” referenced in Majid Khan’s emails.
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On March 6, 2003, the day after Majid Khan was captured in Pakistan, and while being questioned by foreign government interrogators using rapport-building techniques,
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Majid Khan described how he traveled to Bangkok in December 2002 and provided $50,000 USD to “Zubair” at the behest of al-Qa’ida. Khan also stated that he updated KSM’s nephew, Ammar al-Baluchi, via email about the money exchange. Majid Khan’s physical description of Zubair matched previous intelligence reporting already collected on Zubair.
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On March 10, 2003, the CIA
█████████
requested that information about Majid Khan’s travel to Thailand and his delivery of money to “Zubair” be shared with Thai authorities, along with the physical description and a phone number for “Zubair” provided by Majid Khan. CIA
█████████
proposed that it inform the Thais that “[w]e are very concerned that the money mentioned may be funding terrorist activities, as well as the individuals in question,” and that ██████ request the Thai government “provide any details regarding these individuals and phone numbers.”
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On March 11, 2003, after being confronted with information that confirmed KSM’s financial support to Hambali, KSM admitted to providing Hambali with $50,000 to conduct a terrorist attack “in approximately November 2002.” KSM made no reference to Majid Khan or Zubair.
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On March 17, 2003, after being confronted with Majid Khan’s reporting and a photograph of Majid Khan, KSM confirmed that Majid Khan—whom he stated he knew only as “Yusif”—was involved in the money transfer to Hambali.
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KSM denied knowing Zubair—who would be the critical link to Hambali’s capture—or any other Hambali representative in Thailand.
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By May 2003, the CIA had learned that a source the CIA had been developing
████████████████████
, received a call from a phone number associated with Zubair. When the source was contacted by the CIA, he described a Malaysian man
████████████████████████████
.
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CIA officers suspected this individual was the “Zubair” associated with Hambali and Majid Khan.
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██████ later, the source alerted the CIA that the person suspected of being Zubair would be ██████████. When Zubair arrived at ████████████████, he was photographed and followed by Thai authorities.
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A detainee in foreign government custody confirmed the individual in the surveillance photo was Zubair.
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On June 8, 2003, Zubair was detained by the government of Thailand.
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While still in Thai custody, Zubair was questioned about his efforts to obtain fraudulent ████ documents, as well as his phone contact with
██████████████████████████
[Business Q].
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Zubair admitted to seeking illegal ████ documents on behalf of Hambali, as well as using
██████
[Business Q]
█████████
.
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Signals intelligence had alerted the CIA that a phone number associated with Zubair had been in frequent contact with ███████ [Business Q].
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After being transferred to CIA custody and rendered to the CIA’s COBALT detention site, Zubair was immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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Days later, Zubair was asked about his efforts to obtain illegal ████ documents for Hambali, at which point he again acknowledged █████████████ [Business Q] ████████.
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When Thai authorities unilaterally approached a “contact” at
████████
[Business Q], they obtained
███████████████████████████
.
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An operation targeting ████████████ was developed that focused on surveillance of ███████ [Business Q]. As a result of this surveillance, and the cooperation of ███████, Hambali associate Amer was arrested on August 11, 2003.
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Amer was immediately cooperative and assisted in an operation that led to the arrest of Lillie, aka Bashir bin Lap, that same day.
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Lillie was found to have a key fob in his possession imprinted with an address of an apartment building in Ayutthaya, Thailand. In response to questioning, “within minutes of capture,” Lillie admitted that the address on the key fob was the address where Hambali was located. Fewer than four hours later, an operation successfully led to Hambali’s capture at the address found on the key fob.
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On November 28, 2005, the chief of the CTC’s Southeast Asia Branch explained how Hambali was captured in an interview with the CIA’s Oral History Program, stating:

“Frankly, we stumbled onto Hambali. We stumbled onto the [the source] . . . picking up the phone and calling his case officer to say there’s ████████ [related to Zubair] . . . we really stumbled over it. It wasn’t police work, it wasn’t good targeting, it was we stumbled over it and it yielded up Hambali. What I tell my people is you work really, really hard to be in a position to get lucky.”
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Hambali was rendered to CIA custody on August ██, 2003, and almost immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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On September 4, 2006, he was transferred to U.S. military custody.
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G. CIA Secondary Effectiveness Representations—Less Frequently Cited Disrupted Plots, Captures, and Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided as Evidence for the Effectiveness of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

In addition to the eight most frequently cited “thwarted” plots and terrorists captured, the Committee examined 12 other less frequently cited intelligence successes that the CIA has attributed to the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques.
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These representations are listed below:

1. The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as the Mastermind of the September 11, 2001, Attacks

The CIA represented that CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided “important” and “vital” information by identifying Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) as the mastermind behind the attacks of September 11, 2001.
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CIA Director Hayden told the Committee on April 12, 2007, that:

“. . . it was Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, who identified KSM as the mastermind of 9/11. Until that time, KSM did not even appear in our chart of key al-Qa’ida members and associates.”
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