The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (109 page)

1832.
██████████21753████████.

1833.
On January ██, 2004. Hassan Ghul was transferred to U.S. military custody. On January ██, 2004. Hassan Ghul was transferred to CIA custody. On August ██, 2006, Ghul was rendered to ██████. On May ██, 2007, he was released ███████████████. Hassan Ghul █████████████████████████████.
See
██████████ 21815 ██████████; ███████████ 1642 ██████ JAN 04); ██████ 2441 ████████; HEADQUARTERS ██████████; ███████ 1635 ███████; ███████ 1712 ██████████; HEADQUARTERS ███ ██████████; ████████ 1775 █████████; ██████████ 173426 ██████████; and Committee Notification from the CIA dated ██████████ (DTS #2012-3802).

1834.
Italics added. President George W. Bush, Speech on the CIA’s Terrorist Detention Program, (September 6, 2006).
See also
CIA officer ██████████’s February 14, 2007, testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in which she stated that Abu Zubaydah “really pointed us towards Khalid Shaykh Mohammad and how to find him,” adding “[h]e led us to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who in kind of [sic] started the chain of events.”
See
transcript, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337).

1835.
CIA records provided to the Committee identify the pseudonym created by the CIA for the asset. The Study lists the asset as “ASSET X” to further protect his identity.

1836.
TD INTERVIEW, CIA ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM, SEPTEMBER 14, 2004], Presentation to the CTC ██████████ 14 September 2004 by ██████████.
See also
Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 30 November 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of ██████, by [REDACTED], 25 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED]; 24 November & 15 December 2004, ClA Oral History Program.

1837.
See, for example, the September 15, 2001, email from a CIA officer to ██████████ of ALEC Station, in which the officer wrote, “I would say the percentages are pretty high that Khalid Sheikh Mohammad is involved [in the September 11, 2001, attacks].”
See
email from: █████████; to: ██████████; cc: ██████████, ██████████, [REDACTED], ████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: RAMZI LEADS…; date: September 15, 2001, at 5:04:38 AM).
See also
DIRECTOR █████ (132018Z SEP 01), disseminated as ████████████.

1838.
ALEC █████ (231718Z SEP 01). Ramzi Yousef is serving a life sentence in the United States.

1839.
A CIA source from 1995 reported that “all members of ██████████████████████████ are acting together on behalf of a larger and well organized group.” ███████ the source said, “are true terrorists and villains.” (
See
WHDC ██████████OCT 95).) Reporting from 1998 indicated that “Sheikh Khalid” (KSM), along with ██████████, had “switched their allegiance” and were “part of the bin Ladin organization in Afghanistan.” (
See
DIRECTOR ████ ██████SEP 98), disseminated as ██████████).) CIA cables describe ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ [specific intelligence collected on KSM’s █████].
See
██████████ 484112 ██████ JUL 99); WHDC ████ ██████ OCT 95); ████████ 89173 ██████ JUN 95); ███████ 90757 █████ JUL 95); CIA █████ ██████ APR 95); ██████████; ████████ 91147 ██████ AUG 95); DIRECTOR ████ ██████ FEB 96), disseminated as ███ ████████; ██████ 69789 ██████ FEB 95); ████████ 85526 ██████ FEB 95); ALEC ██████████ SEP 01); ███████ 70158 ██████ MAR 95); ████████ 88666 ██████ JUN 95); DIRECTOR ██████████ JUL 00); ALEC █████ ███████ APR 99).

1840.
Email from: ██████████; to: ████████, ███████, ██████████, [REDACTED]; subject: the yousef cohorts █████; date: September 25, 2001, at 6:58:17 PM.

1841.
Email from: ██████████; to: ████████; cc: ████████, █████████; subject: Re: ████████████████; date: October 4, 2001, at 12:52:46 PM. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the Study “claims it was [ASSET X], not detainees, who first identified KSM’s █████ for us.” This is inaccurate. The Committee Study does not claim it was ASSET X who first identified KSM’s ███████ for the CIA. The Committee Study details how the CIA had extensive information on KSM’s █████ as early as 1995; and how in █████ 2001, prior to CIA detainee reporting, ASSET X highlighted how KSM’s ████████████████████ to locating and capturing KSM.

1842.
The subject of the cable from the CIA █████████████, was “possible to lead to UBL target.” (
See
████ 73245 ████████ [spring] 01).
See also
███████ 41495 ██████████; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program.) In ███ [spring] 2001, ASSET X would further indicate, ████████████████████████████████████████.
See
WDC ████ ██████████; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program.

1843.
ALEC ████ (282144Z SEP 01).

1844.
████ 66193 ██████████. ASSET X identified █████████████. The CIA cable also describes ASSET X’s ████████████████████████████████████████ ████ 66177 ██████████; ████ 66193 ██████████; █████ 66178 ██████████.
See also
████████ 41495 ██████████; DIRECTOR ████ █████████; ████ 37701

1845.
████ 66193 █████████.

1846.
Email from: █ q████████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], ██████████, ███████, ██████████, ███████; bcc: ██████████; subject: Re: [REDACTED] ████████████████████; date: ██████, 2001, at 3:59:00 PM.

1847.
Email from ██████████; to: ██████████; cc: ███████, [REDACTED], ██████████, ██████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ███████; subject: Access to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad; date: ██████, 2001, at 6:12:17 AM.
See also
████ 66193 (██████████). The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “detainees gave us the critical information on KSM’s ████ that allowed us to understand that our source knew ███████████████.” This is inaccurate. As detailed, ASSET X’s potential access to KSM through ████████ was apparent to the CIA in 2001, prior to any CIA detainee reporting.

1848.
█████ 66446 ██████████.

1849.
█████ 66487 ██████████.

1850.
DIRECTOR █████ █████████.

1851.
ASSET X’s proposal – ██████████████████████████████████████████████████ presaged the 2003 operation.
See
████████ 66586 (████████).
See also
████ 66530 (████████ 01).

1852.
████████ 66586 (████████).

1853.
ASSET X considered the CIA’s initial offer of $████████████████████ to be insufficient ████████ 66586 ██████████. CIA officers in █████ urged that ASSET X be offered $████████████████████. (
See
████████ 66586 ██████████); email from [REDACTED]; included in response email from: ██████████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: ████████, ████████, ████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: [ASSET X]; date: November 15, 2001, at 6:54:40 AM.) The Station’s appeal was denied by the ALEC Station.
See
ALEC ████ ██████████; █████ 66660 ██████████; ███████ 68881 ██████████.

1854.
██████████ continued to stress that ASSET X was a “financial risk worth taking.” (
See
████████ 67522 ████████.) ALEC Station remained interested in ASSET X, but continued to oppose the compensation package proposed by ██████████.
See
ALEC █████ ██████████.
See also
████████ 68881 ████████████; ████ 68918 ██████████; WHDC ████ ██████████; ███████ 67522 ██████████.

1855.
See
CIA ████ ██████████, disseminated as ██████████.

1856.
CIA officers proposed recontacting a 1995 asset with possible access to KSM through ██████████████████. (
See
email from: [REDACTED]; to Jose Rodriguez, ██████████, ████████, ██████████, ████████. [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Finding Khalid Sheikh Muhammad; date: ████, 2002, at 06:49:13 PM.) The email was resent, on ████, 2002, to additional addressees. (
See
email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████████; cc: subject: Finding Khalid Sheikh Muhammad; date: █████, 2002, at 3:46:13 PM.) At this point, the nefarious activities of KSM’s ██████████ were of significant interest to the Intelligence Community and policymakers. KSM’s ██████████ terrorism were briefed to the President and were the subject of a direct tasking by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
See
ALEC █████ ██████████; ALEC █████ ██████████.

1857.
The detainee was ████████████████████ [DETAINEE S], ████████████████████████████████████████. ██████████████████████████.
See
████ 66193 ██████████; ██████████ 31049 ███████; ███████ 31223 ████████, disseminated as ████████; █████ 31088 ████████; ██████████ 31140 ██████████; DIRECTOR ████████ 31049 ████████; ██████ 31424 ██████████, disseminated as ██████████).

1858.
█████ 2770 ██████████; █████ 2773 ██████████; █████ 2778 ██████████. At this time, the CIA offered a compensation package that was increased from the CIA’s previous offer.

1859.
█████ 1062 ██████████; █████ 1107 ██████████; █████ 1101 ██████████; DIR █████ ██████████; █████ 37701 ██████████; ████████ 41495 ██████████; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program. During this time period, ASSET X reported that he had made contact with KSM’s ██████████████████████████████ (
See
█████████████.) Also during this period, CIA officers ██████████ continued to note that ASSET X had offered to locate KSM’s ██████████. (
See
█████ 2812 ██████████. ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ 481096 ██████████.) ██████████████████████████████████████████████████
See
email from: ██████████; to [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], ██████████, ██████████; subject: another for the highlights; date: ███████, 2002, at 4:14:24 PM.

1860.
████ 37701 ██████████; ████████ 41495 █████████.

1861.
███ 37701 ██████████; ████████ 41495 ██████████; ████ 2426 █████████.

1862.
Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
See
████ 2431 ██████████; DIRECTOR ████ ██████████.

1863.
Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program.

1864.
ASSET X had been using the same names ████████████████████ since 2001.
See
interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program.

1865.
[TD INTERVIEW, CIA ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM, SEPTEMBER 14, 2004] Presentation to the CTC ██████████ 14 September 2004.

1866.
Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program. The CIA’s June 2013 Response claims that the “CIA correctly represented that detainee reporting helped us capture [KSM].” This CIA assertion is based on an indirect chain of causation purporting to connect the reporting of Abu Zubaydah to the intervention of the visiting CIA officer and the subsequent capture of KSM. This account, which the CIA represented for the first time in June 2013, is inaccurate in numerous ways: (1) The CIA represents that “information provided by Abu Zubaydah… helped lead to the capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh [RBS].” The inaccuracies of this representation are described in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II. (2) The CIA represents that reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh (who was not in CIA custody at the time) regarding Ammar al-Baluchi was key to capturing KSM. This too is inaccurate. As detailed in the Study, Ammar al-Baluchi played no role in the operation that captured KSM, which centered around ASSET X and ██████████. (3) The CIA represents that bin al-Shibh’s reporting on Ammar al-Baluchi was “used… to debrief █████████████ [DETAINEE R],” who was in foreign government custody, and that as a result, DETAINEE R discussed ████████████████████. This statement is not supported by CIA records. CIA records related to DETAINEE R’s interrogation in foreign government custody indicate that DETAINEE R’s reporting was prompted using a photograph and a letter. (
See
█████ 10118 (████████; █████ 10120 (███████; █████ 10158 ████████; WASHINGT ████ (████████; █████ 10116 ████████.) (4) The CIA represents that DETAINEE R’s information on ████████ “allowed CIA to understand the value of the access [ASSET X] had to ██████████.” This is also inaccurate. As detailed in the Study, the value of ASSET X’s access to KSM’s ████ was apparent to the CIA in 2001. (5) The CIA states that the visiting CIA officer who intervened to forestall the termination of ASSET X did so because, having been █████████, he was familiar was DETAINEE R’s reporting on KSM’s █████. This representation omits the fact that the vistiting CIA officer was a member of the team that handled ASSET X while ASSET X ██████. That team received information concerning ASSET X’s stated access to KSM through ████████. The information was provided to the team prior to the capture of DETAINEE R. (
See
████ 2778 (██████████). ) (6) The CIA asserts that DETAINEE R’s reporting “helped CIA to redirect [ASSET X] ██████████████ in an effort to locate KSM.” This is inaccurate. As detailed in the Study, ASSET X had been indicating that he had access to KSM through ████████ since 2001 and, as detailed, contacted KSM’s ██████ on his own. CIA records indicate that the detainees who provided corroborating information about KSM’s ██████, DETAINEE S and DETAINEE R, were in foreign government custody at the time they provided the information. DETAINEE R would later be rendered to CIA custody and approved for the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, although there are no CIA records indicating that he was subjected to the techniques.