The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (116 page)

2109.
Hassan Ghul also discussed Abu Bilal al-Suri, aka, Shafiq, who was the father-in-law of Khalil Deek, aka Joseph Jacob Adams, aka Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman BM, aka Abu Ayad al-Filistini. While Ghul did not know where Abu Bilal was located, he had recently seen Abu Bilal’s son preparing a residence in Shkai.
See
███████████████████ 1679 ███████ JAN 04).

2110.
Hassan Ghul stated that he knew Talha al-Pakistani, aka Suleiman, peripherally, through KSM and Ammar al-Baluchi. Ghul last saw Talha in Shkai around October/November 2003 at the residence of Hamza Rabi’a with a group that was undertaking unspecified training. Ghul stated that he was not sure if Talha was a participant or simply an observer.
See
███████████████████ 1679 ███████ JAN 04).

2111.
Hassan Ghul was shown photos of individuals apprehended by ████████ on ██ October 2003 █████ and identified one as a Yemeni named Firas, “a well-trained fighter and experienced killer, who was known to be an excellent shot.” Ghul reported that, when he first arrived in Shkai, Firas was living there. Prior to hearing about Firas’ arrest, Ghul’s understanding was that Firas was in Angorada with Khalid Habib, which Ghul characterized as the “front line.” The other photo identified by Ghul was that of an Algerian named Abu Maryam, whom helped “hide out” in Shkai.
See
███████████████████ 1678 ███████ JAN 04).

2112.
For Hassan Ghul’s reporting on Abu Umama, aka Abu Ibrahim al-Masri,
see
███████████████████ 1687 ███████ JAN 04).

2113.
█████████████████████ 1644 ███████ JAN 04; ██████████████████ 54194 ███████ JAN 04); DIRECTOR █████ ███████ JAN 04), disseminated as ██████████████████; ██████████████████ 54195 ██████ JAN 04).

2114.
Hassan Ghul stated that in the late summer of 2003, al-Zarqawi made the request through Luay Muhammad Hajj Bakr al-Saqa (aka Abu Hamza al-Suri, aka Abu Muhammad al-Turki, aka Ala’ al-Din), but that al-Hadi had not wanted to assist. According to Ghul, al-Hadi had previously sent Abdullah al-Kurdi to Iraq, but al-Kurdi did not want to engage in any activities and was rumored to be “soft.” This led al-Hadi to send Ghul to Iraq to speak with al-Zarqawi regarding the possibility of select al-Qa’ida members traveling to Iraq to fight. According to the cable, “Ghul claimed that the Arabs in Waziristan were tired, and wanted change,” and that Ghul “was tasked to both discuss this issue with Zarqawi, and to recon the route.” (
See
███████████████████ 1644 ███████ JAN 04).) Ghul also describe the roles of Yusif al-Baluchi, Mu’awiyya al-Baluchi, and Wasim aka Ammar aka Little Ammar aka Ammar Choto, in facilitating Ghul’s trip out of Pakistan, as well as his exact route. Ghul identified Yusif’s phone number in his notebook and described how Yusif had come to Shkai to gain al-Hadi’s approval for a plan to kidnap Iranian VIPs to gain the release of senior al-Qa’ida Management Council members in Iranian custody. (
See
███████████████████ 1690 ███████ JAN 04).).

2115.
███████████████████ 1646 ███████ JAN 04).

2116.
███████████████████ 1645 ███████ JAN 04).

2117.
The notes, which Ghul intended to use to brief Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, had been seized during Ghul’s capture. The topics included al-Zarqawi’s willingness to provide missiles to al-Hadi, al-Zarqawi’s offer to provide al-Hadi with an unspecified chemical weapon agent, al-Zarqawi’s request to al-Hadi for walkie talkies, and al-Zarqawi’s willingness to work out any disagreements with al-Hadi. According to Ghul, al-Zarqawi responded positively to al-Hadi’s offer of al-Qai’da personnel and discussed a number of specific, named individuals, including Khatal al-Uzbeki and a Palestinian name Usama al-Zargoi. Al-Zarqawi requested that al-Hadi facilitate the travel of an operative who could assist in training inexperienced operatives in proper operational security. Al-Zarqawi also identified a Jordanian explosives expert named ‘Abd al-Badi, an Algerian explosives expert named al-Sur, and Munthir, a Moroccan religious scholar who was a close friend of al-Zarqai. Ghul identified another operative, Abu Aisha, who explained to him that al-Zarqawi’s reference to chemical weapons was likely a reference to a chemical agent affixed to howitzer shells.
See
███████████████████ 1646 ███████ JAN 04); ███████████████████ 1657 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████████ 54194 ██████ JAN 04); DIRECTOR ████ (█████ JAN 04), disseminated as ███████; ████████████ 54195 █████ JAN 04); ██████████████████ 1650 ██████ JAN 04).

2118.
According to Hassan Ghul, al-Zarqawi told Ghul in January 2004 that he intended to assassinate senior Shi’ite scholars, attack Sh’ite gatherings with explosives, and foment civil war in Iraq. Ghul stated that Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi was opposed to any operations in Iraq that would promote bloodshed among Muslims, and had counseled al-Zarqawi against undertaking such operations. Using Ghul as an envoy, al-Hadi had inquired with al-Zarqawi about whether he (al-Hadi) should travel to Iraq, but al-Zarqawi had responded that this was not a good idea, as operations in Iraq were far different than those al-Hadi was conducting in Afghanistan.
See
███████████████████ 1651 ███████ JAN 04)).
See also
███████████████████ 1652 ███████ JAN 04), for Ghul’s reporting on al-Zarqawi’s plots in Iraq.

2119.
███████ 1283 █████ JAN 04). ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.

2120.
███████ 1285 █████ JAN 04).

2121.
███████ 1285 █████ JAN 04).

2122.
███████ 1285 █████ JAN 04).

2123.
HEADQUARTERS █████ (████ JAN 04). On ██████, DDO Pavitt expressed his personal congratulations to the interrogators at DETENTION SITE COBALT, who elicited information from Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techinques. Pavlitt’s message stated: “In the short time Ghul was at your location, [interrogators] made excellent progress and generated what appears to be a great amount of highly interesting information and leads. This is exactly the type of effort with a detainee that will win the war against al-Qai’da. With the intelligence Station has obtained from Ghul, we will be able to do much damage to the enemy.”
See
DIRECTOR █████ (███████ JAN 04).

2124.
Many of the questions for Hassan Ghul for more specific locational information were about sites Ghul had mentioned or described during his interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT. (
See
HEADQUARTERS ████ (██████ JAN 04); █████ 1299 (██████ JAN 04); ████ 20352 (█████ JAN 04); █████ 20353 (█████ JAN 04); ████ 20401 (████ FEB 04); ALEC ████ (█████ FEB 04)).
See also
email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: ██████, ██████, [REDACTED], █████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: HG on Shkai. Please provide comments/requirements; date: ██████, at 1:11:01 PM; and attachments.) The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that while Hassan Ghul provided “some detail about the activities and general whereabouts of al-Qa’ida members in Shkai” prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, only afterwards did he “provide[] more granular information when, for example, he sat down with █████ experts and pointed to specific locations where he met some of the senior al-Qa’ida members we were trying to find.” A review of CIA records found that Hassan Ghul was not provided the opportunity to identify specific locations on ████████ and line drawings until after he was subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

2125.
The cable noted that “[b]efore Ghul’s capture, the Shkai valley had already been an area of focus ██████████████” The cable detailed Hassan Ghul’s reporting prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as information unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, including extensive information on Shkai from ████ sources, the locations in Shkai ███████████, and exact geolocational coordinates for numerous sites in Shkai.
See
████████ 60245 (██████ 04).

2126.
ALEC █████ (290157Z JAN 04).

2127.
███████ 1681 █████ JAN 04); ███████ 1680 █████ JAN 04); ███████ 1679 █████ JAN 04); ███████ 1678 █████ JAN 04); ███████ 1677 █████ JAN 04); ███████ 1656 █████ JAN 04); ███████ 1654 █████ JAN 04); ███████ 1647 █████ JAN 04); ███████ 1644 █████ JAN 04);

2128.
████████ 2714 (311146Z JAN 04).

2129.
████████ 2714 (311146Z JAN 04). The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “CIA continues to assess that the information derived from Hassan Gul after the commencement of enhanced techniques provided new and unique insight into al-Qa’ida’s presence and operations in Shkai, Pakistan.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response also defends past CIA representations that “after these techniques were used, Gul provided ‘detailed tactical intelligence,’” that differed significantly in granularity and operational ████ from what he provided before enhanced techniques.” The CIA’s Response then states that “[a]s a result of his information, we were able to make a persuasive case ████████████████████████████████████████.” A review of CIA records found that the CIA had previously determined that the information provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was the “perfect fodder for pressing [Pakistan] into action.”

2130.
HEADQUAR ████ (032357Z FEB 04).

2131.
███████████ 2742 (090403Z FEB 04).

2132.
███████████ 60796 (051600Z FEB 04); ALEC ████ (███████ FEB 04); DIRECTOR ████ (██████ FEB 04). The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “[s]enior US officials during the winter and spring of 2004 presented the Agency’s analysis of Gul’s debriefings and other intelligence about Shkai ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.” As support, the CIA Response cites two cables that relied heavily on information provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as information from unrelated sources. (
See
ALEC ████ (████████ FEB 04); DIRECTOR ████ (██████ FEB 04)).

2133.
Directorate of Intelligence,
Al-Qa’ida’s Waziristan Sanctuary Disrupted but Still Viable
, 21 July 2004 (DTS #2004-3240).

2134.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date: December 30, 2005, at 8:14:04 AM.

2135.
██████ 2441 █████████; HEADQUARTERS ████ ██████; ████████ 1635 █████████; ███████ 1712 ████████; HEADQUARTERS ████ ████████; ██████ 1775 ███████; ████████ 173426

2136.
Congressional Notification (DTS #2012-3802).

2137.
In addition to classified representations to the Committee, shortly after the operation targeting UBL on May 1, 2011, there were media reports indicating that the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program had produced “
the lead information
” that led to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, the UBL compound, and/or the overall operation that led to UBL’s death. In an interview with
Time Magazine
, published May 4, 2011, Jose Rodriguez, the former CIA chief of CTC, stated that: “Information provided by KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libbi about bin Laden’s courier was
the lead information
that eventually led to the location of [bin Laden’s] compound and the operation that led to his death.”
See
“Ex-CIA Counterterror Chief: ‘Enhanced Interrogation’ Led U.S. to bin Laden.”
Time Magazine
, May 4, 2011 (italics added). Former CIA Director Michael Hayden stated that: “What we got, the
original lead information
— and frankly it was incomplete identity information on the couriers—
began with information from CIA detainees at the black sites
.” In another interview, Hayden stated: “. . . the lead information I referred to a few minutes ago did come from CIA detainees,
against whom enhanced interrogation techniques
have been used” (italics added).
See
Transcript from
Scott Hennen Show
, dated May 3, 2011, with former CIA Director Michael Hayden; and interview with Fareed Zakaria,
Fareed Zakaria GPS
, CNN, May 8, 2011. See
also
“The Waterboarding Trail to bin Laden,” by Michael Mukasey,
Wall Street Journal
, May 6, 2011. Former Attorney General Mukasey wrote: “Consider how the intelligence that led to bin Laden came to hand. It began with a disclosure from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), who broke like a dam under the pressure of harsh interrogation techniques that included waterboarding. He loosed a torrent of information—including eventually the nickname of a trusted courier of bin Laden.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response confirms information in the Committee Study, stating: “Even after undergoing enhanced techniques, KSM lied about Abu Ahmad, and Abu Faraj denied knowing him.” The CIA’s September 2012 “Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin,” (DTS# 2012-3826) compiled by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, indicates that the CIA sought to publicly attribute the UBL operation to detainee reporting months prior to the execution of the operation. Under the heading, “The Public Roll-Out,” the “Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin” document explains that the CIA’s Office of Public Affairs was “formally brought into the [UBL] operation in late March 2011.” The document states that the “material OPA prepared for release” was intended to “describe the hunt and the operation,” among other matters. The document details how, prior to the operation, “agreed-upon language” was developed for three “vital points,” the first of which was “the critical nature of detainee reporting in identifying Bin Ladin’s courier.”

2138.
CIA documents and cables use various spellings, most frequently “Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti” and “Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.” To the extent possible, the Study uses the spelling referenced in the CIA document being discussed.