The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (113 page)

1983.
Email from: ██████████; to: ██████████; cc: █████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████████; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.

1984.
CIA memorandum for the Record, “Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003,” prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, “
CIA Interrogation Program
,” dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.

1985.
See
email from: [REDACTED]; to: multiple addresses; subject: “Draft of IA on ‘Detainee Reporting Pivotal to the War on Terrorism’”; date: May 16, 2005, at 2:08 PM.

1986.
Italics added. CIA Intelligence Assessment, “Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa’ida,” June 2005, which CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005. The Intelligence Assessment at the SECRET//NOFORN classification level was more broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005. On March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009.

1987.
DIRECTOR ████ (221835Z APR 02); ALEC ████ (222235Z DEC 02); DIRECTOR ████ (221835Z APR 02).

1988.
ALEC ████ (222235Z DEC 02).

1989.
FBI WASHINGTON DC (271623Z MAR 03); ALEC ████ (191630Z MAY 03) (cables explaining previous FBI investigative action on Paracha). On March 28, 2003, the FBI would return to the same employer and the same address, leading to the apprehension of Uzhair Paracha, who would voluntarily provide significant reporting to the FBI.

1990.
CIA ████ (040123Z DEC 02)/████████████.
See also
████████████.

1991.
CIA ████ (040123Z DEC 02)/████████████.
See also
████████████ and ALEC 222235Z DEC 02).

1992.
See
FBI investigative file ██████████████████████.

1993.
██████ 13890 █████████. The cable describing Majid Khan’s foreign government interrogation also included Khan’s reporting on how Ammar al-Baluchi intended to have Uzhair use Majid Khan’s credit card to create the appearance that Majid Khan was already in the United States. As described in the full Committee Study, the cable further detailed Khan’s two meetings with Uzhair and his father, and a subsequent phone call with Uzhair (following Uzhair’s return to the United States), all of which were facilitated by Ammar al-Baluchi.

1994.
See
█████ 10983 (242321Z MAR 03); █████ 10972 (241122Z MAR 03); and the KSM detainee review in Volume III.

1995.
█████ 10983 (242321Z MAR 03); █████ 10972 (241122Z MAR 03).

1996.
Majid Khan was detained in Pakistani on March 5, 2003.
See
██████ 13658 (050318Z MAR 03); ██████ 13659 (050459Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR ████ (050459Z MAR 03).

1997.
████████████ 13890 ██████████████; ████████████ 10984 (24235IZ MAR 03).

1998.
██████████ 10983 (242321Z MAR 03). The CIA’s June 2013 Response asserts that “[r]eporting from interrogations of KSM was directly and uniquely responsible for the arrests of Saifullah Paracha and his son Uzhair Paracha.” The CIA Response also asserts that Majid Khan’s reporting “was disseminated just
after
KSM provided the information that allowed us to identify Paracha” (emphasis in the original). This is inaccurate. The cable describing KSM’s interrogation specifically references the cable describing Majid Khan’s detailed reporting from interrogations in foreign government custody and how KSM was “boxed in” by the information provide by Majid Khan.

1999.
██████████ 10984 (24235IZ MAR 03), disseminated as ████████████.

2000.
██████████ 10984 (24235IZ MAR 03), disseminated as ████████████.

2001.
██████████ 10984 (24235 IZ MAR 03), disseminated as ████████████.

2002.
ALEC ████████ (052230Z MAY 03).

2003.
ALEC ████████ (012248Z APR 03).

2004.
See
section of this summary on the Karachi Plots, including ████████ 14291 (021645Z MAY 03) and ALEC ██████ (142334Z MAY 03). A CIA cable describes a CIA officers meeting with the foreign government officer who used rapport-building techniques to acquire information from Ammar al-Baluchi. The officer stated that Ammar al-Baluchi was “more chatty” than Khallad bin Attash (who was also in foreign government custody at the time), and that Ammar “acknowledged plans to attack U.S. Consulate officials at the airport, the Consul General’s Residence and the Consulate itself.”
See
████████ 19647 ██████████ 04) 2005.

2005.
Ammar al-Baluchi was detained in Pakistan on April 29, 2003, and transferred to ClA custody on May █, 2003.
See
████████ 14259 ██████████; ██████████ 45028 ████████████; ████ ████ 14282 ████████████, ██████████████████████ 38402 ████████████; [REDACTED] 38325 ████████████; [REDACTED] 38389 ████████████.

2006.
For additional details,
see
detainee review for Ammar al-Baluchi in Volume III.

2007.
DIRECTOR ██████ (181929Z JUN 03), disseminated as ██████████; ██████████████ 39239 (301600Z MAY 03).

2008.
Email from: ██████████; to ██████████, [REDACTED]; subject: For coordination - DCI Highlight on Paracha; date: July 7, 2003, at 11:18:39 AM. ████████████ ████████████████████████████████████████████ ████ (
See
interview of ██████████, by ██████████, Office of the Inspector General, August 5, 2003). The CIA originally sought to take direct custody of Saifullah Paracha. On May 6, 2003, CTC’s chief of operations, ██████████████, sent an email to ██████████ CTC Legal, and CTC attorney ██████ ████████, with a proposal for the CIA to detain Saifullah Paracha and interrogate him using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, writing: “we MUST have paracha arrested without delay and transferred to CIA custody for interrogation using enhanced measures. i understand that paracha’s us person status makes this difficult, but this is dynamite and we have to move forward with alacrity. what do you need to do with that? what do we need to do that?”
See
CIA document for: ████████████, ████████████; from ██████; ██████████████; date: 6 May 2003. According to CIA records noted above, Saifullah Paracha’s eventual capture and rendition to U.S. military custody was complicated by ████████████████████████████. According to emails within CTC Legal, Paracha was “████████████████████████████████████████████.”

2009.
██████████ 86058 █████████.

2010.
Email from: ██████████; to: ██████████,[REDACTED}; subject: For Coordination - DCI Highlight on Paracha; date: July 7, 2003, at 11:10 AM; email from: ██████████; to ██████████; cc: [REDACTED}; subject: Re: For Coordination - DCI Highlight on Paracha; date: July 7, 2003, at 11:18:39 AM.

2011.
██████████ 13588 (171505Z JUL 03).

2012.
Email from : ██████████; to: ██████████,████████████, ████████████, ████████████; subject:
see
highlight: again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:29:08 AM.

2013.
Also known as (aka) Adnan Gulshair Muhammad el-Shukrijumah, Jafaar al-Tayyar, and Abu Jafar al-Tayer. Spelling used throughout the Committee Study reflects, to the extent possible, the spelling found within intelligence records.

2014.
CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from ██████████, ██████ Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.”
See also
CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007 (DTS #2007-1563).
See also
CIA Intelligence Assessment, “Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa’ida,” June 2005, which CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005. The Intelligence Assessment at the SECRET//NOFORN level was more broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005. On March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009.
See also
CIA graphic attachment to several CIA briefings on the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, entitled, “Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM).”
See also
CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta entitled, “Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009.”

2015.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “there were cases in which we either made a factual error or used imprecise language, but these mistakes were not central to our representations and none invalidates our assessment that detainee reporting provided key intelligence on this important terrorist.” As one of two examples, the CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges that the “[CIA] incorrectly stated al-Tayyar fled the United States in response to the FBI investigation, although he had in fact already departed the United States by this time.” The Committee found that this inaccurate statement was central to the CIA’s representations. The CIA asserted that “Ja’far al-Tayyar” fled the United States because of KSM’s reporting after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in the context of representations that the use of the techniques “has been a key reason why al-Qa’ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West.”

2016.
ALEC ████████ (210218Z MAR 03). Extensive open source records include “Broward Man Sought as Terror Suspect,”
Miami Herald
, dated March 21, 2003; “Pursuit of al-Qaeda keeps coming back to Fla.,”
USA Today
, dated June 15, 2003; and “A Hunt for ‘The Pilot,’”
U.S. News and World Report
, dated March 30, 2003. For context,
See also
United States District Court Southern District Florida, Case No. 02-60096,
United States of America v. Imran Mandhai and Shueyb Mossa Jokhan
, filed May 16, 2002.

2017.
See
Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III and ██████████.

2018.
██████████ 10884 (182140Z MAR 03); email from: ██████████; to [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Reissue/Correction: CT: Comments on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad on imminent threats to U.S. targets in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines; date March 12, 2003, at 9:36:57 AM; ████████████████ 42247 (210357Z JUL 03); email from: ████████████; to: [REDACTED], ████████████, █████████████, ██████, ████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Ammar al-Baluchi’s Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar--If Ammar is Correct, then KSM Appears to Have a Focused Us on Jaffar in a Extended Deception Scheme--and His Deception Capabilities are Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03 11:24 AM.

2019.
Email from: ████████████; to [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: REISSUE/CORRECTION: CT: CT: Comments on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad on imminent threats to U.S. targets in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines; date: March 12, 2003, at 9:36:57 AM; National Counterterrorism Center, REFLECTIONS, “Ja’far al-Tayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa’ida Operatjonal Threat,” 22 December 2005; ████████████████ 42247 (210357Z JUL 03); email from: █████████; to: [REDACTED], ██████████, ████████████, ██████████, ██████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Ammar al-Baluchi’s Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar--If Ammar is Correct, then KSM Appears to Have a Focused Us on Jaffar in a Extended Deception Scheme--and His Deception Capabilities are Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03 11:24 AM.

2020.
CIA “Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting” faxed from the CIA to the Department of Justice on April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM. For KSM’s inability to identify name,
see
████████ 10741 (100917Z MAR 03); ███████████ 10740 (092308Z MAR 03), disseminated as █████████████.

2021.
10787 (130716Z MAR 03); █████████ 10863 (171028Z MAR 03). For example, November 6, 2006, talking points prepared for a briefing with the President stated that “KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad Atta.”
See
CIA document entitled, “DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007,” dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was “sent to DCIA Nov, 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting.”

2022.
Emphasis in original document. CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from ███████████, ███████ Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.”

2023.
CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from ███████████, ███████ Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.”

2024.
CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - “Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)” including “Tab 7,” named “RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009.” Referenced materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, “D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30–11:30 a.m.” The briefing book includes the previously mentioned “Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting” dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same intelligence claims found in the document of the same name, but dated April 15, 2005. Expected participants included “Senator Boren, Mr. McDonough, Mr. Brennan, General Jones, Mr. Craig, Mr. Lippert, Mr. Smith, Senator Hagel,” as well as several CIA officials, including Director Hayden, ███████████████, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], and ██████████ Legal, ████████████.