The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (107 page)

1737.
█████ 86449 ███████.

1738.
█████ 87409 █████████; █████87617 ████████. Amer was detained by a foreign government.

1739.
█████ 87414 ████████; █████ 87617 ████████. ████████████████████████████████████████.

1740.
See
█████ 9515 ████████; █████ 87617 ████████; █████ 87414 ████████; and ██████████ “Hambali Capture.” Lillie was later rendered to CIA custody.

1741.
Lillie had not yet been rendered to CIA custody. CIA Oral History Program Documenting Hambali capture, interview of [REDACTED], interviewed by [REDACTED] on November 28, 2005.

1742.
███████████ 1241 ██████.

1743.
████ 1242 (050744Z SEP 06); 2215 (051248Z SEP 06).

1744.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “our review showed that the
Study
failed to include examples of important information acquired from detainees that CIA cited more frequently and prominently in its representations than several of the cases the authors chose to include.” This is inaccurate. The CIA’s June 2013 Response provided three examples: the “Gulf shipping plot” (which is addressed in the full Committee Study and in this summary in the context of the interrogation of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri), “learning important information about al-Qa’ida’s anthrax plotting and the role of Yazid Sufaat” (which is addressed in the full Committee Study and in this summary in the context of the interrogation of KSM), and “the detention of Abu Talha al-Pakistani” (which is addressed in the full Committee Study and in this summary in the section on the “Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the Capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi.”).

1745.
For example, in the September 6, 2006, speech validated by the CIA, President George W. Bush stated that: “[Abu] Zubaydah disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias Mukhtar. This was a vital piece of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM.”
See also
CIA document dated July 16, 2006, entitled, “DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA’s High-Value Terrorist Interrogations Program,” and “CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy” drafts supporting the September 6, 2006, speech by President George W. Bush.
See also
unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, “Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program,” as well as CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007 (DTS #2007-1563).

1746.
CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, “Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program.” (
See
DTS #2007-1563 and DTS #2007-3158.) This testimony contradicted statements made in 2002 to the Joint Inquiry by ██████████, in which she indicated that an operative arrested in February 2002 in ████, prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah, “provided proof... that KSM was a senior al-Qa’ida terrorist planner.” (
See
interview by the Joint Inquiry of ██████████, █████, [REDACTED], ████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Khahd Shaykh Mohammad (KSM); date: 12 August 2002 (DTS #2002-4630).).

1747.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that Maybe Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.

1748.
See
CIA Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting, faxed to the OLC in April 2005. The “Briefing Notes” state: “Within months of his arrest, Abu Zubaydah provided details about al-Qa’ida’s organization structure, key operatives, and modus operandi. It also was Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, who identified KSM as the mastermind of 9/11.” As described in detail in Volume II, this CIA document did not specifically reference the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques; however, it was provided to the OLC to support the OLC’s legal analysis of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The document included most of the same examples the CIA had previously provided as examples of the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. There are no records to indicate that the CIA, in reviewing draft versions of the OLC memorandum, sought to correct the inaccurate OLC statements.

1749.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.

1750.
“DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007,” and supporting materials, dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was “sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting.”

1751.
Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, December 2002, pp. 325–331 (DTS #2002-5162); CIA Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, June 2005, pp. xi, 100–126 (DTS #2005-3477).

1752.
Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, December 2002, p. 329 (DTS #2002-5162).

1753.
DIRECTOR █████ (███████ SEP 98), disseminated as ███████; Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Report of the Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (DTS #2005-3477), pp. 105–107.

1754.
The 9/11 Commission Report; Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, p. 277.

1755.
███████ 64626 (131843Z SEP 01); ███████ 64627 (131843Z SEP 01).

1756.
CIA Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, June 2005, p. 113 (DTS #2005-3477).

1757.
Email from: ██████████; to: ██████████; cc: ██████████, ███████, [REDACTED], ██████, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: RAMZI LEADS…; date: September 15, 2001, at 5:04:38 AM.

1758.
CIA CTC internal email from: [REDACTED]; to multiple [REDACTED]; date: October 16, 2001, at 09:34:48 AM.

1759.
████████████; CIA ██████ ██████████; ██████; ████████ 16218 ███████████.

1760.
DIRECTOR ██████ ████████████. The cable added “KSM is an ally of Usama bin Ladin and has been reported at facilities clearly associated with UBL.”

1761.
DIR███ ████ NOV 01). The cable referenced reporting that KSM, along with one other individual, “were the masterminds of the 11 September attacks.”

1762.
DIR █████████████JAN 02).

1763.
For example, in the September 6, 2006, speech validated by the CIA that publicly acknowledged the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, President George W. Bush stated that: “[Abu] Zubaydah disclosed Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias Mukhtar. This was a vital piece of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM.”

1764.
“DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007,” and supporting materials, dated November 6, 2007 with the notation the document was “sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting.”

1765.
See
Volume II, the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, and Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah” provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).

1766.
████████████ 93972 (281153Z AUG 01).
See also
the 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, p. 277. The cable was directed to the CIA’s UBL Station, where it was viewed by the chief of Station and chief of targeting, and to the analytic unit responsible for UBL, where two analysts saw it. (
See
Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Report of the Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (DTS #2005-3477), p. 112.) The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “[w]e continue to assess that Abu Zubaydah’s information was a critical piece of intelligence.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges the August 28, 2001, cable identifying KSM as “Mukhtar,” but states that CIA officers “overlooked” and “simply missed” the cable.

1767.
See
President George W. Bush, Speech on Terrorism and the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, September 6, 2006; and CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, September 6, 2006, Draft #3 (validating speech received on August 29, 2006); email from: [REDACTED]; to ████████████████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ███████████, [REDACTED]; subject: “Speechwriter’s Questions on Monday”; date: September 5, 2006, at 10:30:32 AM.

1768.
Italics added. As described in this summary and in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, this statement was inaccurate. Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa’ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics prior to, during, and after the utilization of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Abu Zubaydah’s inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States and operatives in the United States was the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was “uncooperative” and the CIA’s determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques to become “compliant” and reveal the information the CIA believed he was withholding—the names of operatives in the United States or information to stop the next terrorist attack. At no point during or after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide this type of information.

1769.
Italics added.
See
President George W. Bush, Speech on Terrorism and the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, September 6, 2006; and CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, September 6, 2006, Draft #3 (validating speech received on August 29, 2006); email from: [REDACTED]; to ████████, ███████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ███████████, [REDACTED]; subject: “Speechwriter’s Questions on Monday”; date: September 5, 2006, at 10:30:32 AM.

1770.
See
email from: ██████████; to ██████████, ██████, Mark Mansfield, Paul Gimigliano, and others; subject: “Questions about Abu Zubaydah’s Identification of KSM as ‘Mukhtar’”; date: September 7, 2006. A September 7, 2006, article (published September 8, 2006) in the
New York Times,
by Mark Mazzetti, entitled, “Questions Raised About Bush’s Primary Claims of Secret Detention System” included comments by CIA officials defending the assertions in the President’s speech: “Mr. Bush described the interrogation techniques used on the C.I.A. prisoners as having been ‘safe, lawful and effective,’ and he asserted that torture had not been used. ...Mr. Bush also said it was the interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah that identified Mr. bin al-Shibh as an accomplice in the Sept. 11 attacks. American officials had identified Mr. bin al-Shibh’s role in the attacks months before Mr. Zubaydah’s capture. A December 2001 federal grand jury indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called 20th hijacker, said that Mr. Moussaoui had received money from Mr. bin al-Shibh and that Mr. bin al-Shibh had shared an apartment with Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the plot. A C.I.A. spokesman said Thursday [September 7, 2006] that the agency had vetted the president’s speech and stood by its accuracy. ...[CIA] spokesman, Paul Gimigliano, said in a statement... ‘Abu Zubaydah not only identified Ramzi Bin al-Shibh as a 9/11 accomplice—something that had been done before—he provided information that helped lead to his capture.” For additional news accounts on this subject,
see
former CIA Director Michael Hayden’s interview with the
New York Times
in 2009, in which former Director Hayden “disputed an article in the
New York Times
on Saturday [4/18/2009] that said Abu Zubaydah had revealed nothing new after being waterboarded, saying that he believed that after unspecified ‘techniques’ were used, Abu Zubaydah revealed information that led to the capture of another terrorist, Ramzi Binalshibh.”
See
“Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects,”
New York Times,
dated April 20, 2009.