The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (108 page)

1771.
CIA Testimony of ████████, Transcript, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337).
See also
Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, “Comments to Draft IG Special Review, ‘Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program’ (2003-7123-IG),” Attachment, “Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities,” dated February 24, 2004. Pavitt states: “Abu Zubaydah – a master al-Qa’ida facilitator – was similarly arrogant and uncooperative before the lawful use of EITs. ...His information is
singularly unique
and valuable from an intelligence point of view, but it also has produced concrete results that have helped saved lives. His knowledge of al-Qa’ida lower-level facilitators, modus operandi and safehouses, which he shared with us
as a result of the use of EITs,
for example, played a
key role
in the ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh” (italics added).

1772.
Among other records,
see
CIA ████ (█████ SEP 02) ███████████; CIA ████ (█████ SEP 02) ████████; ALEC ████ (111551Z SEP 02).

1773.
See
additional information below, as well as the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, and Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah” provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS# 2010-2939). The CIA’s June 2013 Response includes the following: “...the Study states that Abu Zubaydah ‘provided similar information to FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.’ This is incorrect. Abu Zubaydah’s unique information concerning his contact with Hassan Gul was collected on 20 August 2002, after he had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques.” This assertion in the CIA’s June 2013 Response contains several errors: First, as described, the statement in the December 13, 2012, Committee Study pertains to Abu Zubaydah’s reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, not Hassan Ghul. As detailed in this summary and in other areas of the full Committee Study, while Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided similar information on bin al-Shibh to FBI interrogators prior to the use and approval of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Second, as detailed in the full Committee Study, Abu Zubaydah provided considerable information on Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. (Some of this reporting has been declassified; for example,
see
the 9/11 Commission Report, specifically the Staff Report, “9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” which highlights reporting by Abu Zubaydah on Hassan Ghul that was disseminated by the CIA on June 20, 2002.) Third, in referencing information that Abu Zubaydah provided on Hassan Ghul on August 20, 2002, the CIA’s June 2013 Response asserts that this was “unique information.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “Abu Zubaydah stated that if he personally needed to reach Hassan Gul, he would contact ██████████████████████████████ [a well-known associate of Hassan Ghul]. We provided this information to Pakistani authorities, who then interviewed [the well-known associate] and ████████████████████ [a specific family member of the well-known associate]—which ultimately led them to an apartment linked to Gul.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response adds that the “unique information concerning his contact with Hassan Gul was collected on 20 August 2002, after [Abu Zubaydah] had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques.” CIA records indicate, however, that the information described in the CIA’s Response was not unique. Pakistani authorities had raided the home and interviewed ████████████ [the same well-known associate] more than a month earlier on July ██, 2002, based on similar reporting from a cooperating detainee in foreign government custody. The CIA had specific and detailed knowledge of this raid and the resulting interview of ███████████ [the well-known associate]. Pakistani authorities remained in contact with ███████████ [the well-known associate], the primary person interviewed, who was cooperative and sent ██████ to help Pakistani authorities identify a possible al-Qa’ida safe house—which the CIA noted was “extremely close to (if not an exact match)” for a safe house the FBI connected KSM to weeks earlier on June 18, 2002.

1774.
DIRECTOR ████████ (271905Z MAY 02)██████████████████.
See
the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.

1775.
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah” and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).

1776.
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah” and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).

1777.
████████████ 10428 (071058Z JUN 02).

1778.
████████████ 10424 (070814Z JUN 02).

1779.
████████████ 10487 (181656Z JUN 02).

1780.
See
Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.

1781.
████████████ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) and email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████████████ and [REDACTED]; subject: “Re: So it begins.” Date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09 AM.

1782.
█████████ 10654 (211318Z AUG 02); ██████ 10656 (2113149Z AUG 02).

1783.
█████████ 10654 (211318Z AUG 02); ██████ 10656 (2113149Z AUG 02).

1784.
█████████ 10654 (211318Z AUG 02); ██████ 10656 (2113149Z AUG 02).

1785.
DIRECTOR ██████ (261338Z AUG 02).

1786.
█████████ 10654 (211318Z AUG 02); ██████ 10656 (211349Z AUG 02).

1787.
ALEC ██████ (222334Z SEP 01); ████ 92557 (15SEP01).

1788.
ALEC ██████ (270132Z JUL 02).

1789.
ALEC ██████ (270134Z JUL 02).
See also
████████ 97470 (281317Z MAR 02) (“In November 1998, [Muhammad] Atta, [Ramzi] Binalshibh, and [Said] Bahaji moved into the 54 Marienstrasse apartment in Hamburg that became the hub of the Hamburg cell.”).

1790.
ALEC ██████ (270132Z JUL 02).
See also
██████ 62533 ████████████ (information from a foreign government concerning the al-Qa’ida suicide operatives portrayed on videotapes found in Afghanistan).

1791.
ALEC ██████ (292345Z AUG 02); ALEC ██████ (111551Z SEP 02).

1792.
ALEC ██████ (241447Z MAR 02).

1793.
ALEC ██████ (261712Z MAR 02).

1794.
███████████ 17369 (131519Z APR 02).

1795.
███████████ 10091 (210959Z APR 02); ███████████ 10102 (230707Z APR 02); ███████████ 10144 (271949Z APR 02); ███████████ 10271 (151654Z MAY 02); ███████████ 1295 (███████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1308 (████████ JAN 04).

1796.
███████████ 10091 (210959Z APR 02); ███████ 10102 (230707Z APR 02); ███████ 10144 (271949Z APR 02); ███████ 10271 (151654Z MAY 02); ALEC ████ (241447Z MAR 02).

1797.
DIRECTOR ███████ (1012312Z MAY 02).

1798.
██████████ 10487 (181656Z JUN 2).

1799.
█████████████ 11746 ██████████████.

1800.
█████████ 11336 ████████ MAY 02).

1801.
███████████ 11746 ██████████.

1802.
███████████ 11746 ██████████.

1803.
███████████ 11755 ██████████.

1804.
███████████ 11755 ███████████. Referenced cable is ALEC ██████ (181900Z JUN 02).

1805.
███████████ 11755 ██████████.

1806.
See
references to prior acquisition of passport in ██████ 12151 (301107Z AUG 02).

1807.
ALEC ███████ ███████████.

1808.
As noted throughout this Study, CIA produced more than six million pages of material, including records detailing the interrogation of CIA detainees, as well as the disseminated intelligence derived from the interrogation of CIA detainees. The CIA did not provide—nor was it requested to provide—intelligence records that were unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. In other words, this Study was completed without direct access to reporting from CIA HUMINT assets, foreign liaison assets, electronic intercepts, military detainee debriefings, law enforcement-derived information, and other methods of intelligence collection. Insomuch as this material is included in the analysis herein, it was provided by the CIA within the context of documents directly related to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. As such, there is likely significant intelligence related to the terrorist plots, terrorists captured, and other intelligence matters examined in this Study that is within the databases of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but which has not been identified or reviewed by the Committee for this Study.

1809.
█████████ 10091 (210959Z APR 02); █████████ 1012 (230707Z APR 02); █████████ 10144 (271949Z APR 02); ██████ 10271 (151654Z MAY 02); ALEC ████ (2414472 MAR 02).

1810.
██████ 10487 (181656Z JUN 02).

1811.
█████████ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) and email from: [REDACTED]; to: █████████ and [REDACTED]; subject: “Re: So it begins.”; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09 AM.

1812.
ALEC ████ (292345Z AUG 02).

1813.
█████████ 11746 ████████████. The CIA’s June 2013 Response highlights the following statement in the December 13, 2012, Committee Study: “It is possible that the sourcing for CIA claims that ‘as a result of the use of EITs’ Abu Zubaydah provided information that ‘played a key role in the ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh,’ are related to Abu Zubaydah’s information indicating that Hassan Ghul could be located through ██████████ [the well-known associate].” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “It is true that Abu Zubaydah provided no information specifically on Bin al-Shibh’s whereabouts, but as the Study explicitly acknowledges, he did provide information on another al-Qa’ida facilitator that prompted Pakistani action that netted Bin al-Shibh.” The Committee could find no CIA records of the CIA ever making this claim externally, or internally within the CIA, prior to the CIA’s June 2013 Response. Rather, as described, the CIA claimed both before and after the President’s September 2006 speech that Abu Zubaydah provided information related to bin-al-Shibh that resulted in bin al-Shibh’s capture. In an email from ████████ to ██████████ and ████████, dated September 7, 2006, ██████ states: “...AZ gave us information on his recent activities that –when added into other information—helped us track him.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response asserts that the information Abu Zubaydah provided—that Hassan Ghul could possibly be located through █████████ [a well-known associate of Hassan Ghul]—was “unique information” and that bin al-Shibh’s “capture would not have occurred” “without Abu Zubaydah’s information,” which was collected “after he had been subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques.” As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, the statement provided by Abu Zubayah was not unique, but corroborative of information already collected and acted upon by government authorities.

1814.
ALEC ████ (292345Z AUG 02).

1815.
███████ 12148 (300601Z AUG 02).

1816.
███████ 12151 (301107Z AUG 02).

1817.
███████ 12207 (050524Z SEP 02).

1818.
While it is unclear from CIA records how Pakistani authorities learned █████████ [the specific family member of the well-known associate] had returned home, █████████ [the well-known associate] had sought the help of Pakistani authorities in retrieving ████████ [the specific family member of the well-known associate]. Further, the CIA in early July 2002 had requested “technical surveillance” of █████████ [the well-known associate’s] telephone, and CIA records indicate that Pakistani authorities were maintaining regular contact with █████████ [the well-known associate] after the initial July 2002 raid.

1819.
█████████ 12249 (091259Z SEP 02).

1820.
█████████ 12249 (091259Z SEP 02).

1821.
█████████ 12249 (091259Z SEP 02).

1822.
█████████ 12251 (███████ SEP 02); CIA ██████ (███████ SEP 02)███████.

1823.
█████████ 12251 (███████ SEP 02); CIA ██████ (███████ SEP 02)███████.

1824.
█████████ 12254 (100510Z SEP 02).

1825.
██████████ 33363 (1111226Z SEP 02).

1826.
█████████ 12251 (███████ SEP 02); CIA ██████ (███████ SEP 02)███████.

1827.
ALEC ███████ (111551Z SEP 02). The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani, aka Abu Badr, provided the information on the “safe houses in Karachi.” This is inaccurate. Multiple CIA records state this information was provided by Abu Badr’s driver, Muhammad Madni, who was cooperating with Pakistani authorities and providing information for the raids.

1828.
ALEC █████ (101749Z SEP 02).

1829.
ALEC █████ (111551Z SEP 02).

1830.
CIA █████ (█████ SEP 02).

1831.
ALEC █████ (130206Z SEP 02). The CIA’s June 2013 Response does not dispute the narrative described by the Committee, and states the “[CIA] should have more clearly explained the contribution [Abu Zubaydah’s] reporting made to this operation.”