The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (106 page)

1702.
See
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/Khalid_Shayhk_Mohammad.pdf.

1703.
See
list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in Volume II.

1704.
Among other documents,
see
CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa’ida,” dated July 13, 2004, faxed the Department of Justice, April 22, 2005, fax entitled, “████, Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah. █████.” This Intelligence Assessment was widely disseminated in the Intelligence Community and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on July 15, 2004. On March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009.
See also
CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from █████████, █████ Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques” and Classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007 (DTS #2007-1563).

1705.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II for detailed information.

1706.
See
United States Court of Appeals, August Term, 2001,
U.S. v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef,
and DIRECTOR ████ (█████ JAN 02).
See also
████ ████ CIA ███████ MAR 02).

1707.
December 15, 2001, CIA Briefing Document, “DCI Highlights.”
See also
ALEC ████ (262150Z APR 02) and email from: REDACTED; to: REDACTED, ██████, ████████, ████████, and others; subject: “Debriefing results of Omani al-Qa’ida cell leader yields further connections between possibly Khalid Shaykh Muhammed and the East Asia al-Qa’ida network”; date: April 16, 2002, at 9:56:34 AM.
See also
9/11 Commission Report.

1708.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including ALEC ████ (262150Z APR 02).
See also
email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED], ██████, ███████, ███████, and others; subject: “Debriefing results of Omani al-Qa’ida cell leader yields further connections between possibly Khalid Shaykh Muhammed and the East Asia al-Qa’ida network”; date: April 16, 2002, at 9:56:34 AM.

1709.
DIRECTOR ████ (241921Z MAR 02).

1710.
ALEC ████ (22150Z APR 02).

1711.
ALEC ████ (041957Z JUN 02).

1712.
████████████████████.
See also
“Terror Informant for FBI Allegedly Targeted Agents,”
Washington Post,
dated January 19, 2008, and Department of Justice documents on Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, including Jabarah’s “Sentencing Memorandum.”

1713.
See
section of this summary and Volume II on the “Information on the Facilitator That Led to the UBL Operation” for additional information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. Masran bin Arshad was in the custody of the government of █████ at this time.

1714.
DIRECTOR ████ (251938Z SEP 02); ███ 65903 █████ AUG 02); CIA ████████ AUG 02); ███ 65903 (████ AUG 02); ████ 65902 (████ AUG 02).

1715.
Among other open sources,
see
“The Secret Mastermind Behind the Bali Horror,”
The Observer,
19 October 2002.

1716.
Among other open source reporting,
see
“The Sadness of Bali is the Sadness of the World,”
The Strait Times,
dated November 16, 2002; “Jemaah Islamiyah Still Capable of Major Terrorist Attacks,” Philippine
Headline News,
dated November 27, 2002; “Police Arrest 13 Linked to Bali Bombers, Uncovers Plot to Blow Up Bank,”
AFP,
dated November 26, 2002; “Bali Friends Have Arabia Link,”
New York Post,
dated December 2, 2002; “Finger Is Pointed At Bomber,”
AFP-Hong Kong,
dated November 26, 2002; and “Mastermind of Bali Bomb Arrested,”
The Strait Times,
dated November 22, 2002.

1717.
ALEC ████ (170117Z JAN 03). At this time open source reporting also placed Hambali in Thailand. See, for example, “FBI Report Pointed to Bali Bombing,”
The Age,
dated January 23, 2003; “Thailand’s Denial of Threat Fails to Convince,”
AFP,
dated November 15, 2002; “We’ll Hit You: Pre-Bali Alert,”
Herald
(Australia), dated November 16, 2002; “JI Terror Group Still Major Threat Despite Arrests,”
Agence France Presse (AFP),
dated November 26, 2002; “Indonesia Arrests a Top Suspect in Southeast Asia Terror Network,”
New York Times,
dated December 4, 2002; and “Inside the Bali Plot: A TIME Inquiry Unearths the Roots of the Bombings and Shows How the Masterminds Remain at Large,”
Time Magazine,
dated December 9, 2002.

1718.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges that the CIA “had some other information linking Zubair to al-Qa’ida’s Southeast Asia network,” but states “that it was KSM’s information that caused us to focus on [Zubair] as an inroad to Hambali.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response further asserts: “KSM provided information on an al-Qa’ida operative named Zubair, we shared this information with Thai authorities, they detained Zubair, and he gave actionable intelligence information that helped us identify Hambali’s location.” This statement in the CIA’s June 2013 Response is inaccurate. On October 25, 2013, the CIA acknowledged the inaccuracy. Confirming information in the Committee Study, the CIA stated that an additional review of CIA records by the CIA found that “No, KSM did not name Zubair in his debriefings.”

1719.
In May 2002, prior to the application of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah identified “Zubair” as a Malaysian national who was associated with KSM and who could be used by KSM to conduct attacks in Thailand. According to Abu Zubaydah, Zubair also “assisted Abu Zubaydah in obtaining passports from a printer facility in either Thailand or Malaysia.” (
See
DIRECTOR ████ (271937Z MAY 02) ████████.) In June 2002, Abu Zubaydah told an FBI interrogator that he sent a Canadian who sought to “help defend Muslims” in Indonesia to a Malaysian named Abu Zubair. (
See
█████ 10475 (141605Z JUN 02).) In July 2002, a U.S. military detainee stated that “Zubair” was a member of the Jemaah Islamiyah and was connected to Jemaah Islamiyah senior leaders. (
See
████ 11691 (141712Z JUL 02). For other intelligence identifying “Zubair” as one of several individuals suspected of being connected to the October 2002 Bali bombings,
see
██████ 95612 (290615Z OCT 02); DIRECTOR ████ (202057Z OCT 02); and DIRECTOR ████ ████████.) Open source news reports highlighted links between senior al-Qa’ida leadership—including KSM—and Jemaah Islamiyah in the context of the Bali bombings. Hambali continued to be identified as a potential mastermind of the bombing— and likely residing in Thailand. These same reports identified a Malaysian named “Zubair” as one of three individuals sought by security officials for Hambali’s Bali bombings. Among other open source reporting,
see
“The Secret Mastermind Behind the Bali Horror,”
The Observer,
19 October 2002; “The Sadness of Bali is the Sadness of the World,”
The Strait Times,
dated November 16, 2002; “Jemaah Islamiyah Still Capable of Major Terrorist Attacks,”
Philippine Headline News,
dated November 27, 2002; “Police Arrest 13 Linked to Bali Bombers, Uncovers Plot to Blow Up Bank,”
AFP,
dated November 26, 2002; “Bali Friends Have Arabia Link,”
New York Post,
dated December 2, 2002; “Finger Is Pointed At Bomber,”
AFP-Hong Kong,
dated November 26, 2002; “Inside the Bali Plot: A TIME Inquiry Unearths the Roots of the Bombings and Shows How the Masterminds Remain at Large,”
Time Magazine,
dated December 9, 2002; and “Mastermind of Bali Bomb Arrested,”
The Strait Times,
dated November 22, 2002.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional detailed information.

1720.
See
█████ 89601 (042006Z MAR 03).

1721.
█████ 13678 (070724Z MAR 03). According to CIA records, “a [foreign government officer] talked quietly to [Majid Khan] alone for about ten minutes before the interview began and was able to establish an excellent level of rapport. The first hour and [a] half of the interview was a review of bio-data and information previously [reported]. When [foreign government interrogators] started putting pressure on [Majid Khan] by pulling apart his story about his ‘honeymoon’ in Bangkok and his attempt to rent an apartment, safehouse, for his cousin [Mansoor Maqsood, aka Iqbal, aka Talha, aka Moeen, aka Habib], at 1400, [Majid Khan] slumped in his chair and said he would reveal everything to officers . . . .”

1722.
██████ 13678 (070724 MAR 03). Records indicate that this information was also disseminated in FBI channels.
See
ALEC █████ █████ █████. For previous intelligence on Zubair’s physical description,
see
█████ ███ 11715 █████ █████.
See also
DIRECTOR █████ ████████████████████.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II for detailed information.

1723.
██████ 81553 (101010Z MAR 03). The request was approved by CIA Headquarters on March 12, 2003 (DIRECTOR ███ (March 12, 2003)).

1724.
█████ 10755 (111455Z MAR 03).
See also
DIRECTOR █████ (112152Z MAR 03). ALEC Station had sent interrogators at the CIA’s DETENTION SITE BLUE at least two “requirements” cables with information to use in the interrogation of KSM specially about Hambali and KSM’s money transfers to Hambali.
See
ALEC █████ (072345Z MAR 03); ALEC █████ (090015Z MAR 03). KSM was rendered to CIA custody on March ██, 2003, and immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques through March 25, 2003.

1725.
KSM was told the CIA had “stacks and stacks of emails,” and that CIA officers were going to do a “test of his honesty” by asking him a series of questions.
See
█████ 10865 (171648Z MAR 03).

1726.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “KSM provided information on an al-Qa’ida operative named Zubair, we shared this information with Thai authorities, they detained Zubair, and he gave actionable intelligence information that helped us identify Hambali’s location.” This statement in the CIA’s June 2013 Response is inaccurate. In a document submitted to the Committee on October 25, 2013, the CIA acknowledged the inaccuracy. Confirming information in the Committee Study, the CIA stated that an additional review of CIA records by the CIA found that, “No, KSM did not name Zubair in his debriefings.”
See
DTS #2013-3152.

1727.
█████ 84783 ████████; █████ 84837 █████████.

1728.
█████ 84257 ██████.
See also
█████ 84783 ███████ and █████ 84837 ███████.

1729.
█████ 84783 ███████; █████ 84837 ███████.

1730.
███████ 31768 ██████. The detainee was in the custody of the government of ████.

1731.
██████ 84854 ███████.

1732.
██████ 84854 ████████; ███ 84876 ███████; ██████ 87617 ██████████; ████████ 84908 █████████. The Committee has used “Business Q” to refer to a specific company.

1733.
██████ 84854 ████████; ███ 84876 ███████; ██████ 87617 ██████████; ████████ 84908 ████████.

1734.
██████ 84908 ██████████. It unclear what specific actions the CIA or local authorities engaged in as a result of the information Zubair provided on ███████ [Business Q] while in foreign government custody. CIA records indicate that Thai authorities were engaged in their own unilateral efforts to track and identify leads related to Hambali and Zubair. A June 28, 2003, CIA cable states that local authorities were investigating Zubair’s links to various ███████ [businesses]. Later, in July 2003, the CIA learned that Thai authorities had approached a “contact” who worked at ██████ [Business Q]. █████████████████ ███████████. The CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges that prior to being transferred to CIA custody, “[d]uring [foreign government] debriefings Zubair reported on the █████████████████ and corroborated reporting on ███████ [Business Q] █████████. This information when combined with reporting from other sources to form a complete picture of Hambali’s status was critical in helping identify Hambali’s general location and led to his arrest on 11 August by Thai [authorities].” A review of CIA records found that the reporting referenced was obtained prior to Zubair’s rendition to CIA custody.

1735.
█████████ 40568 █████.

1736.
████ 84876 ██████; ██████ 84908 ██████; ████████ 40915 ████████; ████████████ 41017 ███████. ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████. In response to this information, ██████ wrote, “Wow..this is just great . . . you guys are soooo closing in on Hmabali [sic].” (
See
email from: ████████; to: ████████, and others; subject: “wohoo—hilite for EA team pls . . . aliases for Hambali”; date: June █ 2003, at 9:51:30 AM.) As noted, CIA records indicate that Thai authorities were unilaterally following investigative leads related to Hambali and Zubair. It is unknown what specific investigative steps were taken by Thai authorities (or by the CIA) between early June 2003 and July 16, 2003, to investigate ███████████████ [Business Q]. On July 16, 2003, the CIA learned that Thai authorities had been independently in contact with █████ [Business Q]. After being transferred to CIA custody and rendered to the CIA’s COBALT detention site, Zubair was immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Days later, on June 25, 2003, Zubair was asked again about his efforts to obtain ████ documents for Hambali, at which point Zubair acknowledged using ███████████████ [Business Q] █████████████████████████. As noted, Zubair had previously identified ████████ [Business Q] while in foreign government custody ██████████████████████████████. The CIA has never claimed to policymakers that information obtained from Zubair after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques led to Hambali’s capture. Nor are there any internal CIA records crediting the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Zubair as leading to Hambali’s capture. As noted, the CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “During [foreign government] debriefings, Zubair reported on the ███ ██████████ and corroborated reporting on ███████ [Business Q] ██████████. This information when combined with reporting from other sources to form a complete picture of Hambali’s status was critical in helping identify Hambali’s general location and led to his arrest on 11 August by Thai [authorities].”
See also
█████ 84876 ████████; ██████ 84908 ████████; ██████████ 40915 ███████; and ██████████ 41017 ███████.