The Grand Alliance (9 page)

But why is it necessary to hand over to the enemy the
enormous advantage of being able to secure the
mastery of the Bulgarian airfields without a shot being
fired or a word being said?

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Germany is in fact preparing to repeat on the frontiers of Turkey the same manoeuvre as she accomplished on the frontiers of France in April and May,
1940. But in this case, instead of hesitating and overawed neutrals like Denmark, Holland, and Belgium, she
has in Bulgaria a confederate and former ally who has
beyond all doubt abandoned the will, and never had the
power, to resist. All this, I repeat, may fall upon us in
February or in March, and all will be open to the Germans even without moving any large masses of troops
from the moment when the Bulgarian airfields have
been fitted to receive the German Air Force and are
occupied by the advanced aircraft personnel and
ground staff. Do we propose to sit still with folded
hands and watch the steady preparation of this deadly
stroke?

It seems to me that we should be held gravely
blameworthy by our respective nations if we were to fail
in ordinary prudence and foresight. Even now we have
waited too long.

I therefore propose to you, Mr. President, that you
and I should repeat in defence of Turkey the same kind
of measures which the Germans are taking on the
Bulgarian airfields. My Government wish to send to
Turkey at the earliest moment when accommodation
can be provided at least ten squadrons of fighter and
bomber aircraft, apart from the five now in action in
Greece. If Greece should surrender or be beaten down,
we will transfer these other five air squadrons to
Turkish airfields, and, further, we will fight the air war
from Turkish bases with ever-increasing air forces of
the highest quality. Thus we shall help to give the
Turkish Army the additional air support which they need
to sustain their famous military qualities.

But, more than that, we shall place Turkey in a
position, once our squadrons are on the Turkish aerodromes, to threaten to bombard the Rumanian oilfields
if any German advance is made into Bulgaria, or if the
air personnel already in Bulgaria is not speedily withdrawn. We will undertake not to take such action from
Turkish airfields except by agreement with you.

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There is more to come. The attitude of Russia is
uncertain, and it is our hope it may remain loyal and
friendly. Nothing will more restrain Russia from aiding
Germany, even indirectly, than the presence of
powerful British bombing forces which could [from
Turkey] attack the oilfields of Baku. Russia is
dependent upon the supply from these oilfields for a
very large part of her agriculture, and far-reaching
famine would follow their destruction.

Thus Turkey, once defended by air power, would
have the means perhaps of deterring Germany from
overrunning Bulgaria and quelling Greece, and of
counterbalancing the Russian fear of the German
armies. If this decisive position is to be saved there is
not an hour to lose, and on receipt of your assent His
Majesty’s Government will immediately give the necessary orders for our advanced personnel, either in
uniform or in plain clothes, as you prefer, to start at
once for Turkey.

Further, we are prepared to send you a hundred A.

A. guns, which are now either in or on their way to
Egypt. These would be complete with personnel, either
in uniform, if you so desire, or in the guise of instructors.

All other measures which have been discussed with
Marshal Chakmak, and also the naval measures, will at
the right moment be brought into operation.

The victories we have gained in Libya will enable us
to give a far more direct and immediate measure of aid
to Turkey in the event of our two countries becoming
allied in war, and we will make common cause with you
and use our growing strength to aid your valiant armies.

I also sent the following to the Chiefs of Staff:
Prime Minister to C.

31 Jan. 41

O.S. Committee

We must not overlook the decision we conveyed to
General Wavell, that once Tobruk was taken the Greek-The Grand Alliance

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Turkish situation must have priority. The advance to
Benghazi is most desirable, and has been emphasised
in later telegrams. Nevertheless, only forces which do
not conflict with European needs can be employed. As
the forecast is now that Benghazi cannot be captured
till the end of February, it is necessary that this should
be impressed upon General Wavell. For instance, the
air support promised to Turkey cannot be delayed till
then. It may, however, be possible to reconcile both
objectives.

The Chiefs of Staff accordingly telegraphed to the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East inviting their attention to my message to President Inönü, and adding the following:

Steps to counter German infiltration into Bulgaria must now have the highest priority. Advantage of going on to Benghazi and thus securing Egypt and the fleet base in the Eastern Mediterranean are fully realised, provided that it can be done without prejudice to European interests. Its capture as soon as possible is, therefore, of the highest importance. Your wish to take

“Mandibles” [Rhodes] is welcomed by us, and we have sent the three Glen ships to you at the cost of paralysing for some months similar operations in the Western Mediterranean. We did this in hope of preventing air-borne German air occupation of “Mandibles,”

which would hamper our communications with Turkey.

We have asked you to speed this operation as much as possible.

In conclusion we must repeat that the Graeco-Turkish situation predominates and should have first place in your thoughts.

I understood at this time how perilous the position of Turkey had become. It was obviously impossible to consider the treaty we had made with her before the war as binding upon her in the altered circumstances. When war had broken out in 1939, the Turks had mobilised their strong, The Grand Alliance

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good, brave army. But this was all based upon the conditions of the First Great War. The Turkish infantry were as fine as they had ever been, and their field artillery was presentable. But they had none of the modern weapons which from May, 1940, were proved to be decisive. Aviation was lamentably weak and primitive. They had no tanks or armoured cars, and neither the workshops to make and maintain them nor the trained men and staffs to handle them. They had hardly any anti-aircraft or anti-tank artillery.

Their signal service was rudimentary. Radar was unknown to them. Nor did their warlike qualities include any aptitude for all these modern developments.

On the other hand, Bulgaria had been largely armed by Germany out of the immense quantities of equipment of all kinds taken from France and the Low Countries as a result of the battles of 1940. The Germans had, therefore, plenty of modern weapons with which to arm their allies. We, for our part, having lost so much at Dunkirk, having to build up our home army against invasion and to face all the continuous pressure of the Blitz on our cities as well as maintain the war in the Middle East, could only give very sparingly and at the cost of other clamant needs. The Turkish army in Thrace was, under these conditions, at a serious and almost hopeless disadvantage compared with the Bulgarians. If to this danger were added even moderate detachments of German air and armour, the weight upon Turkey might well prove insupportable.

The only policy or hope throughout this phase of the ever-extending war was in an organised plan of uniting the forces of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey; and this we were now trying to do. Our aid to Greece had been limited in the first place to the few air squadrons which had been sent from Egypt when Mussolini first attacked her. The next stage had been the offer of the technical units set out in the The Grand Alliance

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Chiefs of Staff telegram, which had been declined by the Greeks on grounds which were by no means unreasonable.

We now reach the third phase, where it seemed possible to make a safe and secure desert flank at and beyond Benghazi and concentrate the largest army of manoeuvre or strategic reserve possible in Egypt.

In this condition we reached the month of February.

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3

Blitz and Anti-Blitz, 1941: Hess
The Blitz Continues — Need to Estimate the
German Air Strength
—
Differences Among the
Departments — Mr. Justice Singleton’s Inquiry,
December,
1940 —
His Report, January
21, 1941

—
German Preparations to Invade Russia — And
to Bomb and Starve Us Out — Three Phases in
the Blitz — Our Smoke-Screens and Decoy Fires

— The Luftwaffe Turns to the Ports, March and
April,
1941 —
My Visit to Bristol, April
12 —
We
Continue to Twist the Enemy’s Beams — Incendiary Attack on London, May
10 —
Fires out of
Control — The House of Commons Is Destroyed

— The German Air Fleet Moves to the East — We
Investigate German Radar Defence — The Battle
of the Beams Postponed — A Week-End at
Ditchley — Unexpected and Fantastic News —

Rudolf Hess Lands in Scotland — A Guess at His
Motives — The German Explanation — Lord
Simon’s Interview with Him, June
10 —
A Vision
of Hitler’s Mind — My Directions About His Treatment — I Tell President Roosevelt
—
Stalin’s
Curiosity in
1944.

A
S THE END OF THE YEAR 1940 approached and the Blitz continued to assail us, it seemed most necessary to peer into the future and attempt to measure our ordeal. How much longer and with what increase of severity must we expect the night onslaughts on our factories and people to