The Grand Alliance (5 page)

In fact, the only two questions which still divide us
are Finland and Constantinople. In regard to Finland, I
do not foresee fundamental difficulties, because we do
not regard Finland as belonging essentially to our
sphere of influence, and the only thing that interests us
is that a second war should not break out in this area.

In contrast to this, it is not in our interest to abandon
Constantinople to Russia and Bulgaria to Bolshevism.

But even here it should be possible, with good intentions, to reach a solution which will avoid the worst and
facilitate what we want. It will be easier to find a
solution if Moscow is clear that nothing obliges us to
accept an arrangement which is not satisfactory to us.

8. Africa. Duce, I do not think that in this theatre any
counterattack on a large scale can be launched at the
moment. The preparation of such an enterprise would

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take a minimum of three to five months. In the
meantime we shall reach the season of the year in
which the German armoured formations cannot successfully go into action. For unless they are equipped
with special cooling devices even the armoured cars
cannot be used in practice at such temperatures. In any
case they cannot be used for tactical operations at long
distances requiring a whole day.

The decisive solution in this sector seems to be to
increase the number of anti-tank weapons, even if that
means that in other sectors Italian formations must be
deprived of these special guns.

Above all, as I stated recently, I believe nevertheless
that we should try by all means to weaken the naval
position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean with our
air forces, because the employment of our ground
troops in this sector cannot improve the situation.

For the rest, Duce, no decision of importance can be
made before the month of March.

Mr. Eden was watching with close attention the darkening clouds in the East.

Foreign

Minister

to

6 Jan. 41

Prime Minister

Salutations and congratulations upon the victory of
Bardia! If I may debase a golden phrase, “Never has so
much been surrendered by so many to so few.”

The object of this minute, however, is to call
attention to a less satisfactory sector of the international
horizon, the Balkans. A mass of information has come
to us over the last few days from divers sources, all of
which tends to show that Germany is pressing forward
her preparations in the Balkans with a view to an
ultimate descent upon Greece. The date usually
mentioned for such a descent is the beginning of
March, but I feel confident that the Germans must be
making every effort to antedate their move. Whether or
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not military operations are possible through Bulgaria
against Salonika at this time of the year I am not
qualified to say, but we may feel certain that Germany
will seek to intervene by force to prevent complete
Italian defeat in Albania. Already there are reports of
increased enemy air forces operating against the
Greeks, and General Papagos states that these are
slowing down his advance. It would be in accordance
with German methods to establish superiority in the air
before making any move on land.

Politically the attitude of the Bulgarian Government
causes me grave disquiet. They give the impression of
men who have now little control of events. Their press
is increasingly under German control, and is now little
else but the mouthpiece of Axis propaganda. It is
essential that our victories in North Africa should not
result in any decrease of watchfulness on the part of
the Turks and Yugoslavs, and we are doing what we
can in the political sphere to ensure this. You may wish
to have all these questions considered by the Defence
Committee.

After reading this I issued the following minute:
Prime

Minister

to

6 Jan. 41

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee

Pray see the attached from the Foreign Secretary. In
spite of the evident need to pursue the Italians along
the Libyan coast while the going is good, we shall have
to consider the dispatch of four or five more squadrons
of the Royal Air Force to Greece, and possibly the
diversion of part of the 2d British Armoured Division.

I cannot look beyond Benghazi at the present time,
and if Tobruk is taken there will be very few Italian
troops, and by no means their best, east of Benghazi….

Although perhaps by luck and daring we may collect
comparatively easily most delectable prixes on the
Libyan shore, the massive importance of the taking of

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Valona and keeping the Greek front in being must
weigh hourly with us.

On January 8 the Defence Committee agreed that in view of the probability of an early German advance into Greece
through Bulgaria
it was of the first importance, from the political point of view, that we should do everything possible, by hook or by crook, to send at once to Greece the fullest support within our power. It was also agreed that a decision on the form and extent of our assistance to Greece should be taken within the next forty-eight hours.

On this same day I received the following telegram from General Smuts. This was written quite independently of my minute two days earlier. I was fortified by his complete agreement with my view, endorsed as it was by the Chiefs of Staff and the Defence Committee.

General

Smuts

to

8 Jan. 41

Prime Minister

Magnificent victories in the Middle East open up a
field of speculation regarding our future course. Flowing
tide will soon carry Wavell to Tobruk. Should he go
farther? Tripoli is much too far. Even Benghazi is as far
beyond the frontier as the frontier is from Alexandria.

But there may be sound reasons, naval or other, for
going so far as Benghazi. In the absence of good and
special reasons Tobruk seems to me the terminus.

Beyond it lie risks not necessary to detail. Leaving an
adequate defensive force there in a fortified position,
the rest of the army should be withdrawn to Egypt and
the Middle East, where a strong army [of] manoeuvre
will be required against possible attack through the
Balkans.

2. I would however suggest that at such a stage
liquidation of the Abyssinian situation should also be
considered. Conquest of Abyssinia would mean a
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deadly blow at Mussolini’s prestige and at the Fascist
plunder. Italy may possibly be forced out of the war and
the whole of the Mediterranean position transformed.

Germany would once more be isolated, with prospect of
certain defeat.

3. For an early liquidation of Abyssinia there is also
the argument that the Italian morale there must be
particularly low now, and early finish of the campaign
would release large forces for reinforcing our front in
the Middle East. If part of Wavell’s Middle East army
could be detailed shortly, reinforcing an attack on
Abyssinia from the north, and a simultaneous attack is
launched from Kenya, Italian resistance might rapidly
disintegrate. I should think that an additional division in
the north and another in Kenya would be sufficient if
both attacks proceed simultaneously.

4. If such a plan for simultaneous attack is approved, I am prepared to supply the additional division
for the south. Except for the deficiency in Bren guns, it
is ready and could be moved as soon as shipping could
be provided. Transport of such large forces both in the
north and south must take some time, and if my suggestion is approved decision should be made as soon as
possible. Attack from the south will rapidly push the
fighting front away from Kenya, and so involve the
scrapping of much of the plan now being worked on
there. Plan of simultaneous attack from the north and
south is required if unnecessary risk and a long campaign are to be avoided in so large an area as Eritrea
and Abyssinia. For this [the] additional division in the
north will be necessary, and probably sufficient. I hope
it can be spared in spite of rumours of large German
concentrations in Rumania and Hungary.

Question is whether Germany can afford to set the
Balkans ablaze with Russia an incalculable factor and
Turkey hostile. The Italian defeat in Africa and Greece,
together with the failure of the German Air Force
against Britain, have profoundly changed the position,
and the German concentrations may only be intended
to pacify the Italians, and to lure the British forces away
from Britain, where the main attack is intended and has
to be made. Whole situation is one for consideration of

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the General Staff, who have full facts before them. To
me it would in the circumstances appear not to involve
undue risk presently to detach one division with the
necessary air force from the Middle East army in order
to strengthen the Sudan force for this attack from the
north. If the operation is brought off soon and expedi-tiously it might produce far-reaching results in Italy and
the Middle East.