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events should develop rapidly in France. Presumably
Herr Hitler realises this. Nevertheless the probabilities
are that the French climax will come about before
anything decisive happens in Spain.

IV

11. We must continually expect that Hitler will soon
strike some heavy blow, and that he is now making
preparations on a vast scale with customary German
thoroughness. He can, of course, easily come down
through Italy and establish an air power in Sicily.

Perhaps this is already taking place.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee are requested to
press on with their study of “Influx” [a scheme for the
occupation of Sicily], which may conceivably require
emergency treatment. It is not seen, however, how

“Influx” can be accorded priority over the operations in
Libya; certainly not, whatever happens, until Tobruk
has been taken and a good forward base made there –

if not farther west – to protect Egypt.

V

12. All the foregoing shows that nothing would suit
our interest better than that any German advance in the
Balkans should be delayed till the spring. For this very
reason one must apprehend that it will begin earlier.

The exploits of the Greek Army have been an
enormous help to us. They have expressed themselves
generously about the extremely modest aid in the air
which was all we could give. But should their success
be followed by a check or a deadlock, we must expect
immediate demands for more aid. The only aid we can
give quickly is four or five more squadrons from the
Middle East, perhaps some artillery regiments, and
some or all of the tanks of the 2d Armoured Division,
now arrived and working up in leisurely fashion in Egypt.

“Furious” has reached Takoradi, and forty Hurricanes, etc., will soon raise Air Marshal Longmore’s
strength to well over a hundred Hurricane fighters. His
losses in the offensive have been singularly small. His
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action in withdrawing squadrons from Aden and the
Sudan has been vindicated. Tobruk may soon be in our
hands, and thereafter it would seem that a strong
reinforcement of air power for Greece should be provided. This should include Hurricane squadrons. Have the
aerodromes in Greece been lengthened and adapted to
them? Has the airfield in Crete yet been made suitable
for their landing on passage? The call, when it comes,
may be very urgent. Everything must be set in train
now. We must know also how long it would take to
move the 2d Armoured Division to the Piraeus, and
what numbers are involved.

13. All accounts go to show that a Greek failure to
take Valona will have very bad consequences. It may
be possible for General Wavell, with no more than the
forces he is now using in the Western Desert, and in
spite of some reduction in his air force, to conquer the
Cyrenaica province and establish himself at Benghazi;
but it would not be right for the sake of Benghazi to lose
the chance of the Greeks taking Valona, and thus to
dispirit and anger them, and perhaps make them in the
mood for a separate peace with Italy. Therefore, the
prospect must be faced that after Tobruk the further
westward advance of the Army of the Nile may be
seriously cramped. It is quite clear to me that
supporting Greece must have priority after the western
flank of Egypt has been made secure.

VI

14. The attitude of Yugoslavia may well be determined by the support we give to Greece and by their
fortunes before Valona. While it is impossible to dogma-tise, it would be more natural for the Germans to push
on through Rumania to the Black Sea and to press
down through their old ally Bulgaria to Salonika, rather
than to force their way through Yugoslavia. Many troop
movements and many more rumours would seem to
point to this. Evidently there is a great building-up of
German strength, and improvement of German communications towards the southeast. We must so act as to
make it certain that if the enemy enters Bulgaria,

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Turkey will come into the war. If Yugoslavia stands firm
and is not molested, if the Greeks take Valona and
maintain themselves in Albania, if Turkey becomes an
active ally, the attitude of Russia may be affected
favourably. Anyone can see how obnoxious, and
indeed deadly, a German advance to the Black Sea or
through Bulgaria to the Aegean must be to Russia.

Fear only will restrain Russia from war, and perhaps a
strong Allied front in the Balkans. with the growing
prestige of the British Army and sea and air power, may
lessen that fear. But we must not count on this.

VII

15. Last, but dominating all our war effort, is the
threat of invasion, the air warfare and its effects on
production, and the grievous pressure upon our
western ports and northwestern communications. One
cannot doubt that Herr Hitler’s need to starve or crush
Great Britain is stronger than it has ever been. A great
campaign in the east of Europe, the defeat of Russia,
the conquest of the Ukraine, and an advance from the
Black Sea to the Caspian would none of them, separately nor all together, bring him victorious peace while the
British air power grew ever stronger behind him and he
had to hold down a whole continent of sullen, starving
peoples. Therefore, the task of preventing invasion, of
feeding the Island, and of speeding our armament
production must in no way be compromised for the
sake of any other objective whatsoever.

Hitler also had his New Year thoughts, and it is interesting to compare his letter to Mussolini written a week earlier with my appreciation. Coincidence is evident about the attitude of General Franco and Spain.

31 Dec. 40

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Duce,

… In examining the general situation I reach the
following conclusions:

1. The war in the West is in itself won. A final violent
effort is still necessary to crush England. In order to
determine the manner of accomplishing this, we must
weigh the factors which separate England from a
complete collapse after the intensification of our air and
submarine offensives will have produced their effect.

In this battle, and after we have achieved the first
stages of success, important German policies will be
necessary for a final assault against the British Isles.

The concentration of these forces – and particularly the
enormous supply dumps – will require an antiaircraft
defence far superior to our original estimates.

2. France. The French Government have dismissed
Laval. The official reasons which have been communicated to me are false. I do not doubt for a moment that
the real reason is that General Weygand is making
demands from North Africa which amount to blackmail,
and that the Vichy Government is not in a position to
react without risking the loss of North Africa. I also
consider it probable that there exists at Vichy itself a
whole clique which approves of Weygand’s policy, at
least tacitly. I do not think that Pétain personally is
disloyal. But one never knows. All this demands constant vigilance and a careful watching of events.

3. Spain. Profoundly troubled by the situation, which
Franco thinks has deteriorated, Spain has refused to
collaborate with the Axis Powers. I fear that Franco
may be about to make the biggest mistake of his life. I
think that his idea of receiving from the democracies
raw materials and wheat as a sort of recompense for
his abstention from the conflict is extremely naïve. The
democracies will keep him in suspense until he has
consumed the last grain of wheat, and then they will
unloose the fight against him.

I deplore all this, for from our side we had completed
our preparations for crossing the Spanish frontier on
January 10, and to attack Gibraltar at the beginning of
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February. I think success would have been relatively
rapid. The troops picked for this operation have been
specially chosen and trained. The moment that the
Straits of Gibraltar fell into our hands the danger of a
French change-over in North and West Africa would be
definitely eliminated.

I am, therefore, very saddened by this decision of
Franco, which is so little in accord with the aid which
we, you, Duce, and myself, gave him when he found
himself in difficulties. I still have the hope, the slight
hope, that he will realise at the last minute the catas-trophic consequences of his conduct, and that even
tardily he will find his way to this battle front, where our
victory will decide his own destiny.

4. Bulgaria. Bulgaria equally is reluctant to associate
herself with the Tripartite Pact and to adopt a clear
attitude in her international relations. The growing
pressure exercised by Soviet Russia is the cause of
this. If the King had adhered immediately to our pact,
no one would have dared to put such pressure on him.

The worst is that this influence poisons public opinion,
which is not insensible to Communist infection.

5. Without doubt it is Hungary and Rumania who in
this conflict have adopted the most clear-cut attitude.

General Antonescu has recognised that the future of
his régime, and even of his person, depends on our
victory. From this he has drawn clear and direct conclusions which make him go up in my esteem.

The attitude of the Hungarians is no less loyal. Since
December 13, German troops have been continually in
transit in the direction of Rumania. Hungary and Rumania have put at my disposition their railway network, so
that German divisions can be rapidly moved to the
points of pressure. I cannot say any more yet of the
operations which we are planning or which may
become necessary, for these plans are being drawn up
at this very moment. The strength of our forces will in
any case be such that any threat of lateral counter-manoeuvre will be excluded.

It is simply necessary, Duce, that you stabilise your
front in Albania so as to contain at least a part of the
Greek and Anglo-Greek forces.

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6. Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is prudently gaining time.

If circumstances are favourable it may be that she will
conclude a non-aggression pact with us, but it seems
now that she will not adhere in any case to the
Tripartite Pact. I do not count on trying to obtain anything more until our military successes have improved
the psychological climate.

7. Russia. Given the danger of seeing internal
conflicts develop in a certain number of Balkan countries, it is necessary to foresee the extreme consequences and to have ready machinery capable of
avoiding them. I do not envisage any Russian initiative
against us so long as Stalin is alive, and we ourselves
are not victims of serious setbacks. I consider it essential, Duce, as a premise of a satisfactory conclusion of
this war that there should be in existence a German
army sufficiently strong to deal with any eventuality in
the East. The greater the strength of this army appears,
the less will be the probability that we shall have to
employ it against an unforeseen danger. I should like to
add to these general considerations that our present
relations with the U.S.S.R are very good. We are on the
eve of concluding a trade treaty which will satisfy both
parties, and there is considerable hope that we can
resolve in a reasonable manner the remaining points at
issue between us.