The Grand Alliance (98 page)

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convoys from the West, but enabled us to strike harder at the transports and supply ships reinforcing Rommel.

Two considerable convoys were fought through successfully. The passage of each was a heavy naval operation. In July a convoy of six supply ships reached Malta, and seven empty vessels were brought out. Two nights later the Italians delivered their only heavy attack upon Valetta Harbour, with about twenty E-boats and eight midget submarines. The harbour defences, manned largely by Maltese, destroyed almost the whole attacking force in spite of its daring. In September another convoy of nine transports came through, with the loss of only one, under a very strong escort, comprising the battleships
Prince of
Wales
and
Rodney,
the
Ark Royal,
five cruisers, and eighteen destroyers. Besides these main convoys, a number of other supply ships reached the island. In all thirty-two ships out of thirty-four came in safely after much peril and gallant conduct. This nourishment enabled the fortress not only to live but to strike. During the three months ending

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with September forty-three Axis ships, of 150,000 tons, besides sixty-four smaller craft, were sunk on the African route by British aircraft, submarines, and destroyers, acting from Malta. In October over sixty per cent of Rommel’s supplies were sunk in passage. This may well have played a decisive part in the Desert struggle of 1941.

In September, as we now know, the German Admiral serving with the Italian High Command reported: Now, as ever, the British Fleet dominates the Mediterranean…. The Italian Fleet has been unable to prevent operations by the enemy’s naval forces, but, in co-operation with the Italian Air Force, it did prevent the Mediterranean route being used for regular British convoy traffic….

The most dangerous British weapon is the submarine, especially those operating from Malta. In the period covered there were thirty-six submarine attacks; of these nineteen were successful…. Owing to the weakness of the Italian Air Force in Sicily, the threat from Malta to the German-Italian sea route to North Africa has increased in the last few weeks…. Moreover, almost daily attacks on Tripoli are made from Malta.

Recently the Italian seaports in Sicily have been visited by British aircraft more frequently than before…. The formations of the Italian Air Force now stationed in Sicily and North Africa are insufficient to stop the British Air Force and naval operations. … I again issue an urgent warning against an underestimate of the dangers arising from the situation at sea in the Mediterranean.

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My anxieties about the Desert delay and the reinforcements reaching Rommel were not allayed by the success of the measures described, and I urged even greater efforts upon the Admiralty. I desired specially that a new surface force should be based upon Malta.

Prime

Minister

to

22 Aug. 41

First

Sea

Lord

(General Ismay to

see)

Will you please consider the sending of a flotilla,
and, if possible, a cruiser or two, to Malta, as soon as
possible?

2. We must look back to see how much our purpose
has been deflected. There was the plan, considered
vital by you, of blocking Tripoli Harbour, for which
Barham was to be sacrificed. There was the alternative
desperate proposal by the C.-in-C. Mediterranean to
bombard it, which was afterwards effected without the
loss of a man or a single ship being damaged. There
was the arrival of Mountbatten’s flotilla in Malta. All this
took place several months ago. It would be well to get
out the dates. How is it that the urgency of this matter
has declined? How is it that we are now content to
watch what we formerly thought unendurable, although
it is going forward on a bigger scale against us?

3. The reason why Mountbatten’s flotilla was withdrawn from Malta was less because of the danger there
than for the needs of the Cretan affair, in which the
flotilla was practically destroyed. We have thus lost
sight of our purpose, on which there was such general
agreement, and in which the Admiralty was so forward
and strong.

4. Meanwhile three things have happened. First, the
Malta defences have been markedly strengthened in
the air and A.A. guns, and the German air forces have
been drawn away to some extent to Russia. Secondly,
the Battle of the Atlantic has turned sharply in our
favour, we have more anti-U-boat craft, and we are to

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expect a substantial relief through American action
west of the twenty-sixth meridian affecting our destroyers and corvettes. Thirdly, General Auchinleck is
disinclined to move before November.

5. Are we then to wait and allow this ever-growing
reinforcement, mainly of Italians and of supplies, to pile
up in Libya? If so, General Auchinleck will be no better
off, relatively to the enemy, when at last he considers
himself perfectly ready than he is now.

6. I shall be glad to hear from you over the weekend, and we could discuss it at the Staff meeting on
Monday night.

The policy was accepted, though time was needed to bring it into force. In October a striking force known as “Force K,”

comprising the cruisers
Aurora
and
Penelope
and the destroyers
Lance
and
Lively,
was formed at Malta. This presently rendered important and timely service.

I had at this time wider aims. In war it is always desirable, though not always possible, to plan ahead. The lull which followed Auchinleck’s decision to delay his offensive and the successful Persian campaign offered an opportunity.

From every point of view I desired at this time to reinforce the East to the utmost shipping limit. I could not tell what would happen in the impending Desert battle, nor how the Russian front in the Caucasus would hold. There was always, besides, the menace of Japan, with all its potential peril to Australia and New Zealand. I wished to have two more British divisions moving eastward. If these could be rounding the Cape about the end of the year, we should have something substantial in hand for unknowable contingencies. Here would be, in fact, that mobile reserve, that “mass of manoeuvre,” which alone could give superior The Grand Alliance

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options in the hour of need. I had learnt about this in a hard school where lessons are often only given once.

It therefore became my ambition to make assurance doubly sure by throwing in another two divisions for the Desert Army, as well as to have a mobile reserve for other needs or chances in the Middle East. For this we had no shipping.

All that could be spared from the Atlantic struggle was employed in convoys round the Cape or from Australia or India. Even Leathers could offer no solution. But I felt sure, from the increasing cordiality in my correspondence with President Roosevelt, that he would lend me some fast American transports. Nor, as will be seen, was I wrong.

This could not of course operate for a good many months, but I longed to have something in hand moving through the Indian Ocean for one or other of the various disagreeable emergencies which might come upon us.

Prime Minister to C.I.

22 Aug. 41

G.S. and Minister of

Shipping

Let me have a scheme prepared that we could
consider Monday night, for sending two more complete
infantry divisions to the Middle East, at the earliest
moment. Let me know what shipping will be required.

Some of the lorries can surely go direct from the United
States from the great numbers now being loaded.

When these figures have been supplied, I will ask
President Roosevelt for the loan of this shipping for this
particular purpose, and I dare say I can get it.

As a modification of the above, the divisions could
go to Halifax or New York, and re-embark there upon
American ships. The Minister of Shipping should throw
himself into this plan, and let me have a report from all
angles. I am convinced that by the end of November we
should have two more divisions in that theatre, though
whether they would operate in Persia, Iraq, or the
Middle East Command must depend upon circum-The Grand Alliance

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stances. Let me also have the time-table of the movement of the 1st Armoured Division to the Middle East.

The intricate details were thrashed out with Lord Leathers and the Chiefs of Staff.

Prime

Minister

to

26 Aug. 41

General Ismay

Pray make arrangements with Lord Leathers and
the War Office Movements Branch to further this
reinforcement in the light of our discussion last night.

Ingenuity and contrivance must be used to minimise the
demand I must make upon the President. The request
will be for one round voyage of a certain number of
ships from America to this country, to the Middle East,
and back to the United States. They ought to have
them at their disposal again in January or in February.

If Normandie could be taken over, transshipment might
be possible at Trinidad, which would release earlier
some of the smaller liners. Arrangements for reception
in the Middle East, involving transshipment to smaller
vessels, must also in that case be considered.

Let me have the best plan possible, and focus the
outstanding points of difficulty, so that I can myself
preside over the final conference. Imports may be cut.

I now appealed to President Roosevelt.

Former Naval Person

1 Sept. 41

to

President

Roosevelt

The good results which have been so smoothly
obtained in Persia puts us in touch with the Russians,
and we propose to double, or at least greatly improve,
the railway from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian, thus
opening a sure route by which long-term supplies can
reach the Russian reserve positions in the Volga Basin.