The Grand Alliance (13 page)

It was with such thoughts in his mind that he was impressed on hearing his astrologer or fortune-teller, Haushofer, express similar sentiments, and mention the Duke of Hamilton as a person of common sense, who must be horrified at this senseless slaughter.

Haushofer had also remarked that he had seen Hess on three occasions in a dream piloting an aeroplane he knew not where. Hess took these remarks, coming from such a man, as a message to fly to this country as an emissary of peace, to seek the Duke of Hamilton, who would conduct him to King George. The British Government would be thrown out of office and a party desiring peace installed in its place. He was insistent that he would have no dealings with that “clique” – the ruling Administration – who would do all in their power to thwart him, but he was very vague as to what statesmen would replace them, and seemed to be extremely ill-informed as to the names and standing of our politicians…. He described how he approached Willi Messerschmidt and obtained facilities for long-distance flying inside Germany in training for the event,

The Grand Alliance

83

and how when he was prepared he set out on his voyage. He maintained that there were no confederates, and that he showed considerable skill in arranging his journey, working out the route himself, and flying with an accuracy which enabled him to land only some ten miles from his destination, Dungavel.
5

The Cabinet invited Lord Simon to interview him, and on June 10 a meeting took place. “When the Fuehrer,” said Hess, “had come to the conclusion that common sense could not prevail in England, he acted just according to the rule of conduct of Admiral Lord Fisher: ‘Moderation in war is folly. If you strike, strike hard and wherever you can.’ But I can confirm that it was indeed always difficult for the Fuehrer to give orders for these [air and U-boat] attacks. It pained him deeply. He was constantly in full sympathy with the English people who were victims of this method of waging war…. He said that even if victorious one should not impose any severe conditions on a country with which it was desired to come to an agreement.” Then, the keynote for Hess: “I thought that if England once knew of this fact it might be possible that England on her part would be ready for agreement.” If only England knew how kind Hitler really was, surely she would meet his wishes!

Much learned medical investigation has been devoted to Hess’s mental state. Certainly he was a neurotic, a split soul seeking peace in the pursuit of power and position and in the worship of a leader. But he was more than a medical case. He believed passionately in his vision of Hitler’s mind.

If only England could share it too, how much suffering could The Grand Alliance

84

be saved and how easy it would be to agree! A free hand for Germany in Europe and for Britain in her own Empire!

Other minor conditions were the return of the German colonies, the evacuation of Iraq, and an armistice and peace with Italy. As it was, England’s position was hopeless. If she did not agree to these conditions, “sooner or later the day will come when she will be forced to accede to them.” To this Lord Simon replied: “I do not think that that particular argument will be very good for the British Cabinet, because, you know, there is a good deal of courage in this country, and we are not very fond of threats!”

Considering how closely Hess was knit to Hitler, it is surprising that he did not know of, or that if he knew he did not disclose, the impending attack on Russia, for which such vast preparations were being made. The Soviet Government were deeply intrigued by the Hess episode, and they wove many distorted theories around it. Three years later, when I was in Moscow on my second visit, I realised the fascination which this topic had for Stalin. He asked me at the dinner table what was the truth about the Hess mission. I said shortly what I have written here. I had the feeling that he believed there had been some deep negotiation or plot for Germany and Britain to act together in the invasion of Russia which had miscarried.

Remembering what a wise man he is, I was surprised to find him silly on this point. When the interpreter made it plain that he did not believe what I said, I replied through my interpreter, “When I make a statement of facts within my knowledge I expect it to be accepted.” Stalin received this somewhat abrupt response with a genial grin. “There are lots of things that happen even here in Russia which our Secret Service do not necessarily tell me about.” I let it go at that.

The Grand Alliance

85

Reflecting upon the whole of this story, I am glad not to be responsible for the way in which Hess has been and is being treated. Whatever may be the moral guilt of a German who stood near to Hitler, Hess had, in my view, atoned for this by his completely devoted and frantic deed of lunatic benevolence. He came to us of his own free will, and, though without authority, had something of the quality of an envoy. He was a medical and not a criminal case, and should be so regarded.

The Grand Alliance

86

4

The Mediterranean War

Vital Importance of Malta — Admiral Keyes’s Plan
to Take Pantelleria — Its Postponement — Naval
Encounter with the German Air Force, January
10

— The Aircraft Carrier “Illustrious” Disabled —

“Southampton” Sunk and “Gloucester” Damaged

— Air Reinforcements for Malta — Determined
German Attacks on the Island — Governor Dobbie

— Admiral Somerville’s Raid on Genoa, February
9
— Need for Carrier-Borne Fast Fighter Aircraft

— Reinforcement of the Malta Garrison — Activities and Successes of Our Submarines — An
Enemy Convoy Annihilated — Capture of Benghazi, February
6
— Conquest of Cyrenaica
Complete — The Eden-Dill Mission to the Middle
East — My Telegram to General Wavell of February
12
— His Reply — Foreign Secretary’s Instructions — Telegram to General Smuts, February
15

— I Take Charge of the Foreign Office — My
Telegram to Mr. Eden, February
20
— Mr. Eden’s
Simultaneous Message — Menace of Mines to the
Suez Canal — Mr. Eden’s Report of February
21

— He Goes to Athens — His Report of February
22
— Greece Will Fight On — She Accepts Offer
of British Troops — War Cabinet in Favour of
Sending an Army to Greece — The Inscrutable
Future.

The Grand Alliance

87

S
INCE THE DAYS OF NELSON, Malta has stood a faithful British sentinel guarding the narrow and vital sea corridor through the Central Mediterranean, its strategic importance was never higher than in this the latest war. The needs of the large armies we were building up in Egypt made the free passage of the Mediterranean for our convoys and the stopping of enemy reinforcements to Tripoli aims of the highest consequence. At the same time the new air weapon struck a deadly blow, not only at Malta but at the effective assertion of British sea power in these narrow waters. Without this modern danger our task would have been simple. We could have moved freely about the Mediterranean and stopped all other traffic. It was now impossible to base the main Fleet on Malta. The island itself was exposed to the threat of invasion from the Italian ports, as well as to constant and measureless air attack.

Hostile air power also imposed almost prohibitive risks upon the passage of our convoys through the Narrows, condemning us to the long haul round the Cape. At the same time the superior air force of the enemy enabled them, by deterring our warships from acting fully in the Central Mediterranean except at much loss and hazard, to maintain a rivulet of troops and supplies into Tripoli.

About 140 miles from Malta, in the throat of the western Narrows between Sicily and Tunis, lay the Italian island of Pantelleria, reputed strongly fortified and with an invaluable airfield. This place was important to the enemy’s route to Tunis and Tripoli, and in our hands would markedly expand the air cover we could give around Malta. In September, 1940, I had asked Admiral Keyes to make a plan for seizing Pantelleria with the newly formed commandos. The idea was to attach two or three troopships to the tail of one of our heavily guarded convoys. While the main body was engaging the enemy’s attention these would drop off in the The Grand Alliance

88

darkness and storm the island by surprise. The project, which was called “Workshop,” gained increasing support from the Chiefs of Staff. Keyes was ardent, and claimed to lead the assault in person, waiving his rank as an Admiral of the Fleet.

In my circle we did not deem the actual capture too hard to try, but the difficulties of holding the prize while we were already hard pressed in Malta caused misgivings.

Nevertheless, on December 28, 1940, I issued the following minute:

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Commit-teeConstant reflection has made me feel the very high
value of “Workshop,” provided that a thoroughly good
plan can be made and it is given a chance. The effect
of “Workshop,” if successful, would be electrifying, and
would greatly increase our strategic hold upon the
Central Mediterranean. It is also a most important step
to opening the Narrows to the passage of trade and
troop convoys, whereby so great an easement to our
shipping could be obtained. Urgency is supplied by the
danger that the Germans, if they take over Italy, will
take over “Workshop” island and make it a very difficult
proposition both for nuisance value and against assault.

The Chiefs of Staff set to work on the problem at once, and I returned to the charge in the New Year.

Prime

Minister

to

13 Jan. 41

General Ismay, for C.