The Grand Alliance (6 page)

On January 10 the Chiefs of Staff warned the commanders in the Middle East that a German attack on Greece might start before the end of the month. It would come, they thought, through Bulgaria, and the probable line of advance would be down the Struma Valley against Salonika. Three divisions, supported by about two hundred dive-bombers, would be used, and three or four more divisions might be added after March. The Chiefs of Staff added that the decision of His Majesty’s Government to give the greatest possible help to the Greeks meant that once Tobruk was taken all other operations in the Middle East must have second place, and they authorised the dispatch therefrom of mechanised and specialist units and air forces up to the following limits: one squadron of infantry tanks, one regiment of cruiser tanks,
2
ten regiments of artillery, and five squadrons of aircraft.

The Commanders-in-Chief in Cairo thought that the German concentration in Rumania, of which we had warned them, was merely a war of nerves, designed to induce us to disperse our forces in the Middle East and stop our advance in Libya. Wavell trusted that the Chiefs of Staff would “consider most urgently whether enemy’s move is not bluff.”

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On reading this reply, which was far astray from the facts, I issued the following:

Prime

Minister

to

10 Jan. 41

General

Ismay

or

Colonel Hollis, for C.

O.S. Committee

Chiefs of Staff should meet tomorrow, Saturday
morning, to consider the various telegrams from the
Middle East H.Q., and they are authorised to dispatch
the attached telegram which I have drafted to General
Wavell and Air Marshal Longmore, unless they wish to
make any communication to me upon it.

Prime

Minister

to

10 Jan. 41

General Wavell

1. Our information contradicts idea that German
concentration in Rumania is merely a “move in war of
nerves” or a “bluff to cause dispersion of force.” We
have a mass of detail indicating that a large-scale
movement through Bulgaria towards the Greek frontier,
aimed presumably at Salonika, will begin before the
end of the month. Hostile forces to be employed in the
aforesaid in vasion would not be large, but of deadly
quality. One, perhaps two, armoured divisions, with one
motorised division, about 180 dive-bombers, and some
parachute troops, seems to be all that could cross the
Bulgarian-Greek frontier up till the middle of February.

2. But this force, if not stopped, may play exactly the
same part in Greece as the German Army’s break-through at Sedan played in France. All Greek divisions
in Albania will be fatally affected. These are the facts
and implications which arise from our information, in
which we have good reason to believe. But is this not
also the very thing the Germans ought to do to harm us
most? Destruction of Greece will eclipse victories you
have gained in Libya, and may affect decisively Turkish
attitude, especially if we have shown ourselves callous
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of fate of allies. You must now, therefore, conform your
plans to larger interests at stake.

3. Nothing must hamper capture of Tobruk, but
thereafter all operations in Libya are subordinated to
aiding Greece, and all preparations must be made from
the receipt of this telegram for the immediate succour of
Greece up to the limits prescribed. These matters have
been earnestly weighed by Defence Committee of
Cabinet, and General Smuts has independently cabled
almost identical views.

4. We expect and require prompt and active compliance with our decisions, for which we bear full responsibility. Your joint visit to Athens will enable you to contrive the best method of giving effect to the above
decisions. It should not be delayed.

The Chiefs of Staff being in accord, this telegram was dispatched. It will be seen that our intentions at this time did not amount to the offer to Greece of an army, but only to special and technical units.

On these orders General Wavell and Air Chief Marshal Longmore flew to Athens for discussions with Generals Metaxas and Papagos. On January 15 they told us that the Greek Government were unwilling that any of our troops should land in Salonika until they could do so in sufficient numbers to act offensively. On receipt of this telegram the Chiefs of Staff telegraphed on January 17 that there could be no question of forcing our aid upon the Greeks. In consequence we modified our view of the immediate future, decided to push on to Benghazi, and meanwhile to build up the strongest strategic reserve possible in the Delta.

On January 21 the Chiefs of Staff accordingly proposed to Wavell that the capture of Benghazi was now of the highest importance. They considered that if it were made into a strongly fortified naval and air base the overland route might be dropped and both men and transport saved. They The Grand Alliance

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also urged him to seize the Dodecanese, and especially Rhodes, as soon as possible, in order to forestall the arrival of the German Air Force, with its consequent threat to our communications with Greece and Turkey, and to form a strategic reserve of four divisions to be ready to help these two countries.

Prime

Minister

to

26 Jan. 41

General Wavell

The apparition of the German aircraft in the Central
Mediterranean has forced me for the time being to
abandon the hopes I had formed of opening and
picketing the way through the Narrows, thus enabling
troop convoys to pass regularly. Unless this situation
can be rectified during the early months of this year, the
lack of shipping and the distance round the Cape will
undoubtedly affect the scale to which I had hoped to
raise the Army of the Nile and the strength of your
command. It pained me very much to find that the
convoys sent at so much cost and risk round the Cape
should so largely consist of rearward services and
make so small an addition to our organised fighting
units. I shall try my utmost to support you in every way,
and I must ask in return that you convince me that
every man in the Middle East is turned to the highest
possible use and that the largest number of organised
divisional or perhaps preferably brigade units are
formed. The soldiers in the rearward services and
establishments should play an effective part in internal
security….

The information reaching me from every quarter
leaves me in no doubt that the Germans are now
already establishing themselves upon the Bulgarian
aerodromes and making every preparation for action
against Greece. This infiltration may, indeed almost
certainly will, attain decisive proportions before any
clear-cut issue of invasion has been presented to the
Turks, who will then be told to keep out or have Constantinople bombed. We must expect a series of very
heavy, disastrous blows in the Balkans, and possibly a
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general submission there to German aims. The
stronger the strategic reserve which you can build up in
the Delta and the more advanced your preparations to
transfer it to European shores, the better will be the
chances of securing a favourable crystallisation.

I now replied to General Smuts:

Prime

Minister

to

12 Jan. 41

General Smuts

Your message of the 8th arrived when we had
reached certain definite conclusions after three or four
days’ thought. I read it my self to Defence Committee,
three Chiefs of Staff, three Service Ministers, Attlee,
and Eden. All struck by complete coincidence of view.

Only point of difference is we think northward advance
from Kenya with large forces would involve long delay
through transport shortage. Rebellion making good
headway; Emperor enters soon. Advance Kassala-Agordat cuts tap-root. Force you mention already on
the way. Pressure from Kenya to be maintained at
utmost, but we cannot carry too many troops on this
line. Please send division at earliest. Perhaps by time it
approaches can land it in Red Sea. Better keep as fluid
as possible in view of imponderabilia. Come though,
please, now.

Fully agreed to pay no heavy price beyond Tobruk,
where very likely 25,000 Italians in net, and to go on
while the going is good so as to make as far-thrown a
western flank for Egypt as possible, meanwhile shifting
all useful elements to impending war front, Bulgarian-Greek frontier. Naturally Wavell and Company heart-set
on chase, but Wavell is going Monday or Tuesday to
Athens to concert reinforcements with Greeks. Cannot
guarantee success; can only make what we think best
arrangements. Weather, mountains, Danube crossing,
fortified Greek-Bulgarian frontier, all helpful factors.

Turkey, Yugoslavia, Russia, all perhaps favourably
influenced by evidences of British support of Greece.

Whatever happens in Balkans Italian army in
Abyssinia probably destroyable. If this should come off,
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everything useful from Kenya should go forward to
Mediterranean. Hope Army of South African Union will
be there for summer fighting. Very large reinforcements
coming continually round Cape. Most grateful for all
your help, and above all for your surefooted judgment,
which marches with our laboriously reached conclusions.

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2

The Widening War

More Intimate Contacts with President Roosevelt

— Arrival of Harry Hopkins in London — A Precious Link with the President — Our Journey to
Scapa — Mr. Wendell Willkie — “Sail On, O Ship
of State!” — Politics and Strategy — Our Grim
Alternatives — German Designs upon Rumania
and Bulgaria — Soviet Concern — Ribbentrop’s
Explanations — My Telegram of January
31
to
President Inönü — Our Offer of Military Help to
Turkey — Turkish Lack of Modern Equipment —

Vital Need to Form a Balkan Front.

W
ITH THE NEW YEAR more intimate contacts developed with President Roosevelt. I had already sent him the compliments of the season.

Former Naval Person

1 Jan. 41

to President Roosevelt

At this moment, when the New Year opens in storm,
I feel it my duty on behalf of the British Government,
and indeed of the whole British Empire, to tell you, Mr.

President, how lively is our sense of gratitude and
admiration for the memorable declaration which you
made to the American people and to the lovers of
freedom in all the continents on Sunday last.

We cannot tell what lies before us, but with this
trumpet-call we march forward heartened and fortified,
and with the confidence which you have expressed that
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in the end all will be well for the English-speaking
peoples and those who share their ideals.

On January 10 a gentleman arrived to see me at Downing Street with the highest credentials. Telegrams had been received from Washington stating that he was the closest confidant and personal agent of the President. I therefore arranged that he should be met by Mr. Brendan Bracken on his arrival at Poole Airport, and that we should lunch together alone the next day. Thus I met Harry Hopkins, that extraordinary man, who played, and was to play, a sometimes decisive part in the whole movement of the war.