The Grand Alliance (36 page)

When you know the situation, ought you not to go to
Belgrade? Meanwhile we are doing all possible and
carrying on.

I telegraphed to the President of Turkey:
27 March 41

Your Excellency: The dramatic events which are
occurring in Belgrade and throughout Yugoslavia may
offer the best chance of preventing the German
invasion of the Balkan Peninsula. Surely now is the
time to make a common front which Germany will
hardly dare assail. I have cabled to President Roosevelt
to ask him for American supplies to be extended to all
Powers resisting German aggression in the East. I am
asking Mr. Eden and General Dill to concert all possible
measures of common safety.

During the day I drafted the following message to Mr. Eden, who had already reached Athens.

28 March 41

Let us visualise clearly what we want in the Balkans
and from Turkey, and work towards it as events serve.

2. Together Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and
ourselves have seventy divisions mobilised in this
theatre. Germans have not yet got more than thirty.

Therefore, the seventy could say to the thirty, “If you
attack any of us you will be at war with all.” The Germans would either attack in mountainous regions and
with poor communications at heavy odds, or alternatively they would have to bring large reinforcements from
Germany. But even this does not cure their difficulties,
because, first, it will take some months to bring the
reinforcements to the theatre, and, secondly, the
theatre itself, and indeed the communications leading
to it, are not strong enough to carry much larger forces
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without a prolonged process of improving the communications. Therefore, it is very likely that a triple note by
the three Balkan Powers would lead to the maintenance of peace, or to a lengthy delay in the German
advance. Perhaps the advance could not be made for
many months, and then they miss the season. Meanwhile British reinforcements and British and American
supplies will vastly increase resisting power of the Allied
armies. There is, therefore, a good prospect if the three
Allies could be brought into line that no invasion southwards would be tried by the enemy. Here is what the
Turks want.

3. This is Turkey’s best chance of avoiding war. For
look at the alternative. If all three remain disunited the
Germans may feel that it will be better to leave Greece
and Yugoslavia alone and turn their whole striking force
rapidly against Turkey in Thrace. There have been
suggestions of this in various telegrams. Thus, by doing
nothing Turkey runs the greatest danger of having
everything concentrated upon her. One can hardly
doubt that the mass of Turkish troops gathered in
Thrace would soon be driven back in confusion upon
the Chatalja [lines] and the Bosporus, without any
obligation or opportunity on the part of Yugoslavia or
Greece to take the pressure off by counter-attack, or by
lengthening the fighting front.

4. The proper order for anyone to give who had the
power would be (a) the diplomatic declaration of unity
and demand to be let alone as set forth above, and (b)
a simultaneous withdrawal of the bulk of the Turkish
Army to Chatalja and the Asiatic shore, leaving only
strong covering troops and rear guards in Thrace. Such
a policy of firm, united declaration, coupled with sound
strategic withdrawal, would prevent the Germans from
gaining a decisive victory in Thrace, would not require
any offensive from Turkey, and would, unless the
Germans shied off, expose them to a stalemate front
from, say, the lines of Chatalja through the Rupel-Nestor sector right up along the northern Serbian front.

Even this could not develop for a long time. But what a
dangerous and uninviting prospect for an enemy for
whom quick successes are especially important! Surely
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this is the true Turkish interest, if it can be brought
about, and we ought to try to make them see it,
however unresponsive they may be. The Turks’

greatest danger is to be taken on alone jammed up in
Thrace.

5. How does this above square with British
interests? If Germany, not withstanding the objections,
attacks in the Balkans, we must play our part there with
our full available strength. If, on the other hand, she
pretends that she never wished to bring war into the
Balkans, and leaves Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey
alone, then we might turn our forces to a strong
summer and autumn campaign in the Central Mediterranean, including Tripoli, Sicily, and the Italian toe. We
should have a good pad in our right hand to protect our
Middle Eastern interests, and take smart action on a
medium scale with our left in the Central Mediterranean.

6. Is it not possible that if a united front were formed
in the Balkan Peninsula Germany might think it better
business to take it out of Russia, observing that we
have had many reports of heavy concentrations in
Poland and intrigues in Sweden and Finland?

7. Pray consider these opinions for what they are
worth.

I also cabled to Mr. Fadden, the Acting Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

30 March 41

When a month ago we decided upon sending an
army to Greece it looked rather a blank military adventure dictated by noblesse oblige. Thursday’s events in
Belgrade show the far-reaching effects of this and other
measures we have taken on whole Balkan situation.

German plans have been upset, and we may cherish
renewed hopes of forming a Balkan front with Turkey,
comprising about seventy Allied divisions from the four
Powers concerned. This is, of course, by no means
certain yet. But even now it puts “Lustre” [the expedition
to Greece] in its true setting, not as an isolated military
act, but as a prime move in a large design. Whatever

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the outcome may be, everything that has happened
since our decision was taken justifies it. Delay will also
enable full concentration to be made on the Greek front
instead of piecemeal engagements of our forces.

Result unknowable, but prize has increased and risks
have somewhat lessened. Am in closest touch with
Menzies. Wish I could talk it over with you.

It was settled that Eden should remain in Athens to deal with Turkey and that General Dill should proceed to Belgrade. Anyone could see that the position of Yugoslavia was forlorn unless a common front was immediately presented by all the Powers concerned. There was, however, open to Yugoslavia the chance already mentioned of striking a deadly blow at the naked rear of the disorganised Italian armies in Albania. If they acted promptly they might bring about a major military event, and while their own country was being ravaged from the north might possess themselves of the masses of munitions and equipment which would give them the power of conducting the guerrilla in their mountains which was now their only hope. It would have been a grand stroke, and would have reacted upon the whole Balkan scene. In our circle in London we all saw this together. The diagram below shows the movement which was deemed feasible.

General Dill was now in Belgrade, and I sent him this message:

1 April 41

A variety of details shows rapid regrouping against
Yugoslavia. To gain time against Germans is to lose it
against Italians. Nothing should stop Yugo developing
full strength against latter at earliest. By this alone can

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they gain far-reaching initial success and masses of
equipment in good time.

The mistakes of years cannot be remedied in hours. When the general excitement had subsided, everyone in Belgrade realised that disaster and death approached them and that there was little they could do to avert their fate. The High Command thought themselves forced to garrison Slovenia and Croatia, to maintain a fictitious internal cohesion. They could now at last mobilise their armies. But there was no strategic plan. Dill found only confusion and paralysis in Belgrade. “In spite of my best endeavours,” he reported to Mr. Eden on April 1, “I was unable to persuade President of the Council to agree to visit by you in the immediate future.

He made it plain that the Yugoslav Government, mainly for fear of the effect on the internal situation, were determined The Grand Alliance

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to take no step which might be considered provocative to Germany.” At this moment all the might of Germany within reach was descending like an avalanche upon them.

On April 4 General Dill sent a full account of his mission to Belgrade, which shows how utterly remote from their immediate peril were the minds of the Yugoslav Ministers.

One would have thought from their mood and outlook that they had months in which to take their decision about peace or war with Germany. Actually they had only seventy-two hours before the onslaught fell upon them. Dill wrote: Final result of Belgrade visit was disappointing in many ways, but it was impossible to get [General]

Simovic to sign any sort of agreement. Nevertheless, I was impressed with offensive spirit of Yugoslav leaders, who will fight if Yugoslavia is attacked or if Germany attacks Salonika. Staff discussions today should have useful results in exchange of views, and, I hope, in agreement on best plans to meet various eventualities. None of these plans will be binding on either side, but there is reasonable prospect that when time comes Yugoslavs will be prepared to carry them out.Fact is that Simovic, though a leader and able, is in no sense dictator. He had difficult task in keeping Cabinet together, and dare not propose to them any form of agreement with us. Nor can he effect such agreement without knowledge and consent of Cabinet.

But he and War Minister Ilic, who is tougher but less intelligent, seem determined to fight….

Yugoslavs’ forces are not yet ready for war, and Simovic wants to gain time to complete mobilisation and concentration. For internal political reasons he cannot take first step in hostilities, but must await German move. He expects Germany to attack Southern Yugoslavia from Bulgaria and leave Greece alone at the moment…. Yugoslavs will aid in Albania, but will not attack even there until Germany attacks them or their vital interests.