The Grand Alliance (32 page)

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and every convoy needed ship-borne airplanes to detect any U-boat within striking distance in daylight, and by forcing it to dive prevent it making contact, or making a report which would “draw others to the scene. Even so, the value of the air arm at this stage was still chiefly for reconnaissance. Aircraft could observe U-boats and force them down, but the power to kill was not yet developed, and at night their value was greatly limited. The lethal power of the air in U-boat warfare was yet to come.

Against the Focke-Wulf assailant, however, the air weapon could be quickly turned to good account. By the use of fighter aircraft discharged from catapults mounted in ordinary merchant ships, as well as in converted ships manned by the Royal Navy, we soon met this thrust. The fighter pilot, having been tossed like a falcon against his prey, had at first to rely for his life on being retrieved from the sea by one of the escorts.

The Focke-Wulf, being challenged itself in the air, was no longer able to give the same assistance to the U-boats, and gradually became the hunted rather than the hunter.

Our losses from enemy action during the fateful months show the stresses of this life-and-death struggle: The April figures, of course, include the exceptional losses in the fighting around Greece.

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I watched the process with constant attention.

Prime

Minister

to

14 April 41

Minister

of

Information

The publication of the weekly sinkings is to be
discontinued henceforward – that is, no more, no
publication next Tuesday. When the press ask why
have the week’s figures not come out, the answer will
be they are to be published monthly instead of weekly.

When the comment is made that we are afraid to
publish weekly because, as you say, we “desire to
cover up the size of our most recent shipping losses,”

the answer should be, “Well, that is what we are going
to do anyway.” Friends and enemies will no doubt put
on their own interpretation. But only the facts will
decide. We shall have a lot of worse things than that to
put up with in the near future.

I will answer any questions on the subject myself in
the House.

Prime Minister to Sir

28 April 41

Edward

Bridges,

General Ismay, and

other

members

of

Atlantic

Committee

concerned

It is not intended to use the catapult ships as ordinary freighters; nor can a number like two hundred,
which has been mentioned, be at any time contemplated.2. There are at present five catapult patrol vessels
working like the Pegasus. These should be joined at
the earliest moment by the first ten catapult-fitted
merchant ships, and from these fifteen vessels there
must be found a regular patrol covering or accompanying the convoys in the Focke-Wulf zone.

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3. As some of these vessels are probably heavier,
faster, and more valuable merchant vessels than are
required for this patrolling service, they are to be
replaced at earliest by other smaller vessels which the
Ministry of Shipping can better spare. The large ones
already fitted, having been relieved, may ply on the
Freetown-Britain route, as they will have the opportunity
of going through two danger zones in each voyage, and
the catapult Hurricanes will thus have adequate opportunities of fighting.

4. If the fifteen ships devoted to the northwestern
approaches patrol are proved to be a success and it is
thought necessary to increase their numbers, a
proposal should be put forward. At the same time the
Beaufighter aircraft now employed on patrol duties
should be returned to Fighter Command, where they
are most urgently needed for night fighting.

We developed and expanded our bases in Canada and Iceland with all possible speed, and planned our convoys accordingly. We increased the fuel capacity of our older destroyers and their consequent radius. The newly formed Combined Headquarters at Liverpool threw itself heart and soul into the struggle. As more escorts came into service and the personnel gained experience, Admiral Noble formed them into permanent groups under group commanders. Thus the essential team spirit was fostered and men became accustomed to working in unison with a clear understanding of their commander’s methods. These escort groups became ever more efficient, and as their power grew that of the U-boats declined.

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Meanwhile in June President Roosevelt made an important move. He decided to establish a base in Iceland. It was agreed that United States forces should relieve the British garrison. They reached Iceland on July 7, and this island was included in the defence system of the Western Hemisphere. Thereafter American convoys escorted by American warships ran regularly to Reykjavik, and although the United States were still not at war they admitted foreign ships to the protection of their convoys.

Throughout these critical months the two German battle-cruisers remained poised in Brest. At any moment it seemed that they might again break out, to cause further havoc in the Atlantic. It was due to the Royal Air Force that they continued inactive. Repeated air attacks were made on them in port, with such good effect that they remained idle through the year. The enemy’s concern soon became to get them home; but even this they were unable to do until 1942. Hitler’s plan for the invasion of Russia soon brought us much-needed respite in the air. For this new enterprise the German Air Force had to be re-deployed in strength, and thus from May onward the scale of air attack against our shipping fell.

It is worth while at this point to anticipate some of the results which were gained in the Battle of the Atlantic by the intensive study which we made of all the knowable factors at work. It was a great advantage that the whole process of our many decisions could be passed continuously through a single-mind, and that, as Prime Minister, I received in so full a measure from my colleagues the authority necessary to give a unified direction throughout this vast administrative sphere. The war machine over which I presided as Minister The Grand Alliance

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of Defences was capable of enforcing all decisions with precision.

At the end of June I reported, on the authority of the Admiralty, to the House of Commons a decisive decline in British losses by aircraft attack in the North Atlantic: February

86,000 tons

March

69,000

April

59,000

May

21,000

June (to date)

18,000
1

In my directive of March 6 I had aimed at reducing the 1,700,000 tons of shipping immobilised by the need for repairs by 400,000 tons by July 1. Later on we became more ambitious and set ourselves as a target a reduction of 750,000 tons by the same date. Actually we achieved a reduction of 700,000 tons. This was accomplished in the teeth of the air attacks made on the Mersey and the Clyde at the beginning of May. The welcome addition of a large number of ships, hitherto given up as hopeless, which were rescued by our splendid Salvage Service and added to the repair list, was another gain. A substantial saving in the turn-round of ships was also effected by various processes, and every day’s saving in the turn-round was worth a quarter of a million tons in effective imports during a year.

There were many complications in all this. We could not always arrange to discharge a ship at the most convenient port. One carrying a mixed cargo might have to visit several ports during the process of discharge, with added risk of destruction by air or mine during coastal passages; and all the time the ports themselves, particularly those on the East Coast, were subject to attack which might temporarily paralyse them. London, by far our main port, was largely

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immobilised owing to the risk of sending large vessels round to the East Coast in the face of attacks by air, by Eboats, and by mines. Thus the East Coast ports could not take their full share of the load, and the greater burden fell upon the ports in the west – Liverpool, the Clyde, and the Bristol Channel. None the less, by intense efforts London, the Humber, and the more northerly ports on the East Coast remained open to coastal and a certain amount of ocean-going traffic throughout these harassing times.

At the height of this struggle I made one of the most important and fortunate appointments of my war administration. In 1930, when I was out of office, I accepted for the first and only time in my life a directorship. It was in one of the subsidiary companies of Lord Inchcape’s far-spreading organisation of the Peninsular and Oriental shipping lines. For eight years I regularly attended the monthly board meetings and discharged my duties with care. At these meetings I gradually became aware of a very remarkable man. He presided over thirty or forty companies, of which the one with which I was connected was a small unit. I soon perceived that Frederick Leathers was the central brain and controlling power of this combination. He knew everything and commanded absolute confidence. Year after year I watched him from my small position at close quarters. I said to myself, “If ever there is another war, here is a man who will play the same kind of part as the great business leaders who served under me at the Ministry of Munitions in 1917 and 1918.”