The Grand Alliance (40 page)

To neither of the important questions whether Germany still intended, as before, to effect a landing in Britain and how German-Soviet relations were now viewed did Matsuoka obtain a clear answer. To his question as to whether, on his return journey through Moscow, he should touch on political questions lightly or go into them more deeply, Ribbentrop answered through his interpreter: “You had better treat your visit as a mere formality.”
3

Without, of course, knowing the substance or character of these secret Berlin parleys, but deeply impressed with their importance, I thought I would use the Japanese Ambassador, whom Matsuoka had summoned to meet him on the Continent, to convey to his chief a few counter-considerations. Mr. Shigemitsu, who, if he was hostile to Britain and the United States and working for war against us, must have been a very good deceiver, accepted with a courtly gesture the task of delivering my message. In the The Grand Alliance

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end he did not travel, and the letter was telegraphed to our Ambassador in Moscow, to be given to Mr. Matsuoka on his return journey by the Siberian Railway.

Mr. Churchill to M.

2 April 41

Yosuke Matsuoka

I venture to suggest a few questions which it seems
to me deserve the attention of the Imperial Japanese
Government and people.

Will Germany, without the command of the sea or
the command of the British daylight air, be able to
invade and conquer Great Britain in the spring,
summer, or autumn of 1941? Will Germany try to do
so? Would it not be in the interests of Japan to wait
until these questions have answered themselves?

2. Will the German attack on British shipping be
strong enough to prevent American aid from reaching
British shores, with Great Britain and the United States
transforming their whole industry to war purposes?

3. Did Japan’s accession to the Triple Pact make it
more likely or less likely that the United States would
come into the present war?

4. If the United States entered the war at the side of
Great Britain, and Japan ranged herself with the Axis
Powers, would not the naval superiority of the two
English-speaking nations enable them to dispose of the
Axis Powers in Europe before turning their united
strength upon Japan?

5. Is Italy a strength or a burden to Germany? Is the
Italian Fleet as good at sea as on paper? Is it as good
on paper as it used to be?

6. Will the British Air Force be stronger than the
German Air Force before the end of 1941, and far
stronger before the end of 1942?

7. Will the many countries which are being held
down by the German Army and Gestapo learn to like
the Germans more or will they like them less as the
years pass by?

8. Is it true that the production of steel in the United
States during 1941 will be 75,000,000 tons, and in
Great Britain about 12,500,000, making a total of nearly

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90,000,000 tons? If Germany should happen to be
defeated, as she was last time, would not the
7,000,000 tons steel production of Japan be inadequate for a single-handed war?

From the answers to these questions may spring the
avoidance by Japan of a serious catastrophe, and a
marked improvement in the relations between Japan
and the two great sea Powers of the West.

I was rather pleased with this when I wrote it, and I don’t mind the look of it now.

Matsuoka meanwhile went to Rome, where he saw Mussolini and the Pope. We now have the German account of what he said to Hitler on April 4, when he returned to Berlin. The Duce, he said, had informed him about the war in Greece, Yugoslavia, and North Africa, and of the part which Italy herself had in these events. Finally he had spoken of Soviet Russia and America. The Duce had said that one must have a clear notion of the importance of one’s opponents. The enemy Number 1 was America and Soviet Russia came only in the second place. By these remarks the Duce had given him to understand that America as enemy Number 1 would have to be very carefully watched, but should not be provoked. On the other hand one must be thoroughly prepared for all eventualities.

Matsuoka had agreed with this line of thought.

Before his homeward journey by the Trans-Siberian Railway Matsuoka tarried for a week in Moscow. He had several long conversations both with Stalin and Molotov.

The only account we have of these is from the German The Grand Alliance

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Ambassador Schulenburg, who of course was only told what the Russians and Japanese wished him to know. It seemed that all the declarations, true or boastful, of German might had by no means convinced the Japanese envoy. The guarded attitude of the German leaders towards a collision with the United States had made a dint in Matsuoka’s mind. At the same time he was aware, from Ribbentrop’s language, of the menacing, widening gulf between Germany and Russia. How much he told his new hosts about this we cannot tell. But certainly, surveying the scene with peculiar advantages, and after receiving from Sir Stafford Cripps the telegraphed version of my letter with its questions, it would appear that Matsuoka found himself closer to Molotov than to Ribbentrop. In this doom-balance of mighty nations Japan was asked by Germany to take the irrevocable step of declaring war on Britain, and potentially on the English-speaking world. By Russia she was only asked to mark time, to wait and see. Evidently he did not believe that Britain was finished. He could not be sure what would happen between Germany and Russia. He was not inclined, or perhaps he had not the power, to commit his country to decisive action. He greatly preferred a neutrality pact, which at least gave time for unpredictable events to unfold, as they must do soon.

Accordingly, when Matsuoka visited Schulenburg in Moscow on April 13 to make his farewell call, he mentioned with incongruous preciseness that a Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact had been arranged at the last moment, and

“in all likelihood would be signed this afternoon at 2 P.M.

local time.” Both sides had made concessions about the disputed island of Sakhalin. This new agreement, he assured the German Ambassador, in no way affected the Three-Power Pact. He added that the American and English journalists who had reported that his journey to

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Moscow had been a complete failure would be compelled now to acknowledge that the Japanese policy had achieved a great success, which could not fail to have its effect on England and America.

Schulenburg has recorded the demonstration of unity and comradeship arranged by Stalin at the railway station on Matsuoka’s departure for Japan. The train was delayed for an hour for salutes and ceremonies, apparently unexpected by both the Japanese and Germans. Stalin and Molotov appeared, and greeted Matsuoka and the Japanese in a remarkably friendly manner and wished them a pleasant journey. Then Stalin publicly asked for the German Ambassador. “And when he found me,” said Schulenburg,

“he came up and threw his arm around my shoulder. ‘We must remain friends. You must now do everything to that end.’” Later Stalin turned to the German Military Attaché, first having made sure that he had got the right man, and said to him, “We will remain friends with you in any event.”

“Stalin,” adds Schulenburg, “doubtless brought about this greeting of Colonel Krebs and myself intentionally, and thereby he consciously attracted the attention of the numerous persons who were present.”

These embraces were a vain pretence. Stalin should surely have known from his own reports the enormous deployment of German strength which now began to be visible to British Intelligence all along the Russian frontier. It was only ten weeks before Hitler’s terrific onslaught on Russia began. It would have been only five weeks but for the delay caused by the fighting in Greece and Yugoslavia.

Matsuoka returned to Tokyo from his European visit at the end of April. He was met at the airport by the Prime

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Minister, Prince Konoye, who informed him that on that very day the Japanese had been considering the possibilities of an understanding in the Pacific with the United States. This was contrary to Matsuoka’s theme. Though beset by doubts, he was still on the whole a believer in ultimate German victory. Backed by the prestige of the Tripartite Pact and the neutrality treaty with Russia, he saw no special need to conciliate the Americans, who, in his opinion, would never face simultaneous war in the Atlantic against Germany and in the Pacific against Japan. The Foreign Minister, therefore, found himself confronted with a mood in Government circles widely different from his own.

In spite of his vehement protests the Japanese resolved to continue the negotiations at Washington, and also to conceal them from the Germans. On May 4 Matsuoka took it upon himself to acquaint the German Ambassador with the text of an American Note to Japan offering to reach a general Pacific settlement, beginning with American mediation between Japan and China. The main obstacle to this proposal was the American requirement that Japan should first evacuate China.

While in Moscow Mr. Matsuoka had received my message, and on his return journey in the train across Siberia he wrote a barren reply, which was dispatched on his arrival in Tokyo.

Mr. Matsuoka to

22 April 1941

Mr.

Winston

Churchill

Your Excellency,

I have just come back from my trip, and hasten to
acknowledge the receipt of a paper handed to me at
Moscow on the evening of the twelfth instant by Sir