The Grand Alliance (38 page)

You will therefore see, Mr. President, the awful
enfeeblement of our war effort that would result merely
from the sending out by Japan of her battle-cruisers
and her twelve eight-inch-gun cruisers into the Eastern
oceans, and still more from any serious invasion threat
against the two Australian democracies in the Southern
Pacific.

Some believe that Japan in her present mood would
not hesitate to court or attempt to wage war both
against Great Britain and the United States. Personally
I think the odds are definitely against that, but no one
can tell. Everything that you can do to inspire the
Japanese with the fear of a double war may avert the
danger. If, however, they come in against us and we
are alone, the grave character of the consequences
cannot easily be overstated.

The agitation among the Japanese in London subsided as quickly as it had begun. Silence and Oriental decorum reigned once more.

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Former

Naval

20 Feb. 41

Person to President

Roosevelt

I have better news about Japan. Apparently Matsuoka is visiting Berlin, Rome, and Moscow in the near
future. This may well be a diplomatic sop to cover
absence of action against Great Britain. If Japanese
attack which seemed imminent is now postponed, this
is largely due to fear of United States. The more these
fears can be played upon the better, but I understand
thoroughly your difficulties pending passage of [Lend-Lease] Bill on which our hopes depend. Appreciation
given in my last “Personal and Secret” of naval consequences following Japanese aggression against Great
Britain holds good in all circumstances.

On February 24 Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Ambassador, came to see me. A record was kept of the meeting.

I dwelt upon the long and friendly relations of the
two countries, my own feelings ever since the
Japanese Alliance of 1902, and the great desire that
we all felt here not to sunder the relations between the
two countries. Japan could not expect us to view with
approval what was going on in China, but we had
maintained a correct attitude of neutrality, and indeed a
very different kind of neutrality to that which we had
shown when we had helped them in their war against
Russia. We had not the slightest intention of attacking
Japan, and had no wish to see her other than prosperous and peaceful, and I said what a pity it would be if at
this stage, when she already had China on her hands,
she got into a war with Great Britain and the United
States.

The Ambassador said that Japan had no intention of
attacking us or the United States, and had no desire to
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become involved in a war with either Power. They
would not attempt to attack Singapore or Australia, and
he repeated several times that they would not attempt
to gain a footing or make encroachments in the Dutch
East Indies. The only complaint which Japan had, he
said, was our attitude to China, which was encouraging
China and adding to their difficulties…. I felt bound to
remind him of the Triple Pact which they had made with
the Axis Powers, and that this naturally was ever in our
minds. One could not believe that a pact so much in
favour of Germany and so little in favour of Japan had
not got some secret provisions, and at any rate Japan
had left us in doubt as to what interpretation she would
put upon it in certain eventualities. The Ambassador
said they had made explanations at the time, and that
their object was to limit the conflict, etc. I told him the
Axis Pact had been a very great mistake for Japan.

Nothing had done them more harm in their relations
with the United States, and nothing had brought Great
Britain and the United States closer together.

I then renewed my friendly assurances. His whole
attitude throughout was most friendly and deprecatory,
and we have no doubt where he stands in these
matters.

On March 4, after he could certainly have reported to Tokyo, I recorded in a minute a second visit from Mr.

Shigemitsu.

The Japanese Ambassador called upon me today
and spoke in agreeable terms of the great desire in
Japan not to be involved in war and not to have a
rupture with Great Britain. He described the Tripartite
Pact as a pact of peace, and said it arose only out of
the desire of Japan to limit the conflict. I asked him
specifically whether the pact left Japan the full right of
interpreting any given situation, and I put it to him that
nothing in the pact obliged her to go to war. He did not
dissent from this; in fact, he tacitly assented. I received
all his assurances with cordiality, and asked him to
convey my thanks to the Foreign Minister of Japan. I do
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not think Japan is likely to attack us unless and until
she is sure we are going to be defeated. I doubt very
much whether she would come into the war on the side
of the Axis Powers if the United States joined us. She
would certainly be very foolish to do so. It would be
more sensible for her to come in if the United States did
not join us.

This was for very different reasons also the German view.

Germany and Japan were both eager to despoil and divide the British Empire. But they approached the target from different angles. The German High Command argued that the Japanese ought to commit their armed forces in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies without worrying about the American Pacific bases, and the main fleet which lay on their flank. Throughout February and March they urged the Japanese Government to strike without delay at Malaya and Singapore and not to bother about the United States.

Hitler had already enough on his shoulders without drawing them in. Indeed, we have seen how many American actions he put up with, any one of which would have provided ample grounds for war. Hitler and Ribbentrop were above all things anxious that Japan should attack what they called

“England” – the name still lingers – and not on any account embroil themselves with the United States. They assured Tokyo that if Japan acted with vigour against Malaya and the Dutch East Indies the Americans would not dare to move. The Japanese naval and military leaders were by no means convinced by this reasoning, or that it was disinterested. In their view an operation in Southeast Asia was out of the question unless either a prior assault was made on the American bases or a diplomatic settlement reached with the United States.

Behind the complex political scene in Japan three decisions seem to emerge at this time. The first was to send the

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Foreign Secretary, Matsuoka, to Europe to find out for himself about the German mastery of Europe, and especially when the invasion of Britain was really going to begin. Were the British forces so far tied up in naval defence that Britain could not afford to reinforce her Eastern possessions if Japan attacked them? Although he had been educated in the United States, Matsuoka was bitterly anti-American. He was deeply impressed by the Nazi movement and the might of embattled Germany. He was under the Hitler spell. Perhaps even there were moments when he saw himself playing a similar part in Japan. Secondly, the Japanese Government decided that their navy and army command should have a free hand
to plan
operations against the American base at Pearl Harbour and against the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and Malaya. Thirdly, a “liberal” statesman, Admiral Nomura, was to be sent to Washington to explore the chances of a general settlement with the United States in the Pacific. This not only served as a camouflage, but might lead to a peaceful solution. Thus agreement between conflicting opinions was reached in the Japanese Cabinet.

Matsuoka set out on his mission on March 12. On the twenty-fifth, passing through Moscow, he had a two hours’

interview with Stalin and Molotov, and he assured the German Ambassador, Schulenburg, that he would repeat to Ribbentrop personally all details of the conversation.

The captured documents published by the American State Department throw a searching light on Matsuoka’s mission and upon the whole German mood and mind. On March 27

the Japanese envoy was cordially welcomed in Berlin as a The Grand Alliance

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kindred spirit by Ribbentrop. The Reich Foreign Minister dilated upon the might of his country.

Germany [he said] was in the final phase of her battle against England. During the past winter the Fuehrer had made all necessary preparations so that Germany stood completely ready today to meet England anywhere. The Fuehrer had at his disposal perhaps the strongest military power that had ever existed. Germany had 240 combat divisions, of which 186 were first-class assault divisions and 24 were Panzer divisions. The Luftwaffe had grown greatly and had introduced new models, so that it was not only a match for England and America in this field, but definitely superior to them.

The German Navy at the outbreak of the war had had only a relatively small number of battleships.

Nevertheless, the battleships under construction had been completed, so that the last of them would shortly be put into service. In contrast to the First World War, the German Navy this time did not stay in port, but from the first day of the war had been employed against the foe. Matsuoka had probably gathered from the reports of the past few weeks that large German battle units had interrupted the supply lines between England and America with extraordinary success.
2

The number of submarines heretofore employed was very small. There had been at most eight or nine boats in service against the enemy at any one time.

Nevertheless, even these few U-boats, in conjunction with the Luftwaffe, had sunk 750,000 tons per month in January and February, and Germany could furnish accurate proof of this at any time. This number, moreover, did not include the great additional losses that England had sustained through floating and magnetic mines. At the beginning of April the number of submarines would increase eight- to tenfold, so that sixty to eighty U-boats could then be continually employed against the enemy. The Fuehrer had pursued the tactics of at first employing only a few U-boats, and using the rest to train the personnel necessary for a The Grand Alliance

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larger fleet, in order then to proceed to a knock-out blow against the enemy. Therefore, the tonnage sunk by the German U-boats could be expected in the future greatly to exceed what had already been accomplished.

In these circumstances the U-boat alone could be designated as absolutely deadly.

On the continent of Europe Germany had practically no foe of any consequence other than the small British forces that remained in Greece. Germany would fight off any attempt of England to land on the Continent or entrench herself there. She would not, therefore, tolerate England’s staying in Greece. The Greek question was of secondary importance, but by the thrust towards Greece, which would probably be necessary, dominant positions in the Eastern Mediterranean would be won for further operations.