The Grand Alliance (111 page)

2. No one must suppose therefore that things will be
better for us next year or in the spring. On the contrary,
for “Whipcord” [Sicily] it is probably a case of “Now or
never.” In my view, by the end of December these
prospects will be indefinitely closed.

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3. Hitler’s weakness is in the air. The British Air
Force is already stronger than his, and, with American
aid, increasing more rapidly. The Russian Air Force is
perhaps two-thirds of the German, well organised in
depth and quite good. Even when the Italian Air Force
is counted for what it is worth, Hitler has not enough Air
for the simultaneous support of the operations open to
his armies. However, the main part of the British Air
Force has to be kept at home against invasion, and is
largely out of action.

4. It is therefore of importance to us to seek situations which enable us to engage the enemy’s air force
under favourable conditions in various theatres at the
same time. Such an opportunity is presented in a high
degree by “Whipcord.”

5. If we can before January secure the combination
of airfields – Tripoli, Malta, Sicily, and Sardinia – and
can establish ourselves upon them, a heavy and
possibly decisive attack can be made upon Italy, the
weaker partner in the Axis, by bombers from home
based on the above system of airfields. The lack of
aerodromes in Italy north of Sicily should make this
possible. All air fighting in this new theatre is a direct
subtraction from the enemy’s normal air effort against
Great Britain, against the Nile Valley, and in support of
his southeastward advance.

6. Other advantages would be gained from British
air predominance in the Central Mediterranean. Subject
to what is said in paragraph 9, the sea route from the
Mediterranean would be opened to strongly escorted
convoys, with all the savings in shipping accruing
therefrom, as well as the stronger support of Eastern
operations.

7. The reaction upon France and French North
Africa following such achievements, including the arrival
of British forces on the Tunisian border, might bring
Weygand into action, with all the benefits that would
come from that.

8. The foundation of the above is of course a victorious “Crusader.” You ought to welcome the very powerful diversion of enemy strengths, particularly air
strengths, which “Whipcord” would bring, provided it
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runs concurrently with “Acrobat” [the British conquest of
Tripolitania]. Nothing gives us greater safety or baffles
the enemy more than the sudden simultaneous up-springing of a great variety of targets. This applies
particularly in the few weeks which remain while the
enemy is disentangling his surplus air forces from the
Russian theatre and re-equipping them for action
elsewhere. As I am sure you realise, a slow advance in
Libya by gradual stages after full preparation, making
everything sure as you go, while nothing else happens
anywhere, ensures the maximum of opposition, and
certainly gives the time for it to be brought to bear.

Such a course would certainly give ample time for the
strong German reinforcement of Sicily and for further
domination of Italy by German troops. I hope you feel,
as I do, the fleeting character of the opportunity presented and how short is the breathing-space which now
remains before Germany, having tidied up her front
against Russia, can redispose her forces in other
theatres. It is, as you truly say, “a question of timing.”

9. What will be the enemy’s reaction to our attempt
to gain a zone of air predominance in the Central
Mediterranean and thus to open the passage? To bring
superior air power to bear will take him time, in view of
the disposition of the airfields which will remain to him
in Italy. Therefore he will need to put pressure on Spain
to procure the closing of the Straits of Gibraltar. We are
led to believe that the Spaniards will resent and resist
any invasion of their country by the Germans, who are
hated by the morose and hungry Spanish people. A
British victory in “Crusader” will powerfully affect the
mood of the Spanish Government. Hitler no doubt can
force his way through Spain, just as he can dominate
Italy. His deterrent is found in the political sphere. His
aim is to establish a United States of Europe under the
German hegemony and the New Order. This depends
not only upon the conquest, but even more upon the
collaboration, of the peoples. Nothing will more effectively destroy such hopes than the continuance of the
murders and reprisals, slaughter of hostages, etc.,
which is now going on in so many countries. It will be a
very serious step for him to take to add Spain and Italy

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to the already vast subjugated and rebellious areas
over which his troops are spread.

10. For all the above reasons the close synchronisa-tion of “Crusader” and “Whipcord” and their intimate
connection seem highly desirable. On the other hand, it
must be realised that we shall not be able to remain
inactive except for the advance in Libya. I am confronted with Russian demands for a British force to take its
place in the line on the Russian left flank at the earliest
moment. It will not be possible in the rising temper of
the British people against what they consider our
inactivity to resist such demands indefinitely. If
therefore it were decided to abandon “Whipcord” or
alternative action in French North Africa at French
invitation, as mentioned in Chiefs of Staff paper, it
would be necessary to make preparations soon for
moving a substantial force into Russia.

11. Your further comments should reach us by
Monday night, when Defence Committee will meet.

The Commanders-in-Chief at Cairo took a different view.

They looked to the defence of the Delta and the Canal, of Basra and the Caucasus, and the “bastion of the Taurus Range” as the first essentials. They did not consider Sicily either practicable or necessary. Their minds lay right-handed and to the East, and should it be decided to move westward and should our efforts prosper, they preferred the occupation of Bizerta to any attempt on Sicily. I fully understood their reasoning, which was strongly supported by General Wavell from India. They expressed their conclusions in a telegram on October 27 embodying the arguments I have set forth.

In consequence I abandoned the idea of an attack on Sicily (“Whipcord”).

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Prime

Minister

to

28 Oct. 41

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee

In view of the Middle East latest telegram and of
your own decisive abandonment of the project “Whipcord,” which you advocated and which I espoused, I
now consider that plan at an end.

2. A force equivalent to two divisions and one
armoured division should however stand ready to
exploit “Crusader” and “Acrobat” should they be successful. There is no reason, unless hope be a reason,
to expect that General Weygand will invite us into
Bizerta or Casablanca as the result of our impending
operations. Should he do so, we must be ready to profit
by so great a turn of fortune. The same Commanders
should study this case forthwith, and it should be
concerted with Middle East H.Q., and especially with
Admiral Cunningham.

3. The situation might arise either through the effect
of a British victory, if gained, on French morale, or,
which is not to be excluded, by a German demand on
Pétain for the use of this theatre in consequence of the
loss of Tripoli, actual or probable.

4. The name of this operation will be “Gymnast.”

5. It is important to know at once what orders should
be issued to convert “Whipcord” into “Gymnast,” so as
to make the least possible inroads upon shipping, and,
secondly, what the demands upon shipping would be
and their full effect.

6. I have received advices from America that our
friends there are much attracted by the idea of
American intervention in Morocco, and Colonel Knox
talked to Lord Halifax about 150,000 United States
troops being landed there. We must be ready, if possible, with a simultaneous offer, or anyhow a British offer,
to General Weygand at any moment which seems
timely after a success in “Crusader.” This might turn the
scale in our favour. The offer should therefore be
couched in most effective terms. I will not myself
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address the President on the subject until after results
of “Crusader” are apparent.

7. I have had a letter from him by Lord Louis Mountbatten, in which he expresses lively interest in Tangier.

This should also be examined, but it evidently raises
very great complications with the Spaniards and the
French, and it would be wrong to sacrifice the chance
of French co-operation for the sake of it.

Apart from dropping the Sicily project, we all held firmly to our estimate of values and chances, and I had no difficulty in procuring a united decision.

Prime

Minister

to

2 Nov. 41

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee and

C.I.G.S.

While fully understanding General Wavell’s point of
view, we have definitely decided to play the sequence,

“Crusader,” “Acrobat,” “Gymnast.” There can be no
going back on this.

Our plan, if everything prospered, was therefore: the clearance of Cyrenaica by the defeat of Rommel’s army; the advance to Tripoli; and, with the French help and invitation, if forthcoming, the entry into French Northwest Africa. The Sicily project was dependent upon the favourable outcome of the first two, and would be an alternative to the third. All this was however so speculative that I did not wish to continue the strategic argument with the Middle East Command.

Prime

Minister

to

11 Nov. 41

Minister of State

I could find no answer but silence to your and
Auchinleck’s telegrams about “Crusader.” No view can

The Grand Alliance