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by itself. (f) The great mass of troops, over 70,000, now
engaged in the Kenya theatre must be severely scruti-nised in order particularly to liberate the South African
divisions for service in Egypt. Any communication with
General Smuts had better pass through the Prime
Minister. A further conference between the Foreign
Secretary and General Smuts might well be convenient.

(g) The Foreign Secretary, when visiting Athens with
the C.I.G.S., General Wavell, and any other officers, is
fully empowered to formulate with the Greek Government the best arrangements possible in the circumstances. He will at the same time try to keep H.M.G.

informed, or seek their aid as far as possible. In an
emergency he must act as he thinks best. (h) He will
communicate

direct

with

the

Governments

of

Yugoslavia and Turkey, duplicating his messages to the
Foreign Office. The object will be to make them both
fight at the same time or do the best they can. For this
purpose he should summon the Minister at Belgrade or
the Ambassador in Turkey to meet him as may be
convenient. He will bear in mind that while it is our duty
to fight, and if need be, suffer with Greece, the interests
of Turkey in the second stage are no less important to
us than those of Greece. It should be possible to
reconcile the Greek and Turkish claims for air and
munitions support. (i) The Foreign Secretary will address himself to the problem of securing the highest
form of war economy in the armies and air forces of the
Middle East for all the above purposes, and to making
sure that the many valuable military units in that theatre
all fit into a coherent scheme and are immediately
pulling their weight. (j) He should advise H.M.G.

through the Prime Minister upon the selection of commanders for all the different purposes in view. In this he
will no doubt consult with General Wavell, who enjoys
so large a measure of the confidence of H.M.G. The
selection of the general who commands in Greece is of
the highest consequence, and it is hoped that an
agreed recommendation may be made on this point. (k)
Air Chief Marshal Longmore will be required to give
effect to the wishes and decisions of the Foreign
Secretary in accordance with the general scope of the

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policy here set out. But here again in the event of any
difference the Foreign Secretary will transmit the Air
Chief Marshal’s views to the War Cabinet through the
Prime Minister. The duty of the air force in the Middle
East is to provide the maximum air effort in Greece and
Turkey compatible with the nourishing of operations in
the Sudan and Abyssinia and the maintenance of
Benghazi. (l) The Foreign Secretary will consult with
Admiral Cunningham upon naval operations necessary
for all the above purposes, and will ask H.M.G. for any
further support, either by transports or warships, which
may seem necessary. (m) He will propose to H.M.G.

any policy concerning Iraq, Palestine, or Arabia which
may harmonise with the above purposes. He may
communicate direct with these countries and with the
Government of India, though not in a mandatory sense.

The India Office must be kept informed. (n) He will
report upon the whole position at Gibraltar, Malta, and,
if possible, on return, at Takoradi. (o) In short, he is to
gather together all the threads, and propose continuously the best solutions for our difficulties, and not be
deterred from acting upon his own authority if the
urgency is too great to allow reference home.

I thought that Smuts should know of Eden’s mission, and hoped that he might be able to go to Cairo himself.

Prime

Minister

to

15 Feb. 41

General Smuts

Joyful acceleration capture Benghazi, Cyrenaica,
gives us secure flank for Egypt. Kismayu is also good.

We must now try to help Greeks and spur Turks to
resist forthcoming German offensive towards Aegean.

Cannot guarantee good results on mainland of Europe,
but we must do our best and save what islands we can
from the wreck should our utmost efforts prove vain.

We have therefore sent Foreign Secretary and C.I.G.S.

to Cairo, thereafter visiting Athens and Angora, in order
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to concert strongest possible front. They will probably
be three weeks in Middle East. Pray consider whether
you could meet them. Please duplicate to me through
United Kingdom High Commissioner any messages you
send to them.

During Mr. Eden’s absence I took charge of the Foreign Office. This was, of course, a heavy addition to my work. I had, however, been accustomed to read all the top-level daily telegrams and special reports since I became Prime Minister, and in my correspondence with President Roosevelt and other heads of Governments I had drafted many of the most important outgoing messages. Except in special cases I left the interviews with foreign Ambassadors to the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and to Mr. Butler, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary. The whole story of foreign affairs and war strategy was at this time fused into one single theme, and this I had in any case to comprehend, and as far as possible shape.

Prime Minister to Mr.

20 Feb. 41

Eden, Cairo

Thankful you have arrived safely. I was making great
exertions to carry 50th Division to you, and had wrung
additional shipping from Shipping Ministry, with generous contribution by Admiralty. Am baffled by reply.

Clearly H.Q. Middle East is not accurately informed
about composition of convoys…. Hope you will be able
to clear all this up. Essential that exact details of
convoys and field states should be known at both ends.

My impression is one of enormous jumbles of ration-strength troops in Middle East with many half-baked
tactical formations. The 6th British Division and 7th
Australian Division both seem likely to be imperfect for
some time. Find out what we can send to make these
effective fighting units. Some local improvisation by
transfer from other half-baked units should surely be
possible. Establishments are not sacrosanct if practical
results obtainable on different basis. Latest Middle East
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ration-strength return shows increase of nearly 50,000

between December 31 and January 31. Does nothing
emerge in the shape of fighting units from this reinforcement? If fighting formations are so few compared
with ration strength, and in addition movement of these
few formations to another theatre is so lengthy and
nothing can be done to improve matters, we must
recognise limits of our power to act on mainland, and
indeed whole Middle East proposition must be
relegated to secondary sphere.

2. Am concerned at check developing at Keren.

Abyssinia might be left, but we had hopes Eritrea would
be cleaned up. Try to include this in your disposition of
air and other forces.

3. Do not consider yourselves obligated to a Greek
enterprise if in your hearts you feel it will only be
another Norwegian fiasco. If no good plan can be made
please say so. But of course you know how valuable
success would be.

This crossed telegrams from Mr. Eden, which gave a clear picture of the convictions of the men on the spot, and included the conclusions of the conference in Cairo between him and Dill with three Commanders-in-Chief.

We are agreed we should do everything in our power to bring the fullest measure of help to Greeks at earliest possible moment. If the help we can offer is accepted by the Greeks we believe that there is a fair chance of halting a German advance and preventing Greece from being overrun. Limitation of our resources, however, especially in the air, will not allow of help being given to Turkey at the [same] time if Greece is to be supported on an effective scale.

After explaining that the scantiness of our air resources made it doubtful whether a line so advanced as to cover Salonika could be held, he continued: General Wavell proposes the following military dispositions: Cyrenaica will be garrisoned by one of the The Grand Alliance

104

less trained and equipped Australian divisions, Indian Motor Brigade, at present under training, and one armoured

brigade

group,

which

represents

all

remaining at present of the 7th Armoured Division. You will remember that this armoured division was never at full strength. Further complication reported by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean is that troops at Benghazi cannot at present be maintained by sea owing to destruction of port. Supply must, therefore, be by road from Tobruk. The 6th Division is being formed, and will be used for Rhodes. Forces committed to operations in Eritrea cannot be reduced until operations there have been successfully completed. Keren is proving a tough nut to crack. On the other hand, it is agreed that forces in Kenya can be reduced, and warning orders have been issued for withdrawal of South African division with a view to its movement to Egypt when shipping can be made available. I hope to see Smuts on this and other matters before I return home.

General Wavell has therefore the following forces available for Greece in the immediate and near future: firstly, one armoured brigade and the New Zealand division, now raised to three infantry brigades, ready to sail; to be followed by Polish Brigade, an Australian division, a second armoured brigade, if required, and a second Australian division, in that order. Dispatch of this force will inevitably strain administrative resources to the utmost and must involve much improvisation.

Timings cannot yet be given, as these depend on discussion with the Greeks and shipping. It is estimated that to move the above forces at least fifty-three ships will be required. These can, of course, only be obtained by holding ships of convoys arriving in the Middle East, with all that that implies. Additional to present anxiety is the menace of mines to the Suez Canal. Energetic measures are being taken to deal with this, but until they are fully organised and material arrives from home there is always a risk that the Canal may be closed for from five to seven days.

My own conclusion, which General Dill and Commanders-in-Chief share, is that in the immediate future assistance to the Greeks, who are fighting and are The Grand Alliance

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threatened, must have first call on resources. Extent of help which we can later give Turks must depend upon volume of air reinforcements that can reach the Middle East and war wastage in African operations.

My present intention is to tell the Greeks of the help we are prepared to give them now, and to
urge
them to accept it as fast as it can be shipped to them. If they will accept this help and brave any risk it may entail of involving them in early hostilities with Germany there is a fair chance that we can hold a line in Greece. If we now split our small resources, especially in the air, we can effectively help neither Greece nor Turkey.

The word “urge,” which I have italicised, in this telegram must not be misunderstood. Mr. Eden meant it to apply, not to the principle of acceptance by the Greeks of British help, but to the timing of their acceptance, if that was their resolve.

I replied:

Prime Minister to Mr.

21 Feb. 41

Eden, Cairo

I have always felt it essential you should see Greeks
before Angora, otherwise commitments might have
been made to Angora which would tie your hands
about Greeks, who are actually fighting. Therefore, am
in complete agreement with procedure you propose.