The Fall of Carthage (67 page)

On
the
find
of
a
probable
Roman
scutum
see
W.
Kimmig,
'Ein
Keltenschild
aus Aegypten',
Germania
24
(1940),
pp.
106-111.
For
Roman
equipment
in
general
see

Polybius
2.
33.
4
records
an
occasion
in
224
when
the
hastati
were
given
the
triarii's
spears,
indicating
that
the
former
normally
carried
another
weapon,
presumably
the
pilum.
On
the
pilum
see
Bishop
&
Coulston
(1993),
pp.
48-50.

For
the
'reform'
of
211,
see
the
unconvincing
arguments
in
M.
Samuels,
'The
Reality
of Cannae',
Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen
47
(1990),
pp.
7-31.

Cato's
grandfather,
Plutarch,
Cato
1;
on
the
saddle
see
P.
Connolly,
'The
Roman Saddle',
in
M.
Dawson
(ed.),
Roman Military Equipment: The Accoutrements
of
War, BAR
336
(Oxford,
1987),
pp.
7-27.

Sentries
sleeping
on
guard,
Polybius
6.
35.
6-37.
6,
Livy
44.
33;
punishments
in general,
Polybius
6.
37.
7-38.
4.

This
decision-making
process
is
implicit
in
our
narrative
accounts,
and
explicit
in Vegetius
3.
1.

Telamon,
Polybius
2.
24-31,
esp.
27.
1-6.

E.g.
Spurius
Ligustinus
mentioned
in
Livy
42.
34.

For
the
importance
of
virtus
see
N.
Rosenstein,
Imperatores Victi
(Berkeley,
1990), pp.
114-51.

Space
allocated
to
each
legionary,
Polybius
18.
30.
5-8,
Vegetius
3.
14,15,
and discussion
in
A.
Goldsworthy,
The Roman Army at War, 100
BC-AD
200
(Oxford,
1996), pp.179-80.

Roman
armies
ambushed,
e.g.
Polybius
2.
25,
3.
118,
Livy
38.
40-1,
&
chapter
7.
Livy noted
that
in
193
a
consul
sent
out
scouts
even
though
he
was
marching
in
daylight, which
implies
that
this
was
not
normal,
Livy
35.
4.
For
accidental
encounters
see Polybius
2.
27-8,
3.
61,
65,
Livy
31.
33,
Polybius
18.
19.
For
military
intelligence
in general
see
M.
Austin
&
B.
Rankov,
Exploratio
(London,
1995).

Delays
before
battle
,
see
Polybius
3.
89-90,110-113,
10.
38-9,
11.
21,
14.
8,
Livy
34. 46,
38.
20,
and
esp.
Livy
37.
38-9;
armies
camped
near
each
other
for
long
periods without
fighting,
see
Polybius
1.
19,
57-8,
Appian
Iberica
11.
65;
strategems
to
cover

Forming
up
Roman
armies,
Polybius
3.
72,113,
6.
31,
Livy
34.
46,
40.
31,
40.
48,
41. 26;
Punic
armies
also
apparently
using
the
processional
method,
Polybius
3.
113.
6,
11. 22;
Macedonians
at
Cynoscephalae,
Polybius
18.
22-5;
confusion
in
deploying
a
Spanish army
in
haste
in
195,
Livy
35.
14;
references
to
Roman
tribunes
being
closely
involved in
deployment,
Polybius
11.
22.
4,
Livy
44.
36.

For
the
role
of
optiones
see
M.
Speidel,
The Framework
of
an Imperial Legion. The fifth Annual Caerleon Lecture
(Cardiff,
1992),
pp.
24-6.

For
a
detailed
discussion
of
this
issue
see
Goldsworthy
(1996),
pp.
138-40.

For
a
stylized
account
of
the
line
system
see
Livy
8.
8.
esp.
9-13.
For
a
discussion
of infantry
combat
in
this
period,
see
P.
Sabin,
'The
mechanics
of
battle
in
the
Second Punic
War',
in
Cornell,
Rankov
and
Sabin
(1996),
pp.
59-79,
esp.
64-73
and
for
the Roman
tactical
system
see
P.
Sabin,
'The
Multiple
Line
System
in
Republican
Roman Armies',
Journal
of
Roman Studies
(forthcoming).
For
a
detailed
discussion
on
combat in
a
slightly
later
period
see
Goldsworthy
(1996),
pp.
171-247;
on
the
role
of
the commander
see
Goldsworthy
(1996),
pp.
116-70.

See
chapters
7
and
8.

Thucydides
1,
esp.
1.
23,
89-117.

Polybius
1.
7.
1-5.
See
F.
Walbank,
A Historical Commentary on Polybius
1
(Oxford, 1970),
pp.
52-3
for
a
discussion
of
the
chronology.

Polybius
1.
7.
6-13.
Dionysius
of
Halicarnassus
20.
4
claims
that
the
garrison
was installed
to
defend
the
city
against
the
Bruttians.

Appian,
Samnite History
9.3.