The Fall of Carthage (65 page)
The historians of the twentieth century readily saw a parallel between the First and Second Punic Wars and the two World Wars of their own century. The struggle between Rome and Carthage was on an unprecedented scale and resulted in massive casualties just as the Great War shattered the European powers. The resentment of many on the losing side provoked the renewal of war and a wider, even more damaging conflict in both 218
BC
and
AD
1939. Some individual incidents seemed to have parallels between these conflicts separated in time by two millennia. In many respects the situation faced by Britain in the summer of
AD
1940 was similar to that of Rome in late 216
BC
. Both sides had suffered military disaster suddenly and unexpectedly, and it seemed only a matter of time before each would be overrun by the all-conquering victors. In each case the victors, intoxicated by the ease of their success, believed that all logic demanded that the other side admit defeat and come to a negotiated settlement. Yet Rome and Britain refused to seek peace and continued to fight, enduring further losses. Revisionists who have tried to argue that Hider's Germany was incapable of launching a successful invasion across the English Channel in 1940 miss the point as certainly as those who debate whether or not Hannibal could have taken Rome in 216. These operations would in practice have been extremely difficult and perhaps impossible with the resources at the Germans' and Carthaginians' disposal. What is far more important is that both the Romans in 216 and the British in 1940 believed that a direct attack upon them was perfectly possible and imminent, posing a real threat to their very existence. In spite of this each preferred to fight on rather than accept defeat and persisted in this resolve in the face of continued pressure from the enemy. For the Romans as much as the British the period was to become their 'Finest Hour', remembered as a time of great unity when all classes stuck together and endured great hardship for the common good. Perhaps the biggest difference is that whilst this occurred in the last days of the British Empire, for the Romans it marked the beginning of their rise to World Empire.
BC
and
AD
1939. Some individual incidents seemed to have parallels between these conflicts separated in time by two millennia. In many respects the situation faced by Britain in the summer of
AD
1940 was similar to that of Rome in late 216
BC
. Both sides had suffered military disaster suddenly and unexpectedly, and it seemed only a matter of time before each would be overrun by the all-conquering victors. In each case the victors, intoxicated by the ease of their success, believed that all logic demanded that the other side admit defeat and come to a negotiated settlement. Yet Rome and Britain refused to seek peace and continued to fight, enduring further losses. Revisionists who have tried to argue that Hider's Germany was incapable of launching a successful invasion across the English Channel in 1940 miss the point as certainly as those who debate whether or not Hannibal could have taken Rome in 216. These operations would in practice have been extremely difficult and perhaps impossible with the resources at the Germans' and Carthaginians' disposal. What is far more important is that both the Romans in 216 and the British in 1940 believed that a direct attack upon them was perfectly possible and imminent, posing a real threat to their very existence. In spite of this each preferred to fight on rather than accept defeat and persisted in this resolve in the face of continued pressure from the enemy. For the Romans as much as the British the period was to become their 'Finest Hour', remembered as a time of great unity when all classes stuck together and endured great hardship for the common good. Perhaps the biggest difference is that whilst this occurred in the last days of the British Empire, for the Romans it marked the beginning of their rise to World Empire.
Successes on the battlefield do not automatically bring victory in the wider conflict. Unless one side was overwhelmingly strong, it was rarely possible in the pre-nuclear age to inflict so much damage that an enemy was incapable of fighting on. Wars ended when one side lost its will to continue the struggle and capitulated. Breaking the collective willingness of an enemy population to fight on was the ultimate goal of the theories of Strategic Air Power developed in the 1920s and 1930s
AD
. When these were put into practice in the Second World War, civilian populations proved far more resilient than the advocates of aerial bombing had anticipated. The bombing of cities did not cause the rapid demoralization of the population, leading to rioting and civil disorder which would force governments to seek peace. Supporters of Independent Air Power argued that the failure was not through any flaw in the concept, but due to a lack of resources, and ultimately such theories reached their culmination in the development of the nuclear arsenal.
AD
. When these were put into practice in the Second World War, civilian populations proved far more resilient than the advocates of aerial bombing had anticipated. The bombing of cities did not cause the rapid demoralization of the population, leading to rioting and civil disorder which would force governments to seek peace. Supporters of Independent Air Power argued that the failure was not through any flaw in the concept, but due to a lack of resources, and ultimately such theories reached their culmination in the development of the nuclear arsenal.
It is not always easy to discover which events will trigger the collapse of the collective fighting spirit of any state or people. In
AD
1991 the United Nations waged a brief and highly successful campaign against Iraq, but this failed to result in the removal from power by his own people of Saddam Hussein, a prospect eagerly anticipated by politicians and much of the media in the West. In the same way, NATO operations in the Balkans later in the same decade failed to destroy the hold on power of the leaders of Serbia. Battlefield success did not produce the political results widely broadcast in the public debate, although this outcome came as little surprise to most military analysts. Military defeat did not persuade the population of a country to realize the inequalities and unfairness inherent in their political system - at least by Western standards - and turn against their oppressive leaders. Instead the threat from outside tended to bring far greater unity to each country. In our eyes the Roman system of government might seem deeply unfair, concentrating power in the hands of a tiny elite, whilst the system of alliances through which the city controlled Italy was surely oppressive and deeply resented by Latins and Italians. Hannibal may have believed this to be the case when he marched to Italy in 218, although it is difficult to know just how well he understood the peculiarities of the Roman system. Yet his appeal to Rome's allies to throw off the oppressor's yoke fell overwhelmingly on deaf ears. No Latins joined him and the bulk of the Italians also remained loyal. Fear of reprisals played a part, as perhaps did suspicion of Carthage's motives, but on the whole we are forced to conclude that most of the Italian communities felt that it was in their best interest to support Rome. In the same way, even the poorer classes at Rome felt a strong enough bond to the community to sacrifice their lives for it.
AD
1991 the United Nations waged a brief and highly successful campaign against Iraq, but this failed to result in the removal from power by his own people of Saddam Hussein, a prospect eagerly anticipated by politicians and much of the media in the West. In the same way, NATO operations in the Balkans later in the same decade failed to destroy the hold on power of the leaders of Serbia. Battlefield success did not produce the political results widely broadcast in the public debate, although this outcome came as little surprise to most military analysts. Military defeat did not persuade the population of a country to realize the inequalities and unfairness inherent in their political system - at least by Western standards - and turn against their oppressive leaders. Instead the threat from outside tended to bring far greater unity to each country. In our eyes the Roman system of government might seem deeply unfair, concentrating power in the hands of a tiny elite, whilst the system of alliances through which the city controlled Italy was surely oppressive and deeply resented by Latins and Italians. Hannibal may have believed this to be the case when he marched to Italy in 218, although it is difficult to know just how well he understood the peculiarities of the Roman system. Yet his appeal to Rome's allies to throw off the oppressor's yoke fell overwhelmingly on deaf ears. No Latins joined him and the bulk of the Italians also remained loyal. Fear of reprisals played a part, as perhaps did suspicion of Carthage's motives, but on the whole we are forced to conclude that most of the Italian communities felt that it was in their best interest to support Rome. In the same way, even the poorer classes at Rome felt a strong enough bond to the community to sacrifice their lives for it.
In the Introduction I stated that it was not my intention in this book to seek in the Punic Wars military lessons of direct relevance to modern warfare. Others are far better qualified to discuss modern strategy and tactics. The aim of this book has been to set the conflict between Rome and Carthage firmly within the context of warfare in the third and second centuries
BC
. If we are to learn from the past then history must first be understood on its own terms. One general point is worth emphasizing, namely that each society and culture tends to have a unique view of warfare which affects how they fight and as a result how they may be beaten. This can be seen in most periods of history, but the difference between two philosophies of war has rarely been as clearly illustrated as it was during the Punic Wars.
BC
. If we are to learn from the past then history must first be understood on its own terms. One general point is worth emphasizing, namely that each society and culture tends to have a unique view of warfare which affects how they fight and as a result how they may be beaten. This can be seen in most periods of history, but the difference between two philosophies of war has rarely been as clearly illustrated as it was during the Punic Wars.
Notes to the Text
Introduction
1.
For
Cannae
see
chapter
8;
Napoleon's
belief
that
much
could
be
learned
from
the
study of
ancient
commanders,
see
D.
Chandler,
The Campaigns
of
Napoleon
(London,
1966), pp.
137-139;
for
twentieth-century
studies
of
the
Punic
Wars
see
B.
Liddell
Hart,
A Greater than Napoleon - Scipio Africanus
(Edinburgh,
1930),
J.
Fuller,
The Decisive Battles
of
the Western World
(London,
1954).
2.
For
relatively
recent
studies
see
T.
Dorey
&
D.
Dudley,
Rome against Carthage
(London,
1971),
B.
Caven,
The Punic Wars
(London,
1980),
N.
Bagnall,
The Punic Wars
(London,
1990)
and
Y.
Le
Bohec,
Histoire militaire des
guerres
puniques
(Paris, 1996)
which
cover
the
entire
conflict;
J.
Lazenby,
Hannibal's War
(Warminster,
1978, reprinted
with
new
preface:
Oklahoma,
1998),
and
The First Punic War
(London, 1996),
J.
Peddie,
Hannibal's War
(Stroud,
1997),
and
S.
Lancel
(trans.
A.
Nevill
),
Hannibal
(Oxford,
1998)
deal
with
individual
wars,
and
in
1993
there
was
also
a
reprint of
T.
Dodge,
Hannibal
(1891);
there
is
also
the
stimulating
collection
of
papers
in
T.
Cornell,
B.
Rankov
&
P.
Sabin
(edd.),
The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal
British Institute
of
Classical
Studies
Supplement
67
(London,
1996).
All
of
these
works
include bibliographies
mentioning
many
more
books
and
articles
published
within
recent
years on
aspects
of
the
subject.
Cornell,
B.
Rankov
&
P.
Sabin
(edd.),
The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal
British Institute
of
Classical
Studies
Supplement
67
(London,
1996).
All
of
these
works
include bibliographies
mentioning
many
more
books
and
articles
published
within
recent
years on
aspects
of
the
subject.
3
Bagnall
(1990)
and
Peddie
(1997),
both
of
whom
were
highly
experienced
soldiers, comment
perceptively
on
some
of
the
practical
aspects
of
the
campaign.
Peddie
pays more
attention
to
the
problems
of
supply
than
most
other
authors.
For
a
general
treatment
of
the
differences
between
different
cultures'
concepts
and
practice
of
war,
see
Bagnall
(1990)
and
Peddie
(1997),
both
of
whom
were
highly
experienced
soldiers, comment
perceptively
on
some
of
the
practical
aspects
of
the
campaign.
Peddie
pays more
attention
to
the
problems
of
supply
than
most
other
authors.
For
a
general
treatment
of
the
differences
between
different
cultures'
concepts
and
practice
of
war,
see
J.
Keegan,
A History
of
Warfare
(London,
1993).
Keegan,
A History
of
Warfare
(London,
1993).
1.
Silenus
and
Sosylus,
see
Nepos,
Hannibal
13.
3.
1.
For
Polybius
see
F.
Walbank,
A Historical Commentary on Polybius 1
(Oxford,
1970), pp.
1-37.
2.
See
P.
Walsh,
Livy
(Cambridge,
1961),
and
T.
J.
Luce,
Livy, the Composition
of
his History
(Princeton,
1977);
Cynoscephalae,
Polybius
18.
24.
8-9,
Livy
34.
8.
13.
3.
See
Walbank
1
(1970),
pp.
26-35;
Polybius'
criticism
of
the
partisan
nature
of
Philinus and
Fabius
Pictor,
1.
14-15.
Chapter 1
1
For
a
useful
survey
of
the
Mediterranean
world
in
the
third
century
BC
see
A.
Toynbee,
Hannibal's Legacy. Vol. 1
(Oxford,
1965),
pp.
20-83.
For
a
useful
survey
of
the
Mediterranean
world
in
the
third
century
BC
see
A.
Toynbee,
Hannibal's Legacy. Vol. 1
(Oxford,
1965),
pp.
20-83.
1.
Origins
of
Carthage,
see
G.
Picard
&
C.
Picard,
Carthage
(rev.
ed.:
London,
1987), pp.
15-35,
S.
Lancel,
Carthage
(Oxford,
1995),
pp.
1-34;
Tarshish,
Ezekiel
27.
12; Spain,
Lancel
(1995),
pp.
9-14.
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