The Fall of Carthage (32 page)
The Roman cavalry, weary and outnumbered, seems to have put up a feeble resistance as Hannibal at last ordered his horsemen forward. Livy claims that they were further weakened by sniping from the Balearic slingers now supporting the Punic horse, and also that the elephants frightened the Roman horses, but his account of the elephants' role in the battle is hopelessly confused. As the Roman cavalry broke, the Numidians and light infantry surged forward to lap around the flanks of the main Roman line, shooting at the allied soldiers. Polybius notes that they outstripped the close order cavalry, which may again be an indication that the mounts of these troops were not in good condition, although in this case they had begun the battle fresher than the Romans'. In spite of this support, the clash between the two main lines of close order foot was long and hard, its outcome uncertain. The
hastati
and
principes
alone outnumbered the enemy foot by a large margin and were also more heavily armoured. It must also be remembered that the Roman line was long and that it took a while for a reverse on the wings to affect the centre. Even when Mago's force emerged from ambush and attacked the rear of the Roman army, spreading confusion throughout the whole army, the legionaries maintained the struggle. Beset by the elephants and Punic foot to their front and skirmishers and Numidians to the rear, the wings of the Roman infantry eventually gave way. In the centre the legions managed to rout the Gauls and a unit of Libyans facing them, breaking right through the enemy line.
hastati
and
principes
alone outnumbered the enemy foot by a large margin and were also more heavily armoured. It must also be remembered that the Roman line was long and that it took a while for a reverse on the wings to affect the centre. Even when Mago's force emerged from ambush and attacked the rear of the Roman army, spreading confusion throughout the whole army, the legionaries maintained the struggle. Beset by the elephants and Punic foot to their front and skirmishers and Numidians to the rear, the wings of the Roman infantry eventually gave way. In the centre the legions managed to rout the Gauls and a unit of Libyans facing them, breaking right through the enemy line.
Hannibal had no reserves with which to oppose this breakthrough, for his infantry had formed in a single line. Fortunately, by this time it was clear that the Roman defeat was irredeemable, with the army degenerating into a mob of fugitives. The 10,000 legionaries who had broken through the enemy line made no attempt to rejoin the fighting, but keeping in formation, they marched north, swinging round the Punic army and recrossing the Trebia opposite Placentia, where they took refuge. Hannibal made no attempt to stop them. His men were weary and his victory was already clear. The rest of the Roman army suffered heavily in the rout, but numbers of soldiers made their way as individuals or small groups back to the camps or joined the force in the colony. We do not have a figure for the Roman losses, but these must have been heavy. Our sources are similarly vague for Hannibal's casualties, although Polybius tells us that the heaviest losses were suffered by the Celts in the centre. However, in the cold spell of weather which followed the battle, many of his men and horses and all but one of the elephants died.
13
13
Longus at first attempted to portray the battle as an indecisive fight, in which he was deprived of victory only by the extreme weather, and it was some while before the Senate appreciated the scale of the disaster. The blow to Roman pride was probably more serious than the actual losses, for the victory persuaded those Gauls who had been wavering to embrace the Punic cause. Even so, the defeat was put down to Longus' mistakes, whilst the success of the Roman infantry in the centre seemed to confirm that the courage of their soldiers had not failed.
Hannibal's victory gave his campaign sufficient momentum to carry it through the months of virtual inactivity forced upon him by the winter weather. His soldiers now knew that they could beat their enemy in the open field, further increasing their faith in their commander. As a general Hannibal had consistentiy outperformed both of his Roman opponents, controlling his soldiers so tightiy that a battle was only fought at a time and place of his own choice. He had been able to exploit the advantage given by his numerical superiority in cavalry, added to the flexibility derived from the mixture of light and heavy horse. At the Trebia his army had fought as a co-ordinated unit, focusing all its strength on the Roman wings. To further the anticipated success of his cavalry over the outnumbered Roman horsemen, the best of his infantry, the Libyans and Spanish, were placed on the flanks of the infantry centre, their attack given even more power by the support of the elephants. Mago's ambush had added to the confusion in the Roman ranks and probably reduced much of the forward impetus of their assault, in particular by involving the third line in combat, but the battle had already effectively been won by the success on the wings. The escape as a formed body of such a large part of the Roman infantry was regrettable, but once the Romans broke through the Gallic infantry there was little that Hannibal could do to stop them. Nevertheless the Roman eagerness to escape from the battlefield rather than renew the fight demonstrated that they had admitted defeat.
The Battle of Lake Trasimene,
c.
21 June 217
BC
c.
21 June 217
BC
The Senate was shocked by the defeat, but began the new year grimly determined to prosecute the war with greater success. The other theatres were not ignored, but the main focus of Roman effort was to be against the enemy on their own soil and both consuls would go north against Hannibal. An air of normality was provided when Longus returned briefly to Rome to preside over the consular elections, which were won by Cnaeus Servilius Geminus and Caius Flaminius. We do not have a detailed breakdown of the citizens and allies levied in this year, but Geminus and Flaminius both seem to have been given the standard consular army of two legions and two
alae,
composed of a mixture of newly raised troops and the remnants of the armies defeated at Trebia. The legions may have had a stronger than usual complement and it is also possible that the armies contained a very high proportion of cavalry, perhaps as a reaction to Hannibal's superiority in this arm. Geminus' army is said to have included at least 4,000 horsemen, which was a very high proportion for a Roman army and probably consisted in the main of allies.
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alae,
composed of a mixture of newly raised troops and the remnants of the armies defeated at Trebia. The legions may have had a stronger than usual complement and it is also possible that the armies contained a very high proportion of cavalry, perhaps as a reaction to Hannibal's superiority in this arm. Geminus' army is said to have included at least 4,000 horsemen, which was a very high proportion for a Roman army and probably consisted in the main of allies.
14
Polybius' account suggests that little military activity occurred during the winter, and although Livy supplies a dramatic account of an action in which Longus gained an initial advantage, but which was ended by bad weather, this is most probably an invention. It may even derive from Longus' own self-serving account of Trebia. The usually sober Polybius does, however, recount the bizarre story of how Hannibal, distrusting many of his newfound Gallic allies, adopted a range of disguises, including a variety of differently coloured wigs, to conceal his true appearance. Perhaps the apparent ability of appearing in different forms enhanced his reputation as a powerful leader with the tribesmen, but this is no more than a conjecture.
15
15
When the new campaigning season opened in the spring of 217, Hannibal had two real alternatives. Remaining in the Po valley would achieve nothing, and the continued consumption of their food by his soldiers might in time weaken Gallic support, whilst moving west into Liguria would not help to weaken Roman resistance and meant passing through country where foraging would be difficult. Hannibal needed to keep up the pressure on the Romans and this meant continuing his advance deeper into their territory. There he could feed his soldiers from the produce of enemy fields, provide them with plentiful booty, and any victories he won would be that much more disturbing to the Romans and perhaps do more to encourage the defection of their Italian allies. The direction he took could not ignore that most important feature of Italian geography, the Apennine Mountains, that solid barrier which cuts the Peninsula in two and which could only be crossed by an army in a few places. Therefore Hannibal could either move east to the sea and advance down the Adriatic coast into Picenum, or go south to the passes of the Apennines and then swing west into Etruria. These alternatives were as clear to the Senate as they were to Hannibal, and their solution was to place one consul in a position to oppose each threat. Geminus moved to Ariminum (modern Rimini) to cover the eastern coast, whilst Flaminius went to Arretium, where he could best cover the various passes over the Apennines.
16
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Caius Flaminius was to play the most prominent role in the forthcoming campaign and has suffered in our sources because he too presided over a Roman disaster and, unlike Sempronius Longus, was killed and so unable to justify his actions. Nor was his family a prominent one at Rome, so that there were few descendants able to have much influence on the widely accepted version of events, for Flaminius was a
novus
h
omo,
a new man who was the first in his family to reach the consulship. Both Polybius and especially Livy depict him as an aggressive demagogue, a man of bold words but little talent who had based a career on pandering to the desires of the poorest citizens to overcome the opposition of most of the Senate. His career up to this point had certainly been controversial, but it had also been exceptionally distinguished, even by the standards of the third century, and especially so for a new man. We have already seen how as a tribune of the plebs in 232 he had passed a bill to distribute land in Cisalpine Gaul to poorer citizens, and in his first consulship in 223 had celebrated a triumph over the Insubres. He had also been the first praetorian governor of Sicily. Elected one of the two censors in 220 he had carried out several major projects, including the construction of the Circus Flaminius in Rome and the
via Flaminia
which ran from the city to Ariminum, connecting the city with the newly colonized land. He was clearly something of a maverick, a politician who achieved his ambitions by methods that were anything but traditional. His land law had been disliked by many in the Senate, and he had gained a reputation for impatience during his first consulship, refusing to be recalled on religious grounds and only celebrating his triumph by Popular vote, after the Senate had refused him this honour. The most successful politicians at Rome were the men who got what they wanted quietly and without such crises. Men like Flaminius made many enemies who only waited for them to become vulnerable to exploit this weakness. In his case they were allowed to savage his reputation after his death.
17
novus
h
omo,
a new man who was the first in his family to reach the consulship. Both Polybius and especially Livy depict him as an aggressive demagogue, a man of bold words but little talent who had based a career on pandering to the desires of the poorest citizens to overcome the opposition of most of the Senate. His career up to this point had certainly been controversial, but it had also been exceptionally distinguished, even by the standards of the third century, and especially so for a new man. We have already seen how as a tribune of the plebs in 232 he had passed a bill to distribute land in Cisalpine Gaul to poorer citizens, and in his first consulship in 223 had celebrated a triumph over the Insubres. He had also been the first praetorian governor of Sicily. Elected one of the two censors in 220 he had carried out several major projects, including the construction of the Circus Flaminius in Rome and the
via Flaminia
which ran from the city to Ariminum, connecting the city with the newly colonized land. He was clearly something of a maverick, a politician who achieved his ambitions by methods that were anything but traditional. His land law had been disliked by many in the Senate, and he had gained a reputation for impatience during his first consulship, refusing to be recalled on religious grounds and only celebrating his triumph by Popular vote, after the Senate had refused him this honour. The most successful politicians at Rome were the men who got what they wanted quietly and without such crises. Men like Flaminius made many enemies who only waited for them to become vulnerable to exploit this weakness. In his case they were allowed to savage his reputation after his death.
17
Flaminius' election was no protest by a 'democratic party' against the Senate's handling of the war. As we have seen such terms have no relevance for Roman politics, and anyway Flaminius' candidature almost certainly predated the news of Rome's early defeats. That he was an experienced man, who had fought successfully against the very Gauls now joined with Hannibal, may well have been useful in his election campaign, but Flaminius must have had some support in the Senate, even if few wished to admit to this after his defeat. Certainly he must have won the votes of many of the wealthier citizens and cannot have relied simply on the poorest to have been successful in the
Comitia Cen
turiata.
It is important not to confuse modern concepts of 'popular support' with Roman or be taken in by the language of political insults at Rome. It is possible that Flaminius exploited a body of support outside the traditional family systems of patronage which tended to dominate the Roman assemblies, for his career as tribune and censor had given him many opportunities of winning the favour of the wealthier classes outside the Senate. The distribution of the
ager Gallicus
and his building projects all gave opportunities to award lucrative contracts and win important friends.
Comitia Cen
turiata.
It is important not to confuse modern concepts of 'popular support' with Roman or be taken in by the language of political insults at Rome. It is possible that Flaminius exploited a body of support outside the traditional family systems of patronage which tended to dominate the Roman assemblies, for his career as tribune and censor had given him many opportunities of winning the favour of the wealthier classes outside the Senate. The distribution of the
ager Gallicus
and his building projects all gave opportunities to award lucrative contracts and win important friends.
Flaminius proved impatient to begin operations, flouting convention by taking up office on 15 March not in Rome, but at Ariminum. Livy says that he was afraid that his rivals in the Senate would manipulate the auspices and delay him in Rome as long as possible, hoping to deprive him of his command, fears which were probably not groundless. To avoid this, he pretended to leave the city on private business and instead went to join the army.
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Militarily this made sense, since it was important to have his army in position to cover the approaches to Etruria before Hannibal made any move and the armies last year had withdrawn to this town. It did mean that Flaminius did not properly carry out the rituals normally presided over by an incoming consul, and further alienated the Senate by ignoring the commission sent to recall him to Rome. As with Claudius at Drepana, the consul's disrespect for the gods was later held to be a major factor in his defeat w
18
Militarily this made sense, since it was important to have his army in position to cover the approaches to Etruria before Hannibal made any move and the armies last year had withdrawn to this town. It did mean that Flaminius did not properly carry out the rituals normally presided over by an incoming consul, and further alienated the Senate by ignoring the commission sent to recall him to Rome. As with Claudius at Drepana, the consul's disrespect for the gods was later held to be a major factor in his defeat w
Hannibal moved as soon as the arrival of spring made it easier for his army to forage. As usual he moved quickly and in an unexpected direction. He had decided to cross the mountains into Etruria, partly because the area was fertile enough to support his soldiers, but also because it would allow him to pose a more direct threat to Rome. He crossed the Apennines probably by the Porretta, or perhaps the Colline pass, and forced his way through the marshes around the River Arno, which had flooded after the winter rains, driving his army hard to push it quickly through this difficult terrain. His most disciplined infantry, the hard-marching Africans and Spanish, led the way with the baggage train, setting a fast pace which the Celtic warriors, unused to the rigours of campaigning, found difficult to maintain. It is anyway always harder and more aggravating to march in the rear of a column. Hannibal's cavalry brought up the rear and chivvied along the Gallic stragglers. It took three days and nights to get through the marshes and the army suffered much in the process, the men finding it difficult to rest on the muddy ground so that some were only able to sleep by lying on pack saddles, or the corpses of the many baggage mules which collapsed and died during the journey. Hannibal himself suffered badly from ophthalmia, eventually losing the sight in one eye since the conditions did not allow proper treatment, and had to be carried for much of the journey by the sole surviving elephant with the army, perhaps the brave 'Syrian' mentioned by Cato.
20
20
Once again Hannibal had done the unexpected, getting his army across a major obstacle in spite of the difficulties and without interference from the enemy. He was now in position to begin the next stage of his campaign. Granting his men a few days' rest when they emerged from the marshes somewhere near Faesulae, Hannibal sent out scouting parties to locate the Romans and gain as much information about the area as possible. Learning that Flaminius was at Arretium, and confirming that the rich plain of Etruria should offer plentiful food to support his army and booty to encourage his soldiers, he decided to push past the Roman army and lure them into following him south. He is said to have realized that Flaminius was a rash commander who was likely to pursue incautiously and so give opportunity for a battle in conditions favourable to the Carthaginians.
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