This was amply demonstrated in the major battles of these conflicts. At Cynoscephalae in 197, Flamininus' and Philip V's marching columns unexpectedly bumped into each other as they approached a pass from opposite directions. In the usual way, the rival armies deployed into a battle line by wheeling their columns to the right. In each case the right wing of the army and thus the head of the column was able to form up more quickly and charge, routing the unprepared enemy left wing. Philip's army was composed of a single line, according to normal Hellenistic practice, and had no reserves. The Romans were in the usual
triplex acies
and an unnamed tribune with the right wing of the army peeled off twenty maniples and led them round to outflank the successful Macedonian right. Philip was unable to respond and his men were massacred. In 190 Lucius Cornelius Scipio, younger brother of Africanus, faced Antiochus III at Magnesia. The king, leading after the manner of Alexander the Great, personally led a cavalry attack which seems to have broken through one of the legions. Without reserves, and with their commander too closely involved to see what was going on in the rest of the battlefield, the Seleucids were unable to exploit this success. Antiochus' cavalry were first stopped by the pickets left outside the Roman camp, which they had rashly attacked, and then beaten as reserves were brought up by one of the Roman subordinate commanders. In the meantime, the gap in the Roman line had been filled by reserves and everywhere else the enemy was in rout. At Pydna in 168 bickering between the outposts of the Roman and Macedonian armies escalated into a full-scale battle as more and more troops were fed into the fight. This confusion, and the long distance traversed in formation, speeded the usual process by which the phalanx broke up into its constituent units. After the Romans had put together enough of a fighting line to stop the Macedonian advance, individual centurions took the initiative and started to lead men into the gaps between the different sections of the phalanx. Pikemen were defenceless against flank attacks and, as the Macedonians began to panic, the whole formation collapsed into rout.
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Pydna decided the Third Macedonian War (172-167), and was really the last gasp of the Second Punic War generation. Even by this time there were beginning to be concerns that recruits for the army no longer possessed the martial virtues of their predecessors. In an effort to restore traditional practices, Lucius Aemilius Paullus was elected consul for the second time in 168. The son of the man who fell at Cannae, he was now over 60, far older than most field commanders since Fabius Maximus and Marcellus. Paullus took with him many experienced officers, carefully trained the army in Greece and brought the campaign to a successful conclusion. The causes of the war help to illustrate the Roman attitude to defeated enemies. After Cynoscephalae Philip had accepted peace terms similar to those given to Carthage. He was no longer allowed to wage war outside Macedon without Rome's permission and had to pay an indemnity of 1,000 talents over a ten-year period. The king acknowledged the independence of communities in Greece and Asia Minor, withdrawing from those subject to him in both areas. In addition the Macedonian fleet was reduced to a token force, removing Roman fears of an attack on Italy, and all Roman prisoners and deserters were returned without ransom. In fact, during the years Flamininus spent in Greece organizing the settlement, he discovered a number of slaves who had been captured by Hannibal, probably in the Cannae campaign, and sold to traders when the Senate refused to permit their ransom. Scrupulously, Flamininus purchased the freedom of these men and returned them to Italy.
11
The Treaty ending the Second Macedonian War made it clear that the kingdom was now subordinate to Rome, even if it remained free to regulate its internal affairs. Rome now directed its foreign policy, arbitrated in disputes between Philip and the Greek cities and expected him to behave as a loyal ally. The army that had beaten the Macedonians was fed, at least in part, on grain from recently defeated Carthage. When Lucius Scipio took his army into Asia against the Seleucids, Philip V used a mixture of diplomacy and force to secure their route through passes controlled by predatory Thracian tribes. When the Roman army returned by the same route under the command of Manlius Vulso, he failed to request assistance from Macedon and as a result suffered badly in a series of ambushes. Antiochus III was obliged to accept similar peace terms to those agreed by Philip V after Magnesia. He agreed to withdraw from Asia Minor, was forbidden from making war in Asia or Greece, and was only to fight defensively if attacked by another state in this area. An indemnity of 15,000 talents was to be paid to Rome, more than had been demanded from Carthage, but not an impossible sum for the wealthy Seleucids. In addition, Antiochus gave up almost all of his warships and war elephants.
12
Although Philip V studiously obeyed the terms of his treaty with Rome, both he and his son Perseus made every effort to strengthen their power within Macedonia. The army was increased and carefully trained, more control gained over the Thracian and Illyrian tribes on their borders, and connections renewed with cities in Greece. This was not the behaviour the Romans expected from a subordinate ally, although entirely legitimate by Greek standards. It is extremely doubtful that Macedonia posed a threat to Rome in the way that Livy claims, or that Perseus had any plans for an invasion of Italy, but clear that the Romans viewed these developments with extreme suspicion. Military strength and an increasingly independent foreign policy were not to be tolerated in former enemies. After the defeat of Perseus, the kingdom was abolished, although the Romans were still very reluctant to add another province to their existing four. Instead Macedonia was divided into four self-governing regions or
Merides,
each with its own laws and magistrates. Elements of this settlement were to last for several centuries.
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Roman Politics, 201-150
BC
Roman politics was changing in the early part of the second century. The Senate was filled mainly with the equestrians enrolled
en masse
during the war and the new generation of the established families whose senior members had been lost in the war, who had now reached maturity. The heavy casualties inflicted by Hannibal had drastically thinned the ranks of the older, experienced senators and particularly the ex-consuls. The Punic Wars had also produced an increase in the number of permanent provinces, reflected in a corresponding rise in the number of praetors elected each year. There had only been one of these magistrates in 265, but this was increased to two during the First War, to four in the early 220s and finally to six in the decade after 201. Before 265 the praetorship had carried purely judicial responsibility in Rome itself and many consuls never held the post. Flamininus was the last man to do so in 198. In the early second century many praetors went out to command overseas provinces, commanded armies and won victories, perhaps even securing a triumph. They returned to Rome with glory and wealth, both of which added to their chances of future electoral success. There were still only two consuls elected in each year, and the simple arithmetic meant that only one in three praetors could hope to secure the highest magistracy. This gready increased the already fierce competition in the consular elections. The dominance of the old, established families was weakened. Their wealth, extensive network of clients and family reputation still brought them much electoral success, but it was now far less likely that it would permit them to hold the consulship more than once. More families could now challenge for the higher offices, although it must always be remembered that the majority of senators were still unlikely to reach the praetorship. Provincial commands were actively sought by most magistrates, so that far less use was made of pro-magistrates than during the war. Most provincial governors served for a single year and needed to take immediate advantage of the opportunities for profit. In this climate of tighter competition, there was increased regulation of the political career. Minimum ages were set and enforced for each office - 30 for the quaestors, 36 for aediles, 39 for praetors and 42 for consuls - and a ten-year interval imposed before the same magistracy could be held again by an individual. For half a century this system worked.
Roman war-making in the early decades of the second century was highly profitable. A great part of the wealth derived from booty and the sale of war captives into slavery remained in the hands of the commanders who led the Roman armies in these campaigns. Warfare in the Hellenistic east proved especially lucrative. During the Second Punic War Marcellus' ovation after the capture of Syracuse and Scipio's African triumph had included unprecedentedly lavish displays of plunder. In the next decades the triumphs of Flamininus over Philip V, Lucius Scipio over Antiochus, Cnaeus Manlius Vulso over the Galatian tribes of Asia Minor, and Aemilius Paullus over Perseus were each said to have been the most spectacular and richest processions ever seen in Rome. Those senators able to gain military commands were becoming more and more wealthy, especially the few who secured the leadership of major wars in the east, and the gap between rich and poor in the Senate was widening. This wealth allowed families to increase their prestige by lavish spending on public entertainments, like the gladiatorial fights which were becoming increasingly popular. It is also in this period that construction of monumental buildings in Rome began to gather pace, as successful commanders constructed basilicas, temples and aqueducts from their spoils. In this way senators commemorated their achievements and helped their own and their families' chances of future electoral success.
14
Political careers were increasingly expensive as men were forced to spend extravagantly to keep pace with their rivals. Electoral success was costly and put many men in debt, making it all the more pressing for them to profit from the senior magistracies. Manlius Vulso was accused and nearly condemned for provoking a war with the Galatians which had not been approved by the Senate and was not in Rome's interests. Only the number of his friends and political allies at Rome narrowly prevented his condemnation. A rich man could use his wealth to win many such allies, making loans to aid those struggling to keep pace with the costs of political life, but this required ability which not everyone possessed. Most of the commanders who won spectacular victories came under fierce attack from rivals in the Senate. Manlius Vulso and Aemilius Paullus both had to struggle to win the right to celebrate their triumphs. Flamininus' brother Lucius was expelled from the Senate by the censors in 184, charged with improper behaviour, including executing a captive at a feast to please a male prostitute. The most successful attacks of all were directed against Publius and Lucius Scipio.
15
Africanus was only in his mid thirties in 201, still too young to have held the consulship according to tradition and the soon-to-be-enacted legislation. It is difficult to see how his career after the war could ever have equalled his achievements in Spain and Africa. Elected consul for the second time in 194, he campaigned competently against the Ligurians and Cisalpine Gauls, but achieved nothing spectacular. A public announcement that he would serve as his brother's
legatus
secured Lucius the Asian command, particularly as it was known that Hannibal had fled to Antiochus' court. In fact the old adversaries did not encounter each other again in battle, nor was Africanus present at Magnesia, as a result of illness - perhaps a diplomatic one allowing his brother to gain full credit for the victory. By the standards of most senators, even the generation who reached maturity between 218 and 201, Scipio had spent little of his adult life in Rome. His first consulship had been dogged with controversy, with the rumours of his willingness to use questionable means to secure the African command and the Pleminius scandal. Although a brilliant soldier and an inspirational commander, Africanus was a poor politician who had difficulty achieving his objectives in the Senate quietly and without confrontation. In the next century Pompey the Great, another successful soldier who was inexperienced in the day-to-day politics of Rome, failed to make best use of his riches and prestige when he at last returned to Rome. Scipio Africanus was the most distinguished ex-consul of his day, named first on the senatorial role as
princeps senatus
for at least a decade, his own wealth and achievements adding to those of his family, but he was also politically vulnerable. In the Roman system there were always ambitious men waiting to attack any prominent senator who appeared vulnerable.
16
Within a few years of their return from Asia, both brothers were prosecuted in the courts, and although surviving accounts of the trials are contradictory, the main charges involved the misappropriation of funds during the Syrian War. Both men refused to answer the accusations and relied upon their past achievements and reputation to prove that they were true servants of the State. Africanus publicly tore up his brother's account books for the war to demonstrate his contempt for the charges. When his own trial was reconvened on the anniversary of Zama, he declared that he intended to go up to the temples of the Capitoline triad and give thanks for his victory. The mass of the court, apart from the prosecutors and their slaves, and all of the many onlookers thronging the Forum promptly followed him, abandoning proceedings for the day. Despite this display of the charisma which had once inspired his soldiers, and his continued popularity with the People, the prosecution was renewed and few senators actively supported the brothers. Africanus, depressed by the ingratitude of the State he had served so well, went into voluntary exile in his villa at Liternum, where he died soon afterwards in 187, or 184 according to a less probable tradition. Lucius pleaded ill-health and withdrew from politics.
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