Livy claims that the Romans had originally planned to land far to the east of Carthage, near one of numerous trading communities known as Emporia, but that after sighting Cape Bon, his pilots steered to the west and made landfall on the third day at the promontory 'of the Beautiful one' (or god), modern-day Cap Farina or Ras Sidi Ali el Mekki. It is difficult to know what to make of his account, especially since we lack Polybius' narrative at this point, but it seems certain that the Romans did in fact land at Cap Farina not far from the city of Utica. Their arrival prompted a widespread flight by the local villagers who fled with their cattie into the cities, and particularly to Carthage itself. Scipio showed the same skill in deploying outposts to screen his army as he had before Ilipa, for 500 Carthaginian cavalry on a reconnaissance were easily defeated. Both the overall commander, one Hanno, and the cavalry's own leader were killed. Despite the exodus of much of the population, the Romans gathered considerable booty and 8,000 captives to send back to Sicily in the transport ships.
7
Soon afterwards Masinissa arrived to join the Romans. His people, the Maesulii, had had a succession of leaders during the civil wars which followed the death of Masinissa's father, Gala. Numidian tribal politics were highly complex, since the throne was not hereditary and disputes were frequently setded by violence. The various protagonists all sought aid from external powers, including other Numidian kings, such as Syphax, the Carthaginians and eventually the Romans. Masinissa's main opponent, one Mazaetullus, had married the widow of another king. She was the granddaughter of Hamilcar Barca, offspring of the daughter he had married to Navaras, emphasizing the often close ties between the Punic aristocracy and the Numidian royal families. Masinissa had defeated this man, but then Syphax intervened, fearing that a strong king of the Maesulii might begin to threaten the power of his own people, the Masaesulii. Although he had dabbled with the idea of an alliance with Rome, Syphax had finally been persuaded to stay loyal to Carthage by Hasdrubal Gisgo, who had given him his daughter Sophonisba in marriage. By all accounts a remarkable woman, she gained great influence over the king and used it for the good of her father and her homeland. Syphax won a victory in which Masinissa was wounded and most of his army dispersed so that by the time he joined Scipio he may have had as few as 200 men still with him, although Livy also mentions that other sources gave him 2,000.
8
The Carthaginians sent another cavalry force to probe the Roman positions. It was led by another Hanno, described variously as the son of Hamilcar and the son of Hasdrubal Gisgo. With around 4,000 men, mostly recently raised Numidians but including a contingent of Carthaginian citizens, Hanno moved to the city of Salaeca, around 15 miles from the Roman camp. Scipio is supposed to have commented scornfully on a cavalry commander who kept his men in a city during the summer months when they ought to be active. He ordered Masinissa to attack and then lure the enemy into a rash pursuit to a position where the Roman cavalry would be concealed in ambush. It was the same type of tactic which Numidian cavalry had used in the past against Roman armies and proved just as effective. Hanno fell and 1,000 of his men were killed or captured in the initial fight, 2,000 of the rest in the 30 mile pursuit. The coincidence of names between the two commanders of the Punic cavalry defeated in different skirmishes has led to the suggestion that there was in fact only one action, which our sources have confused, but even Livy was aware of this possibility and believed that there were two distinct encounters. After this success the Romans continued to ravage the surrounding land, sending their plunder and prisoners back to Sicily in the convoys of ships which regularly brought them supplies.
9
At this point Scipio began the siege of Utica itself, hoping to capture the city and its port to use as a base. The Roman army established itself on a site which was still known as
C
astra Cornelia,
or the camp of Cornelius (Scipio), in Julius Caesar's day over a century and a half later. As was usual when there was no opportunity to seize the city by stealth or treachery, the siege proved slow going, continuing throughout the winter of 204-203. Observing the Roman army from a distance were the two armies of Hasdrubal Gisgo and Syphax, which had finally moved against the invaders late in the previous summer. Polybius and Livy both claim that Hasdrubal had 30,000 foot and 3,000 horse, and Syphax 50,000 and 10,000 respectively, but this seems unlikely since it would have been very difficult to feed such a large concentration of troops throughout the winter. Even so, it is probable that the Romans were significantly outnumbered and perhaps especially so in cavalry, since Numidian armies traditionally included a high proportion of these. The two armies built separate camps, a little more than a mile apart and around 7-8 miles from the Romans. Knowing that they would be there for some time, the Punic soldiers had built fairly solid timber huts, but the Numidians, perhaps following a native style or merely because there was not enough timber left by their allies, had employed reeds. Syphax's camp was far less organized than Hasdrubal's, many of the men even sleeping outside the rampart.
10
During the winter, Scipio tried once again to win Syphax over, hoping that he had by now tired of Sophonisba. The king replied by offering to mediate between Rome and Carthage, suggesting a peace by which the former would leave Africa and Hannibal evacuate Italy. Scipio included centurions disguised as slaves in his delegations to the enemy camps, who assessed in detail the layout and the readily combustible nature of the construction. At the beginning of spring 203, Scipio openly prepared to continue the siege of Utica and made public pronouncements to the soldiers that they were soon to attempt a direct assault. Yet he also suggested to Syphax that he was ready to accept the proposed terms, until at the last minute he reported that his
consilium,
or council of officers, was opposed to the treaty, so that they needed more time for discussion. In the meantime he prepared a night attack on the two enemy camps. The tightening of the blockade around Utica was intended more to prevent its garrison sallying out and threatening the Romans from the rear than to further the capture of the city. On the day chosen for the assault, Scipio summoned his tribunes at noon and briefed them in detail on the proposed attack. The trumpet fanfare sounded each night in the Roman camp, to mark the end of the day's duties and the beginning of the night watch, was on this night to be the signal for the legions to march out of camp. Information provided by scouts sent to reconnoitre the ground and from Masinissa's local knowledge had been carefully analysed to establish the best route for the attacking columns.
Half of the main force, supported by Masinissa's Numidians, went under Laelius to attack Syphax's camp, whilst Scipio led the remainder against Hasdrubal. Laelius was to attack first, but before doing so Masinissa carefully stationed men to cover all the routes in and out of the Numidian camp. The Romans then attacked, setting light to the rudely constructed huts, which began to burn furiously. Unaware of any enemy threat and assuming that the blaze was accidental, many of the Numidians were cut down as they fled. The confusion spread to the Punic camp, some of the mercenaries rushing out to help their allies fight the fire. Just as suddenly, Scipio sent his men into the attack, putting to the torch the Carthaginians' timber camp. Again men were killed as they fled, or perished in the flames which spread rapidly through the closely packed timber huts. Surprise was complete and the attacks devastatingly successful. By the end of the next day's pursuit, both armies were demoralized and dispersed, Polybius claiming that Hasdrubal had only 500 cavalry and 2,000 infantry still with him. The attempt to relieve the pressure on Utica and hem the Roman army into the narrow peninsula around it had failed utterly.
11
Polybius praised the conduct of this night attack as one of Scipio's greatest achievements. A night attack was always difficult, especially a relatively complex one requiring several columns to co-ordinate their movements. The skill with which the Romans undertook this operation provides another indication of Scipio's careful preparation and the high standard of training of his army. Care had been taken to deceive the enemy concerning Roman intentions at Utica, but ultimately the deception plan rested upon convincing Syphax and Hasdrubal that Scipio sincerely wanted peace. Although Polybius believed that Scipio's message to the Numidian king claiming that his officers opposed the treaty made it clear that negotiations were incomplete, and that therefore the two sides remained at war, this was legally questionable by the standards of the day.
12
After the victory Scipio divided his forces between the siege of Utica and plundering expeditions in which he threatened the recently defeated enemy. Loot was so plentiful in the Roman camp that the merchants who habitually followed the army were able to buy at abnormally low levels. The army had also gathered herds of cattle and some food, but huge amounts of grain were still being brought by sea from Sicily and also Sardinia. Large granaries were built in
C
astra Cornelia
to preserve the stockpiles of food. In addition Livy mentions supplies of clothing, for instance one batch of 1,200 tunics and 1,200 togas, although perhaps by the latter he meant military cloaks.
13
The Battle of the Great Plains, 203
BC
News of the disaster caused a fresh outbreak of panic in Carthage, some calling for the return of Hannibal and his army, whilst others even suggested seeking peace with Rome. However, at this stage the majority of the Punic senate summoned by the suffetes were still in favour of continuing the struggle, so they ordered messages to be sent to Syphax, urging him to rejoin Hasdrubal. The king was at the city of Abba, where he had begun reforming his army. He remained loyal to Carthage, urged on by his wife, but also encouraged by the arrival with Hasdrubal of a contingent of recently raised Celtiberian warriors. There were in fact 4,000 of these tribesmen, but rumours encouraged by the Carthaginians inflated the number to 10,000 and spoke in extravagant terms of their ferocity and prowess. The Carthaginians' continued ability to raise mercenaries in Spain, despite their expulsion from the country gives an interesting indication of the minimal control the Romans exercised over the greater part of the Spanish Peninsula. Syphax went to join Hasdrubal after thirty days and their combined forces, something like 30,000 men, encamped in a strong position on the area known as the Great Plains, probably the modern Souk el Kremis.
14
As soon as Scipio received reports of this new concentration of forces, he decided to march and confront them. Leaving his fleet and part of the army to continue the siege of Utica, he led out the remainder, reaching the edge of the Great Plains on the fifth day. It is uncertain how large the Roman force was, but likely that it was smaller than the enemy army. The Romans left behind their heavier baggage, clearly planning on a swift campaign. Scipio camped just under 4 miles from the enemy position and rested his army. On the next day, the Romans marched out into the plain and deployed into battle order a little less than a mile away from the Punic army. There was the usual skirmishing between the cavalry and light infantry, but neither side chose to force a general action on that day or the next two. On the fourth day, the rival commanders seem to have mutually decided to fight a battle and advanced their lines so far forward that a clash became inevitable. Hasdrubal formed his centre from his most reliable troops, the Celtiberians. Next to them on the right were the infantry salvaged from his old army, flanked by his cavalry, and on the left Syphax's Numidians. The Roman deployment was similar with the legions in the centre, presumably flanked by the
alae,
the Roman and Italian cavalry on the right flank and Masinissa's Numidians on the left.
The battle was decided very quickly as Masinissa's Numidians and the Italian horse swept away their counterparts in the first charge. Most of the Punic and Numidian infantry seems also to have collapsed into rout, probably pushed by the
alae
if these were in fact present, leaving the Celtiberians isolated. The fleeing troops all preserved the memory of recent defeat when these same Romans had stormed their camps, and their morale had evidently not yet recovered. Abandoned, the Celtiberian warriors continued to fight hard against the Roman legions, Livy claiming that their unfamiliarity with Africa deterred them from joining the flight. In numbers they at the very least roughly equalled the
hastati
of the two legions who probably formed the centre of Scipio's line. The Romans had deployed in the usual
triplex acies,
but rather than feed the rear lines into the combat, the legions performed another of the manoeuvres which were becoming the trademark of Scipio's armies. The
principes
and
triarii
turned into column and marched out from behind the
hastati,
wheeling to attack the Celtiberians in both flanks. It is unclear whether one entire line went to the right and the other to the left, or the separate legions divided so that half of the
principes
and
triarii
moved against each flank. Enveloped, the Spanish warriors were destroyed as an effective unit, very few escaping, but their sacrifice allowed much of the rest of the army to get away.
15
After this victory Scipio summoned his
consilium
to discuss their next move. Roman magistrates serving in any capacity were expected to seek the advice of experienced men, but, whilst considering other viewpoints, a general was expected to make the actual decisions himself. The gathering of senior officers was then a convenient way of explaining a plan to the subordinates who would carry it out. Scipio decided to divide his army, keeping the main force himself to ravage the surrounding area, whilst Laelius took the remainder and went with Masinissa to restore the prince to power within his own tribe. Once again Scipio's men gathered rich plunder from the wealthy plains and began to find that some of the Libyan communities, weary of the heavy taxes imposed on them to support the Punic war effort, were willing to surrender to Rome. Encouraged, the general decided to make a demonstration against Carthage itself.
16