The Fall of Carthage (56 page)
The devastation of the countryside, the capture of towns and open battles were the three main ways of eroding the enemy's will to fight on. The balance between the three varied from theatre to theatre, but everywhere a major defeat in battle had the greatest impact. The war was finally ended by the Roman victory at Zama, as the First War had been ended by the Aegates Islands. Other battles provided more complete tactical victories, but failed to have such a decisive affect. This is especially true of the series of overwhelming battlefield victories which Hannibal won in Italy and which forced the Romans to admit that they could not face him in the open field. He devastated the lands he passed through and persuaded many of Rome's allies in the south to defect. In spite of all this the Romans refused to seek peace, as any other contemporary state would have done, so Hannibal continued to apply pressure on them by the same methods, although his successes were never again to be quite so spectacular. Still the Romans refused to give in. By the time that Capua and Tarentum, the most important of the defecting states, had been recaptured by the Romans, Rome had also regained the larger part of the areas which had defected and Hannibal's power in Italy was in decline. No Latin city ever joined him. Attempts to reinforce him with new armies failed and it became clear that he could not win. In the meantime the Romans had regained Sicily, expelled the Carthaginians from Spain, and established themselves in Africa.
It is difficult to see what more Hannibal could have done to attain victory. We can never know how close the Romans came to conceding defeat. Perhaps a march on Rome after Cannae would have broken the Romans' nerve, but we cannot be sure of this and such a move would have been a great gamble. One major problem for the Carthaginians was that they had one superb commander with an excellent army, whilst elsewhere they had poor commanders with average armies or average commanders with poor armies. From the beginning the Romans were able to produce in considerable quantity armies which were average in their quality and the skill of their commanders, giving them an advantage over all but Hannibal. As the war progressed and Roman leaders and soldiers gained experience, their superiority over the other Punic armies became even more marked. Had the Romans not found the troops to fight and win the campaigns on the fronts outside Italy, then the outcome of the war would surely have been very different. It is to the immense credit of the Roman Senate that it continued to commit men and resources to distant theatres when disaster appeared to threaten in Italy.
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There was a fundamental difference in the behaviour of Rome and Carthage when under threat. When a Roman army appeared outside their walls in 255,203 and 202, the Carthaginian leadership responded by seeking peace. Livy believed that they were insincere in 203, and both then and in 255 they renewed the war after failing to win terms which they considered appropriate to their still considerable strength. In neither 216, 212 nor any of the other low points of the war did the Roman Senate or any Roman commander seriously consider conceding defeat and negotiating with the enemy. Despite their appalling losses, the string of humiliating defeats, the defections of some Italian allies and the continuing malevolent presence of Hannibal's army in Italy, the Romans simply refused to come to terms with the Carthaginians, as they had earlier refused to treat with Pyrrhus. They were then able to beat the enemy on every other front and force the undefeated Hannibal to evacuate Italy and return to protect Carthage. The Carthaginians expected a war to end in a negotiated peace. The Romans expected a war to end in total victory or their own annihilation, something which no contemporary state had the resources to achieve. This attitude prevented the Romans from losing the war and ultimately allowed them to win it.
Rome's huge pool of military manpower was probably the most important factor in allowing her to adopt such a rigid attitude. Her losses were appalling, far heavier than those of the First War, and this time fell especially heavily on the wealthier classes, the senators, equestrians and the yeoman farmers who served in the heavy infantry of the legions. Perhaps 25 per cent of the men qualified for military service were lost through casualties and defections in the first few years of the war, but in spite of this the number of legions in service increased. Some extraordinary measures were taken to replenish the pool of recruits, so that younger and older men than usual were enrolled, the minimum property qualification for service reduced, and legions of convicts and slaves formed. On the whole this expansion was made possible by the willingness of ordinary citizens to submit to years of harsh military discipline and extremely dangerous campaigning. It is vital to remember that all classes at Rome and amongst most of the allies felt very strong bonds of loyalty to each other and the State. There were some exceptions, most notably the refusal of the twelve Latin colonies to supply more men in 209, but they were extremely rare. It should also be noted that the colonies merely stated that their resources had been exhausted. They did not recommend a settlement with the enemy or make any move to defect. Similarly some men tried to avoid military service, others sought to profit at the expense of the troops they were supposed to be supplying, whilst a very few deserted and fought with the enemy, but the overwhelming majority did not and were led by fierce patriotism to sacrifice themselves for the State.
The Carthaginians suffered much lower casualties, both in number and in proportion of the total citizen body. Punic citizens only took the field in significant numbers in Africa, and their losses at the Great Plains and Zama were not high. Money never seems to have been lacking to hire more mercenaries, although time to recruit them and mould them into an effective army often was. Carthage was simply not geared to warfare to the same degree as Rome, where war-making was an integral part of the political system. Every year the Roman Senate decided on the allocation of commands and military resources and it was simply a continuation of normal procedure to do this throughout the Hannibalic war. It is questionable whether or not the Romans made war more frequently than other contemporary peoples, but they certainly did so with greater efficiency and wholeheartedness. Polybius was surely right to highlight Rome's political organization, social structure and military institutions as the keys to their victory over Carthage. During the Hannibalic War all of these had to be modified to cope with the crisis, so that multiple magistracies and pro-magistracies became common, the ranks of the Senate replenished
en masse
and slaves recruited into the army, whilst the legions were trained to an unprecedented level of efficiency. Each of these institutions had proved flexible enough to adapt without changing their essential nature. In the next half century they would give Rome mastery of the Mediterranean world.
en masse
and slaves recruited into the army, whilst the legions were trained to an unprecedented level of efficiency. Each of these institutions had proved flexible enough to adapt without changing their essential nature. In the next half century they would give Rome mastery of the Mediterranean world.
World Empire, 201-150
BC
BC
The war with Carthage ended in 201, but it left a legacy of continuing conflict which was to occupy Rome for several decades. Hannibal had launched his invasion from Spain, and in order to prevent anyone else following his example two provinces were created and a Roman military presence permanently maintained in the Spanish Peninsula. This involved the Romans in near constant warfare, in part prompted by the resentment of Spanish communities at the presence of a new occupying force, but also as they became involved in traditional patterns of warfare. Roman rule was only secure so long as they were able to protect their allies from raiding. After over two decades of intensive campaigning, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, son of the consul killed in 212, managed to create a lasting settlement through a judicious mixture of force and diplomacy. This produced a period of relative tranquillity for nearly a generation.
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Hannibal's invasion was just another episode in the ongoing struggle between Rome and the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul. His victories and those won by the Gauls themselves inspired a new generation to resist Roman incursions in the Po valley. One Carthaginian officer, a certain Hamilcar who had probably arrived with Mago, remained with the tribes and continued to lead them in battle after 201. Complaints were sent to the Punic authorities, who denied that the man was acting under orders, but the problem was only solved when Hamilcar was killed. In the first decade of the second century more consuls and more legions went to Cisapline Gaul than any other area, and the Senate exercised close control over the campaigns there, which was after all not far from Rome's heartland. This effort brought about the final defeat of the Gallic tribes in the Po valley, some of which were virtually destroyed as political entities and others absorbed. The suppression of the Ligurians took longer, their loose political structure, independent nature and rugged homeland prolonging their resistance and making it necessary to defeat each village in turn. A sizeable part of the population was transplanted and given land in southern Italy left vacant after the Hannibalic War, where they proved successful and peaceful farmers.
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In 200 the consul Publius Sulpicius Galba presented a motion to the
Comitia Centuriata
for the declaration of war against Macedonia. The pretext was an appeal from Athens for aid against Philip V. Nearly all of the voting centuries voted against the proposal, one of the very few occasions when the Roman People seemed reluctant to go to war. The prolonged effort against Carthage had left all classes weary and hesitant about embarking on a major overseas war. The
Comitia Centuriata
was not a forum for debate and could simply vote for or against a proposal. Before Galba summoned the Assembly to vote again, he addressed the centuries at an informal meeting (or
contio).
Livy gives the consul two main arguments in favour of the war. Philip V had shown himself to be Rome's enemy by his unprovoked attack during the crisis of the Second Punic War. If the Romans did not attack him now and fight the war in Greece, then at some time in the future the Macedonians might use their sizeable fleet to land an army in Italy. Athens must be protected from Philip, since the failure to defend another ally, Saguntum, from Hannibal had encouraged him in his plans to attack Italy. When the
Comitia
voted a second time, the motion was passed easily and war declared on Macedonia. There may have been other reasons for the decision. Philip V and the Seleucid King Antiochus III had secretly decided to benefit from the accession to the Egyptian throne of a minor, Ptolemy V, by carving up his territory. This threatened to upset the balance in power between the three great kingdoms, but it is difficult to know to what extent the Romans were aware of this. In the end, Philip V was a clear enemy and the settlement at the end of the First Macedonian War had been most unsatisfactory by Roman standards. As a result, the renewal of war was almost inevitable.
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Comitia Centuriata
for the declaration of war against Macedonia. The pretext was an appeal from Athens for aid against Philip V. Nearly all of the voting centuries voted against the proposal, one of the very few occasions when the Roman People seemed reluctant to go to war. The prolonged effort against Carthage had left all classes weary and hesitant about embarking on a major overseas war. The
Comitia Centuriata
was not a forum for debate and could simply vote for or against a proposal. Before Galba summoned the Assembly to vote again, he addressed the centuries at an informal meeting (or
contio).
Livy gives the consul two main arguments in favour of the war. Philip V had shown himself to be Rome's enemy by his unprovoked attack during the crisis of the Second Punic War. If the Romans did not attack him now and fight the war in Greece, then at some time in the future the Macedonians might use their sizeable fleet to land an army in Italy. Athens must be protected from Philip, since the failure to defend another ally, Saguntum, from Hannibal had encouraged him in his plans to attack Italy. When the
Comitia
voted a second time, the motion was passed easily and war declared on Macedonia. There may have been other reasons for the decision. Philip V and the Seleucid King Antiochus III had secretly decided to benefit from the accession to the Egyptian throne of a minor, Ptolemy V, by carving up his territory. This threatened to upset the balance in power between the three great kingdoms, but it is difficult to know to what extent the Romans were aware of this. In the end, Philip V was a clear enemy and the settlement at the end of the First Macedonian War had been most unsatisfactory by Roman standards. As a result, the renewal of war was almost inevitable.
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The Second Macedonian War led on directly to conflict with the Aetolian League, Rome's former allies, and in turn to the Syrian War with the Seleucids. All of these enemies had been utterly defeated by 189
BC
, the conflicts being swifter and far more quickly decisive than the First Macedonian War. Defeat in a single pitched battle was enough to persuade the Hellenistic kingdoms to concede defeat. The Roman armies which achieved these victories were not especially large, nearly all being the standard consular-sized force of two legions and two
alae
with the addition of local allies, just like the army which had won at Zama. At one point two such armies were operating, one in Greece and the other in Asia, but there proved no need to draw heavily upon Rome's reserves of manpower in these campaigns. Hellenistic armies were far more homogenous than the mixed mercenary and allied forces of Carthage. Their soldiers were mainly professionals, highly trained and disciplined, but relatively few in number and hard to replace.
BC
, the conflicts being swifter and far more quickly decisive than the First Macedonian War. Defeat in a single pitched battle was enough to persuade the Hellenistic kingdoms to concede defeat. The Roman armies which achieved these victories were not especially large, nearly all being the standard consular-sized force of two legions and two
alae
with the addition of local allies, just like the army which had won at Zama. At one point two such armies were operating, one in Greece and the other in Asia, but there proved no need to draw heavily upon Rome's reserves of manpower in these campaigns. Hellenistic armies were far more homogenous than the mixed mercenary and allied forces of Carthage. Their soldiers were mainly professionals, highly trained and disciplined, but relatively few in number and hard to replace.
The principal strength of every army was the phalanx, eight or more ranks deep of men armed with 21-foot (6.4 m)
sarissae
or pikes. These were held in both hands and weighted near the butt, so that two thirds of the weapon reached in front of the soldier. When the army was properly formed the spear points of the first five ranks of a phalanx projected in front of the formation, whilst the men in the rear held their pikes up at an angle, the dense mass of shafts providing some protection from missiles. The Hellenistic phalanx was very difficult for other infantry to defeat in a frontal attack and tended to win combats because of its immense staying power. The close-packed, very deep formation and the physical presence of the long
sarissae
made it very difficult for the men to flee. The phalanx was also a very intimidating sight as it bore down on the enemy, one Roman commander describing it as the most frightening thing he had ever seen in his life. Philip II and Alexander had used the pike phalanx to pin the enemy army and exert steady pressure, creating opportunities for devastating cavalry charges to be delivered at a weak point in their line. By the later period the role of cavalry had diminished, largely because none of the Successor Kingdoms were ever able to field as high a proportion of good cavalry as their predecessors in the fourth century. Instead the phalanx delivered the main attack, a task for which it had never really been intended.
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The Romans first met a modern Hellenistic army in the war with Pyrrhus and Tarentum in 280-275. Defeated in two hard-fought and bloody battles, the legions had finally prevailed in a third and final encounter. The second-century encounters proved to be less close. The Roman soldiers who fought in the eastern Mediterranean in the early second century rapidly showed themselves to be markedly superior to their professional opponents. These legionaries were the men who had grown into manhood during the long struggle with Hannibal. The vast majority of them had many years of military experience, far more than was normal for most Roman armies. The army sent to Greece in 200 even included a sizeable contingent from the Cannae legions, the unfortunate men still waiting for their discharge. The officers of all ranks in these armies were on average both younger and more experienced than was usual. Many former praetors and consuls served as
legati
or even military tribunes. Titus Quinctius Flamininus, the man who brought the Second Macedonian War to a successful conclusion, won the consulship in 198 at the age of 30, and without having held the praetorship. His success was the last example of the constitutional flexibility which had allowed the rise of Scipio Africanus. Soon the career pattern was to become far more rigid. The combination of experienced soldiers and leaders led to exceptionally efficient armies, as well-trained and tactically flexible as those of the last years of the Punic War.
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legati
or even military tribunes. Titus Quinctius Flamininus, the man who brought the Second Macedonian War to a successful conclusion, won the consulship in 198 at the age of 30, and without having held the praetorship. His success was the last example of the constitutional flexibility which had allowed the rise of Scipio Africanus. Soon the career pattern was to become far more rigid. The combination of experienced soldiers and leaders led to exceptionally efficient armies, as well-trained and tactically flexible as those of the last years of the Punic War.
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