The Fall of Carthage (27 page)
In the First War the Carthaginians had invariably responded to Roman moves rather than attempting to dictate the course of the war themselves. It had always been their opponents who escalated the conflict and pushed for a decisive result. From the beginning the Second War was to be very different and the main reason for this was the influence of one man, Hannibal Barca. In our sources Hannibal is represented as making all the key decisions to organize the initial Punic war effort in 219-218, not only in Spain but also in Africa. The Carthaginians habitually interfered very little with commanders once they had been appointed to a task, indeed often to the extent of failing to support them in subsequent operations, but the resources at the young general's immediate disposal were huge. It is at this time more than any other that Hannibal appears most like the ruler of the semi-independent principality in Spain depicted by some scholars.
The war had begun with a local dispute in Spain, the Carthaginians refusing to acknowledge any longer the restrictions the Romans had imposed upon their power there. The Romans clearly expected them to remain there and fight a defensive war to protect their territory, much like the one they had fought in Sicily. With the forces at his disposal Hannibal was in a strong position to meet any invasion. He would in fact have greatly outnumbered the single consular army which Scipio was to lead into the Peninsula and ought easily to have defeated it if it could be forced into a battle. Yet the experience of the First War had shown that destroying a Roman fleet or army simply meant that another was raised to replace it. The dogged persistence which Rome had shown in the face of horrendous losses made it unlikely that they would quickly give up. The longer that a war continued in Spain the less solid the Barcid conquests would seem. Many of the tribes had been overawed by Punic military might, but their loyalty might not last when another army remained in the area, its leaders doubtless making every effort to seduce the Spanish chieftains. The more traditional Carthaginian mode of war-making, enduring an enemy's onslaught till its power began to dissipate, offered at best the prospect of a prolonged stalemate and at worst defeat when the opponent was Rome. Hannibal rejected the defensive option from the beginning and resolved that every effort should be made actively to defeat Rome. Since heavy losses abroad had in the past done little to weaken her power, Rome must be confronted and beaten on her own territory, in Italy.
In many ways, the invasion of Italy was a markedly 'Roman' enterprise, bringing heavy force to bear directly against an enemy's strength. In that sense the Romans perhaps should have been less surprised than they were when Hannibal chose this option, but the past record of Punic war-making did not suggest such a bold venture likely, especially in view of the practical difficulties involved. A seaborne invasion was scarcely feasible in 218. Without bases in Sicily, even southern Italy was at the very limit of operational range for a fleet of galleys operating from North Africa, and Punic naval power in Spain was not great. In either case a landing on a hostile shore, probably in the face of opposition from the powerful Roman navy, was a highly risky venture and it is doubtful that a large enough army could have been landed to operate with any effectiveness.
16
This left the option of a land invasion from Spain, but the difficulties were formidable. Such an expedition involved a march of hundreds of miles through tribes which were at best neutral and potentially hostile, and the crossing of the major obstacle formed by the Alps. Once in Italy the Punic army would have no base, no supplies and be faced by steadily increasing numbers of enemies. It was a bold venture and our familiarity with the story should not blind us to the shock which the Romans must have received when they learned that this was precisely what Hannibal had done.
16
This left the option of a land invasion from Spain, but the difficulties were formidable. Such an expedition involved a march of hundreds of miles through tribes which were at best neutral and potentially hostile, and the crossing of the major obstacle formed by the Alps. Once in Italy the Punic army would have no base, no supplies and be faced by steadily increasing numbers of enemies. It was a bold venture and our familiarity with the story should not blind us to the shock which the Romans must have received when they learned that this was precisely what Hannibal had done.
After the fall of Saguntum Hannibal withdrew to New Carthage for the winter, lavishly rewarding his soldiers with a proportion of the spoils from the city. His Spanish troops were allowed to disperse to their homes and families, having orders to reassemble by the beginning of spring. Correctly anticipating the Romans' course of action, Hannibal took measures to bolster the defences of both Africa and Spain. The figures for the forces involved are unusually precise by ancient standards and Polybius tells us that they came from an inscription erected by order of Hannibal himself during his time in Italy. Africa received a force of 1,200 Iberian horse and 13,850 foot, supported by 870 of the wild slingers from the Balearic Islands. A small detachment of these troops were stationed in Carthage itself, along with 4,000 Libyan foot, who in addition provided hostages for the good behaviour of their home communities. The bulk of the force was garrisoned in the area of Libya known as Metagonia. Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal was given command of the Spanish province, continuing the tradition of government by the Barcid family. Hasdrubal seems to have been an able man and certainly held the trust of his brother, but the personal nature of loyalty amongst the Spanish tribes may well have been another reason for this decision. In addition to the allies which could be levied in the province, Hasdrubal received a strong force of African soldiers. Altogether he had twenty-one elephants, 2,550 cavalry (consisting of 450 Liby-Phoenicians and Libyans, 300 Spanish Ilergetes, and 1,800 Numidians from four different tribes), and 12,650 infantry, mostly Libyans, but including 300 Ligurians and 500 Balearic slingers. Naval support was provided by a small fleet of fifty 'fives', two 'fours' and five 'threes', but only a proportion of these, thirty-two quinqueremes and all the triremes, were properly manned and ready. The exchange of soldiers levied in Spain and Africa was considered a good way of ensuring their loyalty, making it harder for them to desert and return to their homes.
17
17
The bulk of preparations were concerned with the Italian expedition, massing a huge total of 12,000 cavalry and 90,000 infantry according to Polybius. Sadly he does not go into any detail about their composition, although it is likely that most of the nationalities and troop types in the other forces were represented. The bulk were evidently from the Spanish Peninsula and later events make it clear that they included representatives from all the main peoples of the region, Iberians, Lusitanians and Celtiberians. These tribal peoples provided good close order cavalry and both close order and open order foot. Then there was a strong contingent of African regular infantry, well drilled and disciplined, Numidian light horse and perhaps some foot, and a corps of war elephants, thirty-seven in number according to Appian.
18
This army was far larger than any force recorded for the Carthaginians during the century and it is likely that many of the soldiers, and particularly the Spanish, had been raised relatively recently. The core of the army were the troops who had won the many wars of conquest in Spain under Hannibal, his father and his brother-in-law. They were led by a staff of senior officers whom they knew and trusted. Together these men had welded the warriors of many disparate races into a highly efficient fighting force which, for its numbers, was probably better than anything else in existence in the Mediterranean world at that time.
18
This army was far larger than any force recorded for the Carthaginians during the century and it is likely that many of the soldiers, and particularly the Spanish, had been raised relatively recently. The core of the army were the troops who had won the many wars of conquest in Spain under Hannibal, his father and his brother-in-law. They were led by a staff of senior officers whom they knew and trusted. Together these men had welded the warriors of many disparate races into a highly efficient fighting force which, for its numbers, was probably better than anything else in existence in the Mediterranean world at that time.
This huge force of troops by the standards of the day required massive logistic support to feed, clothe and equip itself. This must have occupied
Hannibal and his officers throughout the winter and probably for many months or even years before. It has been suggested that Hannibal's Spanish campaigns from 221 had as one of their main aims the capture of some of the more fertile regions of the Peninsula to ensure a grain supply for his planned Italian expedition.
19
There were many other arrangements which also could not have been completed swiftly. Men were sent to gather as much information as possible about the proposed route for the march to Italy and in particular such major obstacles as the Alps. Representatives went amongst the tribes along the route and especially those of Cisalpine Gaul, seeking their support against Rome once the army arrived in Italy. The recent memory of heavy defeats inflicted by the Romans since 225 ensured that such approaches met a with warm reception. Having allies beyond the Alps, Hannibal could anticipate securing supplies of food as well as adding many warriors to his army. Polybius tells us that the emissaries had returned by the end of the winter assuring him of the welcome he would receive. This means that at the very latest these must have left as soon as Saguntum fell and it is distinctly possible that they went before. All of these arrangements suggest that the Italian expedition, and thus the war with Rome, had long been pondered and perhaps actively prepared by the young Punic general. The expectation of Gallic assistance as part of the plan has been seen by some as proving that the concept cannot have been devised before 225 and therefore at the earliest was created by Hasdrubal rather than Hamilcar. However, perhaps all this meant was that an earlier plan became more practical from that date. Once again without accounts from the Carthaginian perspective we can only speculate about all of this. Hannibal undertook one other preparation during the winter, perhaps as important by ancient, if not modern, standards as all the others: travelling to Gades to sacrifice at the Temple of Melquart - Herakles, a deity associated with his family and depicted on some of the coins they issued.
20
There he fulfilled vows taken earlier and made fresh ones for the success of his expedition.
19
There were many other arrangements which also could not have been completed swiftly. Men were sent to gather as much information as possible about the proposed route for the march to Italy and in particular such major obstacles as the Alps. Representatives went amongst the tribes along the route and especially those of Cisalpine Gaul, seeking their support against Rome once the army arrived in Italy. The recent memory of heavy defeats inflicted by the Romans since 225 ensured that such approaches met a with warm reception. Having allies beyond the Alps, Hannibal could anticipate securing supplies of food as well as adding many warriors to his army. Polybius tells us that the emissaries had returned by the end of the winter assuring him of the welcome he would receive. This means that at the very latest these must have left as soon as Saguntum fell and it is distinctly possible that they went before. All of these arrangements suggest that the Italian expedition, and thus the war with Rome, had long been pondered and perhaps actively prepared by the young Punic general. The expectation of Gallic assistance as part of the plan has been seen by some as proving that the concept cannot have been devised before 225 and therefore at the earliest was created by Hasdrubal rather than Hamilcar. However, perhaps all this meant was that an earlier plan became more practical from that date. Once again without accounts from the Carthaginian perspective we can only speculate about all of this. Hannibal undertook one other preparation during the winter, perhaps as important by ancient, if not modern, standards as all the others: travelling to Gades to sacrifice at the Temple of Melquart - Herakles, a deity associated with his family and depicted on some of the coins they issued.
20
There he fulfilled vows taken earlier and made fresh ones for the success of his expedition.
What was Hannibal's objective in invading Italy? This topic has long been the subject of fierce debate, often revolving around his decision not to march on the city of Rome itself when he apparently had the opportunity in 217 and 216. The most commonly held view now is that Hannibal's plan was never to capture the city of Rome itself, but to weaken her power by persuading as many of her Italian and Latin allies as possible to defect. Therefore, when Hannibal negotiated an alliance against Rome with Philip II of Macedon, the terms clearly anticipated that Rome would still exist in a weakened state after their joint victory. Similarly, Livy tells us that after Cannae in 216, Hannibal addressed his Roman prisoners and claimed that he was not fighting to destroy them, but 'for honour and power'.
21
The answer is a good deal simpler than the controversy over this would suggest. Hannibal attacked Italy to win the war. It was rarely possible in this period for one side to destroy its enemy utterly in war, unless the states involved were very small and one had an overwhelmingly advantage. Later, in 146, Rome possessed such an advantage over Carthage and was able after a hard struggle to destroy her as a political entity. Normally wars, particularly wars between states as large as Carthage or Rome, ended when one side lost the willingness to fight on, not the ability to do so. Then, as Carthage had nearly done in 255 and had actually done in 241, they acknowledged defeat and accepted peace terms which reflected this. The objective of any war was to force the enemy into a position where they would give in. The method was perhaps to win one or several pitched battles, to capture enemy cities, ravage their fields and burn their villages, or most often a combination of all these things. All the more powerful states had absorbed many smaller communities as subordinate allies of varying willingness. A demonstration of the weakness of their masters at the hands of an invader was likely to prompt defections, each group hoping to side with the eventual winners in any conflict. Most city states and tribes were riven by factional divides, who were often willing to side with an external power willing to give them control of their own people. In this way the Sicilian cities had flocked to join Rome after her initial successes in 264, whilst in 240 the Libyans had rapidly sided with the rebellious mercenaries. During the course of this war the tribes of Spain proved ever ready to abandon their alliance and join the side which appeared to be winning. A state seeing its allies and subjects breaking away would be under even more pressure to compromise and accept defeat. Therefore, it was not unreasonable to believe that, if Hannibal could reach Italy and begin winning victories there, Rome's allies would begin to waver. Hannibal was not adopting a novel strategy, and there is no need to claim that he appreciated that Rome's real strength lay in her network of allies. He was simply fighting a war in the normal way. What was unusual about his plans, at least in comparison to recent Carthaginian warfare, was the willingness to act so aggressively and attempt to force a decision in the war.
22
21
The answer is a good deal simpler than the controversy over this would suggest. Hannibal attacked Italy to win the war. It was rarely possible in this period for one side to destroy its enemy utterly in war, unless the states involved were very small and one had an overwhelmingly advantage. Later, in 146, Rome possessed such an advantage over Carthage and was able after a hard struggle to destroy her as a political entity. Normally wars, particularly wars between states as large as Carthage or Rome, ended when one side lost the willingness to fight on, not the ability to do so. Then, as Carthage had nearly done in 255 and had actually done in 241, they acknowledged defeat and accepted peace terms which reflected this. The objective of any war was to force the enemy into a position where they would give in. The method was perhaps to win one or several pitched battles, to capture enemy cities, ravage their fields and burn their villages, or most often a combination of all these things. All the more powerful states had absorbed many smaller communities as subordinate allies of varying willingness. A demonstration of the weakness of their masters at the hands of an invader was likely to prompt defections, each group hoping to side with the eventual winners in any conflict. Most city states and tribes were riven by factional divides, who were often willing to side with an external power willing to give them control of their own people. In this way the Sicilian cities had flocked to join Rome after her initial successes in 264, whilst in 240 the Libyans had rapidly sided with the rebellious mercenaries. During the course of this war the tribes of Spain proved ever ready to abandon their alliance and join the side which appeared to be winning. A state seeing its allies and subjects breaking away would be under even more pressure to compromise and accept defeat. Therefore, it was not unreasonable to believe that, if Hannibal could reach Italy and begin winning victories there, Rome's allies would begin to waver. Hannibal was not adopting a novel strategy, and there is no need to claim that he appreciated that Rome's real strength lay in her network of allies. He was simply fighting a war in the normal way. What was unusual about his plans, at least in comparison to recent Carthaginian warfare, was the willingness to act so aggressively and attempt to force a decision in the war.
22
Before following the Carthaginian army on their epic march to Italy, it is worth pausing to consider what sort of man their commander was. Hannibal was about 28-years-old when he left New Carthage in the spring of 218. It is not clear whether he had remained in Spain since his father took him there at the age of 9,
23
but he certainly had served on many campaigns there and was already an experienced soldier. His education seems to have included a strong Greek element and he was to take Greek historians with him on his expedition. Our sources are unanimous in admiring his military virtues. For Polybius he personified in every respect the ideal of Hellenistic generalship, planning operations carefully and acting with caution, but willing to be very bold when the situation required it. Livy depicts him more in accordance with literary cliches of his day. Therefore, like the best Roman commanders he was as proficient with his personal weapons as he was in directing the movements of an entire army. On campaign he shared the physical hardships of his men, sleeping in the open wrapped only in a military cloak, and wearing the same clothes as the ordinary soldiers, although Livy does note that his equipment and horses were of such high quality as to make him conspicuous. Physically brave and inclined to lead from close to the fighting, he had the moral courage to take decisions and adhere to them.
24
23
but he certainly had served on many campaigns there and was already an experienced soldier. His education seems to have included a strong Greek element and he was to take Greek historians with him on his expedition. Our sources are unanimous in admiring his military virtues. For Polybius he personified in every respect the ideal of Hellenistic generalship, planning operations carefully and acting with caution, but willing to be very bold when the situation required it. Livy depicts him more in accordance with literary cliches of his day. Therefore, like the best Roman commanders he was as proficient with his personal weapons as he was in directing the movements of an entire army. On campaign he shared the physical hardships of his men, sleeping in the open wrapped only in a military cloak, and wearing the same clothes as the ordinary soldiers, although Livy does note that his equipment and horses were of such high quality as to make him conspicuous. Physically brave and inclined to lead from close to the fighting, he had the moral courage to take decisions and adhere to them.
24
Other books
Gale Force by Rachel Caine
So Feral! by J A Mawter
Lacuna: The Ashes of Humanity by Adams, David
Wicked Games by A. D. Justice
Recipe For Love by Sean Michael
Madeleine's Ghost by Robert Girardi
1977 - I Hold the Four Aces by James Hadley Chase
Survive by Alex Morel
To Ride the Wind by Peter Watt
Revenge Sex by Jasmine Haynes
