The Fall of Carthage (53 page)
Despite the dismay caused by another defeat, the Carthaginian Senate remained resolute, giving orders to prepare the city itself for a siege. In the last months considerable effort had been directed towards equipping and crewing a fleet, originally with the intention of threatening the Roman supply lines with Sicily. It was decided to send the fleet to Utica, which was now surrounded by a comparatively weak Roman force. At the very least this might raise the siege, but plans were also made to attack the Roman fleet which was, correctly, believed to be unprepared for naval combat. In addition, the momentous decision to recall Hannibal and his army was taken, a party of Punic senators being dispatched by sea to carry the message to the general.
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Scipio moved against Tunis, which was abandoned by its garrison. He was now about 15 miles from Carthage itself, able to see the city and its harbour. As the Romans watched they saw the Punic fleet putting to sea and immediately realized the threat to their own naval squadrons at Utica. Scipio gave the order to abandon the new camp and hastened back to
castra Cornelia,
the general perhaps riding on ahead, for he reached his base before the enemy ships. Realizing that there was no time to prepare the Roman squadrons for battle, since many had been adapted to carry siege engines, he had the ships lashed closely together, the transports three or four deep around a central line of galleys. On board were stationed 1,000 picked men, equipped with a great quantity of missiles. The Punic fleet had not hastened to reach Utica, and did not attack until the next day. This may simply have been a tactical error on the part of their commander, brought on by over-confidence, or perhaps reflected a desire to give the crews some sea training before they engaged. When they did attack, the Punic ships were able to make little headway against the solid barrier of Roman ships, especially since the transports were significantly higher than the low-slung galleys. However, the Carthaginians managed to cut sixty transports free and towed them in triumph back to Carthage.
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castra Cornelia,
the general perhaps riding on ahead, for he reached his base before the enemy ships. Realizing that there was no time to prepare the Roman squadrons for battle, since many had been adapted to carry siege engines, he had the ships lashed closely together, the transports three or four deep around a central line of galleys. On board were stationed 1,000 picked men, equipped with a great quantity of missiles. The Punic fleet had not hastened to reach Utica, and did not attack until the next day. This may simply have been a tactical error on the part of their commander, brought on by over-confidence, or perhaps reflected a desire to give the crews some sea training before they engaged. When they did attack, the Punic ships were able to make little headway against the solid barrier of Roman ships, especially since the transports were significantly higher than the low-slung galleys. However, the Carthaginians managed to cut sixty transports free and towed them in triumph back to Carthage.
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It took around fifteen days for Laelius and Masinissa to reach the kingdom of the Maesulii. Syphax had raised another army to face them, mostly from his own tribe. In a confused battle his more numerous cavalry initially gained an advantage, but as Laelius' legionaries came up to support Masinissa's horsemen the tide began to turn. The close formations of the Roman infantry gave stability to the line, and provided solid points behind which their own horsemen could rally and reform before charging again. Steadily the Roman line pushed forward until finally Syphax's army broke. The king himself attempted to rally his men by personal example, but when his horse fell beneath him he was captured and taken to Laelius. On Masinissa's suggestion, Laelius then moved on Syphax's capital Cirta, taking it by surprise and easily capturing it. Sophonisba surrendered herself with great dignity to Masinissa, begging him not to hand her over to the Romans. Without informing Laelius, Masinissa impulsively decided to take her as his own wife. The creation of such a link between their closest ally in Africa and the Carthaginian nobility was obviously most unwelcome to the Romans, who believed the Numidians to be a fickle race in their loyalties, but Laelius agreed to allow Scipio to decide what should be done. After mopping up the few garrisons still loyal to Syphax, the victorious leaders returned to join Scipio. The captured Syphax bemoaned his fate, blaming his misfortune on Hasdrubal's daughter who had led him against his inclinations to war with Rome. Subtiy, he claimed that he was glad that his enemy Masinissa would now fall under her spell and suffer the consequences. This added to the Roman commander's suspicion of the young Numidian's action, perhaps especially because of his own refusal of similar temptations at New Carthage. Scipio declared that both Syphax and Sophonisba were captives not of Masinissa but of Rome, and could not be disposed of without his permission. The emotional Numidian sent a gift of poison to his new bride who, the product of a culture which told many tales of aristocratic suicide, took it without hesitation. So ended one of the most romantic and tragic episodes of the war. The next day Scipio confirmed Masinissa as king of his tribe in a public ceremony, lavishing him with praise and honours.
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Peace Negotiations and the Return of Hannibal, Autumn 203 - Spring 202
BC
BC
The Punic army in North Africa had been dispersed, Syphax, their most important ally, utterly defeated, and the minor success won by their fleet too late to pose a serious threat to the invader. The Roman expeditionary force remained at large, its numbers set to grow with the addition of more Numidians rallying to Masinissa. By the end of the campaigning season in 203 the voices in the Punic Senate calling for a continuation of the struggle were drowned out by those advocating peace. The thirty most senior members, the
gerousia,
were sent to Scipio's camp to begin negotiations to end the war. The delegation blamed Hannibal and his supporters for starting the war. Like all treaties which proved short-lived, it is difficult to know how much reliance can be placed on the terms listed in our sources. Livy says that Scipio demanded that the Carthaginians should release all captives, deserters and runaway slaves, withdraw their armies from Italy and Cisalpine Gaul, permanently sever their last ties with Spain, renounce their claim to the islands in the Mediterranean, and hand over all but twenty ships from their navy. In addition they were to supply large quantities of grain, 500,000
modii (c.
3,390 metric tonnes) of wheat for the men and 300,000
modii (c.
2,034 tonnes) of barley for the animals, to feed the Roman army in Africa. There were several different amounts given for the financial indemnity to be imposed.
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gerousia,
were sent to Scipio's camp to begin negotiations to end the war. The delegation blamed Hannibal and his supporters for starting the war. Like all treaties which proved short-lived, it is difficult to know how much reliance can be placed on the terms listed in our sources. Livy says that Scipio demanded that the Carthaginians should release all captives, deserters and runaway slaves, withdraw their armies from Italy and Cisalpine Gaul, permanently sever their last ties with Spain, renounce their claim to the islands in the Mediterranean, and hand over all but twenty ships from their navy. In addition they were to supply large quantities of grain, 500,000
modii (c.
3,390 metric tonnes) of wheat for the men and 300,000
modii (c.
2,034 tonnes) of barley for the animals, to feed the Roman army in Africa. There were several different amounts given for the financial indemnity to be imposed.
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The Carthaginians accepted the terms, although Livy claims that they were simply playing for time, hoping that the return of Hannibal's army could restore the military situation. An embassy was dispatched to Rome to confirm the treaty, which needed approval from the Senate and ratification in the
Comitia Centuriata.
Rome had already received a report of the recent campaigns delivered by Laelius, resulting in the declaration of four days of public thanksgiving. There is now a conflict in our sources, for Polybius later tells us that the treaty was approved by Rome, whereas Livy describes the talks breaking down as the Carthaginian delegation attempted to alter the terms agreed with Scipio and return to a version of the Catulus treaty. He claims that the Senate decided to expel the ambassadors from Italy and voted to give Scipio, as the man on the spot, authority to advise whether or not future peace proposals should be accepted.
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Comitia Centuriata.
Rome had already received a report of the recent campaigns delivered by Laelius, resulting in the declaration of four days of public thanksgiving. There is now a conflict in our sources, for Polybius later tells us that the treaty was approved by Rome, whereas Livy describes the talks breaking down as the Carthaginian delegation attempted to alter the terms agreed with Scipio and return to a version of the Catulus treaty. He claims that the Senate decided to expel the ambassadors from Italy and voted to give Scipio, as the man on the spot, authority to advise whether or not future peace proposals should be accepted.
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The armistice continued throughout the winter months, in spite of the arrival in Africa of Hannibal and his forces. Scipio's army was still dependent on supplies brought by sea from Sicily and Sardinia, especially during the winter. During the armistice, probably at the beginning of spring 203, a convoy of 200 transports and thirty warships was brought by the propraetor Cnaeus Octavius from Sicily, but was struck by a sudden change in the weather. The oared warships were able to row against the wind and reach their intended landfall, but the sail-powered merchantmen were swept eastwards along the coast and scattered, many ending up in the wide bay overlooked by Carthage itself. Encouraged by popular demonstrations, the Punic Senate were unable to resist the temptation to profit from this opportunity. Hasdrubal was sent out with fifty warships to round up the Roman transports, most of which were abandoned by their crews. The prizes were then towed back to Carthage and their cargoes added to the city's grain reserves, which may well have been running short for a population swollen by the influx of refugees from the rural areas.
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Scipio sent a delegation of three ambassadors on board a quinquereme to Carthage to demand the return of the ships and their supplies, complaining that their seizure had violated the armistice and, if Polybius is right, the Peace Treaty agreed in Rome. The mood in Carthage had changed once again, encouraged by the return of Hannibal and his veteran soldiers. All classes were now overwhelmingly in favour of renewing the war, hoping for a victory which would allow them to gain far more favourable terms. The Roman delegation was mobbed and only escaped injury through the protection of the city's magistrates. The Roman galley was given an escort of two triremes to take it to within sight of its own fleet. As the quinquereme passed the Carthaginian fleet observing the Romans near Utica, three Punic triremes (or quadriremes in Livy's version) put out to intercept it. Skilful handling by the Roman captain and crew avoided the enemy rams, and the superior height and numerous marines of the 'five' deterred attempts at boarding, but the ship was deluged with missiles and suffered many casualties.
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Campaigning began again with renewed energy almost immediately. Scipio became more ruthless to demonstrate his determination to the end the war decisively. Cities which surrendered voluntarily were no longer offered terms, but their populations enslaved as if they had been taken by storm. The Roman general had been pleased by the Senate's acceptance of the peace terms he had framed, despite the swift collapse of the Treaty. It showed that he was still popular with the majority of senators. Particular glory was reserved for the Roman commander who completed a major war and there was always a danger that rivals would seek to replace a general in the closing stages of a conflict and steal much of the credit. In 203 the Senate had extended Scipio's command until the war had been won, but there was no guarantee that this decision might not be reversed. Now that Hannibal had left Italy, Africa offered by far the greatest chance of distinction. One of the consuls of 203, Cnaeus Servilius Caepio, is supposed to have travelled to Sicily late in the year, with a view to crossing to Africa. He seems to have been recalled by the dictator appointed to hold the elections for the following year. Both of the successful candidates for the consulship of 202 hoped to be given Africa as their province. Scipio still had enough supporters in the Senate, notably Quintus Caecilius Metellus, to refer the matter to the People, who voted overwhelmingly to continue Scipio's
imperium.
Nevertheless, one of the consuls was sent to Africa in command of a fleet of fifty quinqueremes. This was Tiberius Claudius Nero, cousin of the victor at Metaurus, who was ordered to support by sea the operations of Scipio's army. For the moment, Africanus' popularity with the people and allies within the Senate had defeated the attempts to replace him. The scene was now set for a direct clash between Scipio and Hannibal, without doubt the ablest commanders produced by each side in the Second Punic War.
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imperium.
Nevertheless, one of the consuls was sent to Africa in command of a fleet of fifty quinqueremes. This was Tiberius Claudius Nero, cousin of the victor at Metaurus, who was ordered to support by sea the operations of Scipio's army. For the moment, Africanus' popularity with the people and allies within the Senate had defeated the attempts to replace him. The scene was now set for a direct clash between Scipio and Hannibal, without doubt the ablest commanders produced by each side in the Second Punic War.
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The Battle of Zama,
202
BC
202
BC
The brutality of the Roman campaign against the African towns prompted the authorities in Carthage to bombard their commander with orders to join battle. Hannibal refused to be hurried and remained in his camp near Hadrumentum. He knew that his army was weak in cavalry and managed to persuade a relative of Syphax's named Tychaeus to join him with 2,000 Numidian light horse. Scipio was equally concerned that Masinissa should now justify his support by bringing a strong force of auxiliaries to assist the Roman army, and sent repeated messages to him. Finally Hannibal decided to break the stalemate and advanced his army to Zama, five days' march west of Carthage. Pausing there, he sent spies and scouts out to locate the enemy and assess their strength. Three spies were captured by the Romans, and on Scipio's orders they were given guided tours of his camp and told to report everything to Hannibal. It was the sort of stratagem which demonstrated a general's confidence, but it is also possible that the intention
Laelius Masinissa
Scipio
was to convince Hannibal that Masinissa had not yet arrived, for Polybius claims that the king rode into the Roman camp on the next day. He brought with him a reinforcement of4,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry, the latter perhaps including some of Laelius' command. Livy repeats these figures, but believed that the king had arrived before the capture of Hannibal's spies and that their report discouraged the latter. Both authors report that the Carthaginian was eager to meet his young adversary and that the two commanders met for a parley, but it is questionable whether the speeches attributed to them preserve anything of their actual conversation.
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The Roman army was encamped on a hill outside a town called Magaron by Polybius and Naragarra by Livy. As usual it has proved impossible to locate the battlefield with any certainty, although it was clearly somewhere to the west of Zama. The Roman position was good with close access to a plentiful water supply. Hannibal advanced and camped on another hill just under 4 miles away. It was a stronger position but lacked a good water supply. On the next day the commanders met for their parley and it was on the second day that the armies marched out to fight. Such a swift confrontation, without the usual days of skirmishing, indicates the eagerness of both commanders for battle. The willingness to fight immediately created an impression of confidence in the outcome which could have an adverse affect on the opposing side's morale.
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